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Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin: The Memoirs of Yegor Ligachev

Joseph Gibbs

Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev

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United States, so any buildup in the Russian fleet now would be overtaken by forced reductions at a later date.

Early on, says Stephen J. Cimbala of Pennsylvania State University, Mikhail Gorbachev realized that the security of the Soviet Union could no longer be unilaterally guaranteed by force. Multi-lateral arrangements, emphasizing negotiated settlements, would be the key in the future. This is most likely a precursor to one of the basic tenets of the new doctrine—that Russia views no sovereign state as her enemy. Graham Turbiville, Jr., Senior Analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, further argues that some of the greatest threats to the Soviet Union were from within, such as drugs, crime, and arms sales. Today, reform of the military cannot begin in earnest until these issues are addressed. Finally, the ethnic issue will not go away. Although part of the dilemma has been mitigated by the establishment of armies in the independent states, conscription is down, and there appears to be a refusal to enforce draft requirements on ethnic Russians.

The Soviet Military and the Future captures the Soviet forces in the middle of their decline. It is an interesting and important work.

SUSAN TERRANOVA
Major, U.S. Army
Washington, D.C.

Ligachev, Yegor Kuzmich. *Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin: The Memoirs of Yegor Ligachev*. New York: Pantheon, 1993. 369pp. \$27.50

As second secretary to Mikhail Gorbachev in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1988, Yegor Ligachev was considered a looming threat by supporters of Gorbachev's reforms. A "conservative" and elderly (born 1920) Politburo member responsible for ideology and personnel matters, he held enough power to usurp (and potentially oust) his younger boss. At the time, many in the West saw him as Gorbachev's alter ego—a gray, inflexible *apparatchik* likely to reverse the domestic thaw and kick-start a return to Cold War tension.

Despite his poor relations with Gorbachev, their association evidently tainted Ligachev in the eyes of the conservative rank-and-file. Such strains precipitated his shuttle into retirement at the 28th Party Congress. Yet Ligachev has resurfaced recently as an elder statesman urging the unification of the fragmented Russian left.

Ligachev's book is remarkably candid, and it is perhaps the first genuine memoir by a high-ranking Soviet leader since Trotsky. Selective and often self-serving, Ligachev shows that he emerged unrepentant from the Soviet Union's collapse. Yet the book offers a fascinating look from a hardliner's perspective at the Soviet Union during its final time of troubles.

Ligachev argues that *perestroika* in its original form represented the necessary progression of the reforms attempted by Yuri Andropov during his short tenure as General Secretary. He expresses "joy" in recalling "the country's spiritual élan in the first years of *perestroika*. . . ." But the author's idea of *perestroika* remains Andropovite, and

within communist limits. "My personal position on the question of private ownership of the means of production is well known," writes Ligachev. "It corresponds to the main original slogan of *perestroika*, in whose development I participated: More democracy, more socialism!" Seven pages later, he argues: "There is only one type of ownership and economic structure, and that is socialist."

Gorbachev comes across surprisingly sympathetic in Ligachev's account of *perestroika*'s downfall. Ligachev aims his ire instead at Gorbachev's close adviser Alexander Yakovlev, whom Ligachev accuses of distorting and mismanaging the reform course. The author charges that Yakovlev (whom he describes as a "right-wing radical") deliberately let the reform efforts outrun necessary party leashes, eventually running roughshod into market economics and Western-style press freedom.

Control of the Soviet mass media emerges as a particularly sensitive topic. Ligachev was a proponent of early *glasnost*, linked with bureaucratic reform and personnel change. After Gorbachev broadened press liberalization at the 27th Party Congress, however, Ligachev voiced reservations over the level of party criticism being allowed. He hints that part of his opposition to *glasnost* stemmed from turf battles with Yakovlev over press issues and personnel. Ligachev takes "the blame" for promoting the magazine *Ogonek*'s groundbreaking Vitaliy Korotich but maintains it "was Yakovlev who promoted the other radical editors."

Ligachev supplements his recollections with documents and press accounts.

His work is almost devoid of comments on foreign affairs, and his defense of socialism vs. capitalism is often unsophisticated. Ligachev notes that during his December 1987 speech to the French Communist Party, he received warm applause for remarking that the Soviet constitution guaranteed the right to work. Ligachev quotes Jacques Marchais as telling him the applause came because "many of the delegates had personally experienced unemployment and were constantly in fear of losing their jobs." This, to Ligachev, becomes proof of "the real envy the French working people felt toward the Soviet people." And while he attacks the conventions of Brezhnev-Chernenko stagnation, his vision of a "reformed" Soviet Union seems as unclear as Gorbachev's.

His rebuttal of charges of Stalinism is more complex. He devotes a chapter to discussing Stalinist wrongdoing, noting that his father-in-law, an army general, was purged in 1937 (to be later rehabilitated under Khrushchev). "I smile bitterly," he writes, "when I read today that I desire a virtual return to Stalinist times." He also distances himself from the infamous Nina Andreyeva letter, an early 1988 defense of Stalin that was seen as a Ligachev polemic. Yet anyone who read Ligachev's speeches of 1987 will recall his opposition to Gorbachev's de-Stalinization.

Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin is difficult to approach without background on the era and a critical eye on the author. However, it does shed light on a fascinating, difficult politician, perhaps one of the last substantial true believers in communism.

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JOSEPH GIBBS
Newtonville, Massachusetts

Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I. *August 1914: The Red Wheel*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1989. \$29.95

In February 1974, at the time of Aleksandr Isaevich Solzhenitsyn's expulsion from the Soviet Union, I was studying Russian history under the tutelage of an endearingly eccentric polymath named Sergei Vasilievich Utechin. Saddened, but not surprised, by Solzhenitsyn's eviction, Professor Utechin nevertheless predicted that future historians would come to regard the era not as "the Brezhnev period" but as "the period of Solzhenitsyn"—so profound would his impact upon the Soviet Union prove to be. One can appreciate the prescience of Utechin's assertion when one considers that in 1990: (1) the Soviet leaders ceased referring to "the Brezhnev period" and replaced that designation with the opprobrious "period of stagnation"; (2) many of Solzhenitsyn's works appeared in the Soviet Union (as well as others since then); and (3) periodicals such as *Novy Mir* ("Solzhenitsyn and Us," January 1990) featured articles about the important lessons to be learned from this great writer.

Solzhenitsyn's impact upon the Soviet Union is difficult to assess, or to overemphasize. When in late 1962 *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* appeared in *Novy Mir*, it generated enthusiasm, hope for the future of Russian literature, and critical acclaim. Its controversial theme—the inhuman treatment endured by a simple Russian peasant during the

course of an average day in one of Stalin's notorious labor camps—made publication dependent upon the personal authorization of Nikita Khrushchev. Although Khrushchev eventually regretted this decision, he and Solzhenitsyn became linked inextricably in the history of the reform movement in the Soviet Union. *Glasnost* and *perestroika* were inspired by the limited "thaw" in Soviet culture, and de-Stalinization was permitted by Khrushchev and made real by Solzhenitsyn.

Khrushchev was ousted in 1964. In the period of stagnation that followed, the attempts to silence Solzhenitsyn prompted him to send his novels abroad. Publication of *Cancer Ward* and (especially) *The First Circle* in England and the United States in 1968 elicited rave reviews from both sides of the Atlantic. Two years later, Solzhenitsyn was awarded the Nobel Prize.

Acclaim in the West brought increased Soviet pressure upon the author, and in late 1973, upon receiving word that the KGB had obtained a copy of his *Gulag Archipelago*, Solzhenitsyn authorized Western publication of this scathing expose of the *Glavnoye upravlenie lagerei* (Main Camp Administration). Excruciating to both human sensibilities and Soviet pretense, its publication was soon followed by the writer's expulsion from his native land.

The three-volume *Gulag* and the events surrounding its release caused many intellectuals in the West to reevaluate their thoughts about the Soviet Union. In France, for example, the "new philosophers" (most prominently Andre Glucksmann and Bernard-Henri Levy) claimed to be "children of Solzhenitsyn"