

1995

Future Wars: The World's Most Dangerous Flashpoints

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Recommended Citation

Myers, Robin (1995) "Future Wars: The World's Most Dangerous Flashpoints," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 48 : No. 3 , Article 17.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol48/iss3/17>

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the objective of these conflicts was not to destroy an opponent but rather to cause his surrender with minimum destruction to both parties.

Keegan suggests that the West's capacity to exploit technology—a capacity originally based on face-to-face combat, maneuver warfare, and ideological struggle—has brought it to the point where it might do well to reexamine the less lethal, less direct styles of warfare practiced in earlier times—an individual judgment left to the reader.

The major question in all this is, why does warfare exist? Keegan reviews what anthropologists and other academics have contributed, finding it inadequate. In his own analysis, tribes and states engage in warfare for the acquisition of territory and resources, for the extension of power and influence, for the glory of an idea and of themselves—and, sometimes, he believes, they fight for the simple hell of it. Keegan acknowledges the existence of a warrior mentality but does not, however, claim this to be a first cause of war. He maintains that the existence of well disciplined, state-supported armies is a necessary instrument of civilization and the maintenance of the rule of law.

Ultimately, Keegan holds that warfare is cultural, that a society's style of war reflects its cultural values. Western culture's fascination with technology and Clausewitzian warfare has developed an extraordinarily lethal style. Thus, he concludes that "the habits of the primitive—devotees themselves of restraint, diplomacy and negotiation—deserve relearning. Unless

we unlearn the habits we have taught ourselves, we shall not survive."

FRANK MAHNCKE
Washington, D.C.

Dupuy, Trevor N. *Future Wars: The World's Most Dangerous Flashpoints*. New York: Warner, 1993. 334pp. \$21.95

Colonel Dupuy has again written an interesting and provocative book. Dupuy, noted for his technical and quantitative studies of warfare, attempts in this work to examine how wars may occur and how each will likely be fought. He has been assisted by many hands and by a computerized war-gaming program, the "Tactic Numerical Deterministic Model" (TNDM).

Dupuy's method is straightforward: he identifies nine regions worldwide where cross-border tensions could plausibly evolve into war. Although the tenth conflict involves civil war in Russia, it fits his regional model. For each conflict Dupuy describes the general historical and geopolitical background and the specific causes for regional tensions. He then engages in "pseudo-history" (as he calls it), a scenario that explains how the regional tensions evolved into war, how the primary battle was fought, and how the conflict was brought to resolution. Dupuy is quick to note that the scenario is not necessarily the most likely one, but only a possibility. The combatants are then assigned specific operational forces that parallel their existing armed services. Once the war commences, the

protagonists maneuver and engage in battle, and Dupuy employs the TNDM in order to predict the results. Following the engagement, the war ends quickly—aggressors are repulsed and sue for peace under international pressure.

This work is valuable for several reasons. First, it presents broad and succinct surveys of present, post-Cold War areas of conflict, which remind us of how the Cold War kept them obscure. An example is the political and cultural conflict over ethnic Hungarians in Romania. Further, Dupuy neatly describes the workings of the modern battlefield, discussing likely strategies and the impact of modern (but not high-technology) weapons on the commander's decision-making process.

However, there are a few drawbacks: by constructing each of the ten scenarios so as to force a major battle, Dupuy overlooks some important considerations. Thus foremost of these is that Dupuy's governmental leaders decide quickly, almost cursorily, that war is a better solution to their problem than peace, making only limited, failed attempts to achieve a diplomatic solution. Once at war, there is little definition of either the conflict's political goals or of military objectives that are to achieve those goals. Most of the wars postulated are limited, in that one opponent does not attempt to overthrow the other's government; the wars are fought for their own sakes rather than the achievement of a political goal.

The conflicts described are very short. Dupuy's "Second Korean War," for example, consumes exactly thirty-one days. Again, the brevity of these scenarios derives from Dupuy's focus on

the battle. Once a single battle for a certain scenario has been modeled, simulations become less valuable. Thus Dupuy is forced to conclude his scenarios rapidly, with cease-fires that were apparently agreed to with as little forethought as the decisions to initiate hostilities. Unfortunately, as current events in Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabakh have shown, regional conflicts are rarely resolved so quickly or cleanly.

Future Wars is really designed for those readers who favor computerized war games and simulations. The in-depth scenario play, which focuses on simulated combat of maneuver units up to brigade level, provides a level of detail rarely found elsewhere. However, the cost of this specificity is a cursory treatment of why and when these regional states would truly see war as a valid solution to their external problems—why war would be more advantageous than peace—and little of how war could be prevented. Thus this book, while an interesting snapshot of several important regional conflicts, does not offer the level of predictive analysis on "future wars" that one might expect from such a distinguished military historian.

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Miskel, James F. *Buying Trouble? National Security and Reliance on Foreign Industry*. Lanham, Md.: Univ. Press of America, 1993. 204pp. \$24.50

This is an excellent economic analysis of the strategic risk involved in offshore