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Book Reviews

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BOOK REVIEWS

A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

"Not Strategists, but Technicians of War"

Asprey, Robert B. *The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct World War I.* New York: William Morrow, 1991. 558pp. $27

Barnett, Corelli, ed. *Hitler's Generals.* New York: William Morrow, 1991. 497pp. $14.95

Warlimont, Walter. *Inside Hitler's Headquarters 1939–45.* Navato, Calif.: Presidio, 1991. 658pp. $35

THE MODERN GERMAN ARMY has generally been analyzed in institutional rather than biographical terms. Whether it is presented as incorporating a unique genius for war or described as reflecting a consistent incapacity to look beyond the dynastic conflicts of an earlier era, the army as an entity remains a preferred subject of study. Where personalities appear, they are used to illustrate larger themes: the "specialist idiocy" of a Schlieffen, the proto-fascism of a Ludendorff, or the operational virtuosity of a Rommel or a Manstein.

A strong case can be made for a reverse approach: interpreting the army in terms of its personalities. From its royal Prussian beginnings the German army was deeply rooted in overlapping cultures of individualism. Few men rise to the top of any armed service simply by following in the footsteps of their immediate predecessors. The assertiveness generally necessary to achieve high rank was reinforced in Germany by a steadily increasing emphasis on honor—a concept associated with the individual as well as the class and the profession to which he belonged. A German officer was expected to stand for the right, in principle and practice, even in the face of his superiors. Excessive suppleness of spine was considered a more serious flaw than excessive thickness of head. Finally, the German army's increasing stress on "mission tactics" demanded a corresponding emphasis on initiative at all levels of command. Looking over one's shoulder for

orders was more likely to guarantee early retirement than assure professional success.

Robert Asprey goes so far as to take a biographical approach to the collapse of the Second Reich. Instead of concentrating on the Empire's structural weaknesses, Asprey interprets its downfall as the result of "expanded military egos unchecked by civil authority." The principal "egos" belonged to Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff. "The Duo," as Asprey refers to them, made their reputations in 1914 with the victory of Tannenberg. In the next four years a combination of self-promotion and ruthless intrigue brought them to the summit of power in Germany. Hindenburg and Ludendorff made and broke chancellors, reduced Kaiser Wilhelm to a figurehead, and rendered farcical even the limited parliamentary elements of Germany's constitution. They also led their country to destruction—by a stubborn, irrational insistence on waging total war for total victory. Rejecting any concept of negotiations, "the Duo" exhausted Germany's resources, physical and spiritual, until the eviscerated Imperial system collapsed in November 1918.

Asprey's thesis is defensible, if hardly original; where he falls short is in his presentation. He works from an extremely thin source base. He relies heavily on published diaries and memoirs but takes an essentially uncritical approach to their contents. Also, he derives too many of his lines of argument from a single source, building on that one work and repeating citations to it throughout entire chapters. Finally, his approach lacks subtlety. Asprey paints in primary colors, avoiding nuances that might facilitate understanding of his protagonists. He demonstrates Hindenburg's intellectual shallowness, for example, with extensive quotations from an artist who spent part of 1915 at the Field Marshal's headquarters painting heroic commemorative oils. Repeated accounts of Hindenburg's concern with the accurate spacing of buttons or the proper color of a pair of trousers are meant to show his failure to comprehend the nature of modern war. Paul von Hindenburg was certainly not one of history's great military intellectuals, but what *should* he have discussed with an artist, if not the details of the artist's paintings? Asprey's use of this material makes about as much sense as critiquing General Eisenhower's military competence through the memoirs of his wartime chauffeur.

Similar negative oversimplications emerge in Asprey's treatment of Ludendorff, the Kaiser, Theobald von Bethman Hollweg, and virtually everyone else who wielded power in Germany before 1918. This reviewer holds no brief for "the Duo" in particular or for Germany's wartime government in general. Yet to attribute that country's military and political decisionmaking almost exclusively to motives of base self-interest or plain stupidity, as does Asprey, is to overlook too many facts and principles that influenced German policy.

A more comprehensive and better-balanced work is Corelli Barnett's paperback anthology, originally published in 1989. The book's twenty chapters discuss twenty-six generals, ranging from headquarters personalities like Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl, chief of the German operations staff and principal adviser to Hitler, to battle captains like Erwin Rommel and Sepp Dietrich. Barnett admits that the selection of subjects was arbitrary, seeking at best to represent the different theaters of war and levels of high command. The contributors include more soldiers, journalists, and popular historians than academicians, and none of the essays is particularly remarkable for original scholarship or argument. On the other hand, the authors generally eschew the fashionable tendency to debunk for the sake of debunking. It is refreshing, for example, to read Martin Blumenson's evaluation of Rommel as "meriting the acclaim accorded him" during the war, Sir Michael Carver's analysis of Field Marshal Fritz Erich von Manstein, and Carlo D'Este's empathetic treatment of Field Marshal Walther Model, which stand out among the competent contributions.

Hitler's generals emerge from Barnett's pages as a significantly more heterogeneous body of men than their World War I predecessors. Some, like Sepp Dietrich and Walther von Reichenau, were heavily influenced by the ideology of National Socialism. Some, like Karl Rudolph Gerd von Rundstedt, were old-line in every way, as dubious about new ways of war as they were suspicious of Adolf Hitler. Some, like Heinz Guderian and Kurt Student, were innovators. Taken as a whole, they were most successful at the tactical and operational levels of their profession. Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin was one of the better corps commanders developed by any army during World War II. Hasso von Manteuffel was a model general of armored forces. Hans-Jürgen von Arnim proved himself a gifted tactician and a humane enemy in the North African campaign. However, at higher levels of responsibility the characterizations are decidedly more ambiguous. Rundstedt, in Earl Ziemke's essay, "seemed to be more than he was" both professionally and morally, and Samuel Mitcham charitably describes Ewald von Kleist as "no genius." At planning levels the picture becomes truly pathetic. Walter Görlitz's portraits of Keitel and Jodl only reinforce the familiar image of military office-boys: attendant lords good for little but to swell a progress and start a scene or two. Franz Halder, Chief of Staff in the critical years from 1938 to 1942, emerges from Barry Leach's essay as a man who preferred observing events to shaping them—like Rundstedt, a living inversion of the traditional General Staff motto, "be more than you seem."

To a significant degree the shortcomings of the Third Reich's generals reflected their complex, ambiguous relationship with Adolf Hitler. Barnett points out that the Nazi regime presented a moral challenge as its criminality

became obvious to them, while Hitler's personalized and haphazard approach to military planning posed a professional dilemma.

The development of these processes is a major theme of *Inside Hitler's Headquarters.* This is an unrevised reprint of a work first published in English in 1964. Its author, General Walter Warlimont, served from 1939 to 1944 as deputy chief of the Wehrmacht operations staff—a desk job that gave him ample opportunity to observe, from a relatively safe and critical distance, the dynamics of Hitler's exercise of supreme command. His memoirs avoid both the self-exculpation and the overt Führer-bashing common to their genre. Warlimont describes instead the consequences of Hitler's increasing determination to run the war in detail, using his military professionals as an enlarged planning staff with no real command authority. Especially significant in the context of this review is Warlimont's depiction of Hitler's growing moral domination of the soldiers in his immediate entourage. As Hitler's mental, physical, and emotional resources eroded under the immense stress of his assumed burden, keeping the Führer calm and postponing the next destructive temper tantrum became infinitely more important for them than averting the final catastrophe that loomed ahead for anyone with eyes to see.

The generals of the Third Reich were, to a degree, victimized by their own desires. They might be described as initially creating a Hitler in the army's image. The disaster of World War I had clearly shown the consequences of overextending the military's direct authority. When Hitler described the Third Reich as resting on "two pillars," the German army and the Nazi party, the generals responded by assigning him in their own minds the role once exercised by Bismarck. In their world view, such as it was, the Führer would establish the international and domestic matrices of victory. The soldiers would run the war, and, as a by-product, teach the "Bohemian Corporal" his manners. Instead, for the first time in their history, Germany's armed forces performed in the context of a system that was deliberately unlimited in its seeking of enemies and deliberately open-ended in its grand-strategic objectives.

The familiar argument that Hitler's generals were too busy fighting a war to know the true nature of the system they served has a hollow ring. From Ludendorff to Manstein, the works reviewed here offer protagonists who accepted circumstances instead of altering them. At best, the German army's approach to war was more likely to develop skilled field commanders than outstanding grand strategists, but the National Socialist paradigm defied both the mind and the soul of the army's officer corps. Hitler's generals were not weaklings. There were, as suggested earlier, men of strong will who found themselves confronted by something even stronger—an elemental moral force, albeit a negative one. In everyday terms the relationship between Hitler and his generals described in Warlimont's text invites comparison to such classic

domestic comedies as the television series *I Love Lucy* or the long-running comic strip *Bringing Up Father*. In this context, Hitler plays the "feminine" role, regularly overcoming "male rationalism" with emotional intensity. The generals sputter and blow yet ultimately give in, resigning themselves to make the best of things and, in their own minds at least, abrogating final responsibility for an *outcome* already willed by virtue of their participation in the *process*.

The essential difference between the general and the subaltern is that the latter is tested physically, the former morally. Whatever their motivations, Germany's generals in the twentieth century remained technicians of war—a step or more below the highest levels of military achievement. Might not their self-imposed limitations in the moral sphere have reinforced and reflected their professional shortcomings?

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Corum, James S. *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform*. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1992. 274pp. $29.95

In the summer of 1919, the Treaty of Versailles imposed what Germany considered a humiliating peace. In the summer of 1939, Nazi Germany was poised to launch a war of revenge against the victors of 1919. This would not have been an option were it not for the weapon forged by leaders of the German army during the twenty years in between. How they accomplished it is the subject of this work by James Corum, professor of comparative military studies, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University.

Corum correctly states that "the rebuilding of the German Army is one of the most impressive and significant military accomplishments of the twentieth century." General von Seeckt, as Chief of the Army Directorate of the postwar German army, the Reichswehr, was responsible between 1920 and 1926 for downsizing the army to meet the constraints of Versailles. This Treaty Army was restricted to 100,000 men (4,000 officers and 96,000 enlisted) in seven infantry and three cavalry divisions.

However, Seeckt (and most leading Germans, civilian as well as military) believed that a larger force was needed for the country's legitimate defensive needs, a point that Britain and France were willing to concede only in February 1935.

Seeckt's problem was essentially twofold: (1) rebuild the army from the ruins of war and revolution, and (2)

develop it as a cadre for future expansion. Seeckt's first years in command were marked by internal battles such as border conflicts in the East and the French invasion of the Ruhr. Despite these obstacles, however, Seeckt was able to organize and train the force and, despite the limits placed by the Treaty on its weapons, develop an up-to-date tactical doctrine for the army based on the integration of modern arms. By the time of his dismissal in 1926, Seeckt had molded this Treaty Army into what Corum terms "a superb cadre force with which to build a large, modern army."

Corum acknowledges that Seeckt's reform efforts grew out of the German army's experience in World War I. As documented by Timothy Lupfer in *The Dynamics of Doctrine* (1981), the Western Front brought decentralization of combat. The rifle regiment of 1914, under the tactical command of a colonel, had to make the transition into a combined arms force in which the role of platoon and squad leaders was key.

Seeckt required an army with both an immediate crisis-response capability and a force able to be a cadre for expansion. The former mission required an "elite army" (*eliteheer*) and the latter an "army of leaders" (*führerheer*). Although some units should have been charged with one mission and others with the second, Seeckt was forced to burden all units with both missions.

The East, where Seeckt won his fame, was a training ground for maneuver-warfare operational commanders of the next war, and Corum stresses the "eastern" emphasis in postwar German developments. It was in the West, however, that the German army learned how to fight when maneuver failed and a breakthrough battle needed to be fought. Reichswehr doctrine and organization, in effect, amalgamated the experiences of the two fronts, combining the operations-level lessons of the East with the tactical lessons of the West.

Corum examines the processes by which General von Seeckt was able to turn the weaknesses of the defeated army into advantages. For example, the loss of World War I–generation weapons enabled the Reichswehr to perform detailed analysis of new weapons, build prototypes, and develop doctrine for their use. Also, because 100,000 men were too few to wage war, recruiting technically capable personnel became the rule. They were trained to employ the new systems in combat and to train others in an expanded Reichswehr.

The story of Seeckt's Reichswehr is certainly one of getting the most out of the least: how to build an army of immense potential despite external and internal threats and constraints. Corum helps one to understand how the German army of World War II was able to "fight outnumbered and win."

The book suffers from some irritating flaws, including misidentified officers and a chapter that confuses

operational and organizational doctrine. The main fault of *The Roots of Blitzkrieg*, however, is that it leaves one with the impression that Seeckt and his successors overcame the restraints of Versailles. Corum shows how German industry, with Soviet cooperation, did in fact design, build, and test prototypes of armored vehicles and aircraft prohibited by the Treaty. Yet Germany's defeat in 1945 was due in part to the dismantling of her defense industrial base after 1919. Although able to manufacture prototypes, German defense industry never sufficiently recovered its mass production capacity to meet the requirements of the war of 1939–1945.

On the whole, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg* is a valuable addition to the military bookshelf and can be of great interest to force planners. As of 1 September 1939, the 10,000-man Treaty Army of 1920–1933 had grown into an army of over 3.7 million and an air force of 550,000. The *National Military Strategy of the United States* (January 1992) tasks our own forces with immediate and delayed crisis-response capabilities and with a surge of reconstitution capability. How Seeckt built the Reichswehr for potential expansion should be valuable to those planning our own future forces.

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Hammel, Eric. *Six Days in June: How Israel Won the 1967 Arab-Israeli War*. New York: Scribner's, 1992. 452pp. $30

The Six Day War of 1967 had profound repercussions in the Middle East. For the third time in as many decades, a qualitatively superior, albeit numerically inferior, Israeli force inflicted a crushing defeat on the combined Arab armies. In this latest examination of the conflict, author Eric Hammel analyzes its origins and conduct and concludes that victory was the product of two decades of Israeli military preparation.

Written from a decidedly pro-Israeli bias (the author's grandfather died at the hands of the Nazis, and Hammel uses almost exclusively Israeli sources), the author attempts to justify Israel's preemptive strike on 5 June as a fulfillment of the first rule of war—that an enemy must be judged on the basis of his capabilities and not on the basis of his intentions. Two decades of Arab-Israeli strife dictated that national survival could be preserved only if Zahal (the Israel Defense Force, or IDF) attained a massive qualitative advantage over its adversaries and if the army used all its power decisively in the form of a lightning preemptive offensive designed to take the war into the enemy lands. By June 1967 Syria, Egypt, and Jordan were capable of launching a three-front war against Israel; therefore, Israel had to assume they would. While many readers may question the (im)morality of this logic, Hammel sees few strategic alternatives available to Israel in 1967.

The author makes his greatest contribution in examining the evolution of the Zahal into a world-class military organization. Created in 1949, it struggled to develop an operational doctrine. A host of influential military theorists and practitioners, including Yigal Yadin, Chaim Laskov of the Armored Corps, IDF chief of staff Yitzhak Rabin, and Ariel Sharon all played leading roles in creating an effective military force. Foremost of the reformers, according to Hammel, was Moshe Dayan, whose most significant achievement lay in "identifying encouraging, and institutionalizing the innovations of other younger leaders in the profoundly interconnected doctrine of flexibility and fighting spirit."

The IDF came of age during the 1956 Sinai campaign, which served as a dress rehearsal for war in 1967. Led by Dayan, the IDF carefully analyzed every facet of the war and developed detailed operational plans for the inevitable showdown, which came eleven years later when President Nasser of Egypt ordered his army into the Sinai. The author believes that the lightning victory that startled the world in 1967 was actually preordained, a result of Israeli *elan*, a proven doctrine of offensive mobile warfare, and the complete synchronization of arms and services toward a single objective—the total destruction of Arab military forces.

While Hammel's description of the operational and tactical engagements is superb (particularly the fighting around Jerusalem), the book does contain some shortcomings. The absence of endnotes and the author's over-reliance on secondary sources, save autobiographies of the principal participants, detract from the text. Additionally, the author's obvious infatuation with Zahal leads him to denigrate any capability of Arab forces, so much so he states that whatever Arab operational plans did exist in 1967 were doomed to failure. Moreover, disciples of Clausewitz will cringe as the author laments that the IDF's goals have "sometimes become enslaved to hateful political intentions."

These debits aside, Hammel has written a highly readable, albeit one-sided, popular history of the war that forever changed the political and military face of the Middle East. The Six Day War was Zahal's finest military hour. In the final analysis, Israel's continued existence as a nation rests on the shoulders of Zahal, a military force that demonstrated its military effectiveness during one week in June when it defeated the combined armies of three nations in a modern *blitzkrieg*.

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Lucas, W. Scott. *Divided We Stand*. Kent, United Kingdom: Hodder and Stoughton, 1992. 330pp. $40

A combined Anglo-French airborne force landed in the Suez Canal zone

on 5 November 1956. The main assault force landed from the sea the next day. Their mission was to secure the Suez Canal and return its operation to private European hands. Over two-thirds of France's and England's oil came through the canal, and Egyptian President Nasser's nationalisation of the canal five months earlier was perceived as a direct threat to their national interests. Failing in their efforts to regain the canal or turn it over to the control of the United Nations (UN), the two European governments had joined forces with Israel, hoping to overthrow Nasser in the process. Despite military success, however, they would fail in their objective. Within twenty-four hours of the main force landing, American pressure forced the three nations to accept a cease-fire, and thereat died any chance the Europeans had of achieving their goal. The United States had joined hands with its enemy, the Soviet Union, to stop its own allies, Britain and France, from forcing an Arab leader to accede to their demands. It was an action that strained U.S.-allied relations at the time and has continued to affect that relationship well into the present.

Divided We Stand is a brilliant investigation of the policies, goals, and personalities that shaped the Suez Crisis. The author has done a masterful job of tracing its root causes back to the immediate postwar period. It was here, he argues, and not in the fast-moving days of 1956, that the foundations were laid for the events that would prove so disastrous that November. For the United States, holding communism in check was the main goal, and working with pro-Western nationalist leaders seemed the best method of meeting it. Britain's leaders were more interested in regional stability, because the Middle East and the Suez Canal dominated access to oil supplies in the Gulf and its overseas dominions in Asia. France shared those interests. As an oil-exporting nation (yes, the U.S. exported oil then!), the United States did not.

President Eisenhower's attention and primary focus were on the Korean War, and he delegated Middle East affairs to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Secretary Dulles and his brother Allen, Director of Central Intelligence, viewed the Middle East in the context of the so-called "Northern Tier" countries of Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan, which they hoped to use as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the region. They recognized Britain's preeminence in Egypt, Libya, and Jordan but felt that the leaders in those countries were more interested in maintaining privilege than in ruling effectively. Finally, President Eisenhower believed that the Europeans were too slow to divest themselves of their empires.

This perception shaped Eisenhower's view of European efforts to regain control of the canal that fateful year and ultimately led him to oppose their actions. He and his advisors also had a shorter-term policy goal in

mind. In their eyes, the United States should not antagonize "nationalist forces" in the Middle East by even a hint of approval of "Western" intervention in the affairs of an Arab nation, no matter how much the American government might wish that nation's leader to be overthrown.

Frustrated by what he saw as American inaction, British prime minister Anthony Eden unilaterally approached the French and Israelis to develop a military solution to the problem. Israel welcomed his initiative, for Nasser had just closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, thereby blocking Israel's oil imports.

Thus the stage was set for the disaster that would bring down a British government and lead France to seek its own independent nuclear deterrent. The Europeans and the Israelis would be forced to withdraw by the end of December. The canal would be returned to Egyptian control, and the Soviet Union, not the United States, would reap the propaganda benefits of having saved the "Arab World" from "Western imperialism." Recriminations echoed throughout Whitehall and the White House.

There are no real heroes or villains in this story, only honorable men trapped by their perceptions and the decisionmaking machineries in which they worked. For Britain, Suez was a watershed for its influence and policies in the Middle East and indeed, perhaps, in the rest of the world. London continued to have global interests and presence, but it had found itself increasingly dependent upon American support to sustain its policies. Eden's decision to act in concert with France and Israel represented a final assertion that Britain did not require American approval to defend its interests. In that, it failed; subsequent British initiatives in the region have been conducted with America's tacit approval, if not active support.

Divided We Stand is a stellar work with many lessons for anyone interested in the Middle East. The author tells a complex story in a clear and convincing manner. The parallels with, and divergences from, the recent situation in the Persian Gulf will intrigue many. It is lacking only in its paucity of maps and tables. It would have been nice to see the force dispositions as they were when the cease-fire was implemented. However, this is a minor flaw in an otherwise outstanding depiction of the unique Anglo-American relationship during one of its most trying episodes.

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Packard, Jerrold M. *Neither Friend nor Foe: The European Neutrals in World War II.* New York: Scribner's, 1992. 432pp. $30

[The views and opinions expressed herein are solely the reviewer's and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government.]

Perhaps it should not seem strange that most Americans feel troubled by the concept of neutrality. Only a minority of citizens remember December 6, 1941, the last day the United States was neutral in worldwide military conflict. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor torpedoed neutrality and swept the United States into a war that was easily portrayed as a struggle between good and evil.

The Cold War that followed had a similar moral quality, and only since the fall of the Berlin Wall has it seemed necessary to ask what are the proper security foci of the United States and what strategy the U.S. should employ to defend and promote its interests in the world. It may be timely, therefore, to review how some nations defined their interests differently and the strategic options they chose in pursuing their policies.

Jerrold M. Packard, who has previously written books on the British and Japanese monarchies and the papacy, provides a detailed and even-handed history of how European countries successfully pursued policies of neutrality in World War II—i.e., they maintained the essence of sovereignty and were not invaded militarily. The countries were Eire, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Packard makes clear that their governments chose policies deliberately to avoid injury after they had concluded that to seek involvement would have made little difference in the overall outcome of the conflict but could have been costly for their countries in terms of lives and property.

Packard makes equally clear that the countries shared two other characteristics: their neutrality was neither passive nor absolute. Sweden and Switzerland both followed strategies of simultaneously bending to meet the needs of Hitler and trying to develop enough strength to make a military attack seem unattractive to him. Packard recalls that "Foreign Minister Christian Gunther expressed Sweden's purpose: 'to make ourselves as indigestible as possible.'" Military preparedness was pursued in tandem with appeasement in the form of allowing German troops and material to transit Sweden in sealed trains to resupply forces in Norway and Finland. Similarly, the Swiss government permitted free rail passage between Germany and Italy even as it prepared against a German invasion by prepositioning explosives in rail tunnels and industrial plants and readied plans to harass Nazi troops from a redoubt deep in the Alps.

While the other successful neutrals lacked the military capacity of Sweden and Switzerland, they did enjoy the geographic advantage of location on the periphery, where Germany felt less compulsion to attack. In the case of Spain, Franco's heart was with Hitler, but his country lay devastated from civil war. Franco had to calculate that more war could have jeopardized not only tranquility but his regime as well. He avoided intervention by outsiders carrying the battle to Spain by

resupplying German naval units only clandestinely while denying Hitler access through Spain to Gibraltar. Winston Churchill later acknowledged that Spain "held the key to all British enterprises in the Mediterranean, and never in the darkest hours did she turn the lock against us." Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, whom Packard greatly admires as "a man who lived solely for his country," held Germany at bay by lobbying Franco against letting Hitler use Iberian territory and by counting on Spain's centuries-old alliances with England for protection.

Packard notes that Eire was the only country among the five that was seriously threatened by invasion from both the Allies and the Axis. Ironically, the issue that kept Eire from participating with the other Commonwealth countries on the side of England—the continued inclusion of the island's six northeastern counties in the United Kingdom—gave London the capacity to surveil and protect sea lanes into the Atlantic without inserting troops into Eire. The effort was aided further by the cooperation of Eamon de Valera's government, which, without revealing its hand to the violently anti-British Irish Republican Army, helped London keep track of German ships in the waters off Ireland by the simple expedient of radioing reports of sightings in the clear, where by prearrangement British monitors could pick them up.

Striving throughout his comprehensive review to explain how the five countries escaped involvement in the war, Packard recognized that "of the score of the continent's neutrals at war's outbreak, only this handful successfully maintained their outsider status." He paraphrases a Swedish historian that "there were more Norways—and Hollands and Hungarys and Greeces—than there were Swedens." Packard's writing is interesting and relevant but flawed by an uneven style that ranges from elegant analysis to colloquial slang. He never tires of reminding his readers which side in the war embodied evil, and his editor let stand a few annoyingly redundant passages.

Nonetheless, the book provides a useful reminder of the proposition that not to become involved militarily is sometimes a strategic option that serves a nation's interests.

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Wiley, Peter Booth with Korogi Ichiro. *Yankees in the Land of the Gods*. New York: Penguin, 1991. 577pp. $14.95

This book tells the story of a fascinating episode in American history, when Japan was opened to the West in the mid-nineteenth century by Commodore Matthew C. Perry. This was the beginning of a collision course that would lead almost inexorably to the attack on Pearl Harbor ninety-one years later.

In developing his thesis that Perry's achievement was much more than an isolated incident, Wiley gives a great deal of the setting necessary to understand this remarkable event, starting long before the event and continuing after it. Seven chapters precede the account of Perry's first visit. They describe the situation in both the United States and Japan at the time of the American visit and lay out the logic of both the American move and the Japanese reaction to it. This was a period not only of great expansion by the United States but of important developments in Japan that led up to the overthrow of the repressive Tokugawa regime. These developments enabled the Japanese to respond positively to the American challenge.

The whole long and involved—and happily very readable—account sheds valuable light not only on questions of military affairs and national security but also on foreign policy objectives and strategy. The account goes a long way toward answering a question that has probably puzzled many: Why were we so hell-bent to stir up what turned out to be a hornets' nest? As we know, the Japan that was awakened was in a comparatively feudal state, and, as we found out, after the opening it would be led by an ultra-militaristic clique bent on world conquest.

What about the Americans, who were building up their empire at the same time? Commodore Perry's action was part of the general expansion of American interests westward to the Pacific and then further throughout that ocean and into Asia itself. The recently completed war with Mexico, in which we simply took from that country the vast lands that we wanted, was a part of that empire-building movement. Thus, the opening up of Japan was not an act of benevolence on our part, far from it. Commodore Perry, not the most nationalistic of Americans of that period, stated, "I shall in no way allow of any infringement upon our national rights [in the Bonin Islands]; on the contrary, I believe that this is the moment to assume a position in the east which will make the power and influence of the United States felt in such a way as to give greater importance to those rights which, among eastern nations, are generally estimated by the extent of military force exhibited. . . . It is self-evident that the course of coming events will ere long make it necessary for the United States to extend its territorial jurisdiction beyond the limits of the western continent, and I assume the responsibility of urging the expediency of establishing a foothold in this quarter of the globe, as a measure of positive necessity to the sustainment of our maritime rights in the east." Some Americans in fact set no limitation to what was meant by "manifest destiny."

On the other hand, as the author makes abundantly clear, starting with the very title he chose for his book, the Japanese were not weak either in the matter of national pride and national self-esteem. Indeed, the

Japanese have a strong claim to the championship in this field, making the serene confidence of the Chinese, to whom all outsiders were barbarians, or the Nazis, with their claims of the Germans as a superior race, seem modest in comparison. Hirata Atsutane put it this way: "Ours is a splendid and blessed country, the Land of the Gods beyond doubt, and we down to the most humble man and woman are the descendants of the gods. . . . Japanese differ completely from and are superior to the peoples of China, India, Russia, Holland, Siam, Cambodia, and all other countries in the world, and for us to have called our country the Land of the Gods was not mere vain-glory." Let's concede the point, since it's hard to top it. Gods are indeed superior to mere mortal men, to all men of all other nations.

Perry's efforts extended over a period of time and included a second visit. In the same period, the British, the French, and other Western nations were also attempting, in their own ways and for their own purposes, to "open" Japan. So were the Russians. The Japanese reaction to these moves was mixed, since the Japanese were at a crucial turning point in their history. Many wanted to continue the Tokugawa regime's policy of complete isolation, which required the murder both of foreign sailors who happened to be shipwrecked on the Japanese coast and of any Japanese who had been abroad and were thus infected with dangerous thoughts. Those Japanese with a greater knowledge of the external world realized that their island empire would simply not be allowed to continue in the old way much longer, for Westerners were carving up Africa and Asia into colonies and Japan seemed to be next. All were alarmed by Perry's black ships, an image that remains vivid among Japanese to this day.

Those Japanese who were better acquainted with the world ultimately prevailed, perhaps just in the nick of time. Their reaction was far from surrender. In 1857 Hatta Masayoshi saw it in this way: "I am therefore convinced that our policy should be to stake everything on the present opportunity, to conclude friendly alliances, to send ships to foreign countries everywhere and conduct trade, to copy foreigners where they are best and so repair our own shortcomings, to foster our national strength and complete our armaments, and so gradually subject foreigners to our influence until in the end all the countries of the world know the blessings of perfect tranquillity and our hegemony is acknowledged throughout the globe."

As the reader will find out in a concluding chapter, there are signs that Japan, following its economic triumphs over the U.S. and others, may be now ready to abandon its current low-profile posture. Theodore H. White is quoted as saying, "Perhaps we did not win the war, perhaps the Japanese, unknown even to themselves, were the winners." And a

former Japanese cabinet minister, Ishihara Shintaro, is reported to have said in 1989, "The American nuclear umbrella is just an illusion as far as the Japanese people are concerned. . . . The time has come to tell the United States that we do not need American protection. Japan will protect itself with its own power and wisdom."

JOHN BEX
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania

Shapley, Deborah. *Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1993. 734pp. $29.95

As Secretary of Defense, Robert Strange McNamara was one of the most controversial public figures of the 1960s, in particular in his role as Vietnam decision-maker. Deborah Shapley's long book on the controversial McNamara covers the entire life of the man, from his early years through the post-Defense years, most notably as president of the World Bank. Given the interests of readers of this review, as well as space limitations, my commentary will focus on his period in the Pentagon.

The author, a Washington journalist and investigative reporter, is well qualified for the task she has assumed. Her research is impressive, and the many interviews she had with McNamara are somewhat of a first. The book itself is in fact the first complete account of the subject's life, though there have been a couple of other efforts, both more focused and less critical in tone.

McNamara was born in San Francisco in 1916 and graduated from the University of California at Berkeley in 1937. He received a master of business administration degree at Harvard in 1939 and the following year joined the faculty there, specializing in the application of statistical analysis to management problems. During World War II he served as a commissioned officer in the Army Air Corps, working as a staff officer in statistical control. After the war he and nine other statistical control experts hired themselves out to the Ford Motor Company. He rose rapidly in the firm, and when he was elected its president in 1960, he was the first to hold that office who was not a member of the Ford family.

In that year there was also elected a new president of the United States, and he, as had been evident throughout his campaign, had a keen interest in foreign and defense policy. Like all presidents, John F. Kennedy had his own views on how these interrelated policies should be managed and the kind of persons he wanted for his chief advisers. Kennedy had offered Robert Lovett the post of either secretary of state or of defense, but he declined them both. Lovett, however, subsequently recommended Robert McNamara for Defense.

When McNamara became Secretary of Defense in January 1961, the department was more than thirteen years old and had had seven secretaries. From a loose federal arrangement in the beginning, the secretary's

control had gradually tightened. Eisenhower's 1958 Reorganization Act provided for even greater central control, but the Act was basically untapped when McNamara was sworn in.

His imprint was made largely through his management approach. He was the watershed secretary, and the Department of Defense has never been the same since. He was the first since World War II to achieve true civilian control of the Pentagon below the presidential level.

The image that emerges from Shapley's book is the standard one, of both a good and a bad McNamara. On the good side, McNamara played a major and successful role in the development of national strategy and defense policy in the first three or four years of the tenure. He attempted, with a high degree of success, to make American military power more responsive to U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. While rejecting a counterforce strategy, he did oversee the development of a U.S. deterrent that could survive a Soviet attack and still inflict unacceptable losses on that country. He also strengthened the command and control facilities of our strategic retaliatory forces, thus increasing the flexibility with which they could be employed.

Vietnam is another story. From 1961 on, he was Kennedy's "action officer" on Vietnam matters. To quote Shapley: "By his high profile, his statistics, flying trips, press conferences and optimism, he identified himself with the war. McNamara gave John Kennedy's limited partnership in this remote part of the world its aura of invincible, thoroughly American success." With Kennedy's assassination and Johnson's assumption of the presidency, there was no change. The author comments that McNamara "choreographed his own public transfer of loyalty to Lyndon Johnson." In the case of Vietnam this was done with enthusiasm. As he told a reporter in 1964, "I don't mind its being called McNamara's war. In fact I'm proud to be associated with it."

As time went on McNamara became disenchanted with the possibility of winning the war, and as it dragged on he became more and more conscious of what the war was doing to the American homefront and to a generation of young people. But the failure in Vietnam was in large part a McNamara failure. There were, of course, major domestic constraints imposed on his management of the war. The Great Society dominated Johnson's thinking, and the president wanted no public debate that would jeopardize it. This meant no debate on a reserve call-up and no debate on the budget—which in turn meant that for a time there was concealment of what actual costs would eventually be. Still, McNamara cannot absolve himself for his part in getting America into the Vietnam quagmire in the manner in which he did. Except for Kennedy and Johnson, he more than anyone else led the country into that war.

Eventually he broke with Johnson, who perceived McNamara's disenchantment with the war and moved him to the World Bank. At his peak, McNamara had been a strong cabinet officer and at the same time a key presidential officer in that he accurately represented the president's views to the defense bureaucracy. In this sense, he was intensely loyal to Johnson. Perhaps he was too loyal—who knows what would have happened had he articulated his misgivings earlier?

Of course, the fault was on the military side as well as on the civilian. Had the senior military stood up to Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara and laid on the line their misgivings about such issues as failure to call up the reserves or the incremental strategy being pursued, there is no telling what the result might have been. At the least there would have been a public debate before it was too late, and at best either the war would not have been fought or it would have been fought quickly and decisively without tearing apart American society.

Shapley's final judgments on all this are somewhat ambiguous. "That is the glory and tragedy of Robert Strange McNamara: He feels he must decide and then act, whether to save South Vietnam then or to save the planet today. Cooler heads may recognize the limits of their powers and decline to change the world. They may refrain from the constant manipulation McNamara engaged in and still does. Not he. For better or worse McNamara shaped much in today's world—and imprisoned himself."

The book is nicely written and covers an impressive number of issues. Perhaps too many—the reading is a bit tedious, and at times somewhat superficial. Though this work will probably not be the definitive biography of McNamara, it will be the best for many years, and it is well worth reading.

DOUGLAS KINNARD
Richmond, Virginia

Tucker, Robert C. *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928–1941.* New York: W.W. Norton, 1990. 707pp. $29.95

Events occurring in the Soviet Union since 1985—Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika and his initiatives to end the Cold War, severe economic decline, and the centrifugal forces of national self-assertion, all accelerated by the failed coup of August 1991—have diminished the military and ideological threats to the West and, consequently, should facilitate a less biased study of Russian history during the Soviet period. As the Cold War recedes further, so too will the unnatural consensus that has existed in the Anglo-American school of Soviet studies.

One of the deficiencies of mainstream Sovietology has been its assumption that the uniquely dreadful and excessive policies hatched in the neurotic mind of Joseph Stalin

(forced, reckless collectivization and industrialization, the widespread campaigns of terror, the decapitation of the Soviet military, and his megalomaniacal aspirations toward totalitarian control) were merely the continuation or logical development of the legacy of Vladimir Ilich Lenin and the Bolshevik revolution. Although Professor Stephen F. Cohen (in his 1975 paper "Bolshevism and Stalinism") exposed the flaws of this consensus view, it still thrives today. Given this consensus, Robert C. Tucker's antithetical views about Stalinism are quite noteworthy.

A professor emeritus of political science at Princeton University, Tucker produced his first volume about Stalin, *Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879–1929*, in 1973. The sequel under consideration here not only was "in preparation for over fifteen years" but also has incorporated new evidence that has surfaced recently. Lest the reader overlook the subtitle of his book, Tucker repeats his essential conclusion in the preface: "The Soviet System took shape under the impact not of one revolution but of two."

In assessing the legacy of Lenin, Tucker properly attaches equal significance to Lenin's later writings and policies, which advocated gradual, antibureaucratic reform and a New Economic Policy (NEP). Stalin (and subsequently mainstream Western Sovietology) ignored Lenin's gradualist prescriptions, preferring instead to cite the earlier, more radical passages of the Bolshevik leader as justification for his own extreme measures. However, one need only believe it plausible (if not axiomatic) that prescriptions for revolutionary seizure of power might differ from those for actually ruling to understand the different strains of the Leninist legacy. These differences have not escaped Tucker, who adduces evidence to demonstrate the reformist nature of Bolshevik rule under Lenin. He then proceeds to demonstrate how these norms were demolished by Stalin.

Stalin, Tucker believes, suffered from a psychoneurosis brought on by childhood beatings administered by his drunken father. As a substitute for the self-hatred they generated, Stalin created an ideal self. Seeing himself in a heroic light, Stalin emulated Peter the Great (in forcing the Soviet Union to become a world power), Ivan the Terrible (by purging the party aristocrats, the Old Bolsheviks), and the revered Lenin (by creating socialism in the second October Revolution). Tucker's close attention to Stalin's voracious reading of history adds weight to this interpretation.

Stalin's need to secure his ideal self had a much darker side, however, which compelled him to obliterate any unflattering reminders of his real self. Therefore, when his reckless campaign to collectivize and industrialize the Soviet Union resulted in chaos, breakdowns, and famine, Stalin simply denied the famine, suppressed the peasant uprisings, put industrialists on trial for "wrecking,"

and subsequently shipped many of these unfortunates to labor camps (thereby industrializing and urbanizing the Soviet East). The bungling and scapegoating upset many party members, especially the Old Bolsheviks who had personal knowledge of Stalin's many mistakes, excesses, and undistinguished past. Since their very presence was a standing rebuke to Stalin's ideal self, they had to go. Many were tortured into confessing that they were traitors, wreckers, plotters, and would-be assassins—the very crimes committed by Stalin. Subsequently most were executed or sent to the labor camps (the "Gulag"). Such confessions allowed Stalin to remain blameless.

The terror was long-lasting and wide-ranging. At its worst, during 1937–38, four and one-half to five and one-half million "enemies" were arrested; 800,000 to 900,000 were executed (Tucker accepts the figures from a recent study by D.V. Volkogonov). To ease the burden of processing the new prisoners, those already in the Gulag were placed on restricted diets that would ensure they were quickly worked to death.

The Soviet military was decapitated by the terror. During 1937–38, "over 3,000 naval commanders and 38,679 army men were ordered shot." Of the 101 members of the Soviet high command, ninety-one were arrested, at least eighty were executed. The terror struck down not only army and navy commanders but also fleet and corps commanders.

Finally, given the logic of the terror, the executioners and torturers themselves had to be shot or sent to the Gulag.

Stalin's revolution extinguished not only many independent minds but also independence of mind. It transformed Soviet society into a "limp, fear-stricken mass" where *skloka* ("base, trivial hostility, unconscionable spite breeding petty intrigues") became the norm. Stalin also destroyed the Communist Party "save as an organ of his autocracy subordinate to his police."

In summation, Tucker concludes, "However confusing these things were for contemporaries, they need not confuse later historians. Stalin's was a Bolshevism of the radical right. As such it was wayward, deeply deviationist, and questionably Bolshevist save insofar as it could and did lay claim to all that was harsh, repressive and terrorist in Lenin's legacy. . . . As a Bolshevism of the radical right, Stalin's Russian national Bolshevism was akin to Hitler's German National Socialism."

This work is excellent in its balance, nuance, and painstaking scholarship. This reviewer was disappointed only by the lack of evidence and emphasis in support of Tucker's contention that foreign (external) concerns were primary under Stalin. One need not dispute his conclusion that Stalin hoped to advance socialism through territorial expansion (by exploiting conflicts between the "imperialist" states) to argue that Tucker's own evidence and emphasis support

the primacy of domestic issues, the construction of "Socialism in One Country," in Stalin's scheme of things.

WALTER C. UHLER
Philadelphia, Penna.

Volkogonov, Dmitri. Harold Shukman, trans. *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy*. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991. 642pp. $29.95

General Dmitri Volkogonov's book is a powerful biography of one of the central figures of twentieth-century history. It is primarily a political biography, but readers will find that the author also addresses aspects of diplomatic and military affairs. Needless to say, any work that improves our understanding of Stalin is noteworthy.

Volkogonov, currently an adviser to Boris Yeltsin, is not the typical Stalin biographer. A retired Soviet Army colonel general, former deputy chief of the Main Political Section of the Soviet military and former head of the Institute of Military History, Volkogonov served his country admirably and loyally, despite the fact that his own father was arrested and executed during Stalin's purges in the late 1930s. Volkogonov, who also earned a Ph.D. from the Lenin Military Academy, began to question the system, and its history, in the 1950s. The advent of Mikhail Gorbachev allowed him to complete his work, and the orginal Russian-language edition of *Stalin* appeared in the Soviet Union in 1988. Volkogonov then turned his attention to a comprehensive study of Lenin and, at the Institute of Military History, began writing and directing work on a planned ten-volume, glasnost-era Soviet history of the Second World War.

Unfortunately, in the spring of 1991 Volkogonov's honesty and revisionism led to confrontation with senior Soviet military leaders, including Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev (then Mikhail Gorbachev's military adviser), General Mikhail Moiseyev (then chief of the general staff), and Dmitri Yazov (then minister of defense). One Soviet official, upset by Volkogonov's quest for truth, chided the Institute of Military History's director, "The documents should be used according to the purpose they are intended for." But Volkogonov, repelled by this challenge to history, told his accusers, "We don't need sugary patriotism, we need the truth." Volkogonov resigned, announcing that he could not "write a false history."

The author's sense of openness and honesty and his unparalleled access to official military and Communist Party archives set this biography of Stalin apart. According to Volkogonov, some of the triumphs achieved by the Soviet people in the 1930s and 1940s are attributable to the system, although many others were achieved in spite of, not because of, Stalin's handiwork. And of course Volkogonov recounts in detail the tragedy of a people condemned to suffer and languish under the weight of the cruel,

ineffective, Stalinist super-bureaucracy.

The book's strongest sections are those that deal with the decades of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. Until the early 1930s, many of the Bolsheviks' opponents, including dissenters within the party, left the Soviet Union, some voluntarily, some not. Their accounts have long provided Western historians with a fairly accurate picture of the workings of the Soviet system in its early years—for example, Lenin's deathbed doubts about Stalin's character. However, once Stalin completely established his personal political control, few escaped the Soviet Union with their lives, and little inside information found its way to the West. Thus, while Volkogonov's biography offers little that is new about the dictator's rise to power or the early revolutionary period in Russia, the author does provide details of the purges, the war, and Stalin's final years that are chilling in their revelations.

The account is replete with insight into Stalin's paranoia, brutality, decisionmaking, conduct of war and peace, and obsession with power. Volkogonov describes how Stalin's terror gained a momentum of its own and spread uncontrollably throughout Soviet society. The author has discovered the lists of the condemned, initialled by Stalin himself. We read Stalin's comments written in the margins of reports on the progress of the purge trials. Volkogonov recounts Stalin's desperate efforts to keep war from engulfing the Soviet Union and testing the resilience of what was, in fact, a politically shaky regime. He quotes Ministry of Defense documents to show that Marshal Georgi Zhukov, chief of the general staff in early 1941, proposed a preemptive strike against the Germans as they concentrated along the Soviet border. But Stalin remained committed to a defensive strategy, and moreover, one focused on the southern part of the front. Then, Volkogonov paints a remarkable picture of a shaken Stalin ready, once the war began, to surrender vast tracts of Soviet territory to buy peace. Finally, in 1945 and 1946 Stalin shaped domestic and foreign policies that ensured that the wartime triumphs of the Soviet people would be lost amidst the tragedy of Stalinism. Of Churchill's famous March 1946 "Iron Curtain" speech Volkogonov writes, "This was true. Soon after the war, Stalin had taken energetic measures to reduce all contact with the West and the rest of the world. A curtain, whether of iron or ideology, had decidedly come down. . . ."

Most of the details in Volkogonov's book are not revelations to those familiar with Soviet history. However, it allows us to move from the realm of educated speculation to knowledge based on official sources. Churchill described it as an enigma: "Russia . . . is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. . . ." Thanks to honest, brave individuals such as Dmitri Volkogonov, Russia's

often dark and painful secrets are now being revealed.

Despite its strengths, this work is not without flaws. Its prose and organization are uneven, although whether the fault lies with the author or editor-translator is unclear. Volkogonov also seems uncertain about just where to place responsibility for the Soviet tragedy. Was everything solely Stalin's fault? Or were the problems, in part at least, attributable to the system he inherited from Lenin? Volkogonov appears to be a man going through a personal and extremely painful catharsis as he calls into question the legitimacy of the very system he served for most of his adult life.

Volkogonov's *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy* is an extremely poignant and important work. Anyone with an interest in the history of Russia, the Second World War, the early Cold War period, the twentieth century, or the story of human progress (and regression) will find this biography engrossing.

MICHAEL A. PALMER
East Carolina University

Kennedy, Paul. *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century*. New York: Random House, 1992. 428pp. $25

Students of strategy will view the publication of Paul Kennedy's book with great anticipation. After all, his previous book, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, turned out to be of interest to many more than scholars; selling nearly a quarter of a million copies, it had a profound impact on the view Americans hold of the world around us. *Rise and Fall* looked at the grand sweep of history and the forces which cause nations to gain and lose strength, and it triggered widespread debate on whether or not the United States had reached its apogee and was following earlier powers into the second rank of nations.

Preparing for the Twenty-first Century picks up some of those same themes of growth and decline but goes beyond the constraints of the previous book to look at the forces at work both beyond and within national boundaries, and even forces mutating those boundaries. Readers who enjoyed the parts of *Rise and Fall* where the author speculated on present and future trends will be especially pleased with this text, which does quite a bit of sketching of directions that the future might take. Kennedy, as should not surprise those who see him as a "don" of the "declinist school," is rather gloomy about our prospects. In his prologue he evokes Thomas Malthus, the dour British economist of the eighteenth century, in a discussion of the perils of increasing population. However, while glum, Kennedy does not give in to defeatism, nor does he portray the problems he outlines as immutable. Instead he refers to them as challenges, which he encourages leaders of the world to face.

The bulk of the work is divided into two major parts. The first, "General Trends," looks at forces currently

reshaping the world community: the world's ever-burgeoning human population and the strain it causes; the communications and financial innovations that are creating a "borderless world"; agriculture and biotechnology and their promises for the future; robotics and automation and their impact on industry; threats to the environment; and finally political trends affecting nation-states and their place in global society. The one surprising omission in this section is the lack of discussion on energy and natural resources. The second part, "Regional Impacts," looks at the different regions of the world and how each of the trends previously discussed will affect them. Kennedy sees Japan and Europe as perhaps the most successful in meeting the challenges of the future, with the former Soviet Union and the developing world least successful and the United States muddling along somewhere in between. Kennedy's major theme in the regional section, however, is that no nation or area of the globe is immune to the broad issues such as population, productivity, and environmental concerns that affect us all, regardless of our locations.

In his conclusion, Kennedy summarizes the challenges which face our leaders and chides them for attempting to explain issues away rather than solve them. He briefly discusses areas where solutions can be found: in collective action, in changing the role of women in societies, and political leadership. Kennedy ends with a somber warning that if the challenges he describes are not dealt with, we will bear the responsibility for the resulting problems.

There has been much talk in recent years about taking broader views of what national security entails and about looking beyond the traditional litany of military and strategic threats. Those who wonder what new threats might fall under that broader umbrella of national security will find this book an excellent primer.

ALAN L. BROWN
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U.S. Coast Guard Reserve

Gallie, W.B. *Points of Conflict: Understanding War.* New York: Routledge, 1991. 116pp. $14.95

Newell, Clayton R. *The Framework of Operational Warfare.* New York: Routledge, 1991. 186pp. $30

The first title under review defies simple categorization. It is at once a work of political and military philosophy, and a tract for dealing with the problems of nuclear deterrence in the post–Cold War world. It would be more appropriately titled "Understanding Deterrence." Its author is a professor emeritus of political science at the Cambridge University. However, American readers must not confuse this title with their own vision of a political scientist; Gallie is much more a political philosopher. He was president of the Aristotelian Society in Great Britain in the early 1970s, and before taking his chair at Cambridge

was professor of logic and metaphysics at Queen's University, Belfast. His previous works include *Philosophy and Historical Understanding* (1964) and *Philosophers of Peace and War* (1978).

Gallie's argument is easy to follow. He begins with the proposition that "man is a war-making animal." He then asserts that each of three proposed solutions to the problem of nuclear weapons—political, moral, and technical—is inadequate. He then surveys the broad history of war, dividing it into three periods: an era of classical war up to and including Napoleon; a century of "problematic" war; and a near-century of total war, extending from the Great War to the present. This analysis is followed by an assertion that war, not only in the case of its individual manifestations but also in the case of its existence as a political-social phenomenon, is *inherently* escalatory. This leads to the obvious danger in the nuclear age that war's inherent tendency to escalate will result in the obliteration of the world as we know it. To mitigate against this possibility Gallie provides two solutions. The first is the formation of a power condominium by Russia and the United States to prevent nuclear proliferation and convince the three other declared nuclear powers that their nuclear weapons are superfluous. The second is the establishment of a discipline called "survival studies," which would synthesize present war and peace-studies curricula.

In this reviewer's opinion, the argument is seriously flawed. Gallie sets up straw men in his political, moral, technical paradigm. He says that this paradigm argues for a synoptic view, but he fails to provide the synopsis. Gallie confuses Clausewitz's assertion that *in the purely theoretical realm* war is inherently escalatory with his observation that *real* war comes in two distinct types—those in which the objective is the overthrow of the adversary and those in which the object is merely incremental advantage. But the central defect of the work is in its logic: if one accepts Gallie's propositions that man is a war-making animal and that war is inherently escalatory, there are only two inescapable alternatives. Either you must accept the inevitability of general nuclear war, or you must put forth a way to change human nature. Gallie is unwilling to admit the former and neither of his proposed solutions promises the latter. Overall, therefore, *Understanding War* is an interesting exercise in political and military philosophy, but one as badly argued as it is titled.

The Framework of Operational Art is just as advertised: an outline for understanding war at the operational level. Its author, Clayton Newell, is a retired army officer and former member of the Army War College faculty who also served in the Office of the Chief of Military History. He has written several articles for *Parameters*, the most notable of which advanced the notion that at the operational level

of war the practice of logistics has an element of art as well as science.

The structure of the book is elegant in its simplicity. It comprises a preliminary chapter that examines the study of war and also an analysis of three perspectives of war—strategic, operational, and tactical. There are also two appendices, respectively outlining the format and providing the history of the U.S. Army's five-paragraph field order. The heart of the book parallels the structure of that instrument. That is, it argues that the framework for analyzing war should consider the following issues from each of the three perspectives mentioned above; how situations are understood, how objectives are set, how war is conducted, how war is supported, and how war is controlled. The work concludes with a chapter on the utility of war as an instrument of national policy.

Among the major themes addressed are the chaos inherent in the nature of war and the dilemmas faced by commanders attempting to impose order upon this chaotic activity.

In setting up this form of argument and presenting these insights, it is obvious that the author has profited greatly from his experience of teaching operational art at a senior service college. Unfortunately, however, the high promise of this simple but comprehensive framework is marred by faulty execution. The style is awkward, frequent non sequiturs leave the reader puzzled as to the author's meaning, and the development of the argument within the individual chapters is difficult to follow. The historical analyses are generally valid, but they are maladroitly forced into the analytical framework. This reviewer found the most useful part of the book to be the appendix that traces the origin of the five-paragraph field order back to a single sentence in the German field service regulation of 1887. On the whole this is a promising work that fails to achieve its potential for want of forceful editing.

HAROLD R. WINTON
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Cimbala, Stephen J. *Force and Diplomacy in the Future.* New York: Praeger, 1992. 243pp. $47.95

According to the publisher's blurb, *Force and Diplomacy in the Future* "is an initial effort to assess the post–Cold War international environment in terms of its implications for the relationship betweeen force and policy . . . based on a retrospective look at U.S., allied NATO, and Soviet doctrine strategy. . . ." Right away, there is a problem—while there can be no question of the urgent need for new studies of the relationship between force and policy in the post–Cold War era, Cimbala's narrowly focused overview of the evolution of forty years of U.S. and Soviet thinking about the utility of nuclear weapons and strategies of deterrence provides an absurdly limited base for any informed speculation on the nature of "force and diplomacy in the future."

This book could more accurately have been titled "The Problem of Nuclear Deterrence after the Breakup of the Soviet Union," but even that would be misleading. Nowhere does the author deal with deterring nuclear weapons outside of the context of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, although the end of the Cold War will certainly mean an increase in the number of second and third-rank states possessing such weapons even as the stockpiles of the major powers are reduced. How might nuclear deterrence be practiced in such a world? The author gives us no clue.

Similarly slighted, despite their obvious importance to any discussion of the future relationship between force and policy, are such issues as the increasing proliferation of racial, religious, and ethnic conflicts around the world and the question of what circumstances might justify U.S. or UN intervention. Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were not in the headlines when this book was written, but the Gulf War and plenty of other non–Cold War trouble spots were. Here again, other than to observe that "the issues with which Europe was forced to deal prior to the Second World War will reappear in the aftermath of a socially reconstructed Soviet Union, a defunct Warsaw Pact, and a newly reunited Germany," the author has little more to offer his readers.

All of which is not to say that there is nothing of value in this book. Readers willing to overlook the misleading title and wade through Cimbala's sometimes clunky, jargon-ridden prose (his editor should be shot) will find not only a concise and knowledgeable summary of the evolution of Cold War deterrence theory but also a competent overview of twentieth-century European history, one that at least suggests what underlying problems and trends, long submerged or obscured by the imperatives of the Cold War, are most likely to bedevil us in the decades to come.

Dr. Cimbala, a political science professor at Pennsylvania State University, has previously published such books as *The Soviet Challenge in the 1990s* (Praeger, 1989), *Conflict Termination in Europe: Games against War* (Praeger, 1990), and *Strategy after Deterrence* (Praeger, 1991). Each of the works dealt with some facet of the central strategic dilemma of the Cold War: the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is clear that Cimbala began this book with the intention of making it the fourth in this series. Given that Start II has not been ratified, much less implemented, he should have kept to his original plan and resisted choosing a title that promises more than he delivers.

HEATH TWICHELL
Oak Bluffs, Massachusetts

Blank, Stephen et al. *Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges.* Alabama: Air Univ. Press, 1990. 318pp. (No price given)

Ewald, John. *Treatise on Partisan Warfare*. trans. Robert Selig and David Skaggs, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1991. 192pp. $45

With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the restructuring of the old Soviet empire, and the changing economic, political, and social environment of the United States, the past military force structures, doctrines, and strategies require review. The comfort and familiarity of the bipolar world which many of us grew up understanding is now behind us. Quietly and without much fanfare, the Western powers have won the Cold War. Therefore, the next decade's wars may not have the strategic character envisioned by force planners of the past forty-five years.

The emphasis of strategists, force planners, and others involved in the management of force has shifted from large-scale conventional warfare and nuclear deterrence to low-intensity conflict (LIC). Though numerous works over the centuries have dealt with conflict at this level, these recent additions contribute to a field of military study now increasingly gaining importance.

Published under the auspices of the United States Air Force's Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE), *Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges* presents five case studies that examine the doctrines, strategies, and force structures of the LIC environment. This historical approach to understanding low-intensity conflict scenarios attempts to describe strategies for each case while emphasizing certain overall force structures, doctrines, and strategies that appear successful for all LIC situations.

The five authors are eminently qualified scholars on the various regions presented. Each one has taught, published, or served in a variety of capacities, both in the military and in governmental positions. The first article, "Low-Intensity Conflict in the Middle East," by Lewis Ware, presents an overall view of the LIC environment and then presents the cases of two states in the Middle East—Israel and Algeria. Several valid but often overlooked points are presented in this essay.

One key point repeatedly stressed throughout this work is that LIC is *not* perceived by the belligerents as low in intensity, since oftentimes the survival of each belligerent is at stake in the conflict. Ware further states that LIC is different from conventional conflicts in two important respects. The first is that "LICs result more from conditions of widespread socioeconomic and political unrest than from issues of national sovereignty." Secondly, "LICs are protracted; the choice of weapons, strategy, tactics, and employment of forces is asymmetrical; and the insurgents disregard the classical logic of set-piece engagements."

Ware's historical studies of LIC in Israel and Algeria are well presented, but his conclusions on strategies and doctrines for the state of Israel provide

little in the way of offering a solution to the problems in the Middle East or how to win in the LIC environment. After carefully defining the various political and religious backgrounds of both sides, the author details the deep-rooted contradictions inherent in that part of the world. However, he fails to differentiate between Judaism, the Israeli populace, and the state of Israel, which is critical to understanding LIC in the Middle East.

His description of the Islamic threat—"What one hears from all the Islamists . . . is that only a permanent uprising can eliminate Israel, and all other goals must yield priority"—does not support his argument for greater police forces at the local or village level. His emphasis on changes in the economic, social, and political workings at both the "micro" and "macro" levels of society disregards the tremendous religious roots of this conflict. Ware further confuses the reader by prescribing forces and doctrine to *control* the threat to the state of Israel instead of providing methods to *win* this LIC.

Four tenets of basic LIC doctrine proposed by Ware imply specific actions for all states involved in such conflicts. These four propositions are: (1) politically the threat is permanent, while militarily it is protracted; (2) doctrine must acknowledge the predominance of the political dimension over the military; (3) external actors are becoming more important in the resolution of LICs, which may make unilateral solutions by the belligerents impractical; and (4) there must be fundamental reform of the political systems on both sides if the conflict is to be terminated. These four tenets apply equally well to the other four cases presented in this book.

The four remaining case studies deal with Soviet forces in Afghanistan; Guatemala and El Salvador; the Philippines and Indonesia; and LIC in the African context. Each case provides an adequate historical background and strategic analysis and insight into the variations and similarities of LIC throughout the underdeveloped world. With the exception of the first article's shortcoming that has been noted, this book is an interesting and enlightening source for the student of low-intensity conflict. More emphasis on the religious problems inherent in certain LIC scenarios would have made this book complete. It is a useful primer to members of the national security community and others interested in the resolution of this type of conflict.

A reminder that LIC—by whatever name—is not an entirely new phenomenon is a work by Robert Selig, an eighteenth-century historian, and David Skaggs, historian of the American Revolution and author on military history. They have provided the first English translation of Johann Ewald's *Treatise on Partisan Warfare*. It is a significant contribution to the history of the Seven Years War and the American Revolution, as well as a detailed look into the recruiting,

training, doctrine, and tactics of light infantry.

First published in 1785, Ewald had just completed eight years in North America. Respected for his abilities as a *jager* captain, he had seen his courage and talent for light infantry tactics tested in almost every major battle fought in North America from 1776 to 1784. Destined to attain the rank of major general in the Danish army, Ewald's firsthand knowledge of partisan warfare lends immense credibility to this work.

Of the book's two sections, the first is an introductory essay invaluable to a full appreciation of the work. Its only drawback is the inclusion of almost every contribution of Ewald to modern-day military historians and strategists.

The second section is the treatise, which is divided into eleven chapters and an appendix. Discussed are light infantry procedures from recruitment and discipline to ambushes and retreats. From a tactical perspective, few of today's light infantry forces will be able to utilize Ewald's basic tenets; however, topics such as light infantry training, organization, and leadership techniques transcend the passage of time.

Students of military history will enjoy the detailed analysis of what constitutes revolutionary war and of the distinctive technical features of the American Revolution. Ewald's astute understanding of the relationship between the conflict, the government, and the military would later be espoused by Clausewitz.

This work is valuable not only to the military historian but also to those who need to understand how to lead, organize and employ light infantry forces in a revolutionary war. It is also a highly interesting story, easily read and understood by even the newest student of warfare.

GARY A. TROGDON
Major, U.S. Air Force

Wander, W. Thomas and Arnett, Eric H., eds. *The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry: Technology, Motivations, and Responses*. Washington, D.C.: American Assoc. for the Advancement of Science, 1992. 330pp. (No price given)

This book is stimulating and frustrating. Its international perspectives challenge commonly held assumptions of the American defense community, especially those which allow the United States to have weapons and take military actions that are considered illegitimate by at least some within the world community. The issues addressed here are complex and in general are discussed adroitly, with substantial insight. However, it is astonishing in this modern computer age to find a serious book without an index. Also, though the book is oriented toward regional conflict, its logical constructs and vocabulary are reminiscent of the strategic deterrence discussions of the Cold War. Finally,

the title is somewhat misleading. "Advanced Weaponry" suggests much more than chemical, biological, and nuclear devices and the missiles, mainly ballistic, that deliver them; but the book restricts itself to essentially these weapons. In fact, an underlying premise of the book seems to be that the particular weapons it treats will dominate the issues both of when military conflict will occur (or be deterred) and what the outcome will be. Although advances in other technologies may well have much impact on future conflict, the case supporting the chosen premise is not presented explicitly.

The essays were written by an international group of analysts in conjunction with the Seventh Annual Colloquium of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) on Science and Security, "The Challenges for U.S. and Regional Security," held at the Georgetown University Conference Center in Washington, D.C., on 30 October 1992. The two dozen contributors have impressive credentials. A third are from countries other than the United States. The American contributors have ties with major universities (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard, Stanford, etc.), think tanks (Brookings, RAND, etc.), disarmament agencies, congressional staffs, and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

The book has five major sections. The first provides perspectives on the proliferation of weapons of concern to the book, from both the American and developing-nation points of view. The second section addresses advanced weaponry in the developing world and covers cruise missile and space systems as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons for ballistic missiles. The third section examines why nations buy, build, and sell arms, with essays specifically addressing China, India, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Iran, Israel, and the European Community. The fourth section examines proliferation implications for U.S. policy, considering possible rationales for American use of nuclear weapons, defenses against ballistic missiles, intelligence requirements to support nonproliferation policies, and the U.S. role in creating multilateral constraints on the international arms trade. The final section looks at direct international responses to proliferation through the United Nations and other avenues as well.

Problems of adjusting the arms industries of the United States, Western Europe, the states of the former Soviet empire, and developing nations to the evolving realities of the 1990s are treated with appreciation for the complexities involved. It may surprise some to discover that the U.S. is now the dominant exporter of military systems, accounting for half of the world trade in conventional weapon systems. This is due more to drastic reductions in foreign sales by states of the former Soviet Union than to an

increase in the volume of U.S. arms sales abroad.

Material in the book generally is balanced, relevant, and fair, although several of the authors manifest a definite orientation toward a particular side of an issue. The most obvious of these is Thomas Morgan in his discussion of defense against ballistic missiles. His ideas are more provocative than compelling. For instance, the economic argument that an adversary with ballistic missiles can bankrupt those who employ active defenses against the missiles seems flawed to me; his example assumes continuous defense of every target within range of the adversary's missiles.

Several times writers raise the question of double standards for members of the United Nations Security Council and for developing nations in regard to the legitimacy of having advanced weaponry in their arsenals. Why is it acceptable for the U.S., China, etc., to have nuclear weapons, but not for Brazil, Iran, etc.? Before long-term multilateral restrictions on the proliferation of advanced military technology can be very effective, this question will have to be answered more satisfactorily than it has been to date.

This book, which reads easily and is well organized, does the defense community an important service—not by providing answers to proliferation policy issues but by clarifying a large number of the issues and identifying relationships among them. It is a valuable contribution to the literature and a convenient summary of pertinent background information.

DALE K. PACE
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Kaufman, Yogi and Stillwell, Paul. *Sharks of Steel.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993. 176pp. $39.95

Yogi Kaufman was the skipper of my first submarine, the *Scorpion*. Though I was only an ensign, it is an understatement to say that we clashed at times—but I survived, much better for the wear, and now count Yogi among my professional mentors and friends. When I was asked to do this review, I called him and said it was true that if one waited long enough, the chance to "get even" would arrive; he recommended that I start the review with that observation.

At first glance, *Sharks of Steel* is but another glossy "coffee table" picture book. A clue that it is something more, however, is the gold sticker in the corner that advertises it as a companion piece to the recently aired Discovery Channel four-hour miniseries of the same name, "starring" none other than Yogi himself. Although it stands alone as an informative and aesthetically pleasing document, to appreciate fully the significance and worth of this beautiful book one should savor its photos and study its text after watching at least part of the miniseries.

This book is a documentary unto itself. With photos, artwork, and detailed text, it discusses World War II, the era when the United States submarine force firmly established itself as a first-class combat force, then the birth of the nuclear navy under Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, and then moves into a detailed disclosure of our current force of nuclear attack submarines and the ballistic missile deterrent force. "Disclosure" is a carefully selected word, for only a few years ago many of the photographs would have been stamped "Secret, No Foreign Dissemination." The visual grand finale of the work is the set of pictures taken of a Russian Typhoon-class submarine when Admiral Kaufman was invited to visit that huge ship at Severomorsk on the Kola Peninsula. You will have to view the miniseries, however, to see footage of Yogi's interview with the skipper and the interior of this massive submarine with (honestly) its small swimming pool/large hot tub!

The authenticity and credibility of this book are beyond reproach. There are none of the factual errors that so often mar attempts of this sort. Those who know Yogi, and particularly those who have served with him, would have expected nothing less. The commanding officer of a diesel submarine, the USS *Cavalla*, before attending nuclear power training, Yogi served as executive officer of the *Seawolf*, commanding officer of the *Scorpion*, the commissioning commanding officer of the *Will Rogers*, and the commanding officer of the Nuclear Power Training Unit in Arco, Idaho. He was also a prime mover of the Ultra Large Missile Submarine project, which evolved into our present *Ohio* class of Trident submarines. His personal knowledge gained from such broad experience is the core around which *Sharks of Steel* is woven.

In addition to the technical detail that both photos and text convey, Yogi, his son Steve, and Paul Stillwell also manage to capture the most elusive but most critical dimensions of this nation's submarine force—the extraordinary training of superior officers and men, their professionalism and camaraderie, and the sacrifices that have been and are still being made by their loved ones during consecutive months and aggregated years of total separation.

Many who read or saw *The Hunt for Red October* likely thought the story entertaining but somewhat "hyped"—no machine could be that capable, no people that talented. As the submarine force inches its way out of the "Where'd you go? Nowhere! What'd you do? Nothing!" closet, works such as *Sharks of Steel* will demonstrate that both Tom Clancy and Paramount Pictures significantly *understated* the case for material and personal excellence. If one is a submariner, he should own this book. If he is not, he particularly should.

JAMES PATTON
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Fluckey, Eugene B. *Thunder Below: The USS* Barb *Revolutionizes Submarine Warfare in World War II.* Univ. of Illinois Press, 1992. 444pp. $27

This account of five war patrols of the USS *Barb*, told by her captain, who earned four Navy Crosses and a Congressional Medal of Honor in this command, offers the excitement of the best of fiction. This inspiring true story of World War II is told in such human terms that the events themselves become background. *Thunder Below* is also an outstanding textbook on leadership. Nearly every page shows examples of how to lead successfully. In addition, a number of times superiors are shown being led in the direction that this *Barb* captain felt they should go.

Why did this naval hero have such extraordinary success in World War II? The highly skilled crew of this submarine was well led (which probably could be said about most World War II submarines), especially during the last third of the war, when commanding officers came with combat experience, the torpedoes worked, and proven attack doctrine was in place.

No doubt luck played a part, but probably no more than it does for the team that wins the Superbowl. After all, in five patrols the *Barb* had dozens of encounters with the enemy. The high percentage of successes achieved is a mark of superior performance. The expression the author uses, "Luck is where you find it," accurately describes the contribution that factor made to the success of *Barb*'s operations.

However, another element may have been Commander Fluckey's deep curiosity. Two incidents illustrate this. While *Barb* patrolled between the Chinese mainland and Formosa, her captain began wondering why his patrol area was so devoid of shipping. He began to study charts of the coastal waterways along the China coastline, where he found that except for Hai-tan Strait, where the water was too shallow to allow ships to stay inshore, it was feasible for ships to move north and south without entering waters deep enough for submarines to operate. To find out if that shallow stretch had been dredged, he queried the Commander, U.S. Naval Group China directly and learned that dredging had been done. The tale of how this new intelligence was exploited is a most exciting one. A second example is that before his final patrol, Commander Fluckey believed he could cause more harm to the enemy by adding a newly developed rocket launcher to the *Barb*. To win over the "no-sayers" took a lot of perseverance on his part. He also used every bit of influence he had before he managed to arm the *Barb* with rockets. By effectively employing this new weapon system, he justified the faith his superiors had in him.

A fourth important factor was the resiliency that came from the author's ever-present sense of humor. This, coupled with his humility of spirit,

supported all on board the *Barb* through dark, fearsome moments. With this support, confidence grew until there was no room for either self-doubt or despair.

Thorough research into U.S., Japanese, and Chinese records makes *Thunder Below* accurate and complete. It also reflects the desire to "do it right the first time" that was a hallmark of the *Barb*. As one sailor put it, "We try to do our jobs all the way." How better to achieve success than to take this approach?

This story gives interesting insights into how the *Barb* was run. We are told why crewmen who had been Boy Scouts were given added consideration when choosing a team for a specially hazardous mission. Also, fresh new meaning to the tradition of "splice the mainbrace" is provided.

For those who wish to learn while reading for enjoyment, this book is a must.

JACOB V. HEIMARK
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Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania

Chant, Christopher. *Small Craft Navies*. New York: Sterling Pub., 1992. 160pp. $29.95

Small Craft Navies is a unique and interesting reference work that fulfills two separate and distinct functions. In its first section it provides a lively and entertaining look at the development of fast patrol boats and fast attack craft, beginning with what is generally recognized as the world's first attack craft, the Royal Navy torpedo launch *Lightning*, which entered service in 1876. The second half provides a comprehensive technical directory of more than one hundred designs of fast patrol boats and fast attack craft, as well as illustrations of almost all the boats and craft featured.

Part One begins by making the important distinction between fast patrol boats and fast attack craft. The former are generally fitted with only light armament (such as machine guns, or cannon of less than 40mm) and minimal sensor and fire control suites. The latter are usually of higher speeds and possess much heavier, longer-range armament that can include antiship missiles, guns of up to 76mm, antiship torpedoes, and antisubmarine warfare weapons. The author faithfully retains this distinction throughout the book.

Part One moves quickly through the early years of patrol and attack craft and mostly discusses the post–World War II era. It ties together the development both of these craft and the weapons they carried (particularly the antiship missiles) that have made these vessels so formidable. Where appropriate, this section speaks to the effectiveness of the craft and weapons of various navies, offering information usually seen only in detailed accounts of battles or campaigns.

The author also attempts to define the rationale determining which boats or craft each navy operates. For example, he notes that China is the world's largest operator of fast combat craft

and explains how this is a natural outgrowth of both the geography of the Chinese coastline and the types of threats that the National People's Liberation Army-Navy might typically have to deal with. The author also presents information of a more generalized nature explaining many of the factors that go into a nation's decision to purchase and operate these boats and craft.

Part Two of this book presents an excellent technical directory. Rather than organize the patrol boats and attack craft by country, the author has arranged them alphabetically by type or class, starting with the Turkish AB class and ending with the Polish *Wisla* class. Within each class, the craft are further broken down by nation so that the reader can get an immediate sense of how many of the type exist worldwide and then how many exist in each particular navy. Because of this organization, *Small Craft Navies* is a particularly useful reference book. For example, this arrangement enables us to learn that the Soviet Osa I and Osa II classes comprise over three hundred craft owned by a total of twenty-two nations. A review of this section also reveals that the People's Republic of China is a major exporter of attack craft, with four major classes—the Hainan, Huchuan, Shanghai, and Shantou—exported to a wide variety of nations. The Shanghai class alone is featured in thirteen navies.

Overall, *Small Craft Navies* is a lively and interesting book. Although its subject matter would initially appear to be highly specialized and of rather narrow appeal, its importance is apparent as all navies move into an era of littoral warfare so well articulated, for the U.S. Navy case, in ". . . From the Sea." As these craft increase in numbers and importance, so too will the value of this already useful book.

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Kelly, Orr. *Brave Men, Dark Waters: The Untold Story of the Navy SEALS.* Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1992. 288pp. $22.95

Pity the Navy Seals. Despite a half century's heroic service as the Navy's frogmen, they've failed to garner the spoils of their Army brethren: a hit song, a John Wayne movie, and a green beret ostentatiously sanctioned by the president of the United States.

They do have Bob Kerry, the former Seal whose Medal of Honor was his main calling card as a presidential aspirant. Unfortunately, what the general public knows about the Seals otherwise is hardly flattering: a botched jump that left four dead off Grenada; a calamitous assault on a Panamanian airfield that left another four dead and nine wounded; the awkward arrival in Somalia, where grease-faced Seals crawled out of dark surf into the bright lights of television crews. Their reputation was not helped by the best-selling memoir of former Seal commander Richard Marcinko, *Rogue Warrior.*

A balanced history of the Navy's frogmen was overdue but not easy to achieve. As Orr Kelly, the veteran military reporter for *U.S. News & World Report*, notes in his preface, the Seals are obsessed by secrecy and are not always their own best witnesses. One Seal warned Kelly that if he did not like the book, "I'll rain on you."

Kelly should be safe. As his title suggests, *Brave Men, Dark Waters* is a paean to the under-appreciated Navy commandos, from their bloody baptism in the surf of Tarawa fifty years ago to their largely unheralded contribution to the brilliant deception that convinced Saddam Hussein an amphibious landing was coming in Kuwait.

This book crackles with enough war stories, some revealed for the first time, to keep the most jaded reader turning pages. But Kelly is too modest when he says his goal was to "help today's and tomorrow's SEALS to know themselves better." The Seals seem to know who they are—it's their bosses who seem confused.

Kelly traces the Seals' difficulties to the hectic days after Pearl Harbor, when two overlapping and sometimes contradictory roles emerged for the frogmen. One originated in the need for a reconnaissance capability against enemy beaches and harbors, another in the demand for waterborne sabotage and demolition. First came the Scouts and Raiders, and then the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs). Each had different capabilities based on the objectives of the moment and theater of assignment, a dichotomy that has plagued the units to this day despite their consolidation in 1962 as one big Sea-Air-Land family unit.

Nothing prepared them very well for Indochina, where the CIA first used them to train Vietnamese saboteurs sent north. As Irish Flynn, a lieutenant who later became the first Seal admiral, said, "it was an act of very great arrogance" to assume the Seals could teach tricks to soldiers who had been fighting the communists for a decade. Otherwise, except for a few submarine-based forays so ill-fated that they must be read in full to be appreciated, the Seals were employed in commando raids against Viet Cong units in coastal areas and swamps. After a year mucking around, one disillusioned lieutenant wrote headquarters, "This is not for us," and advised they be pulled out. You can imagine the answer.

Antiterrorism was added to the Seals' quiver in the 1980s, and Kelly offers a thoroughly balanced antidote to *Rogue Warrior*. Yet, for Seal Team Six, "Grenada was the first opportunity to show what it could do." The team tasked to rescue that island's governor general had to be rescued itself; yet another team, trying to capture a radio transmitter, was overwhelmed and had to fight its way to the sea. All this after four Seals had died in a parachute jump into a gale.

The author seems to agree with those who blame "the failure of senior commanders to understand the role of the SEALS . . . and use them properly" for such disasters. After Panama,

some said that tasking a multi-platoon Seal force to secure Noriega's airfield was "unfair," not suited to "SEAL doctrine," etc. "So what?" answered Admiral George Worthington, the senior Seal commander. The Seals, he said, were the best America had to offer at the moment.

One can see his point. But then why have special forces at all? *Brave Men, Dark Waters* should be required reading for anyone concerned about the future of the Seals. After reading it, however, you will not feel confident that anything will change. It is not in the nature of the beast.

JEFF STEIN
author of
A Murder in Wartime

Marcinko, Richard with John Weisman. *Rogue Warrior.* New York: Pocket Books, 1992. 339pp. $22

You will not find this book on the Navy's official professional reading list. As a matter of fact, it is the sort of book that public affairs officers wisely avoid questions about. *Rogue Warrior* is the autobiography of Commander Richard Marcinko, commissioning commanding officer of Seal Team Six, the Navy's counter-terrorist organization. Marcinko formed and commanded Red Cell, a unit designed to use terrorist tactics in testing the security of naval installations. Then he was found guilty, after two trials, of conspiracy to defraud the government. To a great extent, the book is Marcinko's way of getting even with those officers—mostly retired—who thwarted or challenged his professional or personal ambitions. Yet despite (or perhaps because of) the author's motives, this book is less an embarrassment to the Navy as an institution than an indictment of particular personalities, both patrons and enemies, who launched an unguided missile into the most politically sensitive of tasks: counter-terrorism. The lesson it contains goes much deeper than the jacket blurbs, innuendoes of broken faith, or sanitized details of Seal operations. I would recommend it for the reading list as a category of its own—"bureaucratic wars of the ego."

One cannot accurately review the book and avoid reviewing the person. No one can deny that Richard Marcinko is a very brave man. He is also (despite a twenty-one-month prison sentence that he describes as a vacation) a success story; a high school dropout with an obviously unhappy childhood who becomes a frogman, a naval officer, a Seal, and a three-time commanding officer. Unfortunately, he carries with him what his collaborator, John Weisman, politely describes as "warrior's hubris" but others might refer to as the utmost egotism. It is evident in this book that Commander Marcinko's combat experience never taught him that making enemies for fun is a deadly game, particularly in peacetime. In his eyes there are no peers and no rules. There were few below the rank of three stars whom he would not insult or ignore.

Blaming the negative reactions to his snubs and end-around maneuvers on "conventional attitudes" towards unconventional warfare, Marcinko portrays himself as an agent of change—the one who made the Navy accept new roles for Special Warfare and built one of the top counter-terrorism organizations in the world. He argues passionately that he operated as he did to support his men and develop unit integrity.

Perhaps this is true, but it is hard to understand why his profane and public disdain for the "system" was either necessary or productive. Even before he launched into his greatest orgy of bureaucratic enemy-making, the "system" had already provided his creation, Seal Team Six, with more training ammunition than the *entire* Marine Corps. Part of Marcinko's defense lay in the fact that he was a true "shooter," a Vietnam and Cambodia combat veteran operating in a world of pencil-pushers. But like its protagonist, the book is clearest when it describes death-defying missions against defined enemies. In the murk of budget battles and empire building, everyone else appears an enemy. Even other combat veterans are viewed as mere pencil-pushers if they have alternatives to Marcinko's methods.

Although autobiographies can be mere attempts at self-aggrandizement—*Rogue Warrior* being a fine example—the good ones unwittingly reveal much of their subject's inner character. In this respect, Marcinko's book is a classic. In creating Seal Team Six, Marcinko broke or bent many rules and that had brought him success. In operating Red Cell, he disregarded even more rules. This not only caused his promotion to be revoked but brought on an investigation by the Naval Investigative Service. Marcinko is still unable to discern that the personal qualities, attitudes, and methods necessary for the creation of the Seal team did not fit the task of running the Red Cell. More importantly, he does not admit to himself what eventually becomes clear to the reader: that while Marcinko the warrior was a reflection of his own courage and total commitment, Marcinko the commander was the creation of three and four-star patrons who let a useful instrument run amok. The establishment of Red Cell was more a bureaucratic method by seniors to keep Marcinko in the Navy than an organization with a practical purpose. That Red Cell agents, comprised mostly of Seals trained by the master, could penetrate typical naval base security and embarrass those responsible seems hardly a revelation. Apropos of this superfluous mission, Marcinko claims to have operated the unit primarily out of a bar in Alexandria, Virginia. Persistent rumors of physical abuse of victims of Red Cell "training" are not mentioned in the book.

Why do I recommend this book—which, by the way, has more four-letter words per page than your average soft porn? First, it contains illuminating (albeit vetted) depictions of Seal

training and operations and will probably be a choice (albeit one-sided) source for future naval historians to blend with more objective material. Second, it reveals fascinating (and mostly unflattering) vignettes of key national security officials of the 1980s and makes (unsubstantiated) charges of criminal negligence on the part of the senior Foreign Service Officer responsible for security of the bombed Beirut embassy in which sixty-three personnel were killed. However, it is primarily important for what it teaches our future warrior-leaders: beware the temptation of an unrestrained ego. Perhaps (as if Tailhook were not enough) it will also remind senior officers that they are responsible for protecting subordinates from their own worst instincts. The downfall of the successful commander, like the successful rebel, occurs when he or she can no longer distinguish between what is good for one's organization and what is good for one's pride. Commander Marcinko was both commander and rebel, but his bold victories have been overshadowed by his downfall.

SAM J. TANGREDI
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Leckie, Robert. *The Wars of America.* New York: HarperCollins, 1992. 1,281pp. $50

Robert Leckie, a superb narrator, military historian, and prolific author, set himself a formidable task in this book. In one volume he has sought to place the wars of America in perspective. His object is to make his students better citizens by improving their knowledge of the good and bad in our history. In the main, Robert Leckie succeeds.

Historians shoulder an awesome responsibility. They must be precise, accurate, and reasonably objective. They are the reader's surrogate in sifting through the primary source material and in differentiating information from primary, secondary, and hearsay sources. The narrator comes into conflict with the icons of fact while seeking to breathe life into the record of the past. Here also, this reviewer believes that Robert Leckie succeeds.

Leckie escorts the reader from Samuel de Champlain's war against the Iroquois in 1609 to the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Curiously, the author seems to be on firmer ground up to World War I than with more recent events. One feels a degree of superficiality in the discussion of events that led to World War II: little note is taken of the prescient moves of George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, and Brehon Sommervell in creating the logistic architecture for victory. One senses also in Leckie's treatment of Korea and Vietnam a degree of the polarization in opinion and attitude that occurred after those eras.

This review is intended for an audience with strong interests in the sea services of the United States. There is an intriguing thesis advanced on page

623, in the chapter devoted to World War I: "Although great wars are usually fought and won on land, they are often decided at sea." It is left to the reader to develop examples from America's wars. There are a fair number. Robert Leckie's reference is to the outcome of Jutland and the effective removal of the German High Seas Fleet as a challenge to allied control of the seas. The author also notes that the German resort to unrestricted U-boat attacks on shipping was a major factor in America's entry into World War I.

The colonial wars, the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the American Civil War all provide examples of the strategic importance of naval acitivity on the high seas, along the coasts, and in inland lakes and rivers. It is quite thrilling to place the battles of Lake Champlain and Lake Erie in the strategic context. The "Anaconda Plan" for the North's conduct of the Civil War relied upon seapower as the enabling component. Not only did the Union blockade drastically reduce the Southern capability to sustain its fighting forces, but it also led to the Confederate diplomatic failure to gain recognition in Europe. The naval component of the campaign to open the Mississippi was decisive.

Unfortunately, it is left to the reader to supply the context of Mahan's "fleet-in-being" in developing appreciation for the role of naval forces in America's wars. Robert Leckie provides enough substantive detail for the reader to make such analyses and judgments. The discussions of Midway and Coral Sea fall somewhat short of drawing the strategic lessons in the context of Mahan.

The masterful vignette of individuals and events is the hallmark of Leckie's style. On page 280 is an account of the Battle of the Chippewa, where the esprit of the U.S. Army was born and which is memorialized by the gray uniforms of the United States Military Academy. On page 329, Leckie recounts a gruelling march past Mexican adobe huts, whose fine, white dust caked the marching men, whom the cavalry called "adobies" and then "doughboys."

Personalities emerge and sparkle: from Zachary Taylor, Winfield Scott as a young commander, George Dewey, John J. Pershing, right up to Norman Schwarzkopf. Robert Leckie deserves great praise for sharing his knowledge of the broader significance of the battles he discusses. It is said, for instance, that Canada reached nationhood in the magnificent stand of the Canadian Division at Vimy Ridge. The United States Marines and soldiers galvanized the jaded allies by their performance at St. Mihiel, Chateau Thierry, and in the Argonne. It was Pershing who insisted that the Americans fight as a national command, and it was Commander Joseph K. Taussig, USN, who, after a stormy transatlantic passage, signaled the entrance of the U.S. Navy into World War I with his response to the British admiral's question about his readiness: "Ready for sea when fueled."

This is an "armchair" book. Keep it handy. Dip into it. Ponder both glorious and not-so-edifying chapters in our military history. Pay also attention to what Leckie says in his epilogue. Our military history is not over.

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Sears, Stephen W., ed. *World War II: The Best of American Heritage*. Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1993. 280pp. $9.95

Sears, Stephen W., ed. *Eyewitness to World War II: The Best of American Heritage*. Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1993. 308pp. $9.95

Many present readers of history were taught to love the subject by *American Heritage* magazine. Even those put off by its eventual (and grudging) acceptance of advertising may admire the quality, interest, and variety of its articles, the distinction of many of its contributors, its careful fact-checking and effective graphics, and its long association with the revered historian Bruce Catton. Stephen W. Sears, editor of these two titles from "The American Heritage Library," is a former editor and a distinguished historian himself. His byline figures prominently in these two collections, and properly so (as it does also in a recent collection of "the best of" *Military History Quarterly*). With so promising a field of choices and an editor so well qualified to choose, it is no surprise that both of these paperbacks (reissuances of 1991 hardbacks) are quite worthwhile.

World War II is a collection of pieces about that war, *Eyewitness* of recollections of some of its participants. The same selection principles seem to have been applied in both: all services, theaters, "warfare disciplines," and most combat arms are represented. In fact, there is some overlap; for instance, the horrific experience of the USS *Juneau*'s survivors appears in one book and a similar ordeal after the loss of the cruiser *Indianapolis* in the other. There are dividends in such duplication, however: a former civilian contractor on Wake Island recalls with understandable pride his contribution to the island's dogged defense, but we learn in the other volume that he would have been one of the few civilians there who did not (also understandably) run, hide, and steal food.

A large fraction of the selections do not touch on combat or do so only obliquely (e.g., the story of the first, not so well known, Suribachi flag-raising). Both volumes cover the home front; there are oral histories of several women in "war work," and an analysis of the underlying purpose of gas rationing (automobile tires, not gasoline, required conservation—but fuel appeared easier to ration than did tires). The writing throughout is measured, and (the *Juneau* and *Indianapolis* aside) there is little that is very shocking.

There are, of course, memorable descriptions of operations and combat action. The 1970s movie *A Bridge Too Far* would make a closely fitting visual aid for Sears's account of the Arnhem airborne and armored attack, and Charles Cawthon's reminiscence of landing on Omaha Beach evokes the sensations of an inexperienced young officer trying to hold his end up in chaotic circumstances. (Cawthon's story, incidentally, is one of two that point to a third *American Heritage* anthology, not under review. Cawthon tells us in his first sentence that his National Guard battalion was "directly descended" (albeit in a different army) from the Stonewall Brigade of the Civil War, and he never lets us forget it, nor apparently did he himself at the time. General James M. Gavin, writing of the Sicily campaign, is reminded of U.S. Grant at Shiloh and invokes the "shades of gallant Pelham!"—that is, Major John B. Pelham, celebrated Confederate artillerist.)

These, then, are interesting and entertaining books. They are, however, popular history after all—for which many professional historians will dismiss them. Is there value here for the professional military reader? Yes, a great deal, but much of it takes some digging out. There is value in many intriguing bits of information: B-17s flying so low (raiding the Ploesti oil fields) that their guns, meant for use against fighters, directly engaged targets on the ground; German shells made by Czech forced labor that contained not explosives but apologetic notes; Japanese intercontinental balloon-bombs, of which some three hundred were launched (killing a woman and five children); American batborne incendiaries that never saw service; and light spotter aircraft operating from plywood flight decks on tank landing ships. There are also cautionary tales touching upon current doctrinal concerns such as "friendly fire" (e.g., the repeated Allied bombing of troops assembled for the post-Normandy breakout). We can also see, if we stand back a little, an excellent example of how different arms, working closely together, can achieve astounding synergy. Hughes Rudd, who would become a well known journalist, served in Italy directing the fire of the 93rd Field Artillery Battalion from an aircraft that cost less (by a third) than its own shipping crate. But he and the artillerists formed a system, an organism—Rudd speaks of his "firing the 93rd"—of such efficiency and effectiveness that the Germans dared not shoot at his defenseless aircraft, because the 93rd's counterbattery fire would be on target, right now.

The term "popular history" is not itself pejorative, or need not be. Read these books, and read them together, *Eyewitness* first; the most jaded student of World War II will find pleasure and profit.

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Fussell, Paul, ed. *The Norton Book of Modern War.* New York: W.W. Norton, 1991. 830pp. $24.95

"Never think that war, no matter how necessary, nor how justified, is not a crime." Hemingway's view of war sums up the theme of this masterful work. With this thick volume Paul Fussell, a respected literary historian, attempts to ensure that this important message is not lost. That war is an ugly, brutal business is brought home through the compelling words of ninety-seven writers whose thoughts and observations about the twentieth-century wars they have witnessed make compelling reading. Depictions of the horrors of the modern battlefield drawn from the works of such literary masters as A.E. Housman, Erich Maria Remarque, George Orwell, and Studs Terkel are arranged alongside the simple, eloquent thoughts expressed in letters and diaries of the men who fought and died in the two world wars, the Spanish Civil War, and the wars in Asia. It is a story of pain and courage, of humanity and inhumanity, of faith and lies, and above all of life and death.

This is a book that goes to the very heart of war in a way that is often impossible in this era of instant electronic communications. Carefully crafted phrases from literature and interspersed actual descriptions of life and death on the battlefield make war real in a way that televison can never do. Television merely shows images to the eye—this book speaks to the human soul. It should be near every strategist in arms or in armchair, to keep clear the costs that will be imposed whenever war becomes the chosen option.

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG
U.S. Army War College

Thou has frighted the word out of his right sense, so forcible is thy wit.

William Shakespeare
Much Ado About Nothing
(Act V, scene 2)

There are some people who apparently prefer to remain crazy.

J. V. Stalin
Teheran Conference, November 1943