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Force and Diplomacy in the Future

Heath Twichell

of war the practice of logistics has an element of art as well as science.

The structure of the book is elegant in its simplicity. It comprises a preliminary chapter that examines the study of war and also an analysis of three perspectives of war—strategic, operational, and tactical. There are also two appendices, respectively outlining the format and providing the history of the U.S. Army's five-paragraph field order. The heart of the book parallels the structure of that instrument. That is, it argues that the framework for analyzing war should consider the following issues from each of the three perspectives mentioned above; how situations are understood, how objectives are set, how war is conducted, how war is supported, and how war is controlled. The work concludes with a chapter on the utility of war as an instrument of national policy.

Among the major themes addressed are the chaos inherent in the nature of war and the dilemmas faced by commanders attempting to impose order upon this chaotic activity.

In setting up this form of argument and presenting these insights, it is obvious that the author has profited greatly from his experience of teaching operational art at a senior service college. Unfortunately, however, the high promise of this simple but comprehensive framework is marred by faulty execution. The style is awkward, frequent non sequiturs leave the reader puzzled as to the author's meaning, and the development of the argument within the individual chapters is difficult to follow. The historical analyses are generally valid, but they are maladroitly forced into the analytical framework. This reviewer found the most useful part of the book to be the appendix that traces the origin of the five-paragraph field order back to a single sentence in the German field service regulation of 1887. On the whole this is a promising work that fails to achieve its potential for want of forceful editing.

HAROLD R. WINTON
School of Advanced Airpower Studies
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Cimbala, Stephen J. *Force and Diplomacy in the Future.* New York: Praeger, 1992. 243pp. $47.95

According to the publisher's blurb, *Force and Diplomacy in the Future* "is an initial effort to assess the post–Cold War international environment in terms of its implications for the relationship betweeen force and policy . . . based on a retrospective look at U.S., allied NATO, and Soviet doctrine strategy. . . ." Right away, there is a problem—while there can be no question of the urgent need for new studies of the relationship between force and policy in the post–Cold War era, Cimbala's narrowly focused overview of the evolution of forty years of U.S. and Soviet thinking about the utility of nuclear weapons and strategies of deterrence provides an absurdly limited base for any informed speculation on the nature of "force and diplomacy in the future."

This book could more accurately have been titled "The Problem of Nuclear Deterrence after the Breakup of the Soviet Union," but even that would be misleading. Nowhere does the author deal with deterring nuclear weapons outside of the context of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, although the end of the Cold War will certainly mean an increase in the number of second and third-rank states possessing such weapons even as the stockpiles of the major powers are reduced. How might nuclear deterrence be practiced in such a world? The author gives us no clue.

Similarly slighted, despite their obvious importance to any discussion of the future relationship between force and policy, are such issues as the increasing proliferation of racial, religious, and ethnic conflicts around the world and the question of what circumstances might justify U.S. or UN intervention. Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were not in the headlines when this book was written, but the Gulf War and plenty of other non–Cold War trouble spots were. Here again, other than to observe that "the issues with which Europe was forced to deal prior to the Second World War will reappear in the aftermath of a socially reconstructed Soviet Union, a defunct Warsaw Pact, and a newly reunited Germany," the author has little more to offer his readers.

All of which is not to say that there is nothing of value in this book. Readers willing to overlook the misleading title and wade through Cimbala's sometimes clunky, jargon-ridden prose (his editor should be shot) will find not only a concise and knowledgeable summary of the evolution of Cold War deterrence theory but also a competent overview of twentieth-century European history, one that at least suggests what underlying problems and trends, long submerged or obscured by the imperatives of the Cold War, are most likely to bedevil us in the decades to come.

Dr. Cimbala, a political science professor at Pennsylvania State University, has previously published such books as *The Soviet Challenge in the 1990s* (Praeger, 1989), *Conflict Termination in Europe: Games against War* (Praeger, 1990), and *Strategy after Deterrence* (Praeger, 1991). Each of the works dealt with some facet of the central strategic dilemma of the Cold War: the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is clear that Cimbala began this book with the intention of making it the fourth in this series. Given that Start II has not been ratified, much less implemented, he should have kept to his original plan and resisted choosing a title that promises more than he delivers.

HEATH TWICHELL
Oak Bluffs, Massachusetts

Blank, Stephen et al. *Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges.* Alabama: Air Univ. Press, 1990. 318pp. (No price given)