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Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges

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This book could more accurately have been titled "The Problem of Nuclear Deterrence after the Breakup of the Soviet Union," but even that would be misleading. Nowhere does the author deal with deterring nuclear weapons outside of the context of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, although the end of the Cold War will certainly mean an increase in the number of second and third-rank states possessing such weapons even as the stockpiles of the major powers are reduced. How might nuclear deterrence be practiced in such a world? The author gives us no clue.

Similarly slighted, despite their obvious importance to any discussion of the future relationship between force and policy, are such issues as the increasing proliferation of racial, religious, and ethnic conflicts around the world and the question of what circumstances might justify U.S. or UN intervention. Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were not in the headlines when this book was written, but the Gulf War and plenty of other non-Cold War trouble spots were. Here again, other than to observe that "the issues with which Europe was forced to deal prior to the Second World War will reappear in the aftermath of a socially reconstructed Soviet Union, a defunct Warsaw Pact, and a newly reunited Germany," the author has little more to offer his readers.

All of which is not to say that there is nothing of value in this book. Readers willing to overlook the misleading title and wade through Cimbala's

sometimes clunky, jargon-ridden prose (his editor should be shot) will find not only a concise and knowledgeable summary of the evolution of Cold War deterrence theory but also a competent overview of twentieth-century European history, one that at least suggests what underlying problems and trends, long submerged or obscured by the imperatives of the Cold War, are most likely to bedevil us in the decades to come.

Dr. Cimbala, a political science professor at Pennsylvania State University, has previously published such books as *The Soviet Challenge in the 1990s* (Praeger, 1989), *Conflict Termination in Europe: Games against War* (Praeger, 1990), and *Strategy after Deterrence* (Praeger, 1991). Each of the works dealt with some facet of the central strategic dilemma of the Cold War: the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is clear that Cimbala began this book with the intention of making it the fourth in this series. Given that Start II has not been ratified, much less implemented, he should have kept to his original plan and resisted choosing a title that promises more than he delivers.

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Blank, Stephen et al. *Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges*. Alabama: Air Univ. Press, 1990. 318pp. (No price given)

Ewald, John. *Treatise on Partisan Warfare*. trans. Robert Selig and David Skaggs, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1991. 192pp. \$45

With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the restructuring of the old Soviet empire, and the changing economic, political, and social environment of the United States, the past military force structures, doctrines, and strategies require review. The comfort and familiarity of the bipolar world which many of us grew up understanding is now behind us. Quietly and without much fanfare, the Western powers have won the Cold War. Therefore, the next decade's wars may not have the strategic character envisioned by force planners of the past forty-five years.

The emphasis of strategists, force planners, and others involved in the management of force has shifted from large-scale conventional warfare and nuclear deterrence to low-intensity conflict (LIC). Though numerous works over the centuries have dealt with conflict at this level, these recent additions contribute to a field of military study now increasingly gaining importance.

Published under the auspices of the United States Air Force's Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE), *Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges* presents five case studies that examine the doctrines, strategies, and force structures of the LIC environment. This historical approach to understanding low-intensity conflict scenarios

attempts to describe strategies for each case while emphasizing certain overall force structures, doctrines, and strategies that appear successful for all LIC situations.

The five authors are eminently qualified scholars on the various regions presented. Each one has taught, published, or served in a variety of capacities, both in the military and in governmental positions. The first article, "Low-Intensity Conflict in the Middle East," by Lewis Ware, presents an overall view of the LIC environment and then presents the cases of two states in the Middle East—Israel and Algeria. Several valid but often overlooked points are presented in this essay.

One key point repeatedly stressed throughout this work is that LIC is *not* perceived by the belligerents as low in intensity, since oftentimes the survival of each belligerent is at stake in the conflict. Ware further states that LIC is different from conventional conflicts in two important respects. The first is that "LICs result more from conditions of widespread socioeconomic and political unrest than from issues of national sovereignty." Secondly, "LICs are protracted; the choice of weapons, strategy, tactics, and employment of forces is asymmetrical; and the insurgents disregard the classical logic of set-piece engagements."

Ware's historical studies of LIC in Israel and Algeria are well presented, but his conclusions on strategies and doctrines for the state of Israel provide

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little in the way of offering a solution to the problems in the Middle East or how to win in the LIC environment. After carefully defining the various political and religious backgrounds of both sides, the author details the deep-rooted contradictions inherent in that part of the world. However, he fails to differentiate between Judaism, the Israeli populace, and the state of Israel, which is critical to understanding LIC in the Middle East.

His description of the Islamic threat—"What one hears from all the Islamists . . . is that only a permanent uprising can eliminate Israel, and all other goals must yield priority"—does not support his argument for greater police forces at the local or village level. His emphasis on changes in the economic, social, and political workings at both the "micro" and "macro" levels of society disregards the tremendous religious roots of this conflict. Ware further confuses the reader by prescribing forces and doctrine to *control* the threat to the state of Israel instead of providing methods to *win* this LIC.

Four tenets of basic LIC doctrine proposed by Ware imply specific actions for all states involved in such conflicts. These four propositions are: (1) politically the threat is permanent, while militarily it is protracted; (2) doctrine must acknowledge the predominance of the political dimension over the military; (3) external actors are becoming more important in the resolution of LICs, which may make unilateral solutions by the belligerents

impractical; and (4) there must be fundamental reform of the political systems on both sides if the conflict is to be terminated. These four tenets apply equally well to the other four cases presented in this book.

The four remaining case studies deal with Soviet forces in Afghanistan; Guatemala and El Salvador; the Philippines and Indonesia; and LIC in the African context. Each case provides an adequate historical background and strategic analysis and insight into the variations and similarities of LIC throughout the underdeveloped world. With the exception of the first article's shortcoming that has been noted, this book is an interesting and enlightening source for the student of low-intensity conflict. More emphasis on the religious problems inherent in certain LIC scenarios would have made this book complete. It is a useful primer to members of the national security community and others interested in the resolution of this type of conflict.

A reminder that LIC—by whatever name—is not an entirely new phenomenon is a work by Robert Selig, an eighteenth-century historian, and David Skaggs, historian of the American Revolution and author on military history. They have provided the first English translation of Johann Ewald's *Treatise on Partisan Warfare*. It is a significant contribution to the history of the Seven Years War and the American Revolution, as well as a detailed look into the recruiting,

training, doctrine, and tactics of light infantry.

First published in 1785, Ewald had just completed eight years in North America. Respected for his abilities as a *jager* captain, he had seen his courage and talent for light infantry tactics tested in almost every major battle fought in North America from 1776 to 1784. Destined to attain the rank of major general in the Danish army, Ewald's firsthand knowledge of partisan warfare lends immense credibility to this work.

Of the book's two sections, the first is an introductory essay invaluable to a full appreciation of the work. Its only drawback is the inclusion of almost every contribution of Ewald to modern-day military historians and strategists.

The second section is the treatise, which is divided into eleven chapters and an appendix. Discussed are light infantry procedures from recruitment and discipline to ambushes and retreats. From a tactical perspective, few of today's light infantry forces will be able to utilize Ewald's basic tenets; however, topics such as light infantry training, organization, and leadership techniques transcend the passage of time.

Students of military history will enjoy the detailed analysis of what constitutes revolutionary war and of the distinctive technical features of the American Revolution. Ewald's astute understanding of the relationship between the conflict, the government,

and the military would later be espoused by Clausewitz.

This work is valuable not only to the military historian but also to those who need to understand how to lead, organize and employ light infantry forces in a revolutionary war. It is also a highly interesting story, easily read and understood by even the newest student of warfare.

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Wander, W. Thomas and Arnett, Eric H., eds. *The Proliferation of Advanced Weaponry: Technology, Motivations, and Responses*. Washington, D.C.: American Assoc. for the Advancement of Science, 1992. 330pp. (No price given)

This book is stimulating and frustrating. Its international perspectives challenge commonly held assumptions of the American defense community, especially those which allow the United States to have weapons and take military actions that are considered illegitimate by at least some within the world community. The issues addressed here are complex and in general are discussed adroitly, with substantial insight. However, it is astonishing in this modern computer age to find a serious book without an index. Also, though the book is oriented toward regional conflict, its logical constructs and vocabulary are reminiscent of the strategic deterrence discussions of the Cold War. Finally,