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Double Lives: Spies and Writers in the Secret Soviet War of Ideas against the West

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then he quickly loses his way. One problem is his sources and focus; his cultural target group is the division's young officers and enlisted men, but his sample is less than ten. He has ignored an entire population of the thousands of veterans affiliated with the First Marine Division Association. But then, can such old Marines recall the past with any accuracy? Cameron himself says "yes," their "Rockwellized" memories can at least be telling. More importantly, it has long been demonstrated by oral history projects in the United States (for instance, the work of Don Rickey for the Army, at least thirty years ago) that veterans' recollections, if used carefully and in large enough numbers, can produce dependable information. Moreover, their letters, diaries, photographs, copies of newspapers, and other memorabilia not in official repositories are invaluable research sources. For information on Guadalcanal, Cameron did not have to depend only on the Marines. Major Martin Clemens, the Scot-Australian Chief of Scouts, has freely shared his diaries and views with researchers, and on the Japanese side there are veterans' remembrances and an official history of the campaign. But official reports, however cleverly Cameron subjects them to literary criticism, are no substitute for human testimony. Cameron's analysis of Guadalcanal only suggests the sort of intellectual self-indulgence to be found in *American Samurai*, and it sets the tone of the book.

He argues that Marines shot prisoners of war (some did), desecrated the dead (they did—some), and turned surly (many did) because of their terror of the jungle and the night, and that their fear and loathing of the Japanese—even sexual repression and frustration—contributed to their rage. Conceding the possible validity of some of these observations (which could have been confirmed through interviews), there are other factors that influenced the division's sense of anxiety: massive sleep deprivation; a limited diet; growing sickness rates from tropical diseases; the six-week delay of infantry reinforcements; serious lack of good senior leadership; a sense of betrayal by the Navy, which failed until November 1942 to stop Japanese reinforcements; and outrage at the treatment of their prisoners of war by the Japanese.

There is no reason to hold the U.S. Marine Corps, even its World War II performance, sacrosanct with respect to serious scholarship. It is notorious for confusing organizational indoctrination with combat effectiveness. However, that one is attacking a cultural icon does not excuse a disregard for the connection between assertion and evidence. The author of *American Samurai* and his advisors do not know enough about the Marine Corps to fill a canteen cup.

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Koch, Steven. *Double Lives: Spies and Writers in the Secret Soviet War of Ideas against the West.* New York: Free Press, 1994. 419pp. (No price given)

In the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, a scholarly work on Stalin's control and manipulation of the American and European "peace movements" in the decades prior to World War II may seem of interest only to historians of the period. After all, active subversion of Western intellectual circles by foreign intelligence services might be considered anachronistic and irrelevant in today's open society.

This is not the case, however; foreign governments will continue to seek to manipulate the support and influence of respected intellectual leaders for their policies. Koch's well researched study demonstrates how this can be done; there are important lessons to be learned here.

Tracing the covert career of Willi Munzenberg, a founding member of the Communist International (Comintern), Koch demonstrates how such respected writers as André Gide, John dos Passos, Ernest Hemingway, Sinclair Lewis, and other Western intellectuals were purposefully led in the 1930s to support Stalin's intricate and self-serving prewar policies. Using information that has recently become available from the archives of the former Soviet Union, Koch pieces together a credible tale of global and long-term deceit and perfidy. From Paris, to Cambridge, to Hollywood, Koch has traced the close connections between Soviet agents of influence and espionage, shedding new light along the way on the activities of such spies as Klaus Fuchs, Alger Hiss, and Ethel and Julius Rosenberg.

This work is a valuable addition to the literature on the activities of foreign intelligence services, and it is particularly relevant to understanding the ways and means by which intellectuals can be used to generate public support for certain policies. It is also a useful reminder of the perfidy and cynicism of totalitarian regimes in using individuals to further their own ends. While modern circumstances likely make the total control of a Stalin unrepeatable, there can be little doubt that such efforts to gain the support of influential individuals continue today.

In the end, as Koch concludes from his analysis, Willi Munzenberg and most of his Comintern compatriots were themselves sacrificed on the altar of Stalin's paranoia, despite, or possibly because of, their many successes.

This is an interesting book that provides some unique insights into the grey area between perception management and active espionage. It should be required reading both for students of intelligence operations and for anyone seeking to understand the international politics of the period.

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Halpern, Paul G. *A Naval History of World War I.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 591pp. $55

Before World War I began in July 1914, most of those who thought about war at sea were certain they knew how the next struggle would begin—and that as a consequence of that beginning it would end shortly thereafter. They