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Points of Conflict: Understanding War, by W.B. Gallie, and The Framework of Operational Warfare

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reshaping the world community: the world's ever-burgeoning human population and the strain it causes; the communications and financial innovations that are creating a "borderless world"; agriculture and biotechnology and their promises for the future; robotics and automation and their impact on industry; threats to the environment; and finally political trends affecting nation-states and their place in global society. The one surprising omission in this section is the lack of discussion on energy and natural resources. The second part, "Regional Impacts," looks at the different regions of the world and how each of the trends previously discussed will affect them. Kennedy sees Japan and Europe as perhaps the most successful in meeting the challenges of the future, with the former Soviet Union and the developing world least successful and the United States muddling along somewhere in between. Kennedy's major theme in the regional section, however, is that no nation or area of the globe is immune to the broad issues such as population, productivity, and environmental concerns that affect us all, regardless of our locations.

In his conclusion, Kennedy summarizes the challenges which face our leaders and chides them for attempting to explain issues away rather than solve them. He briefly discusses areas where solutions can be found: in collective action, in changing the role of women in societies, and political leadership. Kennedy ends with a somber

warning that if the challenges he describes are not dealt with, we will bear the responsibility for the resulting problems.

There has been much talk in recent years about taking broader views of what national security entails and about looking beyond the traditional litany of military and strategic threats. Those who wonder what new threats might fall under that broader umbrella of national security will find this book an excellent primer.

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Gallie, W.B. *Points of Conflict: Understanding War*. New York: Routledge, 1991. 116pp. \$14.95

Newell, Clayton R. *The Framework of Operational Warfare*. New York: Routledge, 1991. 186pp. \$30

The first title under review defies simple categorization. It is at once a work of political and military philosophy, and a tract for dealing with the problems of nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War world. It would be more appropriately titled "Understanding Deterrence." Its author is a professor emeritus of political science at the Cambridge University. However, American readers must not confuse this title with their own vision of a political scientist; Gallie is much more a political philosopher. He was president of the Aristotelian Society in Great Britain in the early 1970s, and before taking his chair at Cambridge

144 Naval War College Review

was professor of logic and metaphysics at Queen's University, Belfast. His previous works include *Philosophy and Historical Understanding* (1964) and *Philosophers of Peace and War* (1978).

Gallie's argument is easy to follow. He begins with the proposition that "man is a war-making animal." He then asserts that each of three proposed solutions to the problem of nuclear weapons—political, moral, and technical—is inadequate. He then surveys the broad history of war, dividing it into three periods: an era of classical war up to and including Napoleon; a century of "problematic" war; and a near-century of total war, extending from the Great War to the present. This analysis is followed by an assertion that war, not only in the case of its individual manifestations but also in the case of its existence as a political-social phenomenon, is *inherently* escalatory. This leads to the obvious danger in the nuclear age that war's inherent tendency to escalate will result in the obliteration of the world as we know it. To mitigate against this possibility Gallie provides two solutions. The first is the formation of a power condominium by Russia and the United States to prevent nuclear proliferation and convince the three other declared nuclear powers that their nuclear weapons are superfluous. The second is the establishment of a discipline called "survival studies," which would synthesize present war and peace-studies curricula.

In this reviewer's opinion, the argument is seriously flawed. Gallie sets up straw men in his political, moral, technical paradigm. He says that this paradigm argues for a synoptic view, but he fails to provide the synopsis. Gallie confuses Clausewitz's assertion that *in the purely theoretical realm* war is inherently escalatory with his observation that *real* war comes in two distinct types—those in which the objective is the overthrow of the adversary and those in which the object is merely incremental advantage. But the central defect of the work is in its logic: if one accepts Gallie's propositions that man is a war-making animal and that war is inherently escalatory, there are only two inescapable alternatives. Either you must accept the inevitability of general nuclear war, or you must put forth a way to change human nature. Gallie is unwilling to admit the former and neither of his proposed solutions promises the latter. Overall, therefore, *Understanding War* is an interesting exercise in political and military philosophy, but one as badly argued as it is titled.

The Framework of Operational Art is just as advertised: an outline for understanding war at the operational level. Its author, Clayton Newell, is a retired army officer and former member of the Army War College faculty who also served in the Office of the Chief of Military History. He has written several articles for *Parameters*, the most notable of which advanced the notion that at the operational level

of war the practice of logistics has an element of art as well as science.

The structure of the book is elegant in its simplicity. It comprises a preliminary chapter that examines the study of war and also an analysis of three perspectives of war—strategic, operational, and tactical. There are also two appendices, respectively outlining the format and providing the history of the U.S. Army's five-paragraph field order. The heart of the book parallels the structure of that instrument. That is, it argues that the framework for analyzing war should consider the following issues from each of the three perspectives mentioned above; how situations are understood, how objectives are set, how war is conducted, how war is supported, and how war is controlled. The work concludes with a chapter on the utility of war as an instrument of national policy.

Among the major themes addressed are the chaos inherent in the nature of war and the dilemmas faced by commanders attempting to impose order upon this chaotic activity.

In setting up this form of argument and presenting these insights, it is obvious that the author has profited greatly from his experience of teaching operational art at a senior service college. Unfortunately, however, the high promise of this simple but comprehensive framework is marred by faulty execution. The style is awkward, frequent non sequiturs leave the reader puzzled as to the author's meaning, and the development of the argument within the individual chapters

is difficult to follow. The historical analyses are generally valid, but they are maladroitly forced into the analytical framework. This reviewer found the most useful part of the book to be the appendix that traces the origin of the five-paragraph field order back to a single sentence in the German field service regulation of 1887. On the whole this is a promising work that fails to achieve its potential for want of forceful editing.

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Cimbala, Stephen J. *Force and Diplomacy in the Future*. New York: Praeger, 1992. 243pp. \$47.95

According to the publisher's blurb, *Force and Diplomacy in the Future* "is an initial effort to assess the post-Cold War international environment in terms of its implications for the relationship between force and policy . . . based on a retrospective look at U.S., allied NATO, and Soviet doctrine strategy. . . ." Right away, there is a problem—while there can be no question of the urgent need for new studies of the relationship between force and policy in the post-Cold War era, Cimbala's narrowly focused overview of the evolution of forty years of U.S. and Soviet thinking about the utility of nuclear weapons and strategies of deterrence provides an absurdly limited base for any informed speculation on the nature of "force and diplomacy in the future."