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Multinational Naval Cooperation in the Spanish Civil War, 1936

Willard C. Frank, Jr.

THE GREATEST EPISODE OF MULTINATIONAL naval cooperation in the interwar years took place in the early months of the bitter Spanish Civil War of 1936–39. This cooperation was between the navies of states that would soon be locked in mortal combat against each other in the Second World War: Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and the United States. The Spanish conflict would see further occasions of naval cooperation, such as between Italy and Germany in 1936–37 to wage clandestine naval war against the Spanish Republic and its supporters, and the Anglo–French Nyon patrols of 1937–39 to deter just such covert action, which threatened British and French interests. Yet from July until October 1936, a dark era in the slide of Europe and the world into the Second World War, all these navies and more crossed political divides. With zeal they engaged in a vast and spontaneous cooperative humanitarian effort to extract fearful people of all nationalities from the polarized and fratricidal whirlpool that was the unhappy Spain of 1936. Navies, however, remained instruments of state policy; multinational naval cooperation was but a respite from ominous political competition. It was a hope that flared briefly but was soon snuffed out by the hot political winds of the time.

I

The Spanish Civil War began on 17 July 1936 in an attempted military takeover of the foundering Republic, a regime full of raw idealism but beset with bitter divisions of region, class, and ideology. The generals' bid to save Spain from supposed disintegration by a quick coup failed and instead triggered among the Spanish people an explosion of revolution and counterrevolution. Within the first few excruciatingly confused and intense days, the Spanish found themselves divided into two evenly matched armed camps—leftist and

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regionalist Republicans versus traditionalist and centralist Nationalists. One was branded, respectively, either a "Red" or a "Fascist"; there were no in-betweens.¹

The passionate confusion soon sorted itself out into territorial zones, each stamped with only one political color, that of the faction that had gained the upper hand in the first days. The eastern portion of Spain along the Mediterranean coast, the northern coast on the Bay of Biscay, and most of the major cities, including Madrid, rejected the coup attempt and remained in the Republican camp. The western and north-central sections fell to the Nationalists (see the map). The cream of the Spanish army fought for the Nationalist cause, while the bulk of the navy sailed for the Republic. It became evident early that the resources available to neither side were adequate for victory. Each quickly appealed to ideologically compatible states abroad for aid—the Nationalists to Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, and the Republicans first to the Popular Front regime in France and later to the Soviet Union.

The conflict in Spain was in significant ways a microcosm of the wider tensions plaguing depression-era Europe. The leaders of the military coup, headed by General Francisco Franco, quickly called upon the assertive Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany for help. Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler soon obliged. Both foresaw an early Nationalist victory at little cost to themselves. A little intervention would, they assumed, produce valuable effects and do so "on the cheap." It would further confuse and divide Britain and France, weaken the French political and strategic position, and provide opportunity and cover for expansionist aims—Hitler's in Central Europe and Mussolini's in the Mediterranean.²

The British government, middle-class and status-quo, saw in the Spanish conflict another threat to its elusive goal of a stable Europe and consistently did what it could to contain the crisis and ameliorate its effect on the European state system strained by the larger economic and political tensions of the time. The French Popular Front government was as sympathetic to its ideological brethren in the Spanish Popular Front Republic as it was strategically apprehensive about the possibility of a hostile pro-Fascist regime across its Pyrenees border. France was, however, too divided internally and too dependent on Britain internationally to raise the stakes by major aid to the beleaguered and pleading Republic. The United States, isolationist and preoccupied, was politically a very thin reed upon which the European democracies could rely. In consequence, French policy was forced to follow the British, at least on the surface. The Soviet Union, the radical outsider that had adopted the temporary expedient of joining the international system to shore up its security through the creation of an anti-fascist bloc, emerged as the only major power aligned with the Popular Front Spanish Republic. To the Western democracies, Soviet support seemed destabilizing to the international system and Stalinist ways dangerous to the social order, these


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perceptions serving to distance Republican Spain from the Western democracies, including Popular Front France.³

In these conditions, about 100,000 foreigners were caught in the swirl of the ardent confrontation in Spain. At least 84,000 were long-term residents. The largest single group, 25,000 Portuguese, including many agricultural and industrial workers, found itself mostly in the Nationalist zone and in little danger or need for evacuation. The next largest group, 17,000 French citizens, including domestic servants in Republican cities, where their affluent employers were all too often considered enemies of the people, was at greater risk but also within easy reach of evacuation. At yet greater risk was the Germany colony, whose numbers had risen in the years before the war from 9,000 to perhaps 15,000, and which was concentrated in the larger cities under Republican control, 6,000 in Barcelona alone. Similarly, the 4,000 Italians resident in Spain found themselves largely stranded in the Republican zone. German and Italian property and sometimes individuals were, in an expression of the ideological internationalization of the civil war, targets of Republican wrath. The British colony of 8,000 was heavily concentrated in the Republican zone, especially along the northern coast. Some 4,000 Argentine citizens made up the largest Latin American group. Of the total foreign presence, some 22,000 (or 26 percent) were concentrated around Barcelona, with another 8,000 (10 percent) in Madrid, both burgeoning urban centers that bore the brunt of violence that July in the first days of the rebellion. In addition, July was the height of the tourist season, and thousands of visitors were in the country, largely in these same cities and in coastal resorts, the great majority within the Republican zone.⁴

II

The first hurried reports from embassies and consulates were as alarming as they were confused. Rumors abounded. "Masses of armed workers" were in the streets. There were "serious riots" in Barcelona. "Casualties are said to be heavy and several churches have been burnt." Italy and Germany, for good reason, considered their nationals at definite risk. The Italian consul general in Barcelona cabled Rome that attempts against Italian life and property had "intensified," that some Italian nationals were cut off from help and others had disappeared, and that "Italian businesses and offices" had been "laid waste." The Italian consul in Málaga reported that the city was "pillaged" and "in full revolution. Interrupted communications. Not able to communicate with embassy. Provisions are scarce and fighting goes on in the streets." German consuls as well reported similar threatening situations and being cut off from their embassy in Madrid. In any case, the senior diplomat corps had left Madrid for the traditional summer capital of San Sebastián, where it found itself isolated.



Military Situation in the Spanish Civil War, Late in July 1936

jeremy lamotte

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“Unable to communicate with Embassy at San Sebastián,” reported British officials in Madrid. The American consul in Barcelona described “considerable firing in the streets which makes it dangerous to go out.” The same was true in Madrid, where “food supplies will last only 2 more days.”⁵

What were foreigners to do? Junior embassy officials in Madrid, bearing the weight of responsibility, took pains not to panic their governments over the risks their nationals faced in Spain. Yet lurid reports of isolated events made an impression.⁶ An American embassy official, for example, reported the rape of an American woman by armed young men.⁷ Tourists embellished their stories of shootings and burnings in the telling and retelling. The American ambassador, hearing of the made-up statements American evacuees were making to gathered reporters as they debarked in France, observed that “it is remarkable that most truthful people will misrepresent and exaggerate in war days to give a thrill.”⁸ The reality was far more prosaic for the overwhelming majority of foreigners, but the horrors that did happen were real enough.

Fears arising from confusion and lack of knowledge, more than from facts, prompted states capable of doing so to take early action to safeguard the lives of their citizens resident or travelling in Spain. These were the first decisions made by foreign powers; even those powers that would subsequently intervene militarily came to that determination only later. Those few foreigners within reach of border crossings into France or Portugal escaped by land. The vast majority, however, had to be extricated by sea, the great proportion from the Republican zone, which contained the large majority of foreigners and port cities and the least amount of civil order. This burden fell largely to the warships, and often the merchant ships, of Britain, the United States, France, Italy, and Germany—that is, all of the great maritime powers except Japan. No state considered that it could protect the property of its nationals (mines, factories, businesses, homes, investments), but to pluck one’s citizens from danger was feasible and compelling. In their evacuation efforts, all viewed warships as a necessary source of political clout to accomplish the task, the Germans most explicitly seeing naval forces sent to Spain as an instrument of intimidation.⁹

After two days of receiving with mounting alarm reports from its consuls in Spain, on 20 July the British government became the first to issue orders. The Admiralty immediately responded to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden’s request that British warships be sent “for the protection of British residents and visitors.”¹⁰ The next day British warships were the first on the scene, there being already in the vicinity ships on permanent station at Gibraltar and also forces returning home from the Ethiopian crisis. A few destroyers had just reached Devonport from the Eastern Mediterranean (and the crisis caused by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and war fever between Italy and the democracies) when the order came to retrace their course and steam into this new sea of troubles.

While destroyers in the Atlantic steamed for northern ports along the Bay of Biscay, heavy as well as light warships still in the Mediterranean made for eastern ports. Station ships at Gibraltar sped for southern ports.¹¹ By 23 July the battlecruiser *Repulse*, the cruisers *Devonshire*, *London*, and *Amphion*, twenty-two destroyers, and a variety of smaller craft were all on duty in Spanish waters.

Also, on 21 July French warships, including the cruiser *Duquesne* and three large destroyers, and the chartered passenger ships *Chellah* and *Djenne*, all with a mission "to evacuate French nationals," started to extract the large French community in Barcelona. Within two days French ships were active all around the Iberian Peninsula, merchant vessels under the escort of French warships evacuating the large majority of refugees seeking the protection of the French flag.¹²

"Foreign officers from democratic nations . . . could not feel hospitable to a cause whose . . . exponents did not . . . express themselves with politeness and polish."

The first Italian response was immediate (preceding even the Royal Navy) but private. The steamer *Silvia Tripovich*, heeding the pleas of the Italian consul in Málaga, arrived at this revolutionary town on 20 July and extricated Italian nationals.¹³ The Italian colony in Barcelona, where Italian property was being burned and an Italian engineer had been killed, was in greater danger. Italian officials in Spain, with little information, pessimistically assumed the coup would soon be crushed and Italian residents would be exposed to Republican reprisals.¹⁴ The consul general called for help on 21 July, and Mussolini the next day ordered two cruisers, the *Fiume* (wearing the flag of Admiral Ildebrando Goiran) and the *Raimondo Montecuccoli*, and also two chartered evacuation vessels, the ocean liner *Principessa Maria* and the government hospital ship *Tevere*, to Barcelona for the "defense and eventual evacuation of nationals." Goiran soon changed the destinations of the *Montecuccoli* and *Tevere* to Valencia to evacuate Italians from that region. The cruisers arrived early on 23 July and the transports some hours later. Evacuation started in earnest on the 24th. On 28 July the *Grecale* was the first of many Italian destroyers to comb smaller coastal towns for nationals who desired evacuation. This was the beginning of a continuous Italian presence for weeks to come of cruisers, destroyers, and chartered refugee ships in Barcelona and other Republican cities.¹⁵

The American colony was relatively small, only 1,500 persons, but tourists that summer had swollen their ranks. Secretary of State Cordell Hull recalled that "our first thought when the revolt broke out and rapidly assumed the character of a major civil war was not the political one of policy but the practical

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one of getting our citizens out of the war-threatened areas."¹⁶ As chance would have it, as the civil war began out the U.S. Navy's midshipmen's training squadron, including three battleships, was in western European ports, as was the U.S. Coast Guard's training cutter *Cayuga*, while the spanking-new cruiser *Quincy* (CA 39) was en route to Europe on a shakedown cruise. At State Department request of 21 July, the Navy and Coast Guard ordered the disembarkation of midshipmen from the battleship *Oklahoma* (BB 37) and cadets from the cutter *Cayuga*, which, with the *Quincy*, were ordered to Spanish ports at top speed. Other ships soon followed. In addition, and also at State Department request, the Export Steamship Corporation's liner *Exeter*, on the way home from the Middle East, disembarked passengers temporarily in Marseilles and headed for Barcelona to evacuate refugees.¹⁷ The American naval presence, despite logistical distances greater than those faced by any other nation represented, was the largest relative to the numbers of its citizens in Spain of all of the maritime powers represented.¹⁸

Germany was the last major state to send sea forces to Spain. Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath saw the need to follow the example of other great powers and dispatch warships, and Admiral Erich Raeder agreed. Hitler hesitated, not wishing to be caught in a situation requiring measures not of his own choosing, but reluctantly gave his assent.¹⁹ The German colony in San Sebastián seemed in danger, and German property in Bilbao had been attacked. On 23 July the armored ships (better known outside Germany as "pocket battleships") *Deutschland* and *Admiral Scheer*, the cruiser *Köln*, and six torpedo boats were ordered from German waters to Spain. Their mission was "to defend German interests and protect German nationals in Spain," especially in San Sebastián, Barcelona, and Málaga. To speed the evacuation process, the Reich Transport Ministry ordered the steamers *Bessel*, *Bellona*, and *Chronos* to evacuate Germans from San Sebastián and Bilbao, and the *Hennes* those in Barcelona. These warships and merchant vessels began their evacuation efforts on 26 July, by which point Spanish waters and ports were already teeming with foreign warships. Once engaged, the German naval presence was maintained at a level equal to or surpassing that of France and Italy, a level that demanded a larger proportion of ships relative to the overall size of its navy than for any other state.²⁰ (Table 1 tabulates foreign warships and merchant vessels in Spanish waters during the crucial months of 1936.)

III

Separate national evacuation efforts on the scene were quickly and spontaneously absorbed into a grand, cooperative, international enterprise.²¹ At least five factors contributed to the desire for cooperation and the extent it would

Table 1

| Flag | Warships on Representative Dates | | | Refugee Merchant Ships |
|--------------|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------------------|
| | 28 July | 4 Sept. | 20 Nov. | Total |
| British | 28 | 20 | 21 | 2 |
| French | 11 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Italian | 8 | 10 | 6 | 7 |
| German | 7 | 9 | 8 | 20 |
| U.S. | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Portuguese | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Mexican | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Argentine | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Yugoslav | - | - | - | 1 |
| Total | 59 | 51 | 45 | |

Foreign Vessels in Spanish Waters, 1936

assume: the confusion in port cities, the similarity of missions, common attitudes toward the Spanish conflict, common dangers faced by evacuation forces, and the desire of German and Italian officers to be treated with respect and as equals.

The first factor was the state of confusion and urgency. Originally, each government had thought primarily of serving the interests of its own citizens. The reality in Spanish port towns was much more complicated than provided for by such a policy. Embassy officials and consuls in the larger cities were pleading to their nationals to take the opportunity to leave.²² Tourists whose whereabouts and even existence had been unknown would suddenly materialize, a cluster here, a multitude there, all clamoring for immediate passage out of the war zone. Foreign residents who thought their lives in danger were desperate for a way out. On the other hand, foreigners with close personal ties or property to defend hesitated for days or weeks before they too decided it was time to leave. As the commanding officer of HMS *Grafton* noted in astonishment and dismay, British subjects who elected for the moment to remain "had an unbounded faith in the ability of their Government to protect them, whatever the circumstances, and the Navy to lift them out of any trouble they might meet by remaining."²³ Also, non-Aryan Germans saw greater risks in evacuating than remaining, but the German navy was ready to remove them from the war zone as well. Few took advantage of the opportunity.²⁴

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Foreign refugees poured into the port cities from inland, especially from Madrid, where embassies were collaborating in an evacuation committee. The German chargé d'affaires went so far as to assert that the whole German fleet was at the disposal of the committee.²⁵ Embassies arranged safe passage for trains crowded with refugees, which arrived at Valencia or other ports without a predictable schedule. Hundreds of distraught passengers from these refugee trains, sometimes having left all their possessions and funds behind, would huddle on the docks without food or shelter, waiting for embarkation. In almost all cases, refugees representing a score of languages and nationalities were all mixed together. Many were without documentation. Frightened Spaniards tried to blend into the crowds of foreigners. Suspicious armed Republican militiamen on the docks assumed authority over who would be allowed to leave and when. Confusion, rumors, fear, and frustration abounded. Evacuation by land across the French frontier, although attempted under French auspices from Barcelona, was not safe and could not be guaranteed; four Germans had been shot trying.²⁶ Warships had to be alert to any shifting contingency, including the possibility of being the targets of military action. German warships in the Mediterranean kept their guns manned continuously, and for none of the foreign navies was there the possibility of shore leave, a drain on morale that went on for weeks. In these unsettled conditions there was little opportunity or sentiment among naval or consular officials of any nation to sort out refugees by nationality so they might be evacuated under their own flags. The humanitarian need was too pressing, the confusion too tangled, and the language barrier too great.

The second factor was that common objectives created an immediate bond of common purpose and action among naval officers of the evacuation powers. All regarded their duty with humanitarian zeal. Common problems led to cooperative solutions. Officers of the various ships in an evacuation port called on each other, not out of mere courtesy but to share experiences and problems and to devise solutions. The management of the task quickly became a team effort; the rule was courtesy and mutual support. Ships of the five powers accepted for evacuation each other's nationals without question, and all shared the burden of evacuating other foreigners as practicality indicated. Governments of small or non-maritime states frequently requested one or another of the evacuation powers to accept their citizens, but usually naval officers on the scene were already doing so on their own. All welcomed aboard Spaniards who might have become victims of popular wrath and who, with or without permission of Republican authorities and militiamen, could find a way to present themselves on board.²⁷ France opened her harbors freely to foreign warships and her naval bases for emergency repairs; a German destroyer gratefully took advantage of the latter. The British also opened the facilities of Gibraltar, which serviced both Italian and German warships. In the Mediterranean, Marseilles became the main

British and French destination port, and Genoa for the Italians and Germans. In the Bay of Biscay, however, all had to cooperate to make the most effective use of the small French harbors within reach of the various Spanish evacuation ports.²⁸

One acute problem was communications of embassies and consuls with their governments and evacuation ships. Ships lent radio operators and portable radio sets to consulates as needed. A network of communications—in person, by radio, and by mail—was maintained, thanks to the cooperation of the multinational warships in Spanish waters. Radio operators and signalmen learned to relay messages in several languages. Ships' boats transported couriers and mailbags to each other's vessels. Navies relied on each other for communications and knew they could count on it.²⁹

A third factor contributing to the ease of naval cooperation was a common attitude toward the Spanish tragedy. Officers of all the evacuation navies, in their interactions and private sentiments, displayed a clear antipathy toward the Spanish Republic and a corresponding sympathy for the cause of the military rebellion. Italian and German officers were following their states' policies in doing so. In any case, it would have been difficult for crewmen of the German armored ship *Admiral Scheer* to be impassive to taunts of "Death to Hitler!" from quayside in Málaga.³⁰ British, French, and American officers expressed private opinions born of their personal and group impressions. Officers from democratic nations little understood what conditions lay behind the burning of churches and the patrols of Anarchist youth, and they could not feel hospitable to a cause whose most visible and vocal exponents did not dress in smart uniforms or express themselves with politeness and polish. Their social upbringing made them more comfortable with the formal etiquette of the Nationalist authorities and the orderliness of life in the cities they held. The epithets "Red" and "Communist," applied so liberally to all on the Republican side, were menacing labels that set emotions quivering. The large-scale disappearance of the naval officer corps in the Republican navy, reports of whose murder circulated with ever-greater exaggeration, brought the issue perilously close to home. Officers of HMS *Grenville*, for example, were quick to contrast the Republican "gangs of proletarians invested with the authority of a rifle and pistol and little intelligence" with "delightful" Nationalist officials "imbued with that charm of manner for which the Spanish gentleman has long been famous."³¹ In addition, circumstances so placed the ships that only the unseen side of Republican Spain came in view; the fears and horrors silently blanketing Nationalist Spain remained unknown to them. Officers on evacuation duty got their information on conditions in the Republic mostly from the refugees they transported, many of whom exaggerated for effect. Ghastly stories and rumors circulated busily until they saturated the naval forces that ringed Spain. The wardrooms of ships

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newly arrived in Spanish waters were infected with them from the beginning as part of official and unofficial briefings. The conformity of shipboard life served to still any urge to question or to examine another viewpoint; hearing and repeating, rather than seeing and checking, was believing. This common viewpoint served importantly to bridge national differences and underpin the common humanitarian work.³²

Fourth, evacuation efforts entailed common dangers that further deepened the bond among multinational brothers of the sea. The feverish activity of ships of many nations relentlessly extricating foreign nationals and Spanish refugees from Spanish ports and exchanging hostages and prisoners, all while war raged around them, produced many chances for danger and international complication. In a time of widespread and fearful antagonisms among nations, ships of several nations and of the warring Spanish parties were constantly passing each other, berthing near each other, and getting in each other's way. The mysterious shapes of darkened vessels close aboard would startle watchstanders at night, and during the day ships might find themselves in the line of fire of some naval operation or shore bombardment: each Spanish side had declared a blockade on the other's ports, many of which came under air or naval bombardment, and foreign warships at times got in the way.³³ The warring parties did relent to the point of declaring safety zones for foreign anchorages and at least once even to suspend war action so evacuations could proceed, but the risks to foreign ships in Spanish waters remained.³⁴

In a case of mistaken identity, on 5 August 1936 the destroyer HMS *Basilisk* rounded Europa Point, Gibraltar, from an evacuation trip only to be greeted by gunfire from the Nationalist gunboat *Dato* in Algeciras Bay. *Dato* had just engaged the Republican destroyer *Alcalá Galiano* and was entering Algeciras harbor after its faster adversary had fled. The profiles of the two destroyers, British and Republican, were very similar, and the Nationalist crewmen were sure that the enemy had returned. The *Basilisk* hoisted a large British ensign at the foremast but was straddled by shellfire before the Spaniards recognized their mistake. Profound apologies followed.³⁵ Following this incident, British and American ships, at least, flew large ensigns at the fore whenever in Spanish waters.³⁶ The measure was ineffective. In December, the USS *Erie* (PG 50) was almost hit by heavy shells from the Nationalist battleship *España* as it bombarded the port of Musel while the U.S. gunboat was yet in the harbor.³⁷

Aircrews could not tell one ship from another. HMS *Blanche*, another British destroyer having a design resemblance to Republican destroyers, was bombed (without effect) in the Mediterranean on 14 August.³⁸ On 30 August off Cádiz, then under blockade by the Republican navy, Nationalist aircraft dropped six bombs aimed at the USS *Kane* (DD 235) despite the large American flag displayed horizontally, like an awning, as a recognition sign for aircraft. Luckily, no bomb

hit. Each side blamed the other.³⁹ When in harbor, tired and harried by evacuation duty, crews often found themselves under air attack or in the vicinity of stray bullets from the shore. Ships of all nations remained stoically at anchor while air attacks on port facilities raged close by. The Argentine cruiser *25 de Mayo* had close calls from bomb attacks in Alicante on 5 and 22 November and even returned anti-aircraft fire.⁴⁰ British and French warships, going beyond the display of large ensigns, began to paint red-white-blue recognition stripes on their turrets, and the Germans adopted red-white-black bands. Air attacks on foreign warships, however, recurred throughout the war despite the wide use of recognition stripes.

There were numerous other dangers. Mines were an ever-present threat, one that increased as some drifted with the currents and tides.⁴¹ Also, a small boat from HMS *Grenville* was suddenly fired upon in Barcelona harbor as it headed ashore on a routine run to pick up consular mail.⁴² Again, altercations with local authorities over evacuation ship sailings sometimes led to tense moments. On 29 July in Bilbao, boats full of armed German sailors, and later the German torpedo boat *Albatros*, had to intervene to release the loaded evacuation ship *Bessel* from the clutches of the Republican torpedo boat *Número 3*.⁴³

Hovering over all these specific dangers was the distinct possibility that some provocation, some incident, could spread and become a far larger international conflagration. This concern lurked in the minds of all the senior European naval officers in Spanish waters. On 31 July, a sober Admiral Max Horton, Royal Navy, confided to his Italian counterpart, Admiral Goiran, that he would rather abandon his post in Spanish waters and leave the remaining British subjects behind than have some irresponsible provocation against a foreign warship trigger a chain reaction.⁴⁴ Thus, both common danger and a shared desire to avoid harmful repercussions helped strengthen the bond among officers in Spanish waters.

A fifth factor accounting for the extent of naval cooperation was that officers of the several navies found, as they worked closely with one another, that in general their mutual esteem deepened. Though French officers often seemed to Anglo-American observers to be unsure of themselves, even defeatist, competent and cooperative French officers received respect. Also, the nationalistic (and defensive) cockiness of Italian and German officers softened when the American and British, officers of the world's two greatest navies, took the initiative—and it was these who usually did so—to reach out to them and treat them with regard. Italian officers were especially nervous, after the recent Ethiopian crisis, but became more at ease in response to British friendliness and the task that faced them all. Admiral Horton, in the *London*, for example, quickly broke the ice when Admiral Goiran for the first time entered Barcelona harbor in the *Fiume* by offering full cooperation in the common humanitarian work. Italian officers

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were particularly pleased with the congenial respect offered by British officers. Captain L. Biarcheri of the destroyer *Maestrale* spoke for many Italian officers as to their warm relations with their British counterparts when he reported of Rear Admiral James F. Somerville that "we are good friends." Franco-German relations among naval officers, at least in Barcelona, were also quite warm. Anglo-German personal relations were even better. The Americans set themselves apart a little, perhaps a result of American reluctance to become involved in European affairs; however, the friendliness of the Americans, who invited their European counterparts to join them on board for the daily ritual of evening movies, a luxury no other navy offered, broke the ice. The American consul in Barcelona extended that offer to the bored crews of British cruisers, cooped up through a hot summer without shore leave, by providing them a different film every night when in port. Ships' companies exchanged sporting matches, like deck hockey on board or football matches on some deserted stretch of beach.

The only reservations in all this good will in work and play were in subtle tendencies: of German officers to choose the British, American, or French for off-duty companionship over their Italian allies; of British officers to prefer American and German officers over their French political partners; and of Italian officers not to associate too closely with the French. Language limitations probably accounted for some such preferences, but national cultural attitudes surely had their influence. Nevertheless, considering the times, the multinational gatherings of officers, on duty or off, exhibited an extraordinarily high degree of good will and good humor among each other.⁴⁵

IV

In these favorable conditions, officers on the scene in several locations worked out multinational procedures to meet contingencies. Led by French Admiral Marcel Gensoul, flying his flag in the cruiser *Duquesne*, officers in Barcelona developed early a plan of action for all the navies involved should the tenuous public order there deteriorate further into bloody anarchy. German Admiral Erich Raeder was pleased by the way French officers, in particular, worked with Germans on the details of naval cooperation and in the process "extended the warm welcome of the fraternity of the sea to our officers."⁴⁶

A similar spirit of friendly cooperation extended to the warships in the roadstead of Tangier. This international port in Morocco, on the Strait of Gibraltar, was administered by a Control Committee representing Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, and Holland, presided over (in rotation) at that time by the Italian minister De Rossi del Lion Nero. The population of the town was one-tenth Spanish, of both Republican and Nationalist persuasion; tension increased between indigenous leftist Spanish elements and the thousands

of distraught Nationalist refugees arriving from Republican cities. Meanwhile, the Republican fleet illegally made the harbor its base for war operations that included threatening foreign shipping in the Strait of Gibraltar. Nationalist aircraft bombed Republican warships in the roadstead just off Tangier's bathing beaches, full of summer tourists. The situation was explosive.⁴⁷ Prompted by De Rossi, the Control Committee on 21 July requested the warships in the roadstead to provide landing parties to protect the various legations and the residential quarters of the nationalities represented in the city.

The Italian government cable ship *Città di Milano* was the first to respond, sending a landing party ashore the same day to help keep order. Two days later, Italian Admiral Mario Falangola rushed to Tangier in the cruiser *Eugenio di Savoia*. As the senior naval officer present among those belonging to the nations of the Control Committee, Falangola took charge of the situation and held a steady stream of meetings with the captains of the British, French, and Portuguese destroyers then also present in the harbor. By 28 July they had established a Naval Defense Commission of the senior naval officers from these four states, whose warships were constantly present in Tangier. These officers formed a partnership that arranged naval landing detachments to police the city and considered enforcing a prohibition of the Republican fleet's using the roadstead as an operating base. Officers held surprisingly independent views. Italy favored the Nationalists, but Admiral Falangola believed that it would be illegal to eject the Republican fleet unless the powers recognized the warring parties as belligerents. French Captain J. Bahezre de Lanlay of the cruiser *Stiffren*, whose government favored the Republicans, argued notwithstanding that a state of war clearly existed and that the neutrality of Tangier required the departure of the Republican fleet. On 7 August, after the Republican government had announced that its warships would depart, the Naval Defense Commission agreed to demand that they leave at once. Within two days all were gone, and tension in the harbor subsided. The success of the Commission was in no small measure due to the tact of Admiral Falangola, whom British Admiral Somerville considered to be very cooperative and eager to please.⁴⁸

A similar cooperative effort was to be found shortly after at another roadstead, this time in the Balearics. On 19 August, British, Italian, and German warships, along with the German evacuation merchant ship *Hero*, were in the harbor of Palma de Mallorca when Republican authorities announced an imminent naval bombardment of that port and urged all foreign ships to leave. On the suggestion of Rear Admiral Somerville, the senior naval officer present, the warships formed a single squadron to sortie just before the hour of the announced bombardment, maneuver together off the harbor (to keep the ships from embarrassing each other while they awaited developments), and, if necessary, intervene as a unit to impede any bombardment until the *Hero* had embarked

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all of its evacuees and cleared the harbor. It was a sight unique in that era to see the HMS *Galatea* (Rear Admiral Somerville embarked) lead in column formation in order of seniority the German pocket battleship *Deutschland* (Rear Admiral Rolf Carls), the Italian scout destroyer *Malocello*, and the British destroyer *Garland* in maneuvers off the port of Palma. The announced bombardment never transpired, and the newly baptized "sausage-sauerkraut-macaroni squadron" returned to the undisturbed port at sunset. Admiral Somerville's collegial and respectful leadership made a very strong positive impression on both Italian and German officers. The experience prompted Admiral Carls to signal to Somerville that "it would be much better if the nations of Europe could cooperate with each other much as their ships have sailed together here." Somerville's reply affirmed that hope with both special pleasure and seriousness.⁴⁹

V

The vast cooperative enterprise, especially among the British, French, Italian, and German navies, along with chartered merchant ships, evacuated all comers as expeditiously as possible, irrespective of nationality. British, French, and Italian ships evacuated far more refugees of other nationalities than of their own, and the Germans about equal numbers of Germans and non-Germans. Through this common effort, nations were assured that their citizens were provided passage under the protection of some flag, even if not their own. Only the U.S. Navy focused on seeking out Americans for evacuation, yet almost 40 percent of the evacuees in its ships were non-U.S. citizens, many from Latin American nations. All states tried to advise their nationals in Spain, through embassy or consular officials, to evacuate while the means to do so were still available. Many never got the word, but in the end the large majority did make it to evacuation ports by one means or another. Eventually from 80 to 90 percent of the foreigners in Spain were evacuated.

British evacuation efforts most heavily relied on warships (of which it had a plentiful supply) as transports. The British used the permanent station vessels at Gibraltar, especially the destroyer *Shamrock*, and also destroyers of the Mediterranean Fleet, to shuttle from southern ports such as Málaga to "the Rock," which soon became overcrowded.⁵⁰ Cruisers or other large ships of the Mediterranean fleet were constantly stationed in the eastern ports of Barcelona, Valencia, and Alicante. A procedure was soon developed whereby destroyers steamed daily up and down the coast, collected refugees from ports large and small, and brought them to larger Royal Navy ships that served as "refugee clearing stations" in the major ports. These latter were the cruiser *London* (later her sister *Shropshire*, and again *London*) alongside in Barcelona, the depot ships *Resource* and *Despatch*

anchored in Valencia harbor, and the hospital ship *Maine* and the depot ships *Woolwich* and, again, *Despatch* in Alicante. The *Maine* also served as an evacuation ship from Valencia and Alicante. The cruiser *Galatea* served in a similar capacity for a time in Palma de Mallorca.

On board these relatively roomy ships, refugees, who were limited to three suitcases per person, received hot meals, dry quarters, and entertainment from the ships' bands or phonograph records. Officers and crew slept on deck, giving over their quarters for the night, "important personages" receiving the best ones. Sailors provided sweets and led games for the children. Spaces were converted into kennels for pet dogs, who often howled through the night, keeping everyone awake.⁵¹ Early each morning, refugees were ushered onto the crowded weather decks of destroyers for a high-speed run to Marseilles, 230 miles from Barcelona. Speed produced spray, but the destroyers had to arrive in Marseilles before customs closed for the day. Destroyers carried up to three hundred at a time and had no overnight accommodations or shelter in case of rain. Canvas screens helped to protect the huddled refugees from drenching spray, but nothing could be done to alleviate the discomfort produced by the frequently foul Mediterranean weather. Seasickness in close quarters on the soaked weather decks of wildly pitching and rolling destroyers all too often added to the misery. The "destroyer ferry service," if not comfortable, however, was efficient and prompt.

In the Bay of Biscay, British destroyers also plied between Gijón, Santander, Bilbao, or San Sebastián and the small French resort of St. Jean de Luz close by the Spanish border, depositing up to three thousand refugees a day on the overtaxed resources of the town. The threat of mines off Spanish harbors made the roadstead at St. Jean de Luz the only safe anchorage, greatly adding to the congestion. From Marseilles or St. Jean de Luz, evacuees, many of who had no other home but in Spain, were expected to disperse by train. All were, at that point, on their own.⁵²

In the first month of the civil war, forty-one Royal Navy warships and two British merchant vessels were employed in evacuation efforts. About twenty British warships served in Spanish waters at any one time, a level that was maintained for months.

Other states relied more on chartered merchant ships for their main evacuation efforts. By 30 July the French Navy had eleven warships in service on the Mediterranean coast, with five more on the north coast. A week later, France settled into a pattern of maintaining a cruiser in Barcelona, a cruiser or a large destroyer in Málaga and in Tangier, three destroyers in the region of Valencia and the Balearics, a destroyer at the Straits, and one large destroyer on the north coast, for a sum of eight or more warships on Spanish duty. (The total would soon be reduced to six.) Barcelona always held the priority for French naval

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presence. French evacuation destroyers made the Barcelona–Marseilles and north coast–St. Jean de Luz runs as did the British, but larger numbers jammed five chartered passenger steamers between Barcelona and Marseilles and one more in the Bay of Biscay.⁵³

Italy maintained a large naval presence in Spanish waters but, like France, relied on chartered merchant ships for her main evacuation effort, all of which was in the western Mediterranean. Cruisers or large destroyers were stationed in Barcelona, Valencia, Palma de Mallorca, and Tangier. Six to ten Italian warships were in Spanish waters at any one time. To refuel these vessels, chartered oilers were stationed in Barcelona, and later in Tangier and Palma as well. Warships collected refugees from various Mediterranean ports and brought them to evacuation vessels waiting in Barcelona or Valencia—the liners *Principessa Maria*, *Principessa Giovanna*, and *Sicilia*, and the government hospital ships *Tevere* and *Urania*. Some of these ships had just come off Ethiopian duty. When full, they sailed for Genoa, landing 500–1,500 refugees per trip. By 7 August, four such chartered vessels had made six evacuation trips from Barcelona and one from Valencia, carrying a total of 6,400 refugees. Between 26 August and 22 September, two vessels made two trips each, with another 1,600 persons. In addition, two merchant ships and one cruiser evacuated the Italian colony in Málaga. All vessels embarked endangered pro-Nationalist Spaniards whenever possible.⁵⁴

“As humanitarianism had pulled naval officers together, the imperatives of power politics would increasingly drive them apart.”

German warships first arrived at San Sebastián and Bilbao, where they were dissuaded by British officers from sending armed landing parties ashore.⁵⁵ Despite some attacks on German property and taunts from townspeople, German naval personnel, soon learning that it was safer for the German colony if the German navy was non-provocative and that a friendly demeanor received a like response, fell into an evacuation pattern similar to that being set by other navies. Within the first month of the evacuation effort, German warships on the northern coast made eight evacuation runs from northern Spanish ports to St. Jean de Luz or Bayonne, but more often warships aided the collection of refugees into the major harbors, from which hastily chartered German merchant ships, especially the *Bellona* and *Bessel*, made sixteen evacuation runs by 23 August and more thereafter. Leaving the cruiser *Köln* and two torpedo boats to look after the north coast, the armored ships *Deutschland* and *Admiral Scheer*, with four torpedo boats, sailed for the Mediterranean, the location of the major concentrations of German citizens. There, German warships maintained a presence in Republican ports,

while over the first month eighteen German merchant vessels made thirty-two evacuation trips, mostly to Genoa. By late August the first contingent of German warships was relieved by the armored ship *Admiral Graf Spee*, the cruisers *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig*, and six torpedo boats. This pattern was repeated until almost the entire German navy had rotated through multiple tours of duty off Spain. German warships shared with U.S. warships in Spanish waters the burden of a lack of bases in the region; oilers and supply ships of the German fleet train had to take station in Spanish waters, with access granted to Nationalist ports. In this way the German naval presence was kept continuous for two years, representing, as noted above, a greater proportion of the total navy than that of any other power supporting its nation's interests in the Spanish troubles.⁵⁶

The United States, after employing the battleship *Oklahoma* on the north coast, dispatched her to the south coast, leaving only the small Coast Guard cutter *Cayuga* behind in the Bay of Biscay. Ambassador Claude Bowers, cut off from American consuls and citizens in the north, used the *Cayuga* as a floating embassy as he toured port after port, consulting American consuls and evacuating American and other refugees. *Cayuga* left for home in early October, leaving no American naval presence in the Bay of Biscay except, briefly, for the USS *Erie* in December. The *Oklahoma* in the Mediterranean was relieved at the end of August by two destroyers, USS *Hatfield* (DD 231) and *Kane*, and at the end of September the cruiser *Quincy* by the *Raleigh* (CL 7). Thus was established the pattern that would last for the duration of the war—an American presence in Spanish waters of one cruiser and two destroyers, designated Squadron 40 (T). American evacuations quickly tapered off in September, when few Americans could be found who would leave. On these last trips U.S. warships evacuated far more persons of other nationalities than Americans.

Despite the pleas of American consular officers that their own effectiveness and safety required the presence of American warships in Spanish harbors, political caution required that the reduction of risks to the ships take precedence over exercising a protective presence. The ships of Squadron 40 (T) settled down out of sight in quiet French ports to await developments. Periodically relieved, the three ships of Squadron 40 (T) remained on uneventful duty until 1940.⁵⁷

Other states were also involved in evacuation efforts. In August the Portuguese destroyer *Lima* on the north coast and the sloop *Afonso de Albuquerque* in the Mediterranean collected 207 Portuguese, Brazilians, and other refugees, delivering them to Lisbon.⁵⁸ The new Mexican armed gunboat *Durango*, built in Valencia and just turned over to the Mexican government, carried 170 Latin American refugees on her voyage home in October. In August the Yugoslav motor vessel *Nikolina Matkovic* carried eighty-six evacuees from Málaga to Casablanca.⁵⁹ Private yachts extricated a few more.

VI

A special problem was that of political asylum. Up to 15,000 rightist Spaniards took refuge in foreign embassies in Madrid, but the Republican government refused to recognize the legal right of asylum. Conditions in embassy buildings were stifling and insecure. The Argentine government, representing other states that had a long tradition of recognizing the right of asylum, demanded that the Republic guarantee safe passage for all those who had taken sanctuary under foreign protection. When the Republic did not relent, Argentina sent the cruiser *25 de Mayo* in August to lend muscle to diplomacy. By stages the Republic gave way, allowing out women and children, then some men, but never men of military age. Slowly over the fall of 1936, groups of Spaniards made their way under safe-conduct from Madrid embassies to Valencia or Alicante, where the *25 de Mayo* was waiting. She made three trips to Marseilles with a total of 257 persons before she was relieved by the Argentine destroyer *Tucumán*, which carried about 1,500 more in twelve voyages from November 1936 to June 1937.⁶⁰

Foreign warships also aided in hostage exchanges and releases. In the fall of 1936, thanks to the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross, French and British destroyers evacuated 113 Spanish women and children, family members of political prisoners, from Bilbao to St. Jean de Luz and exchanged three hundred Republican women for two hundred Nationalist hostages in Republican hands. Due to the bitterness of the civil war, such exchanges were always chancy and difficult, requiring the utmost in diplomatic tact by Red Cross officials and naval officers alike. Exchanges continued on a small scale for the rest of the war.⁶¹ In August, in hopes of avoiding Nationalist attack, miners of the Río Tinto mines held hostage thirty-eight British and American technical representatives attached to the mines. HMS *Brazen* was dispatched to Huelva, the closest port, with orders to use force if necessary to obtain the release of the foreigners. The threat was enough, and the foreigners were safely evacuated.⁶² In addition, Portugal in October embarked 1,200 Spanish Republicans (who had fled to safety across the Portuguese border early in the war) aboard the *Nyassa*, the largest passenger vessel flying the Portuguese flag, and delivered them under destroyer escort to Tarragona.⁶³

By the end of October 1936, by which point the evacuation effort had greatly slowed, French ships had evacuated approximately 20,000 persons (including 5,000 French citizens), German ships 15,500 (including 8,000 Germans), British ships 12,000 (including 4,000 British), Italian ships 8,300 (including approximately 3,000 Italians), U.S. ships 1,300 (including 800 Americans), and ships of other states about 800, for a total of about 58,000. This did not include exchanges

Table 2.

| Flag | Total/Nationals Evacuated | Percentage Nat./Non-Nat. Evacuated | Percentage Resident Nationals Evacuated |
|--------------|------------------------------|--|---|
| French | 20,000/ 5,000 | 25/75 | 29 |
| German | 15,500/ 8,000 | 52/48 | 53 |
| British | 12,000/ 4,000 | 33/67 | 50 |
| Italian | 8,300/ 3,000 | 36/64 | 75 |
| U.S. | 1,300/ 800 | 62/38 | 53 |
| Other | 800/ - | | |
| Total | 57,900 | | |

**Evacuations by Sea
July through October 1936**

of hostages and prisoners (see table 2). The total reached 61,000 by the end of 1936 and approximately 75,000 by early fall 1937.⁶⁴

Evacuations from October 1937 to the end of the war on 1 April 1939 form part of another story, that of the collapse of the Spanish Republic—a distinct drama with characteristics of its own. In those latter days, as the enemy closed in, quays became packed with frightened and endangered Republican Spaniards desperate for a way out. Neutral foreign war and merchant ships, mostly British, evacuated those they could, leaving the majority to fall into the clutches of Franco's harsh justice. Those fortunate enough to be evacuated by the end of March 1939 raised the final total to over 187,000.⁶⁵

Progressively through the summer and fall of 1936, as naval cooperation took root and common attitudes were shared and as ships faced together the rigors and dangers of evacuation duty, Italian and German naval officers realized with increasing delight that they had finally rejoined the international community as equals. Their self-esteem rose, and they became more anxious to please.⁶⁶ Stories of the humanitarian work filled the newspapers back home. Photographs of a smiling British sailor holding a baby, or a German sailor passing an infant to waiting arms on the pier, or a French seaman with a young child on his shoulders, or a smiling Italian sailor with a child in his arms were distributed liberally to the press.⁶⁷ That both diplomatic officers and warships helped in the evacuation of each other's citizens was as good for morale and self-satisfaction as, potentially, for international politics.⁶⁸ All involved navies basked in genuine expressions of gratitude, in many tongues, from people of many lands.⁶⁹ By mid-October, when the pressures of evacuation had eased, all could begin to relax in the glow of a job well done. In

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November the Germans held a big party on board the *Admiral Scheer* in the harbor of the Tangier, whose Control Commission of allies from the Great War remained a reminder of the humiliation of Germany. Representatives of the several nations in town and of the international assemblage of warships were invited. It was a great success. The commanding officer remarked in his report that to receive on board such a reception in a harbor that had been off-limits to the German navy was very good. Versailles was being undone.⁷⁰

VII

By the time of the Tangier gala, however, it had become clear that the whole episode in international cooperation and good will had not signaled a turnabout in international politics. An undercurrent of hostility and threat was rising as the wave of humanitarian cooperation diminished; Europe would continue on its downslide to war. As humanitarianism had pulled naval officers together, the imperatives of power politics would increasingly drive them apart. To pursue their expansionist ambitions, the dictators had intervened militarily in the Spanish Civil War, Hitler starting on 27 July and Mussolini on 30 July.⁷¹ Although first they sent only aircraft and their support, the German and Italian clandestine but transparent intervention intensified as their public policy became ever more duplicitous. This intervention was a direct threat to the interests of Britain and France in calming the situation and containing the dictators. The international crisis was heating up.

In August, Italy began to transform Mallorca into a Fascist bastion and base of operations that could establish a lasting Italian military presence in the Balearics, a clear threat to French and British interests. On the 17th, the day Captain Biancheri of the destroyer *Maestrale* reported that he and Admiral Somerville were such "good friends," Biancheri sailed for Italy with 604,000 gold pesetas that had been secretly loaded to be used toward an Italian military buildup on Mallorca.⁷² Three days later, on the same day the international "sausage-sauerkraut-macaroni" squadron was formed, three Italian warplanes arrived with their markings painted out, the first of a steady stream that would make Mallorca a bristling Italian air base. From his arrival on 16 August, Commander Carlo Margottini, the commanding officer of the scout destroyer *Malocello*, which had relieved the *Maestrale* on ostensibly humanitarian duty in Palma de Mallorca, became a key organizer of the Italian naval and air buildup.

Margottini was an energetic practitioner of clandestine military operations. The peculiar comings and goings of the *Malocello*, the nameless cargo ships under escort, the mysterious cargoes being transshipped, and Margottini's bland and vague explanations soon aroused British and French suspicions. The captain of HMS *Grenville*, praising Italian naval cooperation, exempted the *Malocello* "as

her policy has necessarily been one of evasion rather than co-operation." Britain and France rightly worried about Italian designs on the island in case of a Spanish disintegration. The British Chiefs of Staff told naval officers to be wary of "possible aggressive action by Italy." Britain and France started keeping ships in Palma just to keep an eye on Italian activities; Italian diplomatic denials only increased suspicion. By late August an increasing stream of supposedly innocent Italian arms ships was headed for Nationalist ports, escorted by Italian warships that were otherwise on humanitarian duty. By early September Italian military participation had been crucial in the defeat of the Republican amphibious attempt to retake Mallorca. Anglo-French mistrust of Mussolini's Italy was clearly ascendant among naval officers in Spanish waters.⁷³

Italy, in any case, had returned the favor by accusing the French seaplane carrier on evacuation duty, *Commandant Teste*, of secretly landing war material by night in Barcelona for use of the "Red militia."⁷⁴ Italy and France soon began trading accusations in the newly formed international war-containing consortium of diplomats, the Non-Intervention Committee.⁷⁵ In November, French and Italian sailors on shore leave in Tangier got into a fight, after which Italian sailors rioted and wrecked leftist cafes.⁷⁶ It was a matter of hurled epithets and bad blood from then on.

German intervention was a bit slower and more cautious than the Italian, but provocative German ways reappeared at sea. Despite official neutrality, the dispatch of German transport aircraft on 27 July to ferry Franco's troops from Spanish Morocco to the Peninsula was plain to see. Rear Admiral Rolf Carls, in command of German naval forces in Spanish waters, while protesting German neutrality, on 2 August ostentatiously steamed into the harbor of Ceuta with the *Deutschland* and *Luchs*, reviewed Nationalist troops, shouted slogans of support to the delight of Nationalist spectators (who shouted back "Heil Hitler!"), and had long secret meetings with Franco and other Nationalist military chiefs in which procedures for further German military aid were coordinated. His crews were meanwhile treated to the town. The visit boosted Nationalist morale, alarmed the democracies, and made front-page news around the world for days. German foreign minister Neurath vainly protested to the French ambassador that the visit was solely for the humanitarian purpose of arranging evacuations. No evacuations, however, were needed or carried out from Ceuta or other Nationalist territory.⁷⁷

Greatly alarmed by German activity in Ceuta and other signs of German and Italian intervention in the Spanish troubles, Vice Admiral François Darlan led a high-level delegation to London on 5 August to plead for a concerted Anglo-French military response to stem the spread of Italian and German power. He raised the specter of a possible German takeover of the Canary Islands, which sat astride British strategic lifelines. The British Admiralty and Cabinet thought

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the French fears excessive and preferred non-provocative diplomacy, but as a precaution quietly kept a British cruiser in the Canary Islands on "humanitarian" duty.⁷⁸

Also on 5 August, Admiral Carls received orders for a secret "special mission" to protect the German merchant vessel *Usaramo* on its way to Cádiz carrying war material for the Nationalist cause. Carls gathered his force and steamed to a rendezvous, an impending operation to refuel from a German tanker off the Portuguese coast as handy cover. His warships had to keep a deceptive distance to maintain appearances that the warships had no other purpose than humanitarian duty, but this negated any practical defense of the *Usaramo*. In fact, the steamer was fired upon (but not hit) by a blockading Republican destroyer as it entered Cádiz harbor early on 6 August. The German squadron also covered the departure of the *Usaramo* two days later, again at great distance. Two weeks later, two further "special mission" freighters appeared, the *Wigbert*, secretly carrying warplanes for the Nationalists, and the *Kamerun*, loaded with fuel and oil products for these aircraft. The *Wigbert* was diverted from Cádiz to friendly Lisbon without incident, but the Republican blockading cruiser *Libertad* stopped and searched the *Kamerun* in the Straits, prompting the master to bring forth a cover story of an innocent destination in Genoa. The Spaniards were not convinced. German warships steamed at high speed to rescue the detained steamer, and Admiral Carls strongly protested the interference with innocent German ships on the high seas. A serious confrontation at sea was narrowly averted. Shortly after, the world correctly guessed the mission of these ships when new German fighters appeared in Spanish skies. Soon more German freighters, most on "special missions," called for naval protection.⁷⁹

The double role—humanitarian relief and protecting clandestine arms traffic, naval cooperation and naval deception—disturbed Admiral Carls. German military intervention could not be kept secret, and now the German navy was implicated. The naval cooperation symbolized by his participation in the "sausage-sauerkraut-macaroni" squadron at Palma on 19 August was gravely at risk; his hope for political cooperation to match the existing naval cooperation was sincere. He reminded Berlin that the new mission of defending secret arms ships was an international incident at sea begging to happen, endangering German citizens yet in Spain and putting all German refugee ships in jeopardy. He recommended that the naval defense role be terminated, that "special mission" steamers enter Nationalist ports on their own during total darkness or stormy weather or be protected by day on the last leg of their voyage by aircraft from land, and that German naval units in Spanish waters return to normal pursuits less fraught with unpredictable repercussions. Admiral Raeder agreed and on 22 August laid before Hitler his own recommended options—either (and preferably) curtail German intervention and restore impartiality in German actions concerning Spain, thus minimizing risks in

a war whose outcome Germany could not guarantee at the current level of aid; or escalate German intervention greatly to ensure Franco's victory, accepting the political risks of so doing. On 25 August, Hitler decided on a middle course of limited escalation, the increased German intervention still to be kept secret. Thus Hitler could keep his options open while stirring the pot in the Mediterranean. Within two weeks, a steady stream of German arms ships, an eventual total of 180, was on its way to Spain.⁸⁰

By 6 October the main German naval mission in Spain had shifted from refugee work to the escort of German arms ships. Intelligence-gathering in Republican ports became another task; German warships became the long-distance eyes of the Nationalist navy, seeing right into the Republican military ports and naval bases themselves. The Republican defenders were silent, for fear of retaliation, but British naval observers were well aware of the German purpose.⁸¹

By mid-November, the Italian and German navies were engaged in political and operational clandestine submarine warfare against the Spanish Republic, riveting the attention of cabinets and the press. Responsibility was quickly laid at the doorsteps of Germany and Italy.⁸² But this was still only the beginning. There was much more Italian and German military intervention to come, on land, sea, and in the air. In 1937, one more opportunity presented itself for international cooperation at sea in the Spanish Civil War—naval patrols to control the flow of contraband. By this time, however, lines had been drawn, opposing alignments solidified, and war containment shown a sham. The Second World War would not be far off.

VIII

Italians and Germans longed for respect. For a little while during the first weeks of the Spanish Civil War, they received it freely. The evacuation efforts at sea became an arena for friendly international cooperation between the official representatives of the democracies and dictatorships. Through their cooperation, naval officers in particular created an opportunity that might have been built upon to reduce international tension had the political will been there to do it. This humanitarian cooperation, however, was far too limited to sustain the requirements of national honor and the demands of power politics under strutting leaders who anticipated respect only through coercion and preferred to be feared rather than loved.

Cooperative evacuation duty, in fact, masked the politically provocative interventionist actions of Italian and German warships. Had there been no evacuation duty in which participation of the Italian and German navies was welcome, their subsequent and overlapping direct maritime intervention in the

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Spanish conflict would have been more obvious and more politically risky. A cautious Hitler might well have preferred a free hand not tied to the uncertainties of political complications in Spain over which he had little control. Alternatively, had the Axis navies intervened in an active, warlike way as they did but without the legitimizing context of multinational evacuations, the shock to British and French security interests might well have provoked the kind of concerted Anglo-French naval opposition that Admiral Darlan hoped for. As it was, the unchallenged presence of Italian and German warships in Spanish waters on cooperative humanitarian duty smoothed the way for an incremental escalation of Axis intervention. Thanks to the gradualism and ambiguity of power politics under the cloak of humanitarian collaboration, the Axis partners were able to intervene as extensively as they did without prompting Britain or France to review sooner their policies of accommodation or America to comprehend earlier the risks of neutrality. Thus, ironically, the unchallenged success of German and Italian warlike action in Spain and the deleterious role it played in the deepening European crisis owe much to the early cooperative and humanitarian nature of foreign naval involvement in the Spanish troubles.

Notes

1. Modern scholarly accounts of the origins of the Spanish Civil War owe a great debt to the first one: Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil War*, 2d ed. (U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1950). The emotional imperatives are displayed in Ronald Fraser, *Blood of Spain: An Oral History of the Spanish Civil War* (New York: Pantheon, 1979). Perhaps the best brief account in English of the civil war itself, including the military campaigns, is Antony Beevor, *The Spanish Civil War* (London: Orbis, 1982).

2. There is as yet no satisfactory survey of the international aspects of the Spanish Civil War. The best to date is Dante A. Puzzo, *Spain and the Great Powers, 1936-1941* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1962), supplemented by my "The Spanish Civil War and the Coming of the Second World War," *The International History Review*, August 1987, pp. 368-409. The best general treatments of the Axis powers and Spain are Mandred Merkes, *Die deutsche Politik im spanischen Bürgerkrieg, 1936-1939*, 2d ed. (Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1969); Hans-Henning Abendroth, *Hitler in der spanischen Arena* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1973); and John F. Coverdale, *Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War* (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975).

3. Among treatments of non-Axis powers and the war in Spain, one might start with Jill Edwards, *The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939* (London: Macmillan, 1979); Richard Alan Gordon, "France and the Spanish Civil War," Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Columbia Univ., 1971; Richard P. Traina, *American Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1968); and David T. Cattell, *Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1957).

4. The last survey of the size and distribution of the foreign colonies had been in 1930. See Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division, *Spain and Portugal*, v. 3, *Spain*, B.R. 502a (March 1944), p. 125. To this was added incomplete further evidence scattered in the archives. No state had a reliable count of its nationals in Spain. The numbers and locations of tourists, those most likely to flee at the slightest danger, were particularly elusive for evacuation officials of all countries.

5. Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939* (hereafter *DBFP*), 2d series, v. 17 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979), pp. 8-11; Italian consular telegrams reproduced in Franco Barzoni, *L'impegno navale italiano durante la Guerra Civile Spagnola (1936-1939)* (Rome: Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, 1992), pp. 44-5; Abendroth, *Hitler in der spanischen Arena*, pp. 26-7; Merkes, *Die deutsche Politik*, p. 144; U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1936* (hereafter *FRUS*) (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off. [hereafter GPO], 1954), v. 2, pp. 629-30.

6. The contrast between measured diplomatic reports and lurid press reports is marked.

7. *FRUS*, 1936, v. 2, p. 628.

8. Claude G. Bowers, *My Mission to Spain: Watching the Rehearsal for World War II* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 269.

9. The fullest documentation of maritime evacuation efforts is of that by Britain, Germany, and Italy. The Royal Navy's Reports of Proceedings (hereafter R. of P) of flag officers and ship captains are in ADM/116, Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter PRO). The corresponding Kriegsmarine files, especially War Diaries and Action Reports, are mostly in RM 50 and 92, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg im Breslau (hereafter BA-MA). Italian naval reports from admirals and captains in Spanish waters are in the Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, Rome (hereafter USMM), as is the detailed and useful draft report of the staff officer responsible for coordinating Italian efforts, Commander Candido Bigliardi, "Relazione sulla guerra di Spagna," (hereafter Relazione Bigliardi), *cartella* 3129, USMM.

The U.S. Navy evacuation effort may be traced in the less full Reports of Operations in RG 80, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington (hereafter NARA). The French naval records from the period were largely destroyed during the Second World War, but an official summary remains: "L'Activité de la marine française depuis le début de la Guerre Civile Espagnole" (hereafter "L'Activité de la marine française"), 3.S.1385, Service Historique de la Marine, Vincennes (hereafter SHM), supplemented by data from the archives of other navies and from published sources. Diplomatic documents supplement the records of all these navies.

10. W 6759/62/41, 22 July 1936, FO 371/20523, PRO.

11. R. of P, 1st Destroyer Flotilla, 31 July 1936, ADM 116/3052; Minute, W 6778/62/41, 21 July 1936, FO 371/20523, PRO.

12. "L'Activité de la marine française," 2-3, 3.S.1385, SHM. See also Bulletin de Renseignements No. 10, *er seq.*, 1 BB² 203, SHM.

13. Relazione Bigliardi, sec. 1, p. 5, c. 3129, USMM; Joaquin Arrarás, ed., *Historia de la cruzada española*, 8 vols. (Madrid: Ediciones españolas, 1939-44), v. 6, p. 77.

14. Bargoni, *L'impegno navale italiano*, pp. 44-5; Coverdale, *Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War*, pp. 68-9.

15. *Fiume* report, c. 3035; *Montecucoli* report, c. 3036; *Zara to Fiume*, 22 July 1936, c. 2961; Relazione Bigliardi, sec. 1, pp. 7-13, c. 3129, USMM.

16. Cordell Hull, *Memoirs* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), v. 1, p. 475; *The New York Times*, 1 September 1936.

17. See messages in Dept. of State, 852.00/2219, 2232, RG 59, NARA.

18. U.S. Department of the Navy, "Midshipmen's Training Cruises," December 1933-March 1937, 6825, carton 366, folder 10, Naval Historical Center, Washington; Commander, Cader Practice Squadron, to Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, 4 August 1936, "601 Cayuga," box 1068, RG 26, NARA.

19. Erich Raeder, *My Life* (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1960), p. 221; Dieckhoff to Moltke, 24 July 1936, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945* (hereafter DGFP), ser. C, v. 5 (Washington: GPO, 1966), p. 821.

20. Tätigkeitsbericht des Befehlshabers der Linienschiffe (hereafter TB des BdL), 23 July-27 August 1936, RM 50/1, BA-MA.

21. Detailed accounts of the evacuation efforts are fullest in the British naval records, followed by the German and Italian. A very useful overall report on British Mediterranean operations is VA, Battle Cruiser Squadron, 28 October 1936, and R. of P, *London*, 23 July-10 October 1936, ADM 116/3051, PRO. The fullest German account is TB des BdL, 23 July-27 August 1936, RM 50/1, BA-MA. The fullest Italian records are the *Fiume* reports, c. 3035, and Relazione Bigliardi, v. 1, pp. 4-15, c. 3129, USMM. Much of the following description of evacuation problems and procedures derives from these sources. The naval records of other nations, despite their more sparse language, point to the similarity of conditions and challenges. Newspaper reports are consistent on details. A reliable contemporary account of British action, written with access to British naval officers and their reports, is Kenneth Edwards, *The Grey Diplomats* (London: Rich & Cowan, 1938), pp. 230-55. Also useful is the official Italian history, Bargoni, *L'impegno navale italiano*, pp. 44-129.

22. For the text of the British radio plea, see *The New York Times*, 7 August 1936. Others were similar.

23. R. of P, *Graffon*, 26 September 1936, ADM 116/3051, PRO.

24. For the German navy and non-Aryan German refugees, see Kriegstagebuch (hereafter KTB) des Befehlshabers der Aufklärungstreitkräfte (hereafter BdA), 19 August-8 October 1936, RM 50/4.

25. Schwendemann to Foreign Ministry, 27 July 1936, RM 20/1181, BA-MA.

26. KTB des BdA, 19 August-8 October 1936, RM 50/4, BA-MA; U.S. Consul, Barcelona, to Secretary of State, 23 July 1936, 852.00/2211, RG 59, NARA; *FRUS*, 1936, v. 2 p. 650. In addition, some Spaniards were able to flee on foot to the safety of Hendeye in the north or Gibraltar in the south, while 1,200 others fled across the Portuguese border. See *FRUS*, 1937, v. 1, p. 245; and *The New York Times*, 25 October 1936.

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27. Britain attempted to control the categories of Spaniards allowed on evacuation ships, but in the confusion and humanitarian needs of the moment such attempts were ignored. See Cabinet Paper 252 (36), CAB 24/264, PRO.

28. For the Mediterranean, see, for example, Rs of P, *London*, 13 October 1936; *Shropshire*, 10 October 1936; and *Grenville*, 28 September 1936, ADM 116/3051, PRO; TB des BdL, 23 July–27 August 1936, RM 50/1; KTB, *Admiral Scheer*, 23 July–29 August 1936, RM 92/5037, BA-MA; and Raeder, *My Life*, pp. 225–6. For the Bay of Biscay, see Rs of P, 1st and 5th Destroyer Flotillas, July–November 1936, ADM 116/3052, PRO; and TB des BdL, 23 July–27 August 1936, RM 50/1, BA-MA.

29. See, for example, U.S. Consul General, Barcelona, to Secretary of State, 22 September 1936, 852.00/3372, RG 59, NARA; R of P, *London*, 10 October 1936; R of P, *Shropshire*, 16 September 1936, ADM 116/3051; R of P, *Exmouth*, September–November 1936, ADM 116/3052, PRO.

30. KTB *Admiral Scheer*, 23 July–29 August 1936, RM 92/5037, BA-MA.

31. R of P, *Grenville*, 28 September 1936, ADM 116/3051, PRO.

32. The attitudes of support for the Nationalists and contempt for the Republicans are clearly evident in the naval records of all states involved, including those of the United States. See, for example, R of P, *London*, 10 October 1936, ADM 116/3051; R of P, *Grofton*, 7 November 1936, ADM 116/3053; copy of R of P, *Galatea*, 9 August 1936, FO 371/20535, PRO; *Fiume* reports, c. 3035, USMM. French attitudes are reported in the records of other states and in Ronald Chalmers Hood III, *Royal Republicans: The French Naval Dynasties between the World Wars* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 161–3.

33. "Spanish Blockade," 19 August 1936, W 9066/62/41, FO 371/20533, PRO; Note Verbale, 20 August 1936, to ten nations, with responses, R 415/39, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Archivo General y Biblioteca (hereafter MAE-AGB), Madrid.

34. HMS *Douglas* on 26 September 1936 persuaded the Republican destroyer *Almirante Miranda* to suspend its bombardment of Ibiza until the *Douglas* had completed its evacuation of foreigners. R of P, *Douglas*, ADM 116/3051, PRO.

35. See reports by Commander Manuel Súnico, N.C. 25-13:23, Archivo Nacional, Servicio Histórico de la Armada, Cuartel General de la Armada, Madrid; and Commander José de Dueñas, A.1, L.21, C.1, Documentación Nacional, Archivo de la Guerra de la Liberación, Servicio Histórico Militar, Madrid.

36. OPNAV to Secretary of State, 7 August 1936, 852.00/2470, RG 59, NARA.

37. Commander Squadron 40 (T), Report of Operations, 19 December 1936, box 2134, RG 80, NARA.

38. Report on the *Blanche* incident, 17 August 1936, ADM/3534, PRO.

39. *FRUS*, 1936, v. 2, pp. 687–90.

40. *The New York Times*, 7 November 1936; *ABC* (Madrid), 6, 7 November 1936; R of P, *Woolwich*, ADM/3054, PRO.

41. R of P, 5th Destroyer Flotilla, 3 October 1936, ADM 116/3052, PRO.

42. R of P, *Grenville*, ADM 116/3051, PRO.

43. TB des BdL, 23 July–27 August 1936, RM 50/1, BA-MA; Fritz Otto Busch, *Kampf vor Spaniens Küsten: Deutsche Marine im spanischen Bürgerkrieg* (Berlin and Leipzig: Schneider, 1939), pp. 92–8.

44. *Fiume* report, 31 July 1936, c. 3035, USMM.

45. These impressions derive from a large number of diverse sources. For the development of mutual respect, see, for example, various Rs of P for *London*, *Shropshire*, *Repulse*, and *Douglas*, ADM 116/3051, and copy of report of Rear Admiral (D), 31 August–2 September 1936, FO 371/20542, PRO; *Moestrale* report, c. 3036, *Fiume* report, c. 3035, USMM; TB des BdL, 23 July–27 August 1936, RM 50/1, BA-MA. U.S. naval logs and reports are full of the outreach of U.S. naval officers to their foreign counterparts on an equal basis of respect. For the Biancheri quote, see *Maestrale* report, c. 3036, USMM. For the U.S. movie offer, see Franklin to Secretary of State, 16 August 1936, 852.00/2924, RG 59, NARA.

46. Raeder, *My Life*, p. 225.

47. Bargoni, *L'impegno navale italiano*, pp. 29–33.

48. Rapporto missione Spagna, *Eugenio di Savoia*, 22 November 1936, c. 3035, USMM; copy of R of P, *Galatea*, 14 August 1936, W9669/62/41, FO 371/20535, PRO; Relazione Bigliardi, sec. 1, pp. 4–6, and sec. 3, pp. 28–34; c. 3129, USMM; Bargoni, *L'impegno navale italiano*, pp. 29–44, 75–8, 117–23. Documents of the Control Committee and the Naval Defense Commission are in c. 3091, USMM.

49. R of P, *Galatea*, 28 September 1936, ADM 116/3051, PRO; TB des BdL, 23 July–27 August 1936, RM 50/1, BA-MA; Diario Missione *Malocello*, 19 August 1936, c. 3044, USMM.

50. See Reports of Proceedings of Royal Navy ships in ADM 116/3051-53; Edwards, *The Grey Diplomats*, pp. 230–41. The pages of *The Times* (London), July–October 1936, contain many details. Movements and locations of the ships of all nations are fully detailed in *Bulletin de Renseignements*, July–November 1936, 1 BB² 91, SHM.

51. See various Rs of P, especially, *London*, 10 October 1936; *Shropshire*, 16 September 1936; *Repulse*, 27 September 1936; *Maine*, July–September 1936; *Resource*, 28 September 1936; *Woolwich*, 3 October 1936; ADM

116/3051, PRO. Experience in London is reported in Noel Wright, *Sun of Memory* (London: Benn, 1947), pp. 127–34.

52. For the “destroyer ferry service” in the Mediterranean, see, especially, Rs of P, *Active, Ardent, Grenade, Grenville, Greyhound, and Repulse*, August–October 1936, ADM 116/3051, PRO; and “Walrus,” “Spanish Patrol: Some Personal Experiences,” *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, August 1936, pp. 522–31. For its counterpart in the Bay of Biscay, see Rs of P, 1st, 2nd, and 5th Destroyer Flotillas, July–November 1936, ADM 116/3052, PRO; and “W.,” “Evacuation of Refugees from Bilhao by HMS ‘Esk’ on Thursday, 17th September 1936,” *The Naval Review*, February 1937, pp. 85–9.

53. “L’Activité de la marine française,” pp. 2–5; Bulletins de Renseignements, July–November 1936, 1 BB² 91, and location charts in “Guerre d’Espagne,” 1 BB² 203, SHM; *The New York Times*, 23, 24, 28, 29, 31 July, 5, 6, 8 August, 11 September 1936; *The Times* (London), 25 July, 3 August, 9, 14 September 1936.

54. Reports of Italian warships; Relazione Bigliardi, sec. 1, pp. 3–15; sec. 2, pp. 16–26; and sec. 3, pp. 27–28, c. 3129, USMM; Bulletins de Renseignements, July–November 1936, 1 BB² 91, and location charts in “Guerre d’Espagne,” 1 BB² 203, SHM; Bargoni, *L’impegno navale italiano*, pp. 44–57, 67–129.

55. *Veteran*, in R of P, 1st Destroyer Flotilla, 31 July 1936, ADM 116/3052, PRO.

56. TB des BdL, 23 July–27 August 1936, RM 50/1; KTB des BdA, 19 August–8 October 1936, RM 50/8; TB des Befehlshabers der Panzerschiffe (hereafter BdP), 1 October–19 November 1936, M 50/8; KTB Admiral Scheer, 23 July–29 August, 4–15 October, 16–29 October, 30 October–6 November, RM 92/5037–40, BA-MA.

57. “Midshipmen’s Training Cruises,” December 1933–March 1937, 6825, carton 366, folder 10, Naval Historical Center; “601 Cayuga,” box 1068, RG 26; Log hooks, U.S. Naval Vessels, RG 24; Reports of Operations, Squadron 40 (T), FC 40-T/A4-3, boxes 2133–34, RG 80, NARA. For the argument of the American consul general in Barcelona for the retention of U.S. warships in Spanish waters, see Mahlon F. Perkins to Secretary of State, 22 September 1936, 852.00/3372, RG 59, NARA.

58. *The Times* (London), 5 September 1936; Mauricio de Oliveira, *La tragedia española en el mar*, 4 vols. (Cádiz: Cerón, 1939), v. 1, pp. 103–4. Infected with Republican sentiments, Alfonso de Albuquerque crewmen unsuccessfully rebelled after this trip. See Portugal, Secretariat of National Propaganda, *Portugal ante la guerra civil de España* (Lisbon: Ediciones SPN, [1939]), pp. 27–29; British government reports on the mutiny in FO 371/20511, PRO; and *The Times* (London), 9, 14, 23 September 1936.

59. *The New York Times*, 23 October 1936; *The Times* (London), 25 August 1936.

60. For asylum and international law, see Norman Padelford, *International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife* (New York: Macmillan, 1939), pp. 157–68; and Rafael V. del Castillo y Bahena, *El asilo diplomático* (México, D.F.: Escuela Nacional de Jurisprudencia, 1951), pp. 41–7. For Argentine action, see Joe Robert Juárez, “Argentine Neutrality, Mediation, and Asylum during the Spanish Civil War,” *The Americas: A Quarterly Review of Inter-American Cultural History*, April 1963, pp. 383–403; and Clara Canipoamor and Federico Fernández Castillejo, *Heroísmo criollo: la marina argentina en el drama español* (Buenos Aires: Fanetti & Gasperini, 1939). Evacuees are listed on pp. 213–38. For German support, see TB des BdL, 23 July–27 August 1936, RM 50/1, BA-MA.

61. Marcel Junod, *Warrior without Weapons* (New York: Macmillan, 1951), pp. 78–107; Spain, Government of Euzkadi, *Rebel Opposition to Efforts for the Humanisation of the Civil War in Spain* (London: Spanish Embassy, 1937), pp. 4–10; Rs of P, *Exmouth and Esk*, September–October 1936, and *Fearless and Foresight*, November 1936, ADM/116 3052, 3512, PRO. For ongoing efforts, see José Giral, *Año y medio de gestiones de causas* ([Barcelona]: n.p., [1938]).

62. *FRUS*, 1936, v. 2, pp. 71–2; *The New York Times*, 15, 16 August 1936. The Report of Proceedings, *HMS Brazen*, has not been found.

63. Pro Memoria, Portuguese legation to the Department of State, 18 February 1937, *FRUS*, 1937, v. 1, p. 245; *The New York Times*, 25 October 1936.

64. Reliable total figures are elusive. Many are extrapolated from available data that are partial and inconsistent as to the groups measured and the points in time to which the statistics refer. Estimates in the press and even by officials vary widely. For key statistics see “L’Activité de la marine française,” 3, 5, 3.S.1385, SHM; TB des BdL, 23 July–27 August 1936, Anlage 5, RM 50/1, BA-MA; Military Branch, Admiralty, “The British Navy in the Spanish Civil War,” 6 April 1938, ADM 116/3677; Relazione Bigliardi, sec. 1, p. 14, c. 3129, USMM.

65. By mid-March 1939, British warships had evacuated 27,000 refugees representing fifty-five nations, and 100,000 Spaniards. See statement of Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty, 16 March 1939, in Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons, Official Report*, 5th Series, v. 345, p. 652.

66. This picture comes across clearly in German records and British reports of their contacts with Italian and German officers. For an example, see copy of R of P, Rear Admiral (D), in *Galatea*, 31 August–2 September 1936, FO 371/20542, PRO.

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67. The press, and especially the weekend photo-magazines, vividly carried the story in pictures. Clippings from foreign newspapers found in various naval archives attest to the similarity of treatment. Vice Admiral, Battle Cruiser Squadron, with his report of 28 October 1936, sent numerous photos to the Admiralty for distribution to the press. An example of press coverage is *The Illustrated London News*, 26 September 1936, p. 520. Pictures of the German humanitarian effort distributed to the press were reproduced in Busch, *Kampf vor Spaniens Küsten*, p. 76. Similar Italian photos are in Bargoni, *L'impegno naval italiano*, p. 47.

68. Merkes makes this point in *Die deutsche Politik*, p. 151.

69. Many letters and clippings are in the various naval archives. *The Times* (London) for October and November 1936 is full of letters of gratitude. Commander Bigliardi reports on similar letters in *Relazione*, sec. 1, p. 15, c. 3129, USMM.

70. KTB *Admiral Scheer*, 30 October–6 November 1936, RM 92/5040, MA-BA.

71. The initial acts of German and Italian military intervention are documented in "Das 'Unternehmen Feuerzauber,'" part 1 of "Zu dem Stand der Bearbeitung der Geschichte der Legion Condor," RL 2 IV/1, BA-MA; and Pro Memoria, "Sulla missione del piroscafo 'Emilio Morandi,'" c. 3098, USMM.

72. L. Biancheri, "Vendita materiale a Maiorca," 23 August 1936, c. 3036, USMM; "Appunto," 11 August 1936, busta 2, Spagna-Fondo di Guerra, Ufficio Spagna, Archivio Storico-Diplomatico, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome (hereafter ASD-MAE).

73. Carlo Margottini, "Relazione sul contributo della R[^] Marina alla liberazione di Mallorca ed Ibiza," c. 3098, *Pola*, "Situazione militare e politica dell'Isola di Maiorca," c. 2953; Diario missione, *Malocello*, pp. 15–31 August 1936, c. 3044; *Relazione Bigliardi*, sec. 2, p. 21, and sec. 4, p. 36, c.3129, USMM; copy of R of P, Rear Admiral (D), *Galatea*, 31 August–2 September 1936, FO 371/20542; R of P, *Grenville*, 28 September 1936, ADM 116/3051; Foreign Office minutes, "Possible Italian designs on the Balearic Islands," W 10452/9549/41, 31 August 1936, FO 371/20574; Chiefs of Staff recommendation, Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, 1 September 1936, W 10288/62/41, FO 371/20536, PRO; Chamberun to Delbos, 13 October 1936, *Documents diplomatiques français, 1932–1939* (hereafter DDF), 2d series, v. 3 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1966), p. 508.

In the course of the war, Italy sent a total of 270 escorted arms ships to Spain. See "Elenco cronologico dei piroscafi partiti per O.M.S.," "Spagna-Fondo di Guerra, Ufficio Spagna, b. 129-131, ASD-MAE.

To keep a close eye on Italian activity, the French Navy maintained two warships in Palma for months on end. The British Foreign Office, wanting to keep the subtle pressure on Italy, objected to the Admiralty's desire in November to reduce the British naval presence below the requested three ships. After the evacuation need had diminished, the Royal Navy regarded a continuous naval presence in Spanish waters as a nuisance that would interfere with training and maintenance schedules. A Foreign Office official minuted in disgust, "It is always a matter of the utmost difficulty to get the Navy to send ships anywhere for pol[itical] purposes." See W 16831/62/41, FO 371/20551, and W 18017/62/41, FO 371/20554, PRO.

74. Entries for 12 and 13 August 1936, "Diario degli avvenimenti navali nel conflitto spagnolo," c. 3129; *Relazione Bigliardi*, sec. 2, p. 17, c. 3129, USMM. It is possible, but unlikely, that the *Commandant Teste* landed war material as alleged. France did send aircraft to the Republic in the early days of the war but denied use of the seaplane carrier for this purpose. The French naval records that would clarify the point were destroyed in the Second World War.

75. International Committee for the Application of the Agreement Regarding Non-Intervention in Spain, *Stenographic Notes of Proceedings, N.I.S. (36), 5th–10th Meetings, 9 October–4 November 1936*, FO 849/1, PRO.

76. R of P, Rear Admiral 1st Cruiser Squadron, *Sussex*, 8 December 1936, ADM 116/3052, PRO; *Relazione Bigliardi*, sec. 3, p. 34, c. 3129, USMM.

77. TB des BdL, 23 July–27 August 1936, RM 50/1, BA-MA; *DGFP*, D, v. 3, pp. 26–8; France, *Assemblée Nationale, Les événements survenus en France de 1933 à 1945, Annexes (Dépositions)* (Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1951), v. 1, p. 219; *DDF*, 2nd, v. 3, p. 155.

78. *DDF*, 2nd, v. 3, pp. 130–3; *DBFP*, 2nd, v. 17, pp. 61–2; correspondence on a continuing British naval presence in the Canary Islands in FO 371/20536, PRO.

79. TB des BdL, 23 July–27 August 1936, RM 50/1; KTB *Admiral Scheer*, 23 July–29 August 1936, RM 92/5037, BA-MA. I have discussed these incidents in "Politico-Military Deception at Sea in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39," *Intelligence and National Security*, July 1990, pp. 89–91.

80. TB des BdL, 23 July–27 August 1936, RM 50/1, BA-MA; *DGFP*, D, v. 3, pp. 50–2; General Karl Warlimont, Statement submitted to American intelligence officers, 22 September 1945, *The Nation*, 13 April 1946, pp. 429–30. For German arms shipments, see tables in Merkes, *Die deutsche Politik*, pp. 374–9.

81. German torpedo boats braved the Republican harbors of Cartagena and Alicante to photograph the details of arriving Republican arms cargoes and pass on the data to the Nationalist headquarters. See TB BdP, 1 October–19 November 1936, RM 50/8, BA-MA; R of P, *Grafton*, 14–31 October 1936, ADM 116/3053, PRO. By November, German naval war diaries had taken on a clearly wartime tone.

82. I have written on this secret naval warfare in "Political-Military Deception," and "German Clandestine Submarine Warfare in the Spanish Civil War, 1936," William R. Roberts and Jack Sweetman, eds., *New Interpretations in Naval History: . . . Ninth Naval History Symposium . . . 1989* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 107-123.

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Japanese POW Ships

Writer of book in progress needs personal information, photographs, and other documentation from World War II naval veterans who have knowledge of the sinking of Japanese ships transporting U.S. and Allied prisoners of war. Contributors will be credited. Write: Lt. Col. R.F. Sawallesh, U.S. Army, Ret., 2541 Brimhollow Drive, Valrico, Fla. 33594.

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