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The Laws of War: A Comprehensive Collection of Primary Documents on International Law Governing Armed Conflict

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act to prevent the violence from spreading.

Other articles worth reading include defense expert James Blackwell's analysis of the U.S. military in Desert Storm and Robert Helms's examination of the imperatives now placed on the U.S. military in the wake of the Gulf war—"win big, win quickly, and win without casualties." Another is Alan Taylor's article, which notes the continuing problems in the Middle East that preclude long-term stability; and Kimberly Ann Elliott's piece on the utility of sanctions as an instrument of economic statecraft.

The key points are skillfully consolidated in Helms's conclusion. His, along with the other articles mentioned, contribute to the understanding of the still emerging international security system and of the U.S. role in it.

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Reisman, W. Michael and Antoniou, Chris T. *The Laws of War: A Comprehensive Collection of Primary Documents on International Law Governing Armed Conflict*. New York: Vintage, 1994. 448pp. \$13

Michael Reisman and Chris Antoniou, a professor and former student, respectively at the Yale Law School, provide a concise description and insightful analysis of a broad range of law of war issues of interest to the national security community. Topics range from attempts by the international community to regulate the right of

nations to use military force to resolve their differences under the League of Nations, Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the UN Charter, through the rules regulating the use of force under a variety of law of war treaties, to the law of neutrality, war crimes, and terrorism.

The authors begin with an interesting history of the law of war and its development through treaties and customary international law, and with a candid discussion of its strengths and weaknesses. Reisman and Antoniou clearly understand the military perspective, recognizing that the uncertain content of some aspects of the law of war—particularly where it derives from customary law—makes decisions difficult for the commander. They also remind us that those who attempt to regulate the violence of war through international treaties must take into account that "the law will be influenced decisively by the concerns of military specialists to protect their own personnel and assets and to use them effectively."

Each chapter consists of commentary and extracts from applicable law of war treaties, judicial decisions, and other relevant documents; since much of the law of war is embodied in treaties approved in the early 1900s, many of the materials are quite old. However, the authors have included such topical materials as the investigation into war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, and the Statute of the International Tribunal, established by the UN to prosecute the individuals responsible for those atrocities.

It is the discussion of war crimes that the military reader will find the

most frustrating. American personnel are, of course, held in strict compliance with the law of war, and, as the court-martials of both Staff Sergeant Griffin and Lieutenant Calley (extracts from the court decisions of both cases are included) illustrate, they are prosecuted for violations. While many nations do hold their personnel in compliance with the law, it is not universal, and, except when conflicts are won decisively, such as World War II, political considerations often result in a decision not to prosecute war crimes committed by the adversary. Thus, despite the well documented evidence of widespread and premeditated war crimes by Iraqi personnel during the occupation of Kuwait, no prosecutions were carried out and none are likely. As Reisman and Antoniou observe, the international community's failure to muster the political will to enforce the law of war detracts from its normative force.

One unfortunate inclusion in the book is a series of rules of engagement for U.S. forces during the Vietnam War. Although the authors characterize these rules as self-imposed limitations that reflect U.S. military conceptions of the operational law of war, the Vietnam rules of engagement have been heavily criticized for being overly specific, inconsistent, unresponsive to military requirements, and as imposing precautions not required by the law of war. Their inclusion does not detract, however, from an otherwise excellent compendium of materials.

The authors express in the introduction the hope that their work will serve the better to inform the citizen, the

journalist, the clergyman, and the politician of the modern law of war. To that list they could have added military officers, who will find this book an informative and useful addition to their professional reading.

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Keegan, John. *A History of Warfare*.
New York: Knopf, 1993. 432pp.
\$27.50

Any book by John Keegan is an event, and this work is no exception. It is undoubtedly his best and most ambitious yet. Keegan, in an interpretive history of warfare from the dawn of recorded history to twentieth-century industrial, mass warfare, analyzes conflict in the societies of the Greeks, Huns, "Horse Peoples," Romans, Arabs, and the industrial West, among many others.

Keegan believes that war is not merely an extension of politics, as is often ascribed to Clausewitz. Indeed, in an age where it is possible for many states to acquire nuclear weapons, politics cannot be permitted to extend casually into warfare. (One need not be a scholar of Clausewitz to see that his view of warfare as a manageable and rational thing belongs to the nineteenth century.)

The discussion begins with several primitive societies in which warfare was conducted by demonstration, maneuver, indirection, delay, and evasion. Withdrawal was seen not as lack of moral fiber but as frequently the sensible thing to do. Most often,