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Book Reviews

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BOOK REVIEWS

A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

"The U.S. Navy: An Instrument of National Policy"

Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S.Navy, 1890–1990.* Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994. 553pp. $49.50

IN THE PAST FEW YEARS there have been several good books about the U.S. Navy, but surely one of the best that this reviewer has read is by the chairman of the Naval War College's Department of Strategy and Policy, George Baer. It is an excellent, balanced study, containing analyses of the interactions between strategy, doctrine, tactics, technology, personnel, and history—how the Navy really works. Baer does not treat the Navy as an isolated unit but as an "instrument of national policy."

The book is divided into two parts: "On the Sea," which constitutes about 60 percent of the book, covers from 1890 to World War II; part two, "From the Sea," discusses the post–World War II era. The author offers several chapters on the postwar and interwar years (areas which have been sadly neglected in other works on navies) that are relevant to the present problems facing the national security community.

Beginning with the year that Alfred Thayer Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* was published, Baer notes that "before 1890 the Navy was a force of cruisers that operated in detached squadrons throughout the world and monitors that were confined to harbor defense at home. That kind of navy, said Mahan, was no longer adequate." Also, 1890 was approximately the time when the modern warships we know today were finally taking shape from the various types of steamships and ironclads. In that same year, Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy published an annual report calling for an offensive battle fleet. As a result, Congress passed a Naval Act that authorized three first-line battleships. Thus, in 1890 the modern American navy was born.

The introductory chapter sets the tone of these interweaving bureaucratic, internal relationships—Mahan's strategy, the internal and external politics of the Secretary's report, followed by Congress' response, resulting in the technology of the three first-line battleships. These are followed by an analysis of how the ships were used, with critical comments by Julian Corbett about the Navy's Mahanian strategy for the Spanish-American War. This skillful, analytical mix is carried nicely throughout the book.

The two chapters on World War I are excellent, noting that it was the destroyer, not the battleship, that proved vital, although the battleship played an important part in assuring America's strategic independence in the postwar era. There follow four chapters covering the interwar period, detailing everything from "The Treaty Navy," to "Are We Ready? 1938–1940." These chapters include interesting descriptions of personalities and war plans. Baer's three chapters on World War II are more analytical than descriptive, and some conclusions may prove controversial. For example, Baer defends Spruance's controversial decision to guard the amphibious forces rather than seek a "Pacific Trafalgar" in the battle of the Philippine Sea.

Part Two, on the postwar Navy, begins with the chapter, "Why Do We Need a Navy?" In it is interesting coverage of the argument between the Navy and the Air Force, some of which may sound familiar due to the post–Cold War "roles and missions" debate. Also of great interest are the chapters "The McNamara Years, 1961–1970" and "Disarray, 1970–1980," which cover periods of our nation that are invariably glossed over in many other books but have great lessons for the present. Also, it was nice to see Admiral Thomas Hayward, the father of the Navy's offensive strategy, get his due in "The Pacific Model," first as Commander Seventh Fleet, then Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and finally as Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Hayward (in an era of so-called "hollow forces" and a shrinking fleet—sound familiar?) showed what could be done with some imagination and leadership. The book ends with a discussion of the strategy of the Navy's publication of ". . . From the Sea." According to Baer, this new policy means that "the U.S. Navy, after one hundred years, closed its book on sea power and doctrine in the image of Mahan."

Readers of such journals as the *Naval War College Review*, and certainly anyone involved with decision making, will, or at least should, find George Baer's book "must" reading.

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Keaney, Thomas A. and Cohen, Eliot A. *Gulf War: Air Power Survey Summary Report*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force, 1993 (available from U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Supt. of Documents., Washington, D.C.). 276pp. (No price given)

At the time of this writing, four serious books on the performance of air power in the Gulf war have been published. All were either sponsored by the U.S. Air Force or written by analysts having an institutional affiliation with the Air Force. They include: this summary, which is part of a five-volume study and captures the main points of the larger document; Air Force historian Richard Hallion's *Storm Over Iraq: Air Power in the Gulf War* (Smithsonian Press, 1992); *Air Power in the Gulf*, by retired Air Force Colonel James P. Coyne (Air Force Assoc. Books, 1992); and *A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War* (RAND Press, 1994), by this reviewer along with RAND colleagues Preston Niblack and Dana Johnson. In the "Summary Report," Professor Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins and Professor Thomas Keaney of the National Defense University have provided what is probably the most authoritative and in-depth examination of the 1991 Gulf war air campaign. Of course, Air Force interest in this topic is not surprising, since the service provided most of the air units that participated in Operation Desert Storm, which it believes vindicated its long-held views on the important role (even primacy) of air power. Former Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice ordered this survey in the immediate postwar period; the post–World War II Strategic Bombing Survey was deliberately chosen as its model. Rice directed the team to "tell it like it was," no matter what the damage to strongly held institutional beliefs. While Keaney and Cohen admire the Air Force's Gulf war achievements, they are not cheerleaders and do not hesitate to take on cherished Air Force views of "lessons learned" from that war.

For example, many officers and Air Force research associates view air power's performance during the Gulf conflict as a revolution in warfare. The combination of stealth technology, precision-guided munitions, high sortie rates, and a unified command and control system are alleged to have shifted the balance of effectiveness and efficiency to air power. Cohen and Keaney take a more guarded view, marshalling evidence that suggests a revolution has *not* occurred—yet. Rather, they write that a "true revolution in war may take decades and require not merely new technologies but new forms of organization and behavior to mature. . . . The ingredients for a transformation of war may well have become visible in the Gulf War, but if a revolution is to occur someone will have to make it."

The strength of this survey lies in its methodical analysis of the effectiveness of the Gulf air campaign: measuring results against objectives. Attacks against specific target sets are examined to determine what the functional objectives of the attacks were and what results were achieved in terms of reduced enemy capabilities. The survey focuses on the success of control of the air; "strategic" attacks—a mixture of success (electricity and oil) and at least partial

failure (nuclear-biological-chemical targets and Scud missiles); gradations between leadership and C3 (i.e., command, control, and communications); and the high degree of success of attacks on Iraqi surface forces.

A Navy or Marine airman (neither of whose services have yet sponsored or authored a book on the subject) may be disappointed with some parts of the survey due to the scant coverage of carrier and Marine air wing operations. While Air Force basing, logistical, communications, and other support elements receive thorough treatment, Navy and Marine counterparts receive almost none, and that lack, although unavoidable, will probably result in the loss of acceptance among many of those services' personnel, who may also express reservations about the tactical and aviation systems. For instance, most will take exception to the emphasis given to USAF F-4G Wild Weasels compared to the major contribution provided by the EA-6s of the sea services. While the Weasels were the principal agent of lethal suppression, the EA-6s were to become an indispensable element of almost every strike package launched from the Gulf airfields and nearby carrier decks.

Regardless, this summary is possibly the best technical analysis of the air war available. This reviewer found it refreshingly devoid of bias, cant, and invidious comparisons of land and sea-based air power. Although other books on the air war have better coverage of some parts of the campaign, none contains more details and backup data.

What is still needed, however, is an analogous Navy-Marine air book that is as solid analytically and as unbiased in judgment as the Keaney-Cohen summary.

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Ahrari, M.E. and Noyes, James H., eds. *The Persian Gulf after the Cold War.* Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993. 264pp. $57.95

Helms, Robert F., II and Dorff, Robert H., eds. *The Persian Gulf Crisis: Power in the Post–Cold War World.* Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993. 216pp. $45

Both books under review include "Persian Gulf" in their titles, and both are edited collections of short articles written by numerous contributors. The similarities, however, mostly end there.

While Ahrari and Noyes examine key contemporary economic, political, and security issues facing the Persian Gulf, Helms and Dorff largely deal with the broader issues of international security and world order in the post–Cold War environment, with analyses drawn from lessons learned during the Gulf war.

Readers interested in Persian Gulf issues should enjoy *The Persian Gulf after the Cold War.* The final three chapters, which examine the regional arms race, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and oil issues, are most worthwhile. Ahrari, formerly a professor at the Air War College, now at the Armed Forces Staff College, has written extensively on

the Middle East and argues convincingly in his chapter on the arms race that the stockpiling of ever more deadly weapons in the region is ultimately destabilizing. While seemingly obvious, this conclusion contradicts that of some authors, who naively predict that mega-armed Middle Eastern dictators are capable of exercising the rational judgment necessary to sustain a workable system of deterrence.

Kenneth Katzman's chapter on the GCC is well written and effectively covers the divisive political and military issues within the GCC. He demonstrates that these differences will prevent any significant levels of military integration, meaning that the GCC will continue to rely on the United States to counter major external threats. David Winterford and Robert E. Looney, both then of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, make a convincing argument in their chapter on oil that prices are likely to remain stable for the next several years. They also conclude that the Gulf war deepened the political rift within the oil cartel.

Also worth reading are the chapters on Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, as well as that on U.S. and Russian perspectives on the Gulf. The latter is written by Noyes, who has vast professional experience in the U.S. government on Middle Eastern affairs. He argues that the cessation of the Cold War is not likely to stabilize the Persian Gulf, a point repeated by other authors in the book. Noyes also concludes that Moscow, which has a history of involvement in the Middle East, will attempt to reassert its influence in the region.

The book would have benefitted from a chapter on another important issue, Islamic resurgence. In fact, the introduction points out that Shi'ite and Sunni movements continue to "exhibit strong appeal in the Gulf"; yet this subject is largely ignored. Nonetheless, the work does enhance our understanding of the region's strategic issues, an important task for policy makers given that the Persian Gulf remains vital to U.S. interests.

The Persian Gulf Crisis, edited by Helms and Dorff, is intended to examine events that led up to the Persian Gulf War and to explore the post–Cold War international security system. Readers interested in the former subject will be only marginally satisfied. The book's real strength lies in its insightfulness regarding the latter subject.

Two particular articles about the emerging international security environment are quite worthwhile. Inis Claude, an international affairs professor at the University of Virginia, has written an outstanding article that points out the inadequacies of collective security and demonstrates that it is unacceptable as a method of promoting world order. Robert Dorff's article is an equally insightful examination of future sources of conflict and their implications for international security. He argues eloquently that ethnic and nationalistic conflicts are inevitable, a fact with which the international system will have to live. He adds, however, that the United States and other powers should

act to prevent the violence from spreading.

Other articles worth reading include defense expert James Blackwell's analysis of the U.S. military in Desert Storm and Robert Helms's examination of the imperatives now placed on the U.S. military in the wake of the Gulf war—"win big, win quickly, and win without casualties." Another is Alan Taylor's article, which notes the continuing problems in the Middle East that preclude long-term stability; and Kimberly Ann Elliott's piece on the utility of sanctions as an instrument of economic statecraft.

The key points are skillfully consolidated in Helms's conclusion. His, along with the other articles mentioned, contribute to the understanding of the still emerging international security system and of the U.S. role in it.

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Reisman, W. Michael and Antoniou, Chris T. *The Laws of War: A Comprehensive Collection of Primary Documents on International Law Governing Armed Conflict.* New York: Vintage, 1994. 448pp. $13

Michael Reisman and Chris Antoniou, a professor and former student, respectively at the Yale Law School, provide a concise description and insightful analysis of a broad range of law of war issues of interest to the national security community. Topics range from attempts by the international community to regulate the right of nations to use military force to resolve their differences under the League of Nations, Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the UN Charter, through the rules regulating the use of force under a variety of law of war treaties, to the law of neutrality, war crimes, and terrorism.

The authors begin with an interesting history of the law of war and its development through treaties and customary international law, and with a candid discussion of its strengths and weaknesses. Reisman and Antoniou clearly understand the military perspective, recognizing that the uncertain content of some aspects of the law of war—particularly where it derives from customary law—makes decisions difficult for the commander. They also remind us that those who attempt to regulate the violence of war through international treaties must take into account that "the law will be influenced decisively by the concerns of military specialists to protect their own personnel and assets and to use them effectively."

Each chapter consists of commentary and extracts from applicable law of war treaties, judicial decisions, and other relevant documents; since much of the law of war is embodied in treaties approved in the early 1900s, many of the materials are quite old. However, the authors have included such topical materials as the investigation into war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, and the Statute of the International Tribunal, established by the UN to prosecute the individuals responsible for those atrocities.

It is the discussion of war crimes that the military reader will find the

most frustrating. American personnel are, of course, held in strict compliance with the law of war, and, as the court-martials of both Staff Sergeant Griffin and Lieutenant Calley (extracts from the court decisions of both cases are included) illustrate, they are prosecuted for violations. While many nations do hold their personnel in compliance with the law, it is not universal, and, except when conflicts are won decisively, such as World War II, political considerations often result in a decision not to prosecute war crimes committed by the adversary. Thus, despite the well documented evidence of widespread and premeditated war crimes by Iraqi personnel during the occupation of Kuwait, no prosecutions were carried out and none are likely. As Reisman and Antoniou observe, the international community's failure to muster the political will to enforce the law of war detracts from its normative force.

One unfortunate inclusion in the book is a series of rules of engagement for U.S. forces during the Vietnam War. Although the authors characterize these rules as self-imposed limitations that reflect U.S. military conceptions of the operational law of war, the Vietnam rules of engagement have been heavily criticized for being overly specific, inconsistent, unresponsive to military requirements, and as imposing precautions not required by the law of war. Their inclusion does not detract, however, from an otherwise excellent compendium of materials.

The authors express in the introduction the hope that their work will serve the better to inform the citizen, the journalist, the clergyman, and the politician of the modern law of war. To that list they could have added military officers, who will find this book an informative and useful addition to their professional reading.

ARTHUR R. THOMAS
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Keegan, John. *A History of Warfare.* New York: Knopf, 1993. 432pp. $27.50

Any book by John Keegan is an event, and this work is no exception. It is undoubtedly his best and most ambitious yet. Keegan, in an interpretive history of warfare from the dawn of recorded history to twentieth-century industrial, mass warfare, analyzes conflict in the societies of the Greeks, Huns, "Horse Peoples," Romans, Arabs, and the industrial West, among many others.

Keegan believes that war is not merely an extension of politics, as is often ascribed to Clausewitz. Indeed, in an age where it is possible for many states to acquire nuclear weapons, politics cannot be permitted to extend casually into warfare. (One need not be a scholar of Clausewitz to see that his view of warfare as a manageable and rational thing belongs to the nineteenth century.)

The discussion begins with several primitive societies in which warfare was conducted by demonstration, maneuver, indirection, delay, and evasion. Withdrawal was seen not as lack of moral fiber but as frequently the sensible thing to do. Most often,

the objective of these conflicts was not to destroy an opponent but rather to cause his surrender with minimum destruction to both parties.

Keegan suggests that the West's capacity to exploit technology—a capacity originally based on face-to-face combat, maneuver warfare, and ideological struggle—has brought it to the point where it might do well to reexamine the less lethal, less direct styles of warfare practiced in earlier times—an individual judgment left to the reader.

The major question in all this is, why does warfare exist? Keegan reviews what anthropologists and other academics have contributed, finding it inadequate. In his own analysis, tribes and states engage in warfare for the acquisition of territory and resources, for the extension of power and influence, for the glory of an idea and of themselves—and, sometimes, he believes, they fight for the simple hell of it. Keegan acknowledges the existence of a warrior mentality but does not, however, claim this to be a first cause of war. He maintains that the existence of well disciplined, state-supported armies is a necessary instrument of civilization and the maintenance of the rule of law.

Ultimately, Keegan holds that warfare is cultural, that a society's style of war reflects its cultural values. Western culture's fascination with technology and Clausewitzian warfare has developed an extraordinarily lethal style. Thus, he concludes that "the habits of the primitive—devotees themselves of restraint, diplomacy and negotiation—deserve relearning. Unless we unlearn the habits we have taught ourselves, we shall not survive."

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Dupuy, Trevor N. *Future Wars: The World's Most Dangerous Flashpoints.* New York: Warner, 1993. 334pp. $21.95

Colonel Dupuy has again written an interesting and provocative book. Dupuy, noted for his technical and quantitative studies of warfare, attempts in this work to examine how wars may occur and how each will likely be fought. He has been assisted by many hands and by a computerized war-gaming program, the "Tactic Numerical Deterministic Model" (TNDM).

Dupuy's method is straightforward: he identifies nine regions worldwide where cross-border tensions could plausibly evolve into war. Although the tenth conflict involves civil war in Russia, it fits his regional model. For each conflict Dupuy describes the general historical and geopolitical background and the specific causes for regional tensions. He then engages in "pseudo-history" (as he calls it), a scenario that explains how the regional tensions evolved into war, how the primary battle was fought, and how the conflict was brought to resolution. Dupuy is quick to note that the scenario is not necessarily the most likely one, but only a possibility. The combatants are then assigned specific operational forces that parallel their existing armed services. Once the war commences, the

protagonists maneuver and engage in battle, and Dupuy employs the TNDM in order to predict the results. Following the engagement, the war ends quickly—aggressors are repulsed and sue for peace under international pressure.

This work is valuable for several reasons. First, it presents broad and succinct surveys of present, post–Cold War areas of conflict, which remind us of how the Cold War kept them obscure. An example is the political and cultural conflict over ethnic Hungarians in Romania. Further, Dupuy neatly describes the workings of the modern battlefield, discussing likely strategies and the impact of modern (but not high-technology) weapons on the commander's decision-making process.

However, there are a few drawbacks: by constructing each of the ten scenarios so as to force a major battle, Dupuy overlooks some important considerations. Thus foremost of these is that Dupuy's governmental leaders decide quickly, almost cursorily, that war is a better solution to their problem than peace, making only limited, failed attempts to achieve a diplomatic solution. Once at war, there is little definition of either the conflict's political goals or of military objectives that are to achieve those goals. Most of the wars postulated are limited, in that one opponent does not attempt to overthrow the other's government; the wars are fought for their own sakes rather than the achievement of a political goal.

The conflicts described are very short. Dupuy's "Second Korean War," for example, consumes exactly thirty-one days. Again, the brevity of these scenarios derives from Dupuy's focus on the battle. Once a single battle for a certain scenario has been modeled, simulations become less valuable. Thus Dupuy is forced to conclude his scenarios rapidly, with cease-fires that were apparently agreed to with as little forethought as the decisions to initiate hostilities. Unfortunately, as current events in Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabakh have shown, regional conflicts are rarely resolved so quickly or cleanly.

Future Wars is really designed for those readers who favor computerized war games and simulations. The in-depth scenario play, which focuses on simulated combat of maneuver units up to brigade level, provides a level of detail rarely found elsewhere. However, the cost of this specificity is a cursory treatment of why and when these regional states would truly see war as a valid solution to their external problems—why war would be more advantageous than peace—and little of how war could be prevented. Thus this book, while an interesting snapshot of several important regional conflicts, does not offer the level of predictive analysis on "future wars" that one might expect from such a distinguished military historian.

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Miskel, James F. *Buying Trouble? National Security and Reliance on Foreign Industry*. Lanham, Md.: Univ. Press of America, 1993. 204pp. $24.50

This is an excellent economic analysis of the strategic risk involved in offshore

production of military products. It should be of great interest to defense planners concerned with the costs of maintaining the defense industrial base during force reductions.

In his review of the buildup of the defense industry in the 1980s, Miskel states that, like other domestic manufacturers, the defense industry turned to offshore sources for materials and components. He addresses the validity of the concerns raised by recent government studies of purchasing defense services and products from foreign manufacturers.

For example, he refers to the performance of the defense industry (both military transport and production) during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. It met the challenges posed by the Gulf war in spite of significant reliance on foreign suppliers—in particular, foreign merchant marines carried about 45 percent of the cargo. Miskel estimates that the government wartime subsidization of domestic industry for the increase in materiel was close to $1.2 billion for sealift and airlift, and $2 billion for manufacturing.

He tries to allay the fears of the risk of foreign interference with shipments, arguing that because the U.S. economy is so significant to the export market, no foreign government would risk interfering with defense deliveries. Also, direct foreign investment in the United States, particularly from Japan, is so great that governments would not endanger retaliation against these assets with a threat to defense supplies in times of crisis. In short, Miskel believes, the domestic defense industry should be as free to benefit from global suppliers as are other sectors.

Miskel's academic background is in European and Soviet history, and he has had experience as Deputy Assistant Associate Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. These factors may explain why the book is more concerned with commonsense economics than with theoretical issues. There are several issues that Miskel does not consider: whether the defense industrial base is a case of externalization (i.e., in which knowledge gained from domestic production provides decisive cost advantages in production); the unevenness of defense production (shipyards that can produce nuclear submarines or aircraft carriers are highly capital-intensive and not easy to scale down); the broader context of protection versus free trade, or technical change and growth; and the rebirth of American industrial competitiveness under the pressure of free trade, and its implications for the defense industry. It is not at all clear that a protected industry will remain highly competitive. In fact, the case appears to be just the opposite—it has been the developing countries, such as Chile, that have experienced the most dynamic economic growth.

The book treats only cursorily the risk of advanced foreign technology becoming available to potential adversaries, in spite of the many examples from the Cold War in which key technologies were sold to the Soviet Union regardless of Defense Department restrictions. Of course, providing regional hegemons with easy access to affordable smart weapons is not a pleasant thought

for strategists, but Miskel ignores the even greater nightmare that overseas defense suppliers might become future adversaries. It appears that such scenarios as that are reserved for war games and Tom Clancy novels.

However, this work is valuable for its logical approach to the strategy of preserving a domestic defense industrial base, and for its estimate of the costs. In the near-term political environment, the idea that there is a threat involved in obtaining offshore defense supplies does not stand up to rigorous scrutiny. In an era when hard decisions must be made about the size of the uniformed services, the level of operations, and the pace of weapon development, subsidies to domestic transportation and manufacturing sectors deserve examination. Dollars spent preserving a domestic defense industrial base must necessarily reduce funds available for other purposes. Economic policies that developed from World War II experiences and the threats of the Cold War may not offer the same benefit in our current environment.

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Fallows, James. *Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System*. New York: Pantheon, 1994. $25

James Fallows's latest book about Japan and the East Asian political economy proves what everyone was told about looking at the sun too long during an eclipse—Fallows's perspective has been blinded by the rising sun of Japan's economic machine. Despite his temporary loss of sight, he has applied his faltering model to make suggestions for an American economic renewal.

Fallows is the Washington editor of *The Atlantic Monthly* and served as a speechwriter in the Carter White House. He is the author of two books, *National Defense* and *More Like Us*; the former a light attempt at defense reform, while the latter was a cursory overview of the relationship between the United States and Japan. To do research for this work, the author went to Japan in 1986, spending nearly four years there, and traveled in East Asia.

This book's purpose is to demonstrate how the United States uses the wrong economic models to understand Asia's commercial success. The Japanese do not embrace the economic principles of Adam Smith and David Ricardo—the essentially Anglo-American model of global free trade and classical lâissez-faire economics. Under our model, "fairness" and "playing by the rules of the game" count for something, and a level playing field demands that everyone view the game through the free-trade lens that America and Great Britain have officially espoused.

Fallows argues that the "new" Asian political economy does not follow the same rules because it is not playing the same game. The author postulates that the Japanese are following the writings of Friedreich List, a German who established a different economic system stressing national production bases, with the consumer playing second fiddle. Fallows argues that this system, a hybrid of neo-mercantilism, is Japan's

blueprint for success and that it is this model which the East Asian bloc nations are emulating. This Asian model is consistent with their cultural predispositions to collective effort and is fundamentally different from our own fixed understanding of economic systems and our emphasis on individualism and consumption. Fallows is at his best demonstrating how our inflexibility colors both interpretations about Japan's political economy and our efforts to gain access to the Japanese market, as well as to deal with Japan's role in the global economy.

Fallows's prescriptions are rather simple in comparison to the profound and bleak picture he paints. He strongly recommends that America invest in education programs, particularly our weak secondary educational systems. He favors a general industrial strategy with general incentives for technology investment, rather than the heavy-handed intervention of a strategic trade system. Finally, he concludes that investment levels in the United States must be increased to raise both productivity and innovation.

Much of Fallows's argument would have been better received if his book had been published earlier—say, prior to 1991—before Japan's *baboru keizai* ("bubble economy") burst. At this point, America's economic strength and enduring character began to indicate that Adam Smith may have had it right all along. It is Japan's political and economic system, not the messy but dynamic U.S. market, that seems unable to meet the demands of change and creativity in the face of new challenges. This book makes much of the decline of Silicon Valley and American dominance in semiconductor chip production in the early 1980s. However, Japan's preeminence in the chip industry has now been overtaken by a resurgent American response. American manufacturers now account for 44 percent of world production compared to Japan's 40 percent, a reversal of the trend of the past decade.

Furthermore, Fallows overlooks the limited applicability of Japan's economic model and its attributes to our culture and form of government. Political reform in Japan has fallen short, and its banking system totters on the brink of failure. Its political corruption and "demosclerosis" restrict opportunities for positive change—to a greater extent than in the United States—and the system remains more responsive to powerful, elitist bureaucrats than to consumers or stockholders. Such a system could never take root in the United States, and economic trends over the past three years suggest that Japan's model is not appropriate for sustained economic growth even in Japan, or Asia at large, much less America.

Despite being outdated by several years of dramatic change in the global economy and of rising interdependence, *Looking at the Sun* is a necessary reminder of the need for real negotiation and true understanding of each nation's political economy. To avoid serious rifts with our major trading partners, and to maintain access to the world's fastest growing markets, we need to deepen our grasp of the Asian economic construct. "There is nothing inherently dangerous in the

new social and economic models being developed in Asia," observes James Fallows, but "there is great danger in failing to see them for what they are." However, as if visually impaired by solar phenomena, the author overlooks the possibility that an even greater danger exists.

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Builder, Carl H. *The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force.* New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1994. 299pp. $39.95

In late 1990, the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, asked the RAND Corporation to develop an essay that the college could use to remind incoming students of the obligations of the profession of arms and of their air power heritage. Carl Builder, a senior staff member at RAND, accepted the task. Thus *The Icarus Syndrome* was written. It is an examination of the relation between the air power theory that was first codified at Maxwell in the 1930s and that of which the institutional health of today's U.S. Air Force is the result.

While ACSC's request initially seemed straightforward, Builder soon realized that it reflected a deep-seated malaise. On the basis of "conversations with Air Force people at all levels," he concluded that the youngest service had somehow lost its bearings. Despite its evident success, the Air Force seemed to be in the throes of an institutional "crisis" of purpose and vision that transcended the fiscal and other problems affecting all of America's services in the post-Cold War era.

How had this institutional crisis arisen? Builder's answer focuses on the theory of strategic air attack that was refined at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) during the 1930s. Essentially the theory argued that air power, properly employed, could decisively defeat an enemy nation through the precision bombardment of "vital links" in the enemy's war economy. It provided air power, in Builder's assessment, an effective, unifying vision for Army Air Force aviators before, during, and immediately after World War II. Before and during the conflict it promised a way to avoid the horrendous human casualties both sides had experienced on the Western Front during the First World War, by directly attacking the heart of the enemy state; by late 1945, with the destructive potential of atomic weapons obvious to all, doubts stemming from the evident indecisiveness of World War II strategic bombing were largely stilled. However, beginning in the late 1950s this air power "vision fractured with the advent of alternative means (missiles and space systems) . . . and with the realization that the atomic bomb was not, after all, a politically usable weapon short of Armageddon." The Air Force's leaders were faced with a choice between their preferred means (the airplane) and embracing alternative means (missiles and space systems) to preserve the purposes of air power theory. By the

early 1960s, the institution had opted to cling to the airplane, thereby turning the means of the original ACTS theory into an end. Hence, Air Force aviators revealed that their real affection was for their airplanes, not for the concept of striking at the heart of the enemy, and from this abandonment of theory sprang the institutional crisis that afflicts the Air Force today.

Builder's analysis holds up best within the context of the Cold War. Ballistic missiles, especially, offered an alternative to the long-range bomber for nuclear deterrence. Builder is not mistaken in arguing that until Russian missile and space developments forced the Air Force's hand its leaders were reluctant to give such systems priority over bomber development.

Nuclear war, though, proved to be a dead end, and even today it is far from clear that Air Force leaders were mistaken in clinging to the airplane for *non-nuclear* warfare. However, the real-world problem that Builder overlooks—by implying that the Air Force should long ago have shifted from aircraft to missiles for contingencies like the 1991 Persian Gulf War—is the high cost of cruise weapons like the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM). Careful analysis of Desert Storm and the major regional contingencies now being envisioned by the Pentagon indicates that even if such campaigns were waged exclusively with precision weapons, *from thirty-five to forty-five thousand weapons would still be needed.* With prices in the vicinity of $1 million per round or more, munitions like TLAM and their Air Force equivalents are simply too expensive to be expended in quantities of more than a few thousand. True, cruise missiles employed in small quantities can, as they did in Desert Storm, play a crucial role early in a campaign. Nonetheless, barring technical breakthroughs that bring their costs down to levels comparable with laser-guided bombs ($65,000 to $85,000 each), these weapons can provide only a small fraction of the stockpile necessary for real-world campaigns; the bulk of the munitions will continue to be direct-attack weapons delivered by aircraft. This substantial oversight notwithstanding, however, *The Icarus Syndrome* will be of interest to all concerned with air power theory and the institutional dynamics of military services.

BARRY D. WATTS
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Watson, George M., Jr. *The Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1947–1965.* Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1993. 390pp. (No price given)

A favorite teacher once told me, "Be careful what you pray for, you might get it!" She might well have been instructing the heavyweights of the United States Army Air Force of the early 1940s, especially General Henry H. Arnold, the Commander Army Air Force, General Carl Spaatz, Commander Army Air Force, and Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. After World War II, at the onset of the great

unification debate, they, along with many influential leaders of the ground Army, pushed hard for a centralization of the services and a powerful secretary of defense. Their efforts, however, were largely frustrated by the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, who was supported by the bulk of the most powerful officers in that service. Arnold and Spaatz long professed that they most wanted one service but that if that was not possible, two would not be satisfactory and so three would have to be the outcome. However, Forrestal and most of the Navy were sure that to have one service (i.e., one secretary and one chief of staff) would result in a perpetual two-to-one majority within its headquarters against the Navy and all that it stood for—this in the wake of the greatest naval victory in history. In a wonderful demonstration of effective bureaucratic politics (with substantial assistance from friends in Congress), Forrestal and others guaranteed that there would be three services.

Dr. George Watson is admirably suited to tell this story by his many years of service at the Office of the Chief of Air Force History and more recently as the Chief of the Air Staff History section in the Pentagon. He is an Army veteran who served in Vietnam, and he is the author of two Air Force publications on that war. His expertise in oral history allowed him to interview personally many of the participants of this story.

The book is organized chronologically, with separate chapters on the tenures of the first seven civilian leaders of the new service, along with a few topical chapters, such as on the B-36 controversy. The organization of the U.S. Air Force and the main issues that faced each secretary during his term are principal topics throughout the work.

Forrestal got what he prayed for, but he came to regret it when, as secretary of defense, he discovered the difficulties entailed in the strict limitation of the powers of that office. Ultimately, however, the Air Force got what it wanted with the gradual centralization of power in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

This book is well researched, craftsmanlike, and well written. It includes a substantial set of appendices with organization charts of the Secretary's office and the text of the National Security Act of 1947, as well as of subsequent legislation. Understandably, the sea of literature that has been written on this subject inhibits the development of a full bibliography; Watson has necessarily limited his coverage to a "bibliographical note" that is successful in identifying the most prominent and worthy sources. In any event, the fiftieth anniversary of the U.S. Air Force guarantees that any bibliography written now will soon be outdated.

Secretary of the Air Force will interest not only the national security scholar desiring background on the early years of the U.S. Air Force but also, as a reference book, those with a special interest in that subject and in organization for national defense.

DAVID R. METS
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Stevenson, James P. *The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993. 448pp. $24.95

James Stevenson has made an expansive, if at times skewed, effort to describe, explain, and critique the decision-making process that allocates resources to procure high-technology weapon systems for the nation's defense. His work is a first-rate, albeit biased, commentary on the intricacies of the Pentagon-Congress-industrial complex that debates, negotiates, and directs the process—and benefits from it through enhancement of power and position, or by receipt of government contracts. Stevenson's focus is on the F-18 program and its source, the lightweight fighter program.

Paradox outlines the development of the requirements for, and the establishment of, the F-18 procurement program. The author attempts to show how the F-18 fits into the overall scheme of things with respect to the use of air power in the accomplishment of military missions, with the emphasis on how technology and concomitant perceptions and expectations influence procurement decision making. The book is both anecdotal and analytical in character, and it tends to be inductive in both its premises and conclusions (e.g., the F-18 was a multi-role platform, which means it was gold-plated, complex, expensive, and unreliable; therefore the decision to develop the F-18 was a bad one, and the airplane does not do the job it was procured to do).

The first several chapters are stage-setters that provide the framework from which the author develops his premise, analysis, and supporting arguments. Stevenson is mainly concerned with the evolving role of air power and the uses and misuses of aviation platforms on the battlefield and in strategic bombing. The chapters immediately following provide a detailed assessment of the origins and context of the lightweight fighter program, and review the vagaries, conflicts, and outcomes that resulted in the procurement of the F-16 Falcon by the Air Force and the development of the F-18 Hornet by the Navy. The penultimate chapters discuss the Navy's subsequent procurement and operational fielding of the F-18—of which he is not only critical but damning. The final chapter is a harsh critique of the current Navy efforts related to the latest version of the Hornet, which he calls the F-19 Wasp.

It is obvious from the preface that Stevenson has been captured by the "lightweight fighter mafia," and he properly acknowledges his allegiance to their point of view. Given the number of conversational quotes by Chuck Myers, one could conclude that the author is ghost-writing doctrine for these "mafiosi." That is fine, for they have many cogent points to make; however, by not presenting the other side of the story, the book loses balance and, in my view, the author's arguments and conclusions lose credibility. Even where I agree with him, I believe much of his analysis is selective or revisionist. He creates the illusion of reality in support of preordained conclusions. A case in point is his discussion of the F-8 Crusader's prowess as a fighter. He overlooks the

efforts to provide a "down the throat" capability, via the semiactive radar homing version of the Sidewinder missile, in response to the operational desires of the fleet pilots (this reviewer included) for that edge in any engagement, day or night—creating the impression that real fighter pilots do not need or want that edge.

I also have problems with Stevenson's attacks on the veracity or accuracy of certain statements by Admirals Burke, Holloway, and Turner, Captain Stiedle, and others. I consider these *ad hominem* in nature, where the author expresses his resentment of that tactic when used against "mafia" members. However, I agree with Stevenson that the issues should be settled on the evidence, not by casting aspersions at opponents' assumed motives. I believe he would have made a better case for his views had he been consistent with this notion throughout this book.

My concerns aside, I think this book is a valuable contribution to improving the defense acquisition process, and I recommend it: not as a sole source, but as an addition to one's library, as an unapologetic expression of a singular point of view.

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Barrett, David. *Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers.* Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1993. 296pp. $35

America's participation in the Vietnam War is widely viewed as a monumental mistake in the conduct of foreign policy. That this country became involved in a major war on the Asian landmass seems nearly incomprehensible when examined with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight. Yet Lyndon Johnson pursued a policy that appeared to him both coherent and consistent with this nation's political objectives. David Barrett explores the interaction between the president and his circle of advisers, and he questions the traditional interpretation that Johnson's penchant for secrecy shielded him from consultation with a wide range of formal and informal counselors.

In this study of the Johnson White House, Barrett traces the evolution from 1965 to 1968 of the president's circle of Vietnam War advisers. His purpose is twofold: the first is to examine the interactions among those "uncertain warriors," by way of explaining why America fought in terrain described as "the most unfavorable place in Asia to fight a war." Secondly, Barrett seeks to prompt a new understanding of Johnson, whom he terms "one of the most complex presidents." Using a plethora of primary sources, including memoranda, letters, diaries, and memoirs, the author portrays an extremely energetic chief executive who valued consultation but fashioned his decisions on an increasingly outdated worldview. The result was a series of decisions by Johnson that resulted in the choice of escalation as the most viable strategy for achieving political and military victory. Not surprisingly, the president paid particular attention to the hawks on his advisory team (Robert

McNamara, Dean Rusk, and Dean Acheson); they proclaimed the premises and conclusions of the "domino theory," which Johnson himself shared—that if South Vietnam fell, its neighbors would inevitably fall also.

Barrett is at his best in describing the July 1965 decision to increase substantially the number of American ground forces in Vietnam. Reaching beyond the formal foreign policy advisers, Johnson also consulted a number of informal consultants, such as Senators Richard Russell, Mike Mansfield, and William Fulbright, former president Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Though some cautioned against increasing involvement, most accepted the domino theory, which was, in the author's words, "quite orthodox in 1965."

Barrett's coverage of the 1967 decision to grant Westmoreland's request for an additional one hundred thousand troops is less complete, since many documents remain classified. Still, he has enough material to present an image of Johnson as a president fully cognizant of public opinion polls, congressional sentiment, and the views of the Washington elite. As antiwar sentiment rose, however, Johnson shrouded his options in secrecy until he made the decision to reinforce Westmoreland. Secrecy was the result of his growing fear that leaks to the press might undermine his policy. Barrett maintains that the controversy in 1967 was not about whether the United States should prosecute the military option, but rather about the costliness of the means to that end.

Johnson's penchant for secrecy also produced disastrous effects in 1968, when the Tet offensive caught the nation and Congress unprepared. Accustomed to optimistic reports and executive announcements that the United States was winning the war, opposition to Johnson erupted violently with the coverage of the fighting in Saigon and Hue. Archival evidence strongly suggests that among the president's advisers the view became widespread that further escalation was no longer a viable strategy. Johnson's subsequent decision not to seek reelection was the result of the sheer accumulation of sentiment against the war among his advisers, the news media, public opinion, and Congress.

Barrett has produced a highly provocative study that examines Lyndon Johnson's national security apparatus and decision-making process. The author succeeds admirably in portraying a president who valued advice, both informal and formal, from a wide range of people. That tragic consequences flowed from the actions of rational, well intentioned leaders is not so surprising when one considers that the majority of policy makers and the American public in 1965 fully accepted a vision of a new world order founded on a doctrine of global containment.

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Shay, Jonathan. *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character.* New York: Atheneum, 1994. 246pp. $20

Jonathan Shay is a psychiatrist with the Tufts Medical School who treats Vietnam veterans for severe, chronic post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). He begins this imaginative and extended analogy with a recollection: "A number of years ago I was struck by the similarity of their war experiences to Homer's account of Achilles in the Iliad." In Shay's view, his patients and Achilles share the same loss of their humanity, through the betrayal of *themis*, a Greek word Shay translates as "what's right." This loss can be defined as the undoing of character by the stress of experiencing combat. It concludes in tragedy for many modern veterans, as it did for Achilles over three thousand years ago. The similarities of their experiences include arbitrary or absent leaders, the death of friends, guilt over their own survival, and a killing rage (the "berserk state") in which a soldier loses (as did Achilles) all restraint and fear and, in some cases, commits atrocities.

Blending the first-person accounts of Vietnam veterans with verses of Homer and his own personal observations, Shay examines such analogous events as the arrogant seizure by Agamemnon of a war prize voted to Achilles and the capricious ordering of American soldiers to lethal missions. These arbitrary decisions not only betray the soldier's sense of what is right but feed his alienation and fury and contract his moral and social loyalties to a small group of fellow warriors. Achilles, at least, was permitted to mourn properly his fallen comrades and to honor his enemy, something American soldiers were not able or oriented to do. That they could not served to deny the enemy's humanity and devalue the grieving process, further undoing the soldier's character.

So Shay's patients came home from war without welcome and suffering PTSD. With the compassion of a healer, the author describes the chronic health problems associated with this disorder: loss of control of mental functions and memory, a constant state of mobilization for danger (triggering survival skills), and persistent feelings of betrayal, isolation, and suicidalness. Shay writes that "the painful paradox is that fighting for one's country can render one unfit to be its citizen."

Shay explores many interesting concepts, from the moral and personal fiduciary responsibility of the military and civilian command structure, to the reclaiming of Achilles' gods as a metaphor of social power. One of the most poignant and instructive parts of this book is Shay's discussion of the importance of narrative in rebuilding undone character. He explains how a fully realized narrative can bring together fragmented knowledge, sensations, and emotions, aiding the survivor to piece together what had been shattered by his trauma.

Although compelling in its use of literary comparison, this book has significant shortcomings. Shay provides no data concerning his methodology, the number of veterans he counseled, or how long he worked with them. Without this information it is difficult to gain a proper perspective on the majority of U.S. combat veterans, who repeatedly faced fire but remained whole in character. He addres-

ses neither the atrocities committed against civilians by U.S. soldiers under his care nor their emotions concerning individual responsibility for their conduct in combat. There are also minor structural problems, stemming both from a disjointed style mixing moving prose and clinical stiffness, and from a repetition of quotes.

Shay rightly emphasizes the importance of trustworthy leadership and relevant training. He concludes with a few recommendations to help prevent combat PTSD: protecting unit cohesion, valuing "griefwork," control of "berserking," respecting the enemy as human, and more readily acknowledging psychiatric casualties. Shay writes, "I have written this book because I believe we should care about how soldiers are trained, equipped, led and welcomed home when they return from war."

America has yet to find its Homer as the Achaeans did; nonetheless, this creative and compassionate work is a worthwhile addition to the literature of combat and the narrative of the American trauma in Vietnam.

WILLIAM M. CALHOUN
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Cheeseman, Graeme. *The Search for Self-Reliance: Australian Defence Since Vietnam*. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1993. 255pp. $A 24.99

Since the early 1970s the constant theme, heard with increasing loudness, in Australian defense policy formulation has been the drive to achieve "self-reliance." Faced with the possibility of having to defend Australia unilaterally, Australian defense planners have been forced to square this enormous military requirement with limited resources. Despite the obvious pitfalls inherent in such a planning dilemma, there has been, with few exceptions, little criticism of the basic tenets of the policy of self-reliance.

One exception is Graeme Cheeseman of the Australian Defence Force Academy. Cheeseman argues that while the basic concept of self-reliance in Australian defense is achievable, the means chosen by recent Labor governments have been seriously flawed. To justify this contention, Cheeseman mercilessly exposes and critiques the problems of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). His bottom line is that Canberra spends too much for the defense capabilities produced. Cheeseman is of the school that believes that the Australian government's policies are predicated upon the U.S. security commitment—a foundation that in his opinion is neither reliable nor conceptually supportive of self-reliance.

In brief, Cheeseman argues that several steps are required for Canberra truly to achieve self-reliance: reducing the planned task-to-asset ratio of the ADF, increasing the ADF's capability to deal with real threats while maintaining a residual capacity for more remote contingencies, matching the ADF's structures and capabilities to existing and projected resources, and reducing the current overreliance on the United States for crucial supplies and services. To achieve this ambitious objective, Cheeseman advocates a policy that would tie Australia's security capabilities to the defense of the

country, and that with a lower level of technology than at present.

I personally disagree with Cheeseman's thesis and, indeed, have been doing so for some years. For instance, I feel he misunderstands the defense relationship with the United States and the value Washington places upon its alliance with Australia. Moreover, the defense policy Cheeseman would have Canberra adopt would leave it ill prepared for military operations outside Australia's immediate region—activities that successful Australian governments have traditionally been very keen to undertake.

However, Cheeseman is a careful scholar and analyst of Australian defense policy, and while his recommendations do not seem to have much support in the defense bureaucracy, ADF, or even the analytical community, some of his arguments are valid. For example, his contention is dead-on that the objective of self-reliance is undercut by the refusal of the defense bureaucracy and successive governments to acquire sufficient combat service support capabilities. In addition, his assessment that the Labor government has given the defense forces much more in the way of missions than of resources to achieve them is also accurate.

Moreover, as a critical analysis of the evolution of Australian defense policy and strategic thinking since 1972, the book has important value to readers of this journal. Consequently, notwithstanding the problems I have with Cheeseman's thesis, he has written a strong critique of recent Australian defense policy. As such, this book should not be dismissed.

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG
U.S. Army War College

Booth, T. Michael and Spencer, Duncan. *Paratrooper: The Life and Times of General James Gavin*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. 494pp. $27.50

James Gavin was one of the most colorful and effective troop leaders among the American generals who served in the European theater during World War II. In January 1946, at the age of thirty-eight, Major General Gavin led the New York City victory parade at the head of his 82nd Airborne Division. Thereafter he had a most interesting career in and out of the Army, but the high point of his life, as described in this nicely written biography, had been the thirty-month period that ended with the victory parade. In many respects, notwithstanding, it is the later period of Gavin's life that might be most instructive to those serving in the military today.

Born in 1907 and graduating from West Point in 1929, he had an undistinguished junior-officer career, and an unhappy marriage, but he achieved a great deal of personal development that was to pay dividends later. In the summer of 1941, while serving as a tactical officer at West Point, Captain Gavin volunteered for parachute training, which was just getting under way in the U.S. Army. He was highly motivated and effective in this new and exciting milieu. By mid-1942 he was a full colonel, commanding the 505th

Parachute Regiment, which he built from the ground up. The regiment became part of the newly formed 82nd Airborne, commanded by Matt Ridgway with Maxwell Taylor as chief of staff and, later, artillery commander. Together they became the three most famous American airborne generals of World War II.

Gavin's wartime experiences as a member, and later commander, of the 82nd constitute about 60 percent of the book. The authors describe the operations of Sicily, Italy, and Normandy, the failed MARKET GARDEN attack, and the Battle of the Bulge in a lively, informative, and dramatic style. Gavin emerges as the stuff of instant legend. He became a major general at the age of thirty-seven.

There is little question that Gavin was a courageous, dedicated, highly successful leader in World War II. At the moment of the victory parade in New York, most people believed he was destined at least to head the Army, perhaps something even higher; but it did not happen that way. What did happen is what much of the remainder of the book is about, and it is no end of a lesson.

The 1950s were the Eisenhower years. As president he tightly controlled American strategic policy, defense budgets, and the organization for and process of defense policy making. Ridgway and Taylor served in these years as successive Army Chiefs of Staff, and both ran afoul of Ike and retired to write their memoirs. At a lower level, Gavin too had problems with Ike's "New Look" strategy, with its heavy reliance on Air Force technology at the expense of the manpower-intensive views of the Army hierarchy.

During this period, Gavin held two key Pentagon positions: first G-3 (plans and training), and then, from 1955, chief of Research and Development, in the rank of lieutenant general. The visionary Gavin fought against tight budgets and bureaucratic constraints, and although he was involved with Army technology, the atomic battlefield, missiles (including the Soviet Sputnik challenge), early Vietnam problems during the Indochina conflict, etc., he could never make the successful adjustment to the realities of Pentagon infighting and politicizing. In the end, it was bureaucratic politics that brought him down. The authors' coverage of this period is brief but insightful.

With his old friend Taylor serving as Chief of Staff but providing little personal support, and at odds with the administration's strategy, Gavin found himself out on a limb from which a more cautious bureaucrat would have retreated. As the authors point out, Gavin's public positions caused problems with the White House and two secretaries of defense; he was made to look like someone bargaining for a fourth star. In short, he had no choice except to walk the plank. He retired in 1958 and made public his dissent with his *War and Peace in the Space Age*, published the same year. The balance of *Paratrooper* is concerned with Gavin's twenty active years after his retirement from the military.

The authors could have stressed more the rationale of those whose ideas clashed with Gavin's during his postwar

career, Dwight D. Eisenhower in particular. Nonetheless, this book will, I believe, be the definitive work on James Gavin—a heroic general, a tragic bureaucrat. Booth and Spencer have done an excellent job. They portray the times and the man clearly and interestingly. What emerges is a Horatio Alger tale in which the principal did in the first part of his life most of what he was to become famous for. The book is a good read.

DOUGLAS KINNARD
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Cameron, Craig M. *American Samurai: Myth, Imagination and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941–1951*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994. 297pp. $24.95

In this deconstructionist assault on the mindset of the First Marine Division in the Pacific and Korean wars, Cameron draws heavily on the work of his intellectual heroes Michael Geyer, Omer Bartov, John Dower, Bruce Cumings, John Keegan, Michael Sherry, Akira Iriye, Paul Fussell, Glenn Grey, and John Shy. What is Cameron and what is borrowed is difficult to say, but the result is obvious—PC meets the USMC.

Cameron, an ex-Marine officer of the 1980s, will never be accused (as he accuses this reviewer) of excessive enthusiasm for the Corps. He argues that anti-Asian racism, male chauvinism, seething resentment of all sorts against the U.S. Army, and irrational fantasies about prior Marine operations turned the First Marine Division into a horde of crazed killers who barbarized the Pacific War as much as did the poor, misunderstood Japanese. He likens U.S. Marines to the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front or the frontiersmen who "exterminated" the native Americans. The effect is much like discovering at Peace Park, Hiroshima, that the Pacific War began and ended with the atomic bomb.

Cameron argues that the demonization of the enemy drove the Marines to intolerable ferocity on Guadalcanal, Peleliu, and Okinawa. Despite an institutional effort to keep the mythic momentum rolling in the Korean War, the Marine Corps could not keep the troops at a frenzied pitch, and the division lost its sharp edge in combat by June 1951—which will be news to the survivors of the fighting of September of that year. Not surprisingly, Cameron pontificates about the Vietnam War and connects its "barbarization" to the dysfunctional myths of past Corps glories and to the ways that they reflect cultural values retarding domestic reform and international harmony.

Other than using the bodies of brave men as a bully pulpit, Cameron commits two errors: he has not done appropriate research, and he does not write proper history. He begins with a legitimate concern: How did the organizational culture of the First Marine Division affect the way it fought? One can then subsume related questions about visions of the enemy, allies, other services, leadership, weapons, comrades, training, and psychological indoctrination. In fact, he does not get off to a bad start with his discussion of Guadalcanal, but

then he quickly loses his way. One problem is his sources and focus; his cultural target group is the division's young officers and enlisted men, but his sample is less than ten. He has ignored an entire population of the thousands of veterans affiliated with the First Marine Division Association. But then, can such old Marines recall the past with any accuracy? Cameron himself says "yes," their "Rockwellized" memories can at least be telling. More importantly, it has long been demonstrated by oral history projects in the United States (for instance, the work of Don Rickey for the Army, at least thirty years ago) that veterans' recollections, if used carefully and in large enough numbers, can produce dependable information. Moreover, their letters, diaries, photographs, copies of newspapers, and other memorabilia not in official repositories are invaluable research sources. For information on Guadalcanal, Cameron did not have to depend only on the Marines. Major Martin Clemens, the Scot-Australian Chief of Scouts, has freely shared his diaries and views with researchers, and on the Japanese side there are veterans' remembrances and an official history of the campaign. But official reports, however cleverly Cameron subjects them to literary criticism, are no substitute for human testimony. Cameron's analysis of Guadalcanal only suggests the sort of intellectual self-indulgence to be found in *American Samurai*, and it sets the tone of the book.

He argues that Marines shot prisoners of war (some did), desecrated the dead (they did—some), and turned surly (many did) because of their terror of the jungle and the night, and that their fear and loathing of the Japanese—even sexual repression and frustration—contributed to their rage. Conceding the possible validity of some of these observations (which could have been confirmed through interviews), there are other factors that influenced the division's sense of anxiety: massive sleep deprivation; a limited diet; growing sickness rates from tropical diseases; the six-week delay of infantry reinforcements; serious lack of good senior leadership; a sense of betrayal by the Navy, which failed until November 1942 to stop Japanese reinforcements; and outrage at the treatment of their prisoners of war by the Japanese.

There is no reason to hold the U.S. Marine Corps, even its World War II performance, sacrosanct with respect to serious scholarship. It is notorious for confusing organizational indoctrination with combat effectiveness. However, that one is attacking a cultural icon does not excuse a disregard for the connection between assertion and evidence. The author of *American Samurai* and his advisors do not know enough about the Marine Corps to fill a canteen cup.

ALLAN R. MILLETT
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Koch, Steven. *Double Lives: Spies and Writers in the Secret Soviet War of Ideas against the West.* New York: Free Press, 1994. 419pp. (No price given)

In the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, a scholarly work on Stalin's control and manipulation of the American and European "peace movements" in the decades prior to World War II may seem of interest only to historians of the period. After all, active subversion of Western intellectual circles by foreign intelligence services might be considered anachronistic and irrelevant in today's open society.

This is not the case, however; foreign governments will continue to seek to manipulate the support and influence of respected intellectual leaders for their policies. Koch's well researched study demonstrates how this can be done; there are important lessons to be learned here.

Tracing the covert career of Willi Munzenberg, a founding member of the Communist International (Comintern), Koch demonstrates how such respected writers as André Gide, John dos Passos, Ernest Hemingway, Sinclair Lewis, and other Western intellectuals were purposefully led in the 1930s to support Stalin's intricate and self-serving prewar policies. Using information that has recently become available from the archives of the former Soviet Union, Koch pieces together a credible tale of global and long-term deceit and perfidy. From Paris, to Cambridge, to Hollywood, Koch has traced the close connections between Soviet agents of influence and espionage, shedding new light along the way on the activities of such spies as Klaus Fuchs, Alger Hiss, and Ethel and Julius Rosenberg.

This work is a valuable addition to the literature on the activities of foreign intelligence services, and it is particularly relevant to understanding the ways and means by which intellectuals can be used to generate public support for certain policies. It is also a useful reminder of the perfidy and cynicism of totalitarian regimes in using individuals to further their own ends. While modern circumstances likely make the total control of a Stalin unrepeatable, there can be little doubt that such efforts to gain the support of influential individuals continue today.

In the end, as Koch concludes from his analysis, Willi Munzenberg and most of his Comintern compatriots were themselves sacrificed on the altar of Stalin's paranoia, despite, or possibly because of, their many successes.

This is an interesting book that provides some unique insights into the grey area between perception management and active espionage. It should be required reading both for students of intelligence operations and for anyone seeking to understand the international politics of the period.

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Halpern, Paul G. *A Naval History of World War I.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 591pp. $55

Before World War I began in July 1914, most of those who thought about war at sea were certain they knew how the next struggle would begin—and that as a consequence of that beginning it would end shortly thereafter. They

believed that within the first few days of the war's opening shots, the two greatest fleets in the world, those of Britain and Germany, would meet somewhere in the North Sea. One would vanquish the other, and with the world's oceans thus firmly under the control of the victor, the other side would have no choice but to seek the best peace terms possible.

Indeed, the war's first shots were fired by warships, in the early morning dark of 29 July 1914. But those warships were not British or German, or dreadnought battleships, or in the North Sea. They were a trio of Austro-Hungarian river monitors, opening an attack on the Serbian defenses of Belgrade from the Save River, a tributary of the Danube.

In the North Sea, Britain's Grand Fleet was based at Scapa Flow in the bleak Orkney Islands, north of Scotland. The smaller High Seas Fleet lay five hundred miles southeastward, mainly at Wilhelmshaven, on Germany's short, shallow North Sea coast.

Because of its smaller size (Halpern tells us that when the war began Britain had twenty-one dreadnoughts and Germany thirteen), the German fleet seldom sailed far enough into the North Sea for the British, even with their excellent communications intelligence, to force them to battle. In their turn the British dared not approach the German bases, for fear of minefields and submarines. Hence it was nearly two years before the expected battle came, on 31 May 1916, off Denmark's Jutland Peninsula. Each fleet hit the other hard. When it was over, the Germans had proved themselves superior in important ways, but they knew they were lucky to have survived and did not want another such experience. In fact, there was to be none. Halpern aptly quotes a journalist who commented that the German fleet had assaulted its jailer and was back in jail.

Though the author does not say so explicitly, it was the submarine that effectively put the big fighting ship—and, indeed, the fleet as a tactical unit—out of business. Invisible or nearly so, comparatively long-ranged, economical to build and operate, and armed with the most deadly of weapons, the torpedo and the mine, the submarine had no need to fear any big ship: rather, the big ship had to fear the submarine. Fleets gave up sailing those waters where enemy mines might lurk, and without the escort of destroyers to protect them from submarines they were not likely to sail anywhere. A contemporary development, the airplane, was eventually to rescue both big ships and the fleet, but at a high price for both, and not until twenty years later.

Halpern has organized his history well, and he covers both accurately and in detail the nearly forgotten naval operations on the Danube and Tigris rivers, the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the Black Sea, and the Baltic. He covers not only the well known allied amphibious failure at Gallipoli but also the poorly known German amphibious success in the approaches to the Gulf of Riga, and also the forgotten Russian amphibious successes in the Black Sea against Turkey. He reports not only about the Russian Black Sea

Fleet's blockade of the short sea route from the Zonguldak coal mines to the mouth of the Bosphorus—which nearly closed down Turkey's primitive industry and threatened to immobilize the German battle cruiser *Goeben*, masquerading as a Turkish ship under the name *Jawus Sultan Selim*—but also about the Imperial Russian Navy's successful task forces built around makeshift seaplane carriers.

German U-boats drove the Grand Fleet to the edge of impotence, not so much by direct attack but by sinking the merchant ships the fleet was supposed to protect. It was upon those ships that not only Britain (including its fleet) but the whole alliance depended. Halpern tells us the familiar story of how, even though the U-boats were winning, the Royal Navy recoiled (because it was a "defensive" scheme) from the only solution in sight, the convoy. Finally, in the spring of 1917, just as the U.S. Navy's destroyers came on the scene, the Royal Navy tried that repulsive tactic. At one stroke this simple, old method of sea warfare reduced the number of targets that the submarines could find, from many individual ships to only a few groups of them, and those in fairly compact formations. If a U-boat were to locate such a convoy, she would find it screened by destroyers or other small warships, each eager to sink the raider. The number of U-boats sunk went up, the number of merchant ships lost went down, and the threat of allied defeat in the Atlantic faded in time for a new, American army to cross that ocean. In turn, the new army helped defeat the Germans in France. It was the German failures, first at sea, and then on the Western Front, that brought the war to an end—or, at least, that is how this reviewer understands it.

The United States fought during the last third of the war. Halpern's assessment of the U.S. Navy's contribution to the victory seems fair and well balanced, though one wishes he had said a bit more on the subject.

One wishes also that Halpern had shown more clearly the effect of action afloat upon the course of events ashore. How important to the development of the war and its outcome were the battles and campaigns in the wide ocean and the narrow seas? Most narrators of the war seem to have trouble with that issue. Halpern, like them, has left readers to figure it out for themselves. Alas!

Still, perfect books do not exist. Paul Halpern's is a very good one. Let us hope he writes more.

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Messimer, Dwight. *Escape*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 288pp. $29.95

Escape is high adventure. It is a chronicle of the wartime experiences of Medal of Honor recipient Edouard Isaacs, the only U.S. Navy line officer captured by the Germans during the First World War. It is a delight to read.

The author, Dwight Messimer, is a history professor at San Jose State University and a specialist in American and German naval history. Although his authoritative account is extensively researched from Isaacs's family

documents, it reads like an action novel, an impression reinforced by the book's fast-reading, third-person format.

Escape details the ill fated last voyage of USS *President Lincoln* in May 1918. Returning after delivering troops bound for the Western Front, the six-masted steamer was torpedoed by the *U-90*, although it had, supposedly, cleared the U-boats' hunting grounds. *President Lincoln* quickly sank, and assistant gunnery officer Lieutenant Isaacs was retrieved from his lifeboat by the German submarine, whose crew had orders to capture the most senior officer surviving an attack. Isaacs quickly acted to deceive the German captain and protect his own captain from capture; consequently he himself was taken prisoner.

During the voyage to Germany, Isaacs learned several startling facts through the carelessness of the submarine's crew and his own vigilance. First, the U-boat patrol area extended one hundred miles further to the west than previously thought, leaving unescorted allied transports like the *President Lincoln* vulnerable to attack. In addition, the German submarines had shifted their return routes in order to avoid the ever more effective British minefields, adopting a circuitous track around Ireland and the Jutland Peninsula and through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. That knowledge kindled in Isaacs the determination to escape and deliver what he believed to be intelligence vital to the allied war effort.

Upon arrival in Wilhelmshaven he was transferred from one prison camp to another, the first of them in Karlsruhe. After two escape plans were forestalled by bad luck, he was moved by train to his final camp, at Villingen, in the Black Forest. During the train journey Isaacs seized an opportunity provided by a momentary lapse of his two guards to dive through an open window. Seriously injured by the jump, Isaacs did not escape. The Germans beat him severely with their rifle butts, shattering a weapon in the process, and marched him the remaining five miles to the prison camp.

At Villingen Lieutenant Isaacs's tenacity continued to manifest itself. His paramount objective was to regain his health, which he accomplished with remarkable speed considering the appalling quality of medical care provided to prisoners. Once more he began to plan his escape, which was complicated by the mixed population of the camp, split roughly evenly between American and Russian officers. On several occasions, ready to carry out his plan, he and his American comrades were preempted by Russians, leading of course to German searches and loss of vital equipment. The Americans' frustration mounted.

The onset of winter in 1918, together with the Germans' increasing suspicion and vigilance, forced the prisoners' hand. Displaying his natural aggressiveness, Isaacs forged the fragmented escape groups into a cohesive team for an all-out escape attempt. Their well thought out plan included shorting-out camp lights, creating a diversion, and even mixing-in with pursuing Germans. It worked. Five of thirteen American prisoners of war escaped; three swam the icy Rhine

to Switzerland, Isaacs among them. Unfortunately, by then the war was nearly at an end, and his intelligence was rendered useless. Consequently, despite the heroic efforts that earned him the Medal of Honor, Isaacs was haunted by a sense of failure.

Escape is of value not as a guide to intelligence gathering or escape from POW camps but as an illustration of honor and commitment to duty. Edouard Isaacs's uprightness and steadfastness are a case study in—dare we use the term?—"core values" that often appear to be lacking in today's armed forces. This work should be required reading in all officer accession programs.

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Smith, Joseph. *The Spanish-American War: Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific, 1895–1902.* New York: Longman, 1994. 262pp. (No price given)

A new president, preferring to focus on the domestic economy, finds himself drawn reluctantly toward foreign crises. The Caribbean is in turmoil. Cuba's imperial patron is collapsing into bankruptcy, unable to support its far-flung outposts. Because of its proximity and ties to the region, the United States finds itself pulled into the situation. While there are many differences, the problem the United States faces today parallels that of a hundred years ago, the days leading up to the Spanish-American War. The past, in many ways, foreshadows the present.

Joseph Smith's book is a good starting point for those who wish to learn from that conflict. *The Spanish-American War* is the third in a series entitled "Modern Wars In Perspective," the aim of which is to "advance the current integration of military history into the academic mainstream," its books being "not merely traditional campaign narratives, but [meant to] examine the causes, course and consequences of major conflicts, in their full international political, diplomatic, social and ideological contexts." Thus the series intends to fill a serious gap in scholarship. Armed clashes no more represent the entire human effort of warfare than visible portions represent the entire iceberg.

The Spanish-American War is an excellent subject for such a study; it represents a cusp in U.S. history, when, having satiated its drive to tame a continent, the nation turned outward toward the international arena—a focus that still exists today. The war has an inevitable pull for those interested in naval warfare, because, besides the Santiago campaign (itself aimed against the Spanish Navy), its action took place almost entirely on the sea. Also, not only had U.S. naval forces been shaped by the theories of Alfred T. Mahan, but he was available at the time to comment on events that appeared tailor-made to confirm those theories.

Smith largely succeeds in his efforts. While its shape is similar to that of most books describing a war (the roots, preparations, execution, and conclusion of the conflict), his text differs in the length of coverage of each of these subjects. More is devoted to

diplomacy, economics, politics, and preparations than to the battles themselves. The text starts well before U.S. involvement, with a discussion of the roots of the Cuban revolution. We see that the Spanish played a role similar to that in which the U.S. found itself during the Vietnam War. Military preparations receive a thorough description, with no attempt to gloss over problems, which included a minuscule standing army, prejudice, poor logistics, and disease. The state of U.S. military preparedness may seem almost comical to the modern reader. Smith spends a good deal of time on the domestic situation in Spain and describes that nation's attempts to marshal its forces. However, once the conflict begins, Smith falls into a more familiar mode, giving the U.S. the lion's share of space and the most complete coverage. He offers clear descriptions of the blockade of Cuba, the American expedition to Santiago, and the battle of Manila. Smith takes pains to examine the appalling and nearly total lack of cooperation between U.S. naval and land forces, an object lesson for those who object to "jointness."

Modern American ties with the Philippines are rooted in this conflict, and it is illuminating to see how differently U.S. forces dealt with Cuban revolutionaries, who were treated (albeit reluctantly) as allies, and Filipino guerrillas, who were treated as a threat almost from the start. The book ends with a thorough discussion of the peace negotiations and the politics behind them, as well as an exploration of the peacetime trends set in motion during the conflict.

Studying the Spanish-American War sheds light on our long involvement in the affairs of the Caribbean and points to the uneven distribution of wealth that lies at the root of the region's troubles. Professor Smith has done an excellent job of illuminating the history of the war. It remains to be seen whether we can learn from it.

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Morelock, J.D. *The Army Times Book of Great Land Battles: From the Civil War to the Gulf War.* New York: Berkley, 1994. 331pp. $29.95

Since peace makes poor reading, *The Army Times Book of Great Land Battles* will be certain to please those who enjoy reading about war without getting dirty. The author has selected fourteen land battles (billed on the dustjacket as "the battles that redefined modern warfare") that he believes "changed the nature of both warfare and politics."

Understandably subjective in approach, Colonel Morelock's book is nonetheless an eager attempt to clarify the importance of battle on land in the shaping of strategy and policy from 1863 to 1991. As an Army officer and historian with two other books to his credit, Morelock has put together a simple, straightforward description of Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Sedan, Port Arthur, Tannenberg, Verdun, Meuse-Argonne, Stalingrad, the Bulge, Okinawa, Korea, Dien Bien Phu, the

Yom Kippur War, and the one-hundred-hour war in the Gulf.

Included in each battle section is a vignette of a participant and an overview of the historical perspective and the weapons and tactics of the opponents. The bulk of the book is, of course, about the battles themselves, a narrative account of each engagement's events from start to finish. For such an immense undertaking, this is a small book, only 320 pages of text; naturally, the space allocated for each battle is small. Consequently, this is not a scholarly, in-depth analysis of land battles; rather, it is more a layman's primer, similar to the "Classics Illustrated" comic books of years past.

Despite its promotional hype and self-stated goal of becoming "required reading for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College," *Great Land Battles* does not qualify for that status. For readers new to the subject of war and to military history, this is a brilliantly organized, brief, and simply stated history that serves as an introduction to modern land warfare. More experienced, critical readers will quickly see the book's shortcomings.

Morelock's selection of land battles is both predictable and refreshing. Gettysburg is certainly a predictable pick; it appears on nearly every American historian's list. Stalingrad is another familiar selection, nothing new here. However, it is refreshing to see Morelock choose several other significant but obscure engagements, like Sedan (1870), Port Arthur (1905), and Tannenberg (1914). In fact, Morelock's chapter on Tannenberg is clearly the best in the book, the most insightful, entertaining, and instructive.

As Morelock moves into the World War II era, however, the choice of land battles becomes murky and less focused. Stalingrad and the Battle of the Bulge are straightforward, but Okinawa as a land battle cannot truly be divorced from the naval fighting that raged while the soldiers and Marines struggled ashore. The author treats Korea as one giant land battle, but his own writing makes it clear that what he describes, 1950 to 1953, was in fact a campaign, encompassing the battles of Task Force Smith, Pusan, and Inchon, and also the series of battles up to the Yalu River and back to the 38th parallel.

Also, the chapter on the Yom Kippur War (1973) cannot be considered a single land battle; even Morelock deals separately with the fighting in the Sinai and that for the Golan Heights, two distinctly different battles. The final chapter, on the "100 Hour AirLand Battle" of the Gulf war (1991), is a well presented and concise account of the ground operations of that war. However, as with Okinawa, Korea, and the Yom Kippur War, it is too narrowly focused on the land battle, which cannot be legitimately separated from all the other aspects of truly modern warfare—air power, naval forces, intelligence, and electronic warfare.

This book takes on too big a challenge for its size. Probably most lacking is a clear understanding of the roles of the commanders in these land battles. Command personalities on the opposing sides are treated superficially in most cases, and that deficiency eliminates much of

the style, color, and character from Morelock's analyses. A collection of excellent photographs and adequate maps cannot bring *Great Land Battles* up from the general-reader category to the level it claims. If this were a paperback selling for ten dollars, it would be a bargain. As it is, *Great Land Battles* is a good idea carried out in a workmanlike way, but it falls short of its greater potential.

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Howse, Derek and Thrower, Norman J.W., eds. *A Buccaneer's Atlas: Basil Ringrose's South Sea Waggoner, A Sea Atlas and Sailing Directions of the Pacific Coast of the Americas, 1682*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1992. 314pp. $75

In the centuries during which Spain controlled the Pacific coasts of America, Spanish officials took care to guard carefully the knowledge that their experienced pilots and seamen had gained about those coasts, as it was the kind of knowledge that an enemy could use in making an attack. Little of this information reached English or Dutch map makers directly. In those days, it was as rare and unusual to find a set of sailing directions as it would later be to find an enemy code book. For an Englishman to find such information in the seventeenth century probably involved a tale of adventure as well as an intellectual and hydrographical coup.

Among the manuscript maps and charts in the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich there is just such an unusual set of sailing directions for the Pacific coast of South America, drawn about 1682. Two years before, a band of English pirates under Captain Bartholomew Sharpe had crossed the Isthmus of Darien on foot, passing through the hot, humid rain forests of easternmost Panama to reach the Pacific coast. There they attacked Spanish shipping and reaped a harvest for themselves, although one marked by many setbacks. Sharpe and his band stole a Spanish ship and became the first Englishmen to sail from the Pacific to the Atlantic, eventually returning to England via the West Indies. The story was very well known at the time, and the most popular version of the day may be found in the second volume of Exquemelin's classic account, *Buccaneers of America*.

Basil Ringrose, one of the buccaneers with Sharpe, wrote the journal that was revised and edited for the book under review. Among Ringrose's lesser-known accomplishments was to copy the Spanish charts and sailing directions, translating them into English. Another Englishman, William Hack, used Ringrose's work to produce a very famous atlas in 1683–1684. The book at hand publishes for the first time a facsimile of Ringrose's work, bringing us closer to what the original Spanish document might have looked like. Ringrose's "waggoner" covers the Pacific coast from Cape Mendocino in California southward to the Galapagos Islands and Cape Horn. It is a fascinating collection of information and a reflection of late seventeenth-century knowledge of the region, including a

variety of geographical, navigational, biological, and cultural aspects.

The editors have thoroughly analyzed the material, providing cross-references to other works, locations of related documents, indices and explanations for the charts and the terms used. From this point of view, it is a masterfully crafted reference work for scholars. The only drawback is in the production of the maps themselves, which are disappointingly small and printed in black and white. Undoubtedly, the publisher made the decision to print a less expensive volume, which may be justified by the fact that Ringrose's work is not of the highest artistic standard—he applied his colors sparsely and crudely. All the maps in the volume are, nevertheless, legible and useful, even though they fail to project the impact one receives from the originals at the National Maritime Museum. In general, Howse and Thrower have made with this volume an important contribution to the history of hydrography.

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