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Our cover: "Norfolk Sunset"—a *Belknap*-class cruiser and two *Spruance*-class destroyers alongside at the Destroyer-Submarine Piers, Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, in fall 1992. This photograph, by Lt. Cdr. Thomas D. Walczyk, DC, U.S. Navy, of the Branch Dental Clinic at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada, won Second Prize in the fifth annual *All Hands* photo contest, in the single–image color feature (amateur) category. The contest was featured in the February 1994 issue of that magazine. Reproduced by the permission of the photographer and with the kind assistance of *All Hands*.

2   Contents

4 Contents

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"A true learned journal can be an important source of information for those who have heavy demands on their time. From my experience, such a journal is no better than its reviews; and institutions are no better than their journals."

Hyman G. Rickover

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"In a world in which societies are becoming ever more interdependent but in which political power remains fragmented, whatever security or civility prevails may well depend on the character, the policies, the strength, and the will of a few great states, and the leadership for those states must come from this country."

President's Notes

IN VARIOUS FORMS, the Secretary of the Navy's Current Strategy Forum has been an annual event at the Naval War College ever since 1949. In many respects, its inception was occasioned by the conclusion of the successful struggle with the Axis powers and the need to understand the dimensions of, and the

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Admiral Strasser holds a B.S. from the Naval Academy, two master's degrees from The Fletcher School, Tufts University, and from the same school a Ph.D. in political science. He graduated from the command and staff course at the Naval War College in 1972. He commanded the USS *O'Callahan* (FF 1051), Destroyer Squadron 35, Cruiser-Destroyer Group Three, and Battle Group Foxtrot. His seven years in Washington included two years in the office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Adapted from remarks delivered at the 1994 Current Strategy Forum, 14–16 June 1994, at the Naval War College.

appropriate response to, threats and opportunities arising from the ashes of that conflict. In 1949 those who gathered in Newport reflected on the hopes and fears of a nation thrust as never before into global leadership. They labored to discern the ageless and the changing features of the emerging world. Above all, they sought to understand how the generation of Americans which was heir to the mixed legacy of depression and world war might shape the future. They probably understood, as Samuel Johnson expressed it, that "the future is purchased by the present."

As we convene another Current Strategy Forum, we are in a situation remarkably comparable to those earlier years. With almost breathtaking speed the great twilight struggle of the Cold War has come to an end and with it the disintegration of the last great European empire. Ancient antagonisms once thought transformed by the events of recent history are reemerging, new hopes are kindled, and messianic dreams are moving masses once thought inert. Permanent peace remains an aspiration, but all around the world many peoples find themselves, in Milton's words, "in worst extremities, and on the perilous edge of battle." What then in this new "postwar" period constitutes the requisites of national security and the objects of military power? What will be the role of naval power in securing a just and durable international order? And what will be the vocation of the United States in that order?

The historian John Lewis Gaddis, a former member of this faculty, entitled his recent study of the Cold War *The Long Peace*—a suggestive title for a period that we generally characterize as war, albeit cold. He posits that historians yet unborn would look at the forty-five years after the Second World War as an era of statecraft at least the equal of that of the ages of Metternich and of Bismarck—a period in which creative statecraft so engineered alliances and understandings and so balanced antagonisms as not only to prevent a general war but to provide an environment in which economies would prosper and democratic institutions develop. The forces that landed on Normandy's beaches fifty years ago signalled not only the overthrow of a particularly wicked oppression but the development of practices and institutions that would both secure the West and provide a peaceful and prosperous harbinger for the entire world. Whether or not future historians will make this judgment, however, will depend on the wisdom and energy, the devotion and sacrifices, of the new leadership that has inherited the hard-won victories of the hot and cold warriors.

Winston Churchill, in the prefatory page of the last volume of his magisterial study of World War II, wrote, "How the Great Democracies Triumphed, and so Were able to Resume the Follies Which Had so Nearly Cost Them Their Life." Whether or not the peoples and leaders of what we came to call the "free world" in fact largely avoided those follies is still left to the assessment of history not written. But I would suggest, as a preliminary reflection, that the evidence

indicates that they acquitted themselves very well indeed. Follies did occur, but the ultimate folly of renewed depression and general war was avoided. Structures of balance, of order, of economic growth, of humane values were created, deepened, and extended: the alphabet soup of the post-World War Two era summons up those structures—NATO, OECD, GATT, IMF, EC, UN. The list goes on. The fundamental issue of our time and of this Forum is what we shall do with the world we have inherited. And, like those participants in the 1949 forum, we cannot wait for the dust to settle, we are unable to delay until a clearer view of the future emerges.

It has been said that we are in a transitional period. Although this observation seems sensible, it is also not very helpful, not least because you never know what you're transiting and often where you're going until after you arrive. It has been reported that, as Adam and Eve were being driven out of the Garden of Eden, Adam remarked to Eve, "Dear, I think we're about to go through a transition." Transition or not, the odyssey upon which the United States and our friends and allies are embarked will raise certain fundamental questions and suggest answers, probably both hackneyed and sublime.

The past hundred years have seen the emergence of the United States as a great power and its rejection of the nineteenth century policy of nonalignment. Many still living have witnessed two world wars and a titanic struggle between the two superpowers that emerged from the ashes of those wars. Ancient empires have fallen and new nations have arisen. Worldwide depression has leveled economies, and the greatest economic growth in world history has raised per capita income to unparalleled heights. Populations have exploded, and migrations have spilled over political borders. Famine has spread even as agricultural production has expanded beyond imagining. The world of 1994 seems both heir to and far distant from that of 1894. So, too, the American people are both intimately connected to and separated from the founding and pioneering generations. In considering our future agenda as a nation, is it any wonder that we are at one and the same time in a reflective and a cranky mood? We are seeking simultaneously to grasp the nature of the world that has arisen from the struggles of this century, the requirements for our welfare and security as a people, and the policies and strategies that will guarantee our commonwealth. Transcending partisanship, we are forced to admit that the demands of leadership today can be heavy and that the exigencies of followership are not fully appreciated.

One thing, however, is certain. In a world in which societies are becoming ever more interdependent but in which political power remains fragmented, whatever security or civility prevails may well depend on the character, the policies, the strength, and the will of a few great states, and the leadership for those states must come from this country. If those states endowed with relative

territorial security, political stability, humane institutions, and great wealth retreat into self-absorbing parochialism, violence will become the norm, first at the periphery of the international order and finally in the very core of that order.

Myres McDougal, Sterling Professor of Law at Yale University, argued during the years of the Cold War that one of the key objects of American foreign policy must be the development of norms and practices that favor some "minimum world public order." Key to this concept was the control of unauthorized coercion across state lines and the distinction between permissible and impermissible coercion, that is, between self defense or police action and aggression. Minimizing coercion was, in Professor McDougal's mind, central to maximizing human dignity. Today we see the threat and use of coercion both across national boundaries, as in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and in the brutal and even genocidal force employed within recognized borders. Human dignity has indeed suffered in unspeakable ways. Moreover, grotesque crimes against humanity which once could be cloaked in ignorance are now daily displayed across the electronic airwaves. Neither U.S. power nor the authority of the organized international community is sufficient to halt all such aggression and such depravities. Yet, utterly unrestrained defiance of international standards of conduct related to the use of force can only create such an atmosphere of insecurity and cynicism as to impede and perhaps at last cripple normal economic commerce and civilized social intercourse.

One other thing is apparent: naval power and military force will still define much of the currency of international order. Just because a nation grows and diversifies economically, it is not relieved of the need to maintain public order through law enforcement. So in the international realm, the strength and visibility of American military power, as well as the wisdom and will of those who may wield it, will give heart to those who would minimize coercion and maximize peaceful change—and would make them willing to assume the risks and costs necessary to join with us, where necessary, to meet aggression.

Moreover, our reassuring presence and our early response to international crises will depend on the deployments and endurance around the globe of our naval forces and indeed all of our military forces. They represent the full panoply of American power and the evidence of U.S. engagement. They provide much of the framework of U.S. cooperation with potential allies and enable American might to be felt where, in the words of Washington, our "interest, guided by justice," shall determine.

This is our agenda for the future. I hope that our deliberations will have at least clarified that agenda and kindled within us the spirit of innovation whereby we may join with others to encourage and to build the new postwar world. The peacemakers are still blessed—because not only of the intent of their hearts but the energy of their minds and the firmness of their will. As the generation after

World War II worked boldly to remove the menace to both peace and justice, may we so strive as we meet the new challenges and opportunities of another hard peace. If this Forum contributes to that understanding, I can say that we will have succeeded indeed.

The ancient Greeks believed that the owl of Minerva, the symbol of wisdom and understanding, was only visible at dusk. In the heat of the day and in the glare of sunshine, action is normally characterized by fragmentary understanding and too little wisdom. I think this is an elegant way of saying that we get smart too old. The life of nations and the quality of civilization, however, force us, even in the midst of action, to continue the quest to deepen our understanding and seek wisdom. Over the past year the officers who have attended the Naval War College have been summoned to this reflection. Now we ask all of you who have come to Newport to join us in that reflection, so that when we all return to the field of battle, whether it be the battle of war or of peace, we do so forearmed with something of the spirit of that owl of Minerva.

JOSEPH C. STRASSER
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

Winners of the
Hugh G. Nott Prize
for 1993

The President of the Naval War College has announced the winners of prizes for the finest articles (less those on historical subjects) appearing in the *Naval War College Review* in 1993:

• First Prize ($500), Lieutenant Commander Bruce A. Ross, U.S. Navy, for "The Case for Targeting Leadership in War" (Winter);

• Second Prize ($300), Sergei Fedorenko, of Salve Regina College, for "Russia and Arms Control: The Trials of Transition to a Post-Soviet Era" (Spring); and,

• Third Prize ($200), Lieutenant Colonel Kevin J. Kennedy, U.S. Air Force, for "Stealth: A Revolutionary Change in Air Warfare" (Spring).

This award is given in memory of the late Captain Hugh G. Nott, U.S. Navy, who made major contributions over a period of ten years to the professional life of the Naval War College.

Winners of the
Edward S. Miller History Prize
for 1993

Through the generosity of the distinguished historian Edward S. Miller, the President of the Naval War College has awarded prizes to authors of the finest articles on historical subjects appearing in the *Naval War College Review* in 1993.

The winner ($700) is Professor Sadao Asada, of Doshisha University in Kyoto, Japan, for "The Revolt against the Washington Treaty: The Imperial Japanese Navy and Naval Limitations, 1921–1927" (Summer).

The runner-up ($300) is Professor William C. Green, of Boston University, for "The Historical Russian Drive for a Warm Water Port: Anatomy of a Geopolitical Myth" (Spring).

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These awards are made with the support of the Naval War College Foundation, a private non-profit organization dedicated to improving the quality of the educational resources of the Naval War College in areas where government funds are not available.

Salvage Support and Operational Commanders
What They Need But May Not Get

Commander Kemp L. Skudin, U.S. Navy

YOU ARE THE COMMANDER of the U.S. Navy Middle East Force, stationed in Bahrain. Joint air raids from aircraft carriers and by B-2 bombers based in the United States have just demonstrated U.S. resolve in the face of blatant violations by Saddam Hussein's government of United Nations sanctions. But now, a B-2 is down in the northern Arabian Gulf, under sixty feet of water in a mined area claimed by both Iran and Iraq. You are to salvage it before the Iraqis or Iranians do.

The North Korean army, in a surprise assault, has driven the Combined Forces back to pockets around Kunsan and Pusan. North Korean saboteurs and suicide merchant ships have blocked essential facilities in both harbors. As the naval component commander, your ability to resupply and reinforce the surrounded armies depends upon your ability to clear these ports quickly.

During an amphibious assault on a Middle Eastern littoral shore, the USS *Tarawa* (LHA 1) grounds in a poorly charted area while avoiding missile fire. Within twelve hours, a severe storm is expected that may result in the loss of a large and valuable ship. Can you, as the amphibious group commander, stabilize *Tarawa* or get her off in time?

Changes in both technology and the world political situation have increased the importance of salvage as a consideration at the operational level of maritime warfare. Its importance was easy to underemphasize when planning for the

Commander Skudin, a 1976 Officer Candidate School graduate, has served in five salvage ships—USS *Abnaki* (ATF 96), USS *Hitchiti* (ATF 103), USS *Moctobi* (ATF 105), USS *Reclaimer* (ARS 42), and USS *Beaufort* (ATS 2)—and one repair ship, USS *Ajax* (AR 6). Ashore, he has served on the staffs of the Naval Diving and Salvage Training Center in Panama City, Florida, and Combat Support Squadron Five in Hawaii. A qualified ship salvage and mixed-gas diving officer, he commanded USS *Beaufort* from April 1989 until August 1991, during which time the ship was the only U.S. naval salvage ship in the Gulf War. Commander Skudin graduated from the Naval War College in November 1992 and is currently the executive officer of Naval Weapons Station Earle in Colts Neck, New Jersey.

fast-moving, global, open-ocean conflict that was envisioned until the demise of the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, all the salvage missions established since the First World War—clearance of sea lines of communication, battle damage repair, deep object recovery, support of amphibious assaults, and harbor clearance—always vital concerns, have become more obviously so. The relative importance of these functions in the likely operational environment now appears much higher than it would have been in global warfare.

National military strategy and naval doctrine recognize the probability of regional conflicts, perhaps protracted, requiring naval presence in littoral areas, and a concomitant decrease in the chances of open-ocean battles. This prospect implies increased requirements to operate in shallow, mined areas and to keep lines of communication open to operations remote from bases; in practical terms this involves such salvage functions as rescue towing, "debeaching," underwater repair, and minor clearance. While, on one hand, efficient positioning of salvage resources is made easier when operations are geographically restricted (as littoral contingencies are), the intensity of the salvage problem as a whole may be increased by limited port facilities and the criticality of keeping open those that are available.

New political, social, and environmental dimensions must also be respected. The omnipresence of the media can make it a matter of national concern that salvage be carried out quickly and with minimal environmental impact. Deep object recovery, especially of downed aircraft or human remains, can be a domestic political issue; it becomes a military security problem as well if opponents recover classified or sensitive material, ordnance, remains, or a submarine's survivors before we do.

Also, the naval or expeditionary force commander is likely to command a smaller number of ships—but each of them larger and of higher value—than his predecessors. The consequences of losing a single unit are therefore much greater than they might once have been. Accordingly, the importance of on-scene salvage forces to provide prompt, effective battle damage repair and at-sea diving services (to clear fouled propellers, etc.) is greatly increased. If salvage assets are immediately available, damage (or its aggravation) is minimized, chances of sinking are reduced, and speed of towing is increased; of equal importance, another combatant need not be diverted from its own mission in order to render assistance or tow the damaged unit.[1]

The U.S. Navy is not well prepared to meet the salvage needs of the near future. The history of modern American naval salvage demonstrates that the most critical shortcomings the Navy faces are division of operational responsibility and, especially, over-dependence upon contracted civilian resources.

The World Wars

Although modern Navy salvage began with the introduction of metal ships, there was no permanent U.S. naval salvage organization until World War I. The Navy had stationed divers on large ships and in shipyards and had operated a few harbor and oceangoing tugs. Alone or in conjunction with contractors, they completed a number of large operations, including the raising of Spanish gunboats in Manila Bay after the 1898 battle, the American gunboat USS *Princeton* (PG 13, sunk alongside a pier at Pago Pago in 1914), and the submarine USS *Skate* (SS 23, in 1915, from the then-world-record depth of 306 feet). This latter operation was undertaken to determine the cause of the first loss of a U.S. Navy submarine, and it pioneered submarine salvage and deep-diving methods. The best-known salvage of the era before American entry into World War I, however, was the raising of the USS *Maine* in Havana harbor by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—which, as it does now, possessed greater capabilities for harbor clearance than the Navy.

Lacking an operational salvage organization, the Navy generally had its salvage successes in stable situations, in which there was time to divert the few knowledgeable salvors from other duties, typically (since there were no salvage ships) at shipyards. Salvage officers tended to be members of the Navy Construction Corps (CC); they were the equivalent of today's Engineering Duty officers, although only a few CC officers were experienced at salvage, and those few at salvage engineering, not seamanship. Almost no line or shipboard officers had salvage experience.

Illustrative of the hazards of this lack of ready expertise was the December 1916 stranding of the submarine *H-3* on a beach near Eureka, California. After rejecting civilian bids to refloat the boat, the commandant of Mare Island Navy Yard decided to try the twenty-one thousand horsepower of the armored cruiser USS *Milwaukee* (C 21). Attempting a straight pull in a heavy cross-current, the cruiser was soon "in irons"; she broached, went aground, and became a total loss. *H-3* was later salvaged by a civilian company for $18,000. Any experienced salvage engineer, after only a brief inspection, could have predicted the futility of *Milwaukee*'s effort; and any experienced salvage seaman-operator would have taken greater precautions against the current.

With the U.S. entry into the war in 1917, the need for a salvage organization became evident. The sea lanes had to be cleared of vessels breaking down or stranding, and there were numerous harbor clearance and repair tasks to be done, mainly in French ports. The Navy first attempted to provide to the British (who had made an urgent request) civilian salvage ships from the three American salvage companies then in business on the East Coast. When none of these three felt the risk was justified, salvage ships from the firms of Merritt and Chapman

14   Naval War College Review

(New York) and T. A. Scott (New London, Connecticut) were taken over by the Navy, and experienced salvors were put into uniform as reservists. Overseas, significant successes were achieved in keeping ships moving and ports open in the face of the U-boat assault. At home, a patchwork squadron of ex-fishing boats with commandeered civilian equipment was assembled. It assisted numerous commercial and naval vessels in the North Atlantic, pulling, for example, the battleship USS *Texas* (BB 35) and the gunboat *Don Juan d'Austria* off the beaches at Block Island and Woods Hole, respectively.

At the end of the war, this salvage organization was almost completely abandoned. In order to retain some salvage capability but without great expense, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, worked out a deal with the two remaining salvage concerns on the East Coast (one having gone bankrupt). The two companies were allowed to buy new, surplus *Bird*-class minesweepers at scrap-value prices and were merged to form a commercial firm (Merritt, Chapman, and Scott) under Navy contract. The company established salvage bases on both coasts, with four ships east, one west. The contract—which allowed the salvor to refuse work if the risk appeared too great—was administered by the Bureau of Construction and Repair, which was staffed by CC officers. (This bureau was later to become the Bureau of Ships (BUSHIPS), and is now the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).)

The record of contracted and mixed naval-and-contractor salvages in the interwar years was generally satisfactory. Four stranded warships were successfully retracted—USS *DeLong* (DD 129, in 1921), *S-19* (1925), *S-48* (1925), and USS *Omaha* (CL 4, in 1937). U.S. naval salvage's long suit in these years (though the number of people involved was small) was engineering and diving expertise. In the areas of submarine rescue and salvage and, consequently, deep diving, the U.S. Navy's capability became the best in the world. Of nine submarine sinkings from 1920 to 1939, seven were raised, and the depths involved accelerated the development of helium-oxygen diving. The failure of early attempts to save trapped survivors resulted in the fitting of submarine rescue ships with McCann Rescue Chambers, which fitted onto submarine hatches.

These efforts remained generally within the Construction Corps and submarine communities, but they provided the nucleus from which our World War II salvage forces were to grow. By no means the least influential of those involved was Captain Ernest J. King, who, as commander of the submarine base at New London from 1925 to 1927, was involved with the raising of the submarines *S-4* and *S-51*. King was never to lose sight of the importance of the salvage mission and its requirements for experienced men and materiel. On the other hand, from this experience there arose in the salvage community a submarine-focused segment that was separate, both organizationally and fiscally, from the "surface side."

In other ways, however, all was not well. When seven destroyers in formation ran aground in 1923 at Honda Point, California, no salvage assets were available and all seven were lost. Also, in 1920 the submarine *H-1* sank during salvage after a grounding. As with the *Milwaukee* in 1916, the post–World War I Navy, despite its engineering and diving capabilities, had not developed the specialized operational skill and seamanship needed for salvage. "In the more complex jobs, a vital element in the equation for success—the *specialized knowledge of salvage techniques and seamanship*—was not resident in the Navy but was provided by a contractor."[2]

In 1938 the Navy's salvage contractor abandoned West Coast operations as uneconomical, forcing the Navy to begin a real salvage organization in the Pacific. When the U.S. entered the Second World War, there was only one shore facility on the Pacific coast, in San Diego. The U.S. Navy salvage forces were produced, then, out of necessity; "grey-hulled" (that is, naval-manned) ships were built for overseas duty in a crash program. At the onset of war, large numbers of civilian tugs were taken over, and twelve civilian and Navy ships were chartered to a firm which was given the Bureau of Construction and Repair contract for salvage on the East and West coasts. These efforts were overseen by a newly created Supervisor of Salvage (SUPSALV), under the Navy Bureau of Construction and Repair. These civilian ships and their shore stations, collectively called the Navy Salvage Service, performed all salvage in North and South America—except Alaska after 1943, when a New Year's Day grounding caused by drunkenness led to the loss of the salvage ship USS *Rescuer* (ARS 18).

In American waters alone the Navy Salvage Service reclaimed over $675 million worth of ships and cargo in over seven hundred salvage incidents, at a cost of under $20 million. A civilian-run salvage school was started in New York City; it trained 2,500 salvage officers and divers as they worked to raise the 1,029-foot, 65,000-ton USS *Lafayette* (AP 53, the former French liner SS *Normandie*), capsized alongside Pier 88. These men, and others who received their training on the job at Pearl Harbor, constituted the body of expertise for the massive wartime tasks of overseas harbor clearance, underwater repair, rescue towing, firefighting, stranding salvage, and even deep diving for intelligence exploitation of sunken enemy ships.

The Navy built scores of rescue ships (ATAs and ATRs) to support fleet operations or warship concentrations and to rescue sailors and seamen; sixty-nine fleet tugs (ATFs) for towing within convoys and fleet operations (the ATFs were powerful enough to tow a Liberty ship at seven knots, the nominal speed of slow convoys); nine wooden and twenty steel-hulled salvage ships (ARS); a dozen battle damage repair ships (ARB); four lift craft (ARSD); three dozen landing craft repair ships (ARL); three salvage craft tenders (ARST); eleven deep-diving and submarine rescue ships (ASRs); a wide variety of floating docks (ARD, ABD,

ABSD, AFD); and numerous miscellaneous landing craft configured for salvage and repair.

The hundreds of ships, landing craft, and aircraft that the salvage forces saved and the many harbors they cleared were essential to the war effort. The oft-repeated observation of naval commanders that salvage units were highly effective but too few was borne out by the number of missions they accomplished and their hectic work pace. Ships' logs show them towing, changing propellers, raising wrecks, rescue-towing, fighting fires, or debeaching *daily or more often* for months at a time.

The Postwar Years

The massive and crucial harbor clearance efforts of World War II were not repeated. Korean War salvage was fast-paced and crucial but on a much smaller scale than in 1941–1945. The Suez Canal clearance of the late 1950s—while massive—was multinational, involved both military and civilian forces, and was accomplished without opposition. Accordingly, maintaining high levels of salvage capability in immediate readiness would have been disproportionately expensive, so the massive derricks, numerous support craft, and qualified uniformed personnel required were mostly discarded and their roles let out to contractors. However, the postwar Navy had been left with tremendous salvage assets and a unique organization—the Navy office of the Supervisor of Salvage, that continued to administer (as it does today) civilian salvage contracts.

Vietnam. By the start of the Vietnam War, while the Navy still possessed and operated many World War II–era salvage ships (ATA, ATF, ARS, and ASR), there were no military units dedicated to harbor clearance. Pools of ready portable salvage assets (pumps, compressors, etc.) and some yard and lift craft existed in mothballs;[3] also, SUPSALV had conducted clearance operations in a peacetime setting with a variety of assets. The need for a uniformed, combat harbor clearance capability became evident when the USNS *Card* (T-AKV 40) was mined at Saigon in 1964. A patchwork team that included two salvage ships refloated and removed the *Card*; but the operational problems experienced in the process led to the formation of a Harbor Clearance Unit (HCU 1) in the Mekong Delta, with a floating base ("mother" craft or a YRST).

HCU 1 was organized and equipped along World War II lines and was furnished with both heavy and light lift craft, a shore base, and converted landing craft and boats. This unit kept the Mekong Delta clear by removing innumerable sunken boats and aircraft, four grounded or sunken ships, and three sunken dredges. It also provided "fly-away" units (i.e., that travelled by air to salvage sites) to assist in strandings all over Southeast Asia as well as battle damage and

recovery operations. HCU 1 was often under fire, and most of the craft and ships it raised had been sunk as a result of enemy action. When the war ended, the Navy retained two Harbor Clearance Units, but much of the heavier equipment was gradually discarded.

The '70s and '80s. Two developments in the years between the end of the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War of 1991 are of particular importance. The first was the maturing of ocean technologies that had been rapidly advancing since the Second World War; the capabilities that emerged had a profound effect on the U.S. Navy salvage mission and its organization. For several decades, the Navy had enthusiastically pursued a "Man in the Sea" program, which took advantage of the unprecedented depth and duration of saturation diving; both manned and unmanned submersible technology advanced in the sixties and seventies. However, by the late seventies the offshore oil industry's experience confirmed Navy lessons from submarine rescue and classified underwater operations that saturation diving is highly dangerous and expensive. The answer was a surge of research and development in the area of unmanned remotely operated vehicles and manned submersibles. The results, coupled with advances in sonar, computer technology, and highly accurate vessel positioning, produced underwater systems of such efficiency and reliability that saturation diving technology was eclipsed in most applications. Accelerating since the early 1980s, these technological advances have dramatically expanded the salvage mission of deep object recovery, placing within our (and others') reach objects and depths inconceivable only ten years before.

The second major development, and this time a negative one, was the aging and dwindling of the Navy's salvage fleet. The end of World War II, as noted, had found the Navy with many capable salvage ships. But in the postwar decades this force was added to only sporadically, and its increasingly obsolescent vessels began to retire. By the end of the 1980s the "grey-hulled" salvage force consisted of four *Safeguard* (ARS 50), three *Edenton* (ATS 1), and two *Pigeon*-class (ASR 21) ships of recent construction, seven modern ATFs assigned to the civilian-manned Military Sealift Command (MSC) and fewer than two dozen World War II–era vessels. By 1994 it dropped to nine Navy ships (ATS, ARS, and ASR) and, in the Military Sealift Command, seven salvage tugs (T-ATF); by 1996 there are likely to be only four naval vessels, all of the *Safeguard* (ARS 50) class, and ten MSC (seven T-ATFs and three salvage and rescue ships, T-ATS).

As a result, Navy salvage ships in the 1980s were kept constantly busy; as their numbers declined, civilian contractors and the MSC vessels took up the slack. In addition, battle forces, even amphibious groups, seldom included a salvage component. An entire generation of operational commanders grew up without exercising salvage ships. This deficiency was the result not only of the paucity of

18   Naval War College Review

Navy salvage ships but also, until the end of the Cold War, the result of the U.S. Navy's focus upon aircraft carrier battle force operations on the open ocean. Save only for operations during the 1980s in "havens" like Vestfjord in Norway, salvage ships found no place in such warfare; they could not keep up with the battle groups.

Yet war against the Soviet navy did not occur. Between the war in Vietnam and the war in the Persian Gulf, what did occur were numerous groundings, collisions, fires, and hostile actions; and in all of these the lessons of World War II were repeatedly applied. In the Persian Gulf, for example, the frigate USS *Davidson* (FF 1045, which suffered an engineroom fire), the USS *Stark* (FFG 31, hit by an Iraqi missile), and the USS *Samuel B. Roberts* (FFG 58, nearly broken in half by an Iranian mine) were assisted by Navy combatants or commercial tugs, not U.S. Navy salvage ships. The services of a cruiser, USS *Leahy* (CG 16), were lost while it towed *Davidson* more than two thousand miles to Diego Garcia. Warships could not be risked in a minefield to rescue *Samuel B. Roberts*, although she was assisted by helicopters delivering damage control equipment.

Ironically, U.S. Navy salvage ships could have done these jobs had they been assigned to the area. There were also many other ways in which such vessels could have been useful, including salvage of wrecks from the "tanker war," convoy escort, mine countermeasures "mother-ship" duties, light salvage, port visits, intra-theater cargo hauling, underwater repairs, diving, and participation in joint and combined exercises. Throughout these years the Navy had enough salvage ships to provide a continuous capability in so important an area as the Middle East, but from 1979 until Desert Storm it did not do so, and neither did it assign a salvage officer to the staff of the Commander, Middle East Force (COMIDEASTFOR).

Desert Storm. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, no Navy salvage ship, salvage equipment, or land-based salvors were in that theater of operations, nor had any been requested. Moreover, because salvage did not appear in any operations plan and there was no salvage officer on the staff of the Commander, Naval Forces, Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT), no assets had been programmed to be sent to the region. In a frantic effort, the Supervisor of Salvage at the Naval Sea Systems Command dispatched Navy experts to the region, where they scrambled to set up a salvage organization and get resources to the theater. These resources included ready access to salvage funding that was, by law, centrally controlled. The U.S. Army, by contrast, had pre-positioned and pre-programmed the 7th Transportation Group's harbor maintenance and diving equipment; it was in place by September 1990. Not until mid-January 1991 did the U.S. Navy establish a salvage force responsive, through COMIDEASTFOR,

to the naval component commander, COMUSNAVCENT. This force consisted mainly of contracted vessels and 325 tons of portable salvage gear. Salvage officers in the theater determined that in order to handle two or three vessel casualties at once, two or three Navy salvage ships would be necessary, along with fifty to seventy-five shore-based enlisted clearance and salvage divers. In fact, only one ship, USS *Beaufort* (ATS 2), four salvage officers, and one portable recompression chamber with its team were on the scene before the end of the war made the problem moot.

The salvage organization did accomplish many small but essential tasks: underwater hull inspection, ship repair (at sea, in forward areas), underwater recoveries (one helicopter, one aircraft, and four missiles), and minor harbor clearance (stabilizing sinking ships, removing floating wrecks, and raising a patrol boat). More importantly, it was also able to provide immediate response to the mine-stricken USS *Tripoli* (LPH 10) and USS *Princeton* (CG 59). In fact, by prompt assistance, inspection, and technical advice, it may have saved the latter from breaking up. That effort involved flying aboard a repair ship's Battle Damage Assessment Team with a salvage engineer in charge, and then arranging for the Navy's only available salvage ship to conduct an underwater inspection before towing the *Princeton* out of the combat zone; she was eventually passed off to a civilian charter tug with a Navy liaison group embarked. This response, which took only hours, stands in marked contrast to the case of USNS *Andrew J. Higgins* (T-AO 190), which remained aground for three days (2–5 January 1991) awaiting the arrival of divers and an experienced salvage engineer from Subic Bay. Had the weather been worse, *Higgins* might well have suffered much greater damage or even been lost; as it was, her damage was undoubtedly exacerbated by her prolonged working on a submerged (and uncharted) pinnacle.

The naval salvage assets deployed for Desert Storm were much needed, well used, and operated to capacity. However, they were sufficient in number, one may conclude, only by good luck. That is, certain likely and very demanding scenarios (some of which had been actually expected)—multiple missile hits, grave damage to more than one ship simultaneously (the damage to *Tripoli* was less than grave, but she hit a mine on the same day *Princeton* did), two major groundings, battle damage from an amphibious assault, or the need for a rapid and extensive harbor clearance to support a stalled ground offensive—did not occur.

Furthermore, when active hostilities ended, streamlined access to wartime salvage funding ended as well. Frustration soon resulted, because CO-MIDEASTFOR (under COMUSNAVCENT) still faced recovery and harbor clearance operations beyond the capability and capacity of available naval resources. For example, when operational commanders desired to recover objects from a downed aircraft, sophisticated civilian resources, including side-scan sonar

and remotely operated vehicles, were required. However, the Chief of Naval Operations office whose funds were required chose not to release them to NAVSEA, and the parts were not recovered. In the harbor of Ash-Shuwaikh in Kuwait a commander was again unable to accomplish an operational task because he did not control the necessary funds; the result was that this harbor was not cleared (other than of mines) by the Navy at all, but later, by civilians. A contrasting example of what could have been done had the commander possessed more resources was Ash-Shuaybah, where a team of U.S. Navy salvage officers, a few senior enlisted men, and U.S. Army dive teams and equipment were able to raise an Osa II missile boat.

These examples are not given in order to argue that any particular project would have been worth the money to the Navy. The point is that operational commanders did not have, under their direct control, the means to accomplish even relatively modest salvage tasks.

Where We Are Now

What should two world wars and two "major regional contingencies" (as we are learning to call them) have taught us about operational naval salvage? First, salvage forces are necessary to keep sea lines of communication open and to clear port facilities blocked by sunken vessels. Second, amphibious and mine clearance operations require particularly extensive salvage support. Third, forward battle damage repair is best performed by specialized vessels capable of towing, firefighting, and damage control, and integrated into the combatant force. Fourth, successful salvage of any kind in an operational environment demands specialized and distinct resources in seamanship and engineering, both of which the commander must knowledgeably and directly control. Finally and most fundamentally, we learned that naval, not civilian—whether contracted, Navy-augmented Military Sealift Command, or chartered—salvage ships are essential, because of their ability to integrate into battle groups in forward, fleet, or combat environments. Though a useful adjunct in rear areas, civilian-manned salvage has never been adequate for wartime needs. While dependence upon civilian-manning and contracting is attractive in peacetime, especially as a matter of economy, it seriously risks costly and fatal inabilities to react rapidly to conflict or disaster.

Desert Storm revealed that in certain important ways the U.S. Navy had not digested its experience; some lessons had to be relearned under fire, and others remain unlearned today. Although individual skills and specific technical competencies involved in salvage remain, the Navy's ability at the operational level to utilize the much smaller fleet salvage force is seriously degraded. There is a lack of expertise on operational staffs; accordingly, planning for the salvage mission is inadequate. Naval forces are deficient in organization for salvage, in

the ability to obtain and employ salvage contractors, and in integrated salvage assets—especially naval-manned, but even MSC.

Unity of Command. The historical dichotomy between the engineering and operational aspects of salvage has grown as ships have become larger. While a simple task can often be handled by either an experienced operator or an engineer, for a complex operation the expertise of both the "operating salvor" (i.e., line officers and divers) and the salvage engineer are necessary. Further, the advance of technology has made it much more likely that a given salvage project will be more complex and also that short-notice operations, at least, will require the cooperation of U.S. Navy, MSC, civilian, U.S. Army, and sometimes allied assets. In addition, compelling legal, technical, and budgetary factors have concentrated a vital portion of Navy salvage capability and funding in the hands of the Supervisor of Salvage, not under the direct control of naval component commanders. Navy operational commanders are generally unaware of these special resources, their capabilities and organization, or of the planning factors that directly affect their effectiveness.

Further, when projects must be done in conjunction with contractors, the systems commands (rather than operational commanders) contract and coordinate with commercial salvage contractors and often supervise the actual operation. It is a principle of war—and historically a very dangerous one to violate—that forces "must be so organized that the tactical commander has unquestioned control over his own logistical support allocated to his use."[4] This control is unquestioned with respect to naval ships and teams, or non-contracted MSC vessels like the T-ATFs. But, as the head of Ship Repair Unit at Bahrain stated after Desert Storm, "The idea that every salvage task had to first be approved and signed as a contract task order was abhorrent to everyone in the fleet. You cannot build a civilian operation into a military organization in the middle of a war. . . . The salvage line of communication by commercial land line and INMARSAT [communication satellite], both in and around the Gulf theater and direct to Washington, coupled with the civilian salvage contract, placed salvage outside the theater military [command, control, and communications]."[5] Interestingly, the managing director of the major civilian contractor agreed: "The USN combat salvage command structure should be vertically integrated, culminating with a senior salvage officer on the staff of the top operational command—with budgetary authority for all required in-theater salvage commitments."[6]

The existence of a parallel chain of command leading from a combat zone to the shore establishment is also outside the experience of almost all Navy operational commanders. It virtually guarantees misunderstanding, miscommunication, and non-coordination between the two commanders and their

respective subordinates. In such conditions it is almost inevitable that operational planning for salvage will be inadequate—as it was in Desert Storm—and that the operational commander will be obliged to make up the deficit in the heat of action.

In practical terms, the problem stems primarily from the fact that the operational commander does not have control over relevant funds. During Desert Storm, the Supervisor of Salvage sent officers with contracting authority to work directly for the commanders in the theater; however, they were still required to communicate with Washington for contract administration. Also, as soon as the cease-fire occurred, peacetime salvage procedures again applied, thwarting the operational commander in several instances.

Over-dependence on Civilian Salvors. The use of civilians in salvage is a long-established fact of life. However, naval salvage resources have been so severely depleted that commanders will be obliged to rely far too greatly upon civilian contractors. The U.S. armed services as a whole no longer possess the quantity or types of salvage vessels and equipment required for many conceivable contingencies. In 1950, the USS *Missouri* (BB 63), aground near Norfolk, was pulled free by an all-naval effort involving eighteen salvage ships, seventeen purchase ground legs, and seven yard tugs. This assemblage exceeds the present inventory of salvage ships in the entire Navy and Military Sealift Command combined. The U.S. Navy cannot perform its own harbor clearance; civilian cranes, berthing barges, and lift craft are necessary. Deep object recoveries are often beyond its capability; they require specialized civilian assets. In short, there is often no way for the operational commander to avoid using civilian firms, even for critical requirements, even directly in the combat area.

For legal and financial reasons, however, civilian tug assistance is rarely available in a combat environment.[7] In each of the pre-Desert Storm Persian Gulf cases previously mentioned, a Navy salvage ship could have done the assistance job better than the combatant that was suddenly assigned. There would have been no need to ask (and pay) civilians to operate in a combat area; the assisting combatant would have remained free to perform its intended mission; and a less expensive ship would have been risked in the rescue attempt.

Ultimately, however, civilian assets cannot be counted upon in the most critical and hazardous combat-related scenarios, simply because they are not military. To say this is not to impugn the courage, devotion, patriotism, or skill of these individuals and firms; civilian salvors have voluntarily undergone great danger. They have also, however—in both world wars, in Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf—been known to refuse to go in harm's way or to increase their rates exponentially as danger increased. It is their right, from some viewpoints their obligation, to do so. But in the extreme case—and the military exists for

extreme cases—a commander cannot rely on someone who can legitimately say "No." As an experienced planner cautioned, "If USS *Princeton* had gone hard aground after the mine strike, the decision for *Smit New York* to go into mined waters or under hostile gunfire would have been made back at Smit International Headquarters in Rotterdam, and not by the ship's master or the Navy Salvage Coordinator. In spite of Smit's willingness to go in harm's way, it is difficult to say what the outcome of such a decision would be until it actually happens. The financial and liability issues are considerable."[8]

To a worrisome degree, we are going to have to live with these ills and others like them. As for the division of responsibility and control of salvage operations, administrative efficiency and budgetary constraints inevitably lead to the centralization of specialized support functions, and the needs of "users" will conflict with the concerns of "owners." As for over-dependence upon civilian resources, the obvious remedy would be for the Navy to build for itself all or most of the specialized, highly capable, and numerous salvage vessels its future commitments are likely to require. That would be an easy recommendation, but a useless one; while the salvage capability has a strong claim to a place in the "recapitalized" force of the coming decade, a large new "grey-hulled" salvage fleet is simply not in prospect. However, there are things that can realistically be done to reduce the worst effects and put operational commanders in the best practical position with respect to salvage.

To assist the commanders of fleets, forces, and joint naval components, operational salvage officers who have experience in planning, along with salvage engineers skilled in the execution of maintenance and repair, should be assigned (if only on additional duty) to the commanders' staffs. Navy operational planning doctrine, especially in the amphibious area, should be reviewed by systems command and operational salvage specialists; the resulting revisions should take adequate account of salvage, with specific reference to sea lane clearance, amphibious support, harbor clearance, deep object recovery, and battle damage repair as separate but interrelated missions. The military and civilian resources available at the systems commands should be made known to the planning commander, which should in turn lead to the involvement of those commands in the planning and doctrine-review processes. Battle group and naval component organizations should be altered to provide for a salvage coordinator directly subordinate to the commander, controlling a salvage organization that flexibly addresses each salvage mission and balances centralization of resources with local execution. It also should be possible to prearrange SUPSALV funding and to preposition the equipment to be used—and operationally controlled—by maritime commanders.

24   Naval War College Review

Naval salvage assets, especially vessels, can and should be assigned more often to participate in exercises (the South American UNITAS cruise, for example) and in actual power projection, forward presence, and evacuation missions. A naval salvage ship should always be on station with the U.S. Navy Middle East Force. Finally, when conflicts begin to develop, early action must be taken to concentrate "grey-hulled" salvage ships and clearance forces capable of operating with battle groups so that reliance upon civilian resources "at the point of the spear" is minimized.

Notes

1. Despite a warship's greater horsepower, rigging and hawser constraints normally force her to tow more slowly than a salvage ship, which has a wire tow hawser and an automatic towing winch. This differential in tow-speed increases with the size of the vessel being towed and severity of the weather.

2. C. A. Bartholemew, *Mud, Muscles, and Miracles* (Washington: Naval Historical Center and Naval Sea Systems Command), p. 48. (Emphasis supplied.)

3. As a technical note for non-salvors, a salvage ship is often not an optimal platform for major harbor clearance operations, although it can accomplish many simple clearance tasks and provide whatever portable gear it carries and function as a base. A salvage ship's lifting capability (in and out of water) is generally not sufficient for major clearance, and of course it is not available for other salvage missions while engaged in (often lengthy) clearance operations. The use of the salvage ship, then, seldom obviates the need for harbor tugs, yard craft, derricks, etc., for major clearance operations.

4. H. E. Eccles, *Logistics in the National Defense* (Harrisburg, Penna.: Stackpole), p. 125.

5. Commander Naval Sea Systems Command, *Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Salvage, Vol. II Interview Report* (Washington: July 1991), p. 64. Interview of Captain Patrick Shepard, USN.

6. Commander Naval Sea Systems Command, p. 38. Interview of Mr. Roger Elliot.

7. Commercial salvors generally work on a Lloyd's Open Form contract with a "no cnre, no pay" provision. This contract awards a percentage of the value of salved property, based on the difficulty and danger (considerably greater in conflict) of the salvage. The salvor has a lien on the property salved until adjudication of the salvage award. This proviso has caused legal problems in the past with the rescue and salvage of U.S. Navy ships; theoretically, it could result, for example, in an award of 10 percent of the value of an Aegis cruiser. The system also subjects commercial salvage companies to dramatic fluctuations in cash flow; accordingly, these firms often do not make themselves available, or at least only to a very limited extent, in most non-lucrative areas of the world.

8. Commander Naval Sea Systems Command, p. 10. Interview of Mr. Richard Asher.

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Wisdom should reckon on the unforeseen.

G. K. Chesterton
"The Blue Cross," 1911

Coalition Forces in the Korean War

Wayne Danzik

O N 25 JUNE 1950, THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY surged across the 38th parallel under the cover of darkness and massive artillery fire. The same day, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution naming North Korea an aggressor and calling for withdrawal of its armed forces. Two days later, another resolution asked UN members to "furnish such assistance . . . as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."[1] The United States was designated the UN's executive agent for military action in Korea, and in short order a United Nations Command was established under U.S. leadership.[2]

The invasion of South Korea galvanized the world community into a remarkable display of collective support. Forty-nine nations and scores of private organizations contributed supplies, food, and equipment. Five more countries provided medical units. Most important, fifteen nations from Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas joined the United States in sending armed forces to Korea.[3] This was the first example in history of such a diverse coalition fighting under the auspices of an international organization. The nations joined together neither from strategic interest based on geographical proximity, nor the threat of imminent attack, nor any potential for economic gain. Rather, they shared the political goals of resisting aggression and halting the spread of communism.

In terms strictly of the number of fighting men who served in Korea, the contribution of coalition countries was small. In fact, just eleven years after the end of the war, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff advised against relying on allies in Vietnam on the grounds that America had received "no significant support in Korea. . . . The U.S. did essentially all of the fighting, took all the casualties, and paid all the bills."[4] At first glance, therefore, it could be argued that our coalition partners added nothing of value to military operations in Korea.

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A more pragmatic view, however, holds that without the coalition, the United States would have had to field in Korea another two divisions (the coalition's contribution) and would have borne another fifteen thousand casualties (the number the coalition suffered). In reality, the coalition forces made an important contribution; they participated in all the major battles, acquitted themselves well in combat, bore heavy casualties in proportion to their strength, and reimbursed the United States for the logistical support they received. After a visit to the front in 1951, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall was "impressed with the complete amalgamation of the various United Nations units . . . into an integrated, coordinated fighting force."[5]

Forty years after Korea, the United States has come to appreciate the value of coalition partners, as its National Military Strategy reflects: "We expect to strengthen world response to crises through multilateral operations under the auspices of international security organizations [and we] must be prepared to fight as part of an ad hoc coalition . . . where no formal security relationships exist."[6] Notwithstanding, and although we fought successfully in 1991 with a coalition in Desert Storm, the conditions that made a "hundred-hour war" possible then may not exist next time. Instead, the Korean War—a protracted ground campaign—could be the paradigm for future conflict. It is essential that operational commanders be aware of the unique characteristics of that war if they are to be prepared to employ coalition forces effectively in a similar situation in the future.

Toward that end, this article uses the Korean War as a case study showing that coalition forces can make a positive contribution on the battlefield but that there are factors that make the employment of these forces a challenge. After summarizing the key aspects of the ground, naval, and air operations in Korea and the contributions made by our coalition partners, the article explores issues relating to coalition force employment and then extracts the "lessons learned."

The Coalition Contribution

The presence of coalition partners added much to the military effort in Korea. They gave the war an international legitimacy it may have otherwise lacked, and they helped keep it limited at a time when some American voices (such as General Douglas MacArthur's) were calling for escalation. Moreover, the coalition forces fought hard in battle. Their courage and ability were recognized by U.S. commanders, who awarded citations for bravery to many coalition units.

The Ground War. The ground war in Korea consisted of four distinct phases. The first phase, from the North Korean invasion to the Inchon landing, involved the defense of the Pusan perimeter. The second, comprising the push to the Yalu

River and the subsequent Chinese intervention, ended with the withdrawal of UN forces to the 38th parallel. The third, the Chinese spring offensive and UN counteroffensive, ended in relatively fixed battlefield positions. The final phase, which spanned the two years of armistice negotiations, involved primarily positional warfare reminiscent of World War 1.[7] Coalition forces fought in the key battles of each period. By 1953, 15 percent of the 155-mile front was held by non-U.S. and non–Republic of Korea troops.[8]

The British Commonwealth contributed a large share of those forces; its ground units operated in Korea throughout the war. First attached as independent units to U.S. divisions, these forces were later unified as the 1st British Commonwealth Division and were assigned as a body to the U.S. 1 Corps.[9] The United Kingdom was the first non-U.S. nation to send ground forces to Korea, and its 27th Brigade helped defend the Pusan perimeter. Over the course of the war, nine British regiments were represented. One of these, the Gloucestershires, was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for its stand on Gloucester Hill, called "the most outstanding example of unit bravery in modern warfare."[10] Australia provided an infantry battalion, New Zealand an artillery battalion, and Canada a three-battalion infantry brigade.[11] The Canadians and Australians were all volunteers, recruited from the general population. Battalions from both countries were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for heroism in the battle of Kapyong.[12]

Ten other countries supplied brigade and battalion-size formations to Korea; these were attached directly to U.S. regiments and divisions. Belgium's volunteer infantry battalion was accompanied by a forty-four-man detachment from Luxembourg. The Belgians' and Luxembourgers' most significant fighting was at the battle of Imjin River, for which they received the Presidential Unit Citation.[13] Colombia was the only Latin American country to send forces to Korea. Its infantry battalion, made up of volunteers from the regular Colombian army, saw its heaviest fighting in the Kumsong offensive and at Pork Chop Hill.[14] In one three-month period, the Colombians inflicted losses on the enemy estimated at fifty times their own.[15] The only African nation to send ground forces to Korea was Ethiopia. It provided an infantry battalion, a volunteer force from the Imperial Bodyguard.[16] The Ethiopians were the only troops in Korea that did not lose a prisoner or leave a single man unaccounted for.[17] As the U.S. Army Chief of Staff put it, "No braver or finer troops ever fought in Korea. They were never driven from the battlefield. They returned as they went out—all together—whether they were living or wounded or dead."[18]

France sent an all-volunteer infantry battalion of professional soldiers led by a highly decorated general who reverted to the rank of lieutenant colonel to command in Korea. The French battalion saw hard fighting at the Twin Tunnels, Chipyong-ni, Hongchon, and Heartbreak Ridge.[19] Within three months of

·entering combat, it had suffered the highest proportion of casualties of any nation but the United States and the Republic of Korea.[20] Altogether, the battalion earned three Presidential Unit Citations.[21] There was also a battalion of Dutch infantry, which first saw action at Wonju, where it earned the Presidential Unit Citation for its "courageous four-day stand" against the enemy.[22]

Turkey, for its part, was the third-largest contributor of combat forces to Korea (after the U.S. and U.K.). Its brigade took part in some of the hardest fighting in the war, losing one-fifth of its personnel at Kunu-ri.[23] The Turkish brigade was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for gallantry during the battle of Kumyanjang-ni.[24] Finally, Greece, Thailand, and the Philippines each sent infantry battalions to Korea, and they all saw hard fighting.[25]

The Naval War. On 4 July 1950 President Harry S. Truman ordered a blockade of the Korean coast; the United Nations Blockade and Escort Force was quickly organized as part of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. It included separate task groups to cover Korea's east and west coasts. The east coast group was under U.S. operational control and contained all the U.S. naval units; the west coast force was under the command of a British admiral, and it included all the Commonwealth naval vessels and most of the coalition units.[26] There was close coordination between the U.S. and British staffs, and the two task groups regularly shared assets.[27]

The North Korean "gunboat navy" was disposed of soon after the blockade was declared.[28] For the duration of the war, the coalition naval forces maintained control of the sea, provided fire support to ground forces, bombarded lines of communication and other targets ashore, conducted antisubmarine patrols, escorted aircraft carriers, supported commando raids behind enemy lines, and protected islands along the coasts.[29] Coalition aircraft from one Australian and four British aircraft carriers flew direct support missions, performed reconnaissance for ground troops, spotted for naval bombardment, and provided air cover for UN ships.[30] The Inchon landing and the evacuation of Hungnam were both supported by coalition naval forces.[31]

There was concern at the time that the UN blockade of North Korea might be ineffective, since the enemy continued to be supplied even though (as was mistakenly believed) air force bombing had cut the enemy's overland supply routes.[32] In reality, the land routes had not been cut, but the naval blockade was highly effective. A study conducted by the Chief of Naval Operations determined that any "leakage" through the blockade was in the form of small craft passing through the coastal islands and that it amounted at most to a "trickle" of troops and supplies.[33]

Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom supplied a total of five aircraft carriers, five cruisers, seventeen

destroyers, seventeen frigates, and numerous support vessels. The Canadian destroyer HMCS *Nootka* had the honor of capturing a North Korean minelayer, the only enemy vessel taken during the war.[34]

The Air War. The Commander, U.S. Far East Air Force, controlled all air operations in Korea.[35] Although the United States provided the majority of air assets, coalition air forces were present as well. The primary contributions of coalition air forces were in the close air support of ground troops and the interdiction of enemy lines of supply and communication; bomber escort, reconnaissance, transportation, and combat air patrol missions were also undertaken.

Canada, Thailand, and Greece provided transportation aircraft; Greece's C-47 Skytrain group earned the Presidential Unit Citation for action at the Chosin Reservoir just after the Chinese intervention.[36] The United Kingdom provided artillery spotter aircraft and three squadrons of Sunderland seaplanes for maritime reconnaissance.[37] Australia's 77th Squadron was the first non-U.S. force to fight in Korea, and it was instrumental in defending the Pusan perimeter.[38] South Africa's "Flying Cheetah" Squadron demonstrated "classic examples of airmanship and courage" in its frontline support and interdiction operations.[39] Finally, Canadian pilots flew combat missions as part of the U.S. Fifth Air Force.

Political Considerations

Politics can have a fundamental impact on military operations, particularly when the cooperation of many nations is required for success. The interaction of multiple Clausewitzian "trinities" of governments, peoples, and militaries creates a changeable and fragile partnership that can be fractured if the interests of individual nations are threatened. The Korean War coalition held together for over three years of conflict. Our coalition partners were reliable; they had strong political reasons for participating in the war; and their military contributions had a significance for each nation that went beyond the comparatively small number of the troops sent.

Each of the coalition partners joined the war effort because it supported the United Nations goals of resisting aggression and halting the spread of communism. In addition, many had political reasons of their own. Britain wanted to return to the level of influence with the United States that it had enjoyed in World War II.[40] Colombia wanted to assert itself as a "player" on the world stage. Others, like Turkey, felt they might need UN help in the future.[41] Ethiopia wanted to express solidarity with the collective effort because it had felt abandoned by the League of Nations in 1935.[42] Unity of effort in Korea was thus the result of a synergy of collective purpose and national objectives.

Despite the demonstrated commitment of our coalition partners, however, the American public at the time felt that their contributions were not enough. In reality, for some of the countries to field even a small force was a burden. Luxembourg's forty-four-man detachment may have seemed a token contribution, but its total armed forces were only a few hundred strong.[43] Colombia supplied only an infantry battalion and a frigate, but they cost every week what the nation had spent on its entire army and navy in a year.[44] It must also be remembered that many of our partners were simultaneously fighting regional conflicts of their own. The British were trying to contain an insurrection in Malaya and the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, France was deeply embroiled in Indochina, and the Philippines was dealing with the Huk Rebellion.[45] Most important, these partners and some of the others were willing to join the war effort even though they were just beginning to recover from World War II.[46]

Korea was a war of "firsts" for many of the coalition countries. The dispatch of its destroyers marked the first time Canada had placed a military force under a foreign commander in peacetime.[47] It was the first action the Turkish army had seen since 1923, the first time in 127 years that Colombian troops had fought on foreign soil, and the first war Ethiopia had waged outside of Africa in thirteen centuries.[48] Nevertheless, there was vigorous support in these countries for the troop commitments. In Canada, fifteen thousand men applied for Korean service, in a time of full national employment;[49] in Ethiopia, for every man in the volunteer force, ten had been rejected who wanted to come.[50]

As the UN's executive agent, the United States was responsible for accepting or rejecting offers of military assistance from potential coalition members, and such decisions often had political significance that superseded operational considerations. For example, the U.S. turned down an offer of thirty-three thousand troops from Taiwan in part because their use would have been provocative to Communist China.[51] Our reliance on Japan for equipment and logistical support may have given color to the Soviet Union's accusation that we were employing Japanese troops in the field.[52] The desire to limit contributions to formations of operationally significant size (i.e., battalion or higher) precluded accepting the offers of Cuba and Bolivia, who would have given smaller contingents, and of Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Panama, who would have let men volunteer on an individual basis.[53] Such nations protested the limitation on the ground that it prevented them from performing their "legal and moral obligations to the United Nations."[54] On the other hand, the presence of at least some forces from Latin America and Africa helped to allay any perception by newly independent states that the Korean War was an "imperialist campaign."[55]

The actual employment of coalition forces could also be a politically sensitive issue, one with repercussions far beyond the immediate operation. Britain was assigned control of the west coast portion of the naval blockade primarily because

it recognized the People's Republic of China—if a Commonwealth vessel strayed into Chinese waters, the situation could be addressed diplomatically.[56] But it was also possible to give offense in this way. For instance, British and Canadian troops were sent to guard the POW camp on Koje-do Island soon after an insurrection in which the camp commander had been captured; both governments accused the U.S. of trying to spread the blame for the condition of the camp.[57] Many coalition partners were determined to keep the war limited and vigorously protested anything done without full consultation that they feared might escalate the conflict.[58] In one case, pilots were denied permission for "hot pursuit" of enemy aircraft across the Chinese border because five allies thought it would be provocative.[59] In another case, the bombing of power plants on the Yalu River provoked serious diplomatic tension because the U.S. had failed to consult with Britain beforehand.[60] Fortunately, no incidents of this type ever proved serious enough to disrupt the coalition.

Logistics

The United States provided nearly all of the clothing, rations, equipment, and weapons used by the coalition partners, except for the Commonwealth nations. The latter were provisioned through a separate British supply line (although a portion of their supplies was furnished by the U.S.).[61] Despite the complexity of the coalition force, logistical problems never became crippling, although there were some remarkable challenges to overcome.[62]

Cultural and religious preferences dictated certain modifications to combat rations to accommodate the coalition forces. The Turks, who were Muslims, required a pork-free ration. Thais were given an allowance of two and one-half ounces of tabasco sauce per man per week. The Filipinos did not like the local rice, so theirs had to be shipped in from Manila. The French insisted on baking their own bread, and the Ethiopians cooked their own meals in accordance with Ethiopian Orthodox (Coptic) tradition.[63]

Most of the coalition forces wound up wearing U.S. uniforms at some point, if only assuming them piece by piece as their national uniforms wore out.[64] Problems ranged from the objection of the Argyll Highlanders to brown combat boots (they had worn black ones for over a century) to the Thai soldiers' need for specially made shoes to fit their extra-wide feet.[65] The real challenge, however, was outfitting for cold weather. The subzero winter was a surprise for the Ethiopians and Australians, who had never seen snow, and the Canadians, who had expected tropical conditions.[66] Several of the units, including the Ethiopians and the British 27th Brigade, had arrived in summer uniforms. It was generally felt that Americans "did a fine job" providing cold weather gear, although many of the coalition troops had to be trained in its use.[67]

Transportation was a major concern for coalition partners, many of whom either lacked equipment or brought antiquated, pre–World War II vehicles. Even with the proper equipment, movements of smaller units would be delayed for hours or days while road priority was given to U.S. convoys.[68] Maintenance and operation were also problems, as some coalition units were deemed mechanically incompetent and in others there was a shortage of trained drivers.[69] As a result, the U.S. provided most of the transportation within the theater.

The problems that might be encountered were epitomized by the experience of the Turkish brigade. The Turks brought with them obsolete trucks, which became a traffic menace when they broke down.[70] As a result, in the battle of Kunu-ri the brigade requested American equipment; unfortunately, the vehicles provided were fewer than promised, were delivered late, and had to be given back before the Turks actually reached the battle area.[71] Had the vehicles been left at the Turks' disposal, the brigade's mobility and firepower would have increased, and its casualties might have been fewer.[72]

The United States signed formal agreements with the coalition partners on reimbursement for logistical support provided during the war and, four days after the war broke out, specified how material was to be controlled and accounted for.[73] However, it was not until the summer of 1951 that satisfactory administrative procedures were in place and working.[74] Keeping track of what the individual coalition partners used remained a significant burden to the quartermasters, since units attached to U.S. formations drew from their common resources.[75] A different problem resulted from the Commonwealth division's pool accounting system for its countries who drew American supplies: reimbursement would be funneled to the U.S. through Britain. Britain at first refused to settle its account, and it was not until 1964, after protracted negotiations, that it finally did so.[76]

The Challenge of Diversity

The presence of multinational forces in Korea, with different languages, cultures, and command and control procedures, posed a particular problem for operational commanders. Its effects were largely mitigated by the preponderance of U.S. forces in the theater and in the United Nations command structure, but there were certainly opportunities for improvement.

The UN Command specified English as the basic language for operations in Korea.[77] All orders, instructions, and directives were accordingly issued in English; the burden of translation fell on each unit.[78] Some countries selected officers for their English skills, and liaison personnel were exchanged between the coalition forces and U.S. units. Notwithstanding, translation resources were usually inadequate; at least thirteen languages plus a number of regional dialects

were spoken by UN forces in Korea.[79] The Command tried to ease the situation of the Philippine and Colombian battalions by assigning them to the Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican regiment. Unfortunately, of course, the Filipinos spoke Tagalog; as for the Colombians, they were eventually assigned elsewhere in the name of more equitable distribution of UN forces.[80] The Turkish brigade had a more tragic experience: after their heroic stand at Kunu-ri, the Turks were unable to ask for directions back to the U.S. lines. By the time they straggled back in, the Americans had assumed the Turks had fled the battle; instead of promptly sending forward a relief force, the Americans had written off the Turks as lost.[81]

The presence of coalition forces resulted in a certain amount of cultural friction as well. The Ethiopian commander insisted that his troops not be called "Negroes"; a U.S. officer referred to the Thai regimental commander as a "gook."[82] Notwithstanding such isolated incidents, however, the policy of keeping other UN units attached to American divisions or corps helped to develop mutual understanding and esprit de corps.[83] Probably the most striking accommodation to cultural requirements occurred when the UN Command flew in a flock of sheep so that the Greeks could perform their customary Easter sacrifice.[84]

Cultural differences can be exploited by an enemy to split a coalition, and the Chinese tried to do so in Korea. First, they focused attacks against frontline coalition units, as happened to the Ethiopians repeatedly, thinking perhaps to demoralize these troops or to find a weak link.[85] Second, coalition prisoners were sometimes treated more leniently than Americans in the hopes of creating POW turncoats and thereby a propaganda coup. Thanks to the firm cohesion of the coalition troops, however, these attempts at disrupting the UN effort failed.[86]

Command relationships within the coalition were established from the very beginning; they included formal agreements between the U.S. and its partners that coalition forces would obey the orders of U.S. commanders.[87] At all times, the senior military representative of each nation had direct access to the UN commander on matters of major policy and could contact his government directly on administrative issues affecting his force.[88]

The United States and Britain, whose command structures were the predominant ones in Korea, were able to iron out differences in staff concepts, communication procedures, and military terminology because of their shared experiences in the Second World War.[89] Examples were naval signalling procedures, maneuvering instructions, and the adoption of standard-size maps that units could reproduce.[90] Notwithstanding, the need for simplicity in communication—even among partners who speak the same language—was demonstrated once again. For instance, the U.S. and Britain differed in how they prepared operational orders.[91] On at least one occasion, a Commonwealth naval commander did not like the U.S. version; for the Inchon landing, he was given

"two enormous volumes" of operations orders that specified many matters in excruciating detail but had "no reference to the nature of enemy resistance, adverse weather conditions, actions to be taken in the event of heavy minelaying, or other considerations of basic interest to the operational commander."[92]

Tactical Issues

The military doctrinal concepts of the two major UN powers in Korea—the United States and Great Britain—being largely in congruence, there were no tactical mismatches serious enough to jeopardize the war effort. There were, however, occasions in which the coalition was strained by poor American leadership on the battlefield.

The combat readiness of coalition forces ranged from that of the Greeks, who were experienced mountain fighters, to the New Zealanders, who had never handled artillery before their regiment was formed a few months earlier.[93] Some of the forces, including the Colombians, Ethiopians, and Canadians, had under-gone preliminary training with U.S. Army advisers before deploying to Korea.[94] The U.S. and Canadian navies had developed combined tactical doctrine and had carried out battle workups for the Canadian destroyers headed to Korea.[95] In the theater, the U.S. Army set up the UN Reception Center (UNRC), whose mission was in part to "provide familiarization training with U.S. Army weapons and equipment."[96] UNRC services ranged from brief indoctrination to major unit training, and many problems would "shake out" there before units went into combat.[97] The amount of training a coalition force received at UNRC depended on its previous preparation; but most were given additional training once they reached their assigned U.S. units.[98] No Commonwealth troops passed through the UNRC, the British having set up their own reception and training center.[99]

Despite such preparation, however, some of the coalition forces retained tactical idiosyncrasies that were disruptive to operations. The French disliked marching at night, and they lit huge campfires even when near enemy posi-tions.[100] The Turks marched in closely packed columns, providing prime targets for ambushes.[101] On the other hand, the U.S. found many coalition practices superior to its own and adopted them, such as Turkish bayonet techniques, British methods of consolidating ground, and Commonwealth artillery com-munications.[102]

A greater problem than minor tactical differences was the inferior performance on the battlefield of some U.S. forces working with the coalition. Agreements were signed with some partners not to hold the other liable for deaths of personnel or destruction of property;[103] however, morale of the coalition forces was weakened when the losses were seen as resulting from U.S. mistakes. Fratricide

is a prime example; almost every frontline unit on the Pusan perimeter was attacked by friendly aircraft at some point.[104] Notably, the British 27th Brigade, which had called for air support, was hit by a U.S. napalm strike; although many British troops were killed, both sides appear to have attributed the incident to the "fog of war," and no ill will was harbored.[105] Unfortunately, the problem seems not to have been rectified; in 1951, the U.S. napalmed Australian positions at Kapyong.[106] American forces also were prone to abandon comrades in arms when, as the troops put it at the time, they "bugged out" in wholesale retreat from the invading Chinese. On at least three occasions U.S. troops withdrew without warning the Turks, who became encircled by the enemy and had to fight their way out with horrendous losses.[107] The British were forced time and again to cover the retreat of U.S. forces and at times suffered friendly fire from panicking American soldiers.[108] Eventually the British and Turks began to protest U.S. decisions to withdraw; at one point, the French, Dutch, Greek, and Turkish contingents requested to be placed under British rather than U.S. command.[109] It eventually became U.S. policy that American troops, not coalition partners, would be the last to withdraw.[110]

L egally, there is today only an armistice in Korea. The UN Command is still in existence, and periodic reports of its activities are made to the Security Council.[111] Korea has continued to be one of the world's "hot spots"—very much so at this writing—and the U.S. National Military Strategy takes specific note of it: "The Korean Peninsula remains divided in stark contrast with the end of the Cold War in Europe. Logic dictates that change is inevitable, but the transition period is likely to be fraught with great risks."[112] Nevertheless, the UN forces of 1950–1953 accomplished the political objectives expressed by President Truman at the time, "to repel attack and to restore peace."[113] That demonstration of effective collective action may also have deterred aggression elsewhere in the world.[114]

In two respects, however, the U.S. was fortunate in Korea in ways that might not be true at a future time—its coalition achieved unity through strongly shared collective and national objectives, and its partners maintained their commitment throughout the war. Also, the overwhelming predominance of U.S. forces in Korea, with the accompanying authority of being the UN's executive agent, allowed U.S. leadership to overcome many of the coalition-related problems that arose. However, those could easily have been magnified and their resolutions made more difficult had the United States been anything other than the dominant member.

A number of lessons can be drawn from Korea. First, the use of coalition forces inevitably involves political factors that can influence operations. Offers of assistance might have to be turned down in spite of operational need because of the political statement that acceptance would make; on the other hand, to refuse an offer could cost that country's support at a time when political cohesion is as important as success on the battlefield. In addition, political considerations can affect the operational commander's ability to employ coalition forces in specific situations.

Logisticians must take into account the unique requirements of coalition forces in areas such as food, clothing, and transportation. Providing for these needs is essential for preserving morale and ensuring the combat effectiveness of coalition partners. Communication is the key to working with diversity, on the battlefield as in the office. The lack of translators in Korea placed an undue burden on the multilingual force and hampered its training and operations. In the probable absence of manuals and training aids available in all the languages of potential partners, the problem may be expected to recur; however, there is a clear need for foreign language skills as part of U.S. officers' professional development. Even among forces that speak the same language, differences in tactical doctrine, military terminology, planning procedures, and equipment skills can lead to confusion on the battlefield. Standardization should continue to be developed through combined exercises and training of foreign officers at American military schools and should be expanded to include as wide a range of potential coalition partners as possible.[115]

Finally, the "eyes of the world" watch how we employ the troops entrusted to our command. It is therefore critical that, to the greatest extent possible, coalition forces receive equitable treatment and proportionate combat exposure.[116]

In a world as interconnected by political and economic interests as at present, it is difficult to imagine a future conflict not involving a coalition. Despite the vast strength of American armed forces, one must not underestimate the value even small nations can provide. "The contribution of a single weak nation is often overlooked, and yet the sum of the weak nations' contributions may conceivably be the balancing factor among irreconcilable giants."[117] Whether the next war looks like Korea, Desert Storm, or something in between, U.S. forces must be prepared to fight beside soldiers of every nationality, race, and religion.[118] As the Korean War showed, diversity can be a source of strength on the battlefield.

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38　Naval War College Review

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We need the wit that nature gave us
To face our foes as all men must,
But from the ones we love and trust,
From our good friends, may Heaven save us!

Alexander Pushkin
Eugene Onegin
(trans. Deutsch)

Reducing the Risks of
Depending upon Foreign Industries

James F. Miskel

A COMMON VIEW AMONG NATIONAL SECURITY strategists is that the United States is courting trouble by importing too many defense-related components and technologies from Europe and Asia. According to this view, the United States has allowed itself to become so dependent upon imported components, subsystems, and materials that the success of future military operations may very well hinge upon continued access to and cooperation by foreign suppliers.[1] Adherents of this view acknowledge that an interruption in the flow of defense-related imports would obviously have less dire consequences today than it might have had during the Cold War, when national survival and the global balance of power could have been at stake. Even so, they hold, the consequences might still be substantial.

For example, during the Persian Gulf War of 1991 the United States depended upon foreign industries for a number of essential goods and services. Industries in Western Europe were important sources of the munitions and heavy-duty trucks that were employed by the Desert Storm coalition. Asian industries provided essential electronic components. Merchant marines of Europe and Asia provided nearly half of the sealift ships required by Desert Shield and Storm.[2] Speculation aside as to what could have happened on the battlefield had these imports been unavailable, suffice it to say that the preparations for the Gulf War would have been greatly complicated and perhaps considerably slowed if foreign industries had not continued to export to the United States.

Because the consequences of an interruption in the flow of defense-related imports could indeed be severe, a number of strategies have been proposed in recent years to reduce the risks associated with dependence upon foreign

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A fuller treatment of the foreign dependence issue is found in the author's *Buying Trouble? National Security and Reliance on Foreign Industry* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1993).

industries. Many of these strategies reflect assumptions that are at odds with the industrial and political realities of the post–Cold War era and thus are not likely to be effective risk-reduction strategies. This does not mean that the problem should be ignored as beyond repair. As will be discussed, new policies for the foreign dependence issue need to be developed, and this article concludes by identifying approaches that seem worthy of further study.

The strategies that have been proposed for reducing the national security risks of foreign dependency generally fall into two categories. One would mitigate risk by limiting the amount of defense-related goods and services that the United States would import during wartime, typically through "buy American" restrictions on military acquisitions or through subsidies for domestic industries. The other would adopt trade and acquisition policies that permit dependencies to develop only upon those foreign industries that Washington expects to be reliable in the future; at the same time, dependence on all other foreign suppliers of defense-related goods and services would be limited through deliberate government actions.

Before discussing these approaches, two preliminary observations are warranted. First, effectiveness is often in the eye of the beholder. The managers and workers at an ammunition factory would naturally regard as highly effective any policy that enabled their factory to keep its financial head above water. Yet for a variety of reasons, staying the closure of that particular plant may not materially reduce the overall damage that an interruption in imports could cause. The focus of this article will be on national, macro-level effectiveness, not on possible impact on individual facilities.

A second observation is that the foreign dependence issue has itself two dimensions: reliability and capacity. Both are important in that wartime shortages can result when unreliable foreign industries stop exporting to the United States or when reliable foreign industries lack the capacity to increase production quickly. Although the battlefield effects are identical (e.g., insufficient supplies of munitions for artillery or of spare parts for aircraft, too few chemical protective suits to replace units that have reached their expiration dates), production capacity and reliability are different issues. With respect to reliability, the issue is whether foreign industries can be counted upon to export defense-related goods and services to the United States during wartime. Capacity is a matter of the speed with which the foreign industries exporting to the United States can increase their output. Furthermore, capacity is a consideration for both foreign and domestic industries, whereas reliability is an issue only for foreign industries.

A foreign industry may be reliable in that it would not deliberately interrupt production of defense-related exports to the United States; practical obstacles, however, could nevertheless prevent it from increasing production quickly enough to meet American military requirements. Indeed, foreign industries are

affected by many of the same problems that might impede domestic manufacturers. Examples of the factors unrelated to reliability that could constrain production increases are shortages of raw materials, lack of capital, insufficient time to train new workers properly, environmental regulations delaying the construction of new factories, and restrictions on the disposal of waste that accelerated production in existing plants would produce.

Capacity problems could also develop during coalition wars if industries located in allied nations are unable to meet the combined production demands of the Pentagon and their own ministries of defense. If that were to occur, the industries would understandably give precedence to orders from their own national governments, leaving American demand at least temporarily unsatisfied. Some observers believe this possibility to be one of the risks associated with reliance upon foreign industry.[3] To an extent it is—but the risk derives from the industry's capacity, not its reliability.

Because many discussions of foreign dependence treat reliability and capacity as if they were two sides of the same coin, it is often assumed that policies addressing reliability will have complementary effects on capacity, or that reliability and capacity problems can be resolved with a single stroke. Unfortunately, some measures that have been proposed to mitigate reliability risks would actually make capacity problems worse; this would be particularly troublesome as the United States, Western Europe, and the former Soviet Union all downsize their defense industrial bases. In the discussion that follows of various approaches to reliability risks, an eye will be kept on their probable effects on capacity.

Protecting Domestic Suppliers

Many recommended approaches to the reliability problem call for indirect financial incentives to protect domestic industries from foreign competition. Examples include "buy American" restrictions on defense-related goods and services, tariffs or quotas on imports, and voluntary restraint agreements under which exporting nations agree (under pressure from Washington) to limit "voluntarily" the amount of goods and services they export to the United States.

"Buy American" rules have been in existence for years, and a significant number of items are already restricted to domestic industry. Some, but not all, of the rules provide exceptions for industries in nations whose markets are relatively open to American defense exports. These *quid pro quo* arrangements are designed to facilitate peacetime trade and promote the interoperability of equipment among Nato armed forces. They do not reflect explicit judgments about the wartime reliability of the "excepted" industries.

Among the products that have been reserved for domestic contractors are periscopes, casings for various munitions, land mine components, rocket motors, night-vision goggles, "Meals Ready to Eat," fabric for chemical protection suits, and cold-weather boots.[4] In the transportation sector, similar rules bar foreign shippers from trade routes in American coastal and inland waters and reserve most international government cargo (e.g., food aid shipments and military supplies for overseas bases) to domestic merchant marine carriers.

Industries shielded from international competition are able to charge higher prices than those that must compete against overseas producers having lower cost bases or heavy subsidies. From the reliability perspective, these higher prices are wise investments if the right industries benefit and the higher prices induce domestic industries to continue "stateside" production and spend money on maintenance and modernization. However, from the capacity perspective, "buy American" restrictions and direct subsidies can be counterproductive. Because the rules discriminate against all foreign industries, reliable foreign industries— however few or many these may be—lose peacetime access to what is still the world's largest and most valuable defense market. Thus, reliable foreign industries may be forced to leave the defense trade or to defer investment in maintenance and modernization. In either case their ability to increase production quickly in response to wartime demand from the United States, from American-led coalitions, or from their own national governments, would suffer.

Whereas "buy American" restrictions and domestic subsidies seek to prevent future erosion of the U.S. industrial base, a primary purpose of various stockpiling and war reserve programs is compensation for *past* erosion. Stockpiles of raw materials and reserves of finished products and components reduce the volume of goods and services that would have to be imported during wartime; they thereby greatly diminish the impact that an embargo on wartime exports to the United States might have. Stockpiles and war reserves can also reduce the amounts that would have to be produced by domestic or reliable foreign industries during a crisis. Thus, stockpile and war reserve programs tend to have compatible effects on reliability and capacity, unlike programs that protect domestic industries from foreign competition.

War reserve programs include the multibillion-dollar inventories of military supplies and equipment that the Defense Department prepositions in depots in the United States and overseas, the Ready Reserve Force fleet of cargo ships, and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet for commercial air carriers. The latter programs were activated for the first time during the Gulf War to supplement military sea and airlift. Had the United States been unable to call upon these programs during Desert Shield, significant capacity constraints in transportation would have resulted, as would have greater dependence upon foreign merchant marines and air transport.

The Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile is a similar program, under which raw materials worth about $9 billion are kept in storage to eliminate "dangerous and costly dependence by the United States upon foreign sources of supply."[5] It has also been used to remediate capacity constraints. For example, throughout the 1980s stockpiled feroalloy ore was refined to meet purity specifications; the process was financed through the sale of tin from the stockpile. The refining was performed by domestic industries, and the refined product was

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"Attempting to reduce reliability risks without first evaluating current dependence on foreign sources would be analogous to closing the barn door without first looking to see if any horses are inside."

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then returned to the stockpile for possible wartime use. This arrangement addressed capacity problems in two ways: the amount of refining that might have been necessary during wartime was reduced, and domestic refineries were given extra business during peacetime—with, accordingly, incentive to stay in that business longer.

Eliminating reliability risks by building a vast array of industrial subsidies, expanding war reserves, and stockpiling great quantities of materials would certainly cost far more than the nation will be willing to spend in the 1990s. Even the Defense Department, which presumably would have the most to lose from unreliable foreign sources, will oppose major expansions of these programs, because they would draw funds away from higher-priority accounts like research and military readiness.

Conceivably the costs could be limited by targeting a select group of industries or facilities rather than by attempting to cover the entire industrial base. The drawback to this approach to the reliability issue is that the federal government does not know enough about the extent of the nation's current dependence upon foreign industries. This point has been repeatedly affirmed by experts since the mid–1980s, and as recently as March 1993 the General Accounting Office reminded Congress that "DOD generally does not know whether and to what extent it relies upon foreign technology and products to meet its critical needs."[6] Attempting to reduce reliability risks without first evaluating current dependence on foreign sources would be analogous to closing the barn door without first looking to see if any horses are inside.

If a defense industry or facility is already dependent upon a continuous flow of imported raw materials or components, reliability risks will not be reduced by protecting that industry or facility from foreign competition. Similarly, if only one of several imported components for a particular weapon is stockpiled, wartime production of the weapon can still be interrupted if the suppliers of the

other components prove unreliable. Moreover, subsidies may not even prevent a bad situation from getting worse—the recipient of subsidies might develop further foreign dependence if its domestic suppliers fail to match the quality and cost of imports.

The point here is not that subsidies and "buy American" programs are ineffective tools, but rather that the nation does not know enough about the defense industrial base and its relationships with foreign industries to use such tools properly to reduce reliability risks, or to do so without creating capacity problems. Defense industries in the United States are highly complex enterprises, and it is hardly surprising that the relationships among the prime contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers are not fully grasped by the federal government. Precisely because the entire production chain is imperfectly understood, however, it is virtually impossible to guarantee that protecting any one link (or stockpiling any one component or raw material) would have more than a marginal effect on wartime procurement reliability. Acquiring a thorough knowledge of the defense industrial base—i.e., the insights that would be necessary for a serious effort to reduce reliability risks—is a task that would require substantial amounts of time, money, and professional expertise; it does not appear achievable in the current budget climate.

Moreover, defining essential industries as those facilities that produce essential products or components overlooks the fact that essentiality is situational, a function of more than the inherent characteristics of the particular end-product, component, or service. A factory that produces an important component, for example, may itself become unessential once an ample supply of that component is produced, or when additional manufacturers in the United States or reliable foreign nations come on-line, or if technological breakthroughs enable the introduction of substitute components.

Finally, the process of deciding which prime contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers merit protection or subsidization is inescapably political. Perhaps even more so is the process of terminating existing protections and subsidies. By their very nature such programs favor vested interests, the existing industries that employ constituents and pay local taxes, at the expense of emerging industries whose potential contributions to national security are necessarily less well appreciated. Favoring existing industries may have been appropriate when the threat was near-term, as was arguably the case in the Cold War; but the Cold War is over, and it is the emerging industries that may be the most important in the future.

Predicting Which Foreign Sources Will Be Reliable

The second general approach to the reliability issue assumes that at least some foreign industries can be counted upon during wartime. A corollary assumption

is that Washington will have the foresight to formulate and administer effectively policies that allow dependence to develop only on reliable sources, while simultaneously preventing wartime dependence upon unreliable ones. These assumptions are, in fact, embodied in recent legislation. For example, the 1992 amendments to the Defense Production Act direct the executive branch to evaluate the reliability of foreign sources and to reduce dependence upon foreign industries that do not measure up to minimum standards.[7] Obviously, the criteria for evaluating reliability are crucial; yet the legislation is silent on the subject. While there is no unanimity, most students of the issue have advocated criteria that treat reliability as a reflection of the strength of political–military relations between the United States and the nation in which the exporting industry is located.

For example, in 1991 the Office of Technology Assessment, a research agency of the Congress, proposed a "co–belligerency" standard for reliability. Using this measure, the only reliable foreign sources would be defense industries in nations that are expected to deploy forces to fight alongside American soldiers.[8] Industries in neutral or allied-but-nonbelligerent nations (e.g., our Nato allies during the Vietnam War) would be considered unreliable under this standard.

During the Gulf War, however, there were no significant interruptions in the flow of imports from neutrals or nonbelligerents to the United States or other coalition members.[9] Thus the only contemporary empirical evidence suggests that the Office of Technology Assessment's co–belligerency standard is too rigorous. The Gulf War also demonstrated that a policy of depending only on imports from co-belligerents may be virtually impossible to administer. In order for such a policy to succeed, the United States must be able to predict accurately whether other nations will deploy their armed forces in future conflicts. Apart from Cold War confidence that the European Nato members would fight against a Soviet invasion, it has never been easy to guarantee predictions about co–belligerency. Even during the Cold War, there were substantial doubts about the willingness of Nato nations to participate in out-of-area conflicts; now that the Cold War is over, crises are more likely than ever to be outside the traditional Nato arena. The Gulf War offers an instructive example of the difficulty of foretelling the military policies even of close allies. For some time after Kuwait had been invaded there was considerable doubt about which Western European nations could be counted upon actually to commit forces to a ground war against Iraq. A strict application of the co–belligerency criterion during the early days of the Gulf crisis would have classified virtually all major European industries as unreliable.

A related but more pragmatic approach would be to base reliability determinations on current alliance relationships. The Center for Strategic and International Studies argued in a 1991 report that defense industries in all Nato

countries should be considered reliable as long as "the Atlantic Alliance remains strong."[10] According to this view, the underlying strength of the Alliance is such that defense industries in Western Europe should be relied upon to export to the United States even when their national governments refuse to put military forces in harm's way. By inference, defense industries in nations with equally strong political relationships with the United States would also be reliable; but as long as Nato is unique, defense industries in other nations would presumably be considered unreliable under this standard.

A clear benefit of this approach is that it finesses the uncertainties inherent in predicting the military policies of the individual nations from which the United States imports defense-related products. The drawback is that it is based on the untested and ultimately untestable assumption that defense industries in Western Europe will be reliable trading partners in 2000 and 2001 because Nato as a whole is strong in 1995 and 1996.

While the Warsaw Pact remained a threat, it made eminent sense for the United States to assume that Nato would remain strong as a political-military

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"The risks of a major trading partner proving unreliable during a crisis may be lower now than at any time in recent years."

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alliance. But how long will Nato retain the same kind of strength now that the Soviet threat—the *raison d'être* for the alliance—has evaporated and trade frictions increasingly dominate dialogue between Europe and North America? At the very least it is likely that Nato will gradually weaken as a military alliance. If that happens, there would be less reason to regard a nation's membership in Nato as sufficient assurance that its industries will be reliable wartime trading partners.

There could as well be turnover in Nato, which would reflect both that the nature of the Alliance was changing and that difficulties could flow from a policy equating industrial reliability with Nato membership. Many Eastern European nations have expressed strong interest in joining, and it is possible that the Czech Republic, Poland, and even Ukraine might eventually be admitted through the Partnership for Peace. If that were to happen, should Czech, Polish, or Ukrainian industries be considered reliable wartime suppliers?

Conversely, under some circumstances longstanding members could leave the Alliance. For example, it is not inconceivable Turkey might someday decide to withdraw in response to a territorial dispute with another Nato member, as a protest over the treatment of Turkish emigrant workers in a northern European Nato state, if its industries were denied free access to the single European market, or if the United States pursued accords with Russia that frustrated Turkish ambitions in the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. To provide

another example, Greek opposition to the newly recognized Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia could result in the eventual estrangement of Greece from the rest of Nato. If wartime reliability were equated with Nato membership, Turkish and Greek industries would cease to be considered reliable if and when Ankara or Athens decided to leave the Alliance. Assuming that Washington wanted to maintain amicable relations with lapsed members (or wished to bring them back into the flock), it obviously would be counterproductive for the United States to adopt trade policies that discriminated against defenserelated imports from Turkish or Greek industries.

Predictions about the long-range future and composition of the Nato alliance and about the military policies of other nations in as-yet-unforeseen crises are not merely academic exercises. Unreliable sources need to be identified years before a crisis arises in which access to imports could be militarily significant. According to the Defense Department it can take a year or longer for existing facilities to manufacture major pieces of military hardware, and this time frame is likely to grow as defense industries respond to military spending cuts by consolidating operations and liquidating assets.[11] Clearly, building new plants to replace unreliable foreign producers, shaking down the new facilities and then refilling the military hardware pipelines could add many months to the process. Thus if Nato is destined to weaken over the next several years, the time to start taking industrial action to reduce dependence upon defense industries in Western Europe is now, not in 1998 or 1999. If Japan or France, for example, are considered unlikely co-belligerents in whatever crises may erupt at the turn of the century, efforts should be initiated in 1995 or 1996 to reduce dependence upon those nations' defense industries.

If distinguishing between reliable and unreliable foreign industries is to be a meaningful exercise, political consequences must flow from predictions of another nation's unreliability in future crises. But there is a fundamental dilemma: designating industries in neutral, friendly, or even allied countries as unreliable would obviously be inimical to day-to-day diplomatic relations and would be stoutly resisted by the foreign policy establishment. Moreover, as long as there are no serious threats on the immediate horizon, taking action to reduce dependence upon unreliable foreign industries would be seen as having higher diplomatic costs than military benefits.

Another policy recommendation for reducing reliability risks is diversification. This approach recognizes that many foreign industries will be reliable suppliers but concedes the impossibility of identifying exactly which foreign sources can be relied upon and which should not be taken for granted. Under the diversification strategy, the risks of relying upon unreliable sources would be minimized by importing from multiple suppliers and avoiding heavy dependence upon foreign industries that dominate their respective markets.[12] Rather than buying large quantities of imports from one or two industries in a single

country, the United States would reduce its reliability risk by apportioning orders among manufacturers in several countries, the theory obviously being that the shortages caused by a supply interruption will be more manageable if the affected supplier is only one of many sources. As sensible as diversification sounds, however, it too confronts serious practical limitations.

One is that for an increasing number of defense products multiple sources simply may not be readily available. As defense industries in the United States, Europe, and Asia consolidate and "convert" to commercial activities or go out of business entirely, pools of second, third, and fourth suppliers will shrink like puddles in the hot sun. Indeed in some product lines the pool has already shrunk to the point where the first and second manufacturers have merged, the third is phasing out of the defense business, and the fourth has declared bankruptcy. A second limitation is that budgetary pressures will almost certainly prevent the Defense Department from spending what would be required to identify, develop, and qualify second, third, and fourth suppliers and to provide enough business for these companies.

Even when it can be implemented, diversification could negatively affect capacity in the same way that during the nineteenth century Irish inheritance laws diminished the capacity of peasant families to make a living from their farms. The Irish laws prevented land from being passed on to a single heir; thus farms were continuously broken up into smaller and smaller plots, and successive inheritors became progressively less able to feed themselves and their families. Aggressively pursuing diversification during an era of reduced defense spending could result in a similar vicious cycle of progressively smaller contracts being distributed each year among progressively weaker industries. All other things being equal, higher levels of investment in maintenance and modernization are more likely when there are one or two suppliers than when there are four or five. With respect to capacity, as the overall level of defense business decreases, one or two high-volume suppliers may be in a better position to meet crisis production goals than four or five low-volume suppliers.

M ost recommendations made in recent years to reduce the reliability risks associated with dependence upon foreign industry suffer from insufficient knowledge. In particular, proposals to protect or subsidize selected industries and facilities suffer from insufficient data about existing dependencies and trends in the global industrial base. This lack of knowledge ultimately means there is no way to ensure that whatever actions the government does take will have more than a marginal effect on reliability risks. Subsidies to a domestic gear manufacturer may, for example, enable that particular manufacturer to stay in

business; but they do not ensure that the raw materials or additional production machinery the firm needs will be available during wartime, or that all of the other components that join with those gears in a weapon system or military vehicle will be available in sufficient quantity.

Imperfect knowledge about the political and military policies that other nations will adopt in future crises raises doubts about the efficacy of proposals to allow dependence to develop only with allies or co-belligerents. Also, lack of both funding and knowledge about industrial developments overseas makes problematic any recommendation to diversify foreign sources.

There are, however, more promising and less expensive alternatives that deserve further consideration. One is to make anti-American trade embargoes more difficult to administer. This aim could be accomplished as a by-product of free trade agreements with neighboring nations, for example the North American Free Trade Agreement, or an arrangement that included some or all Central and South American nations. In order for an anti-American embargo to have a tangible effect, the embargoing nation would have to prevent its exports from reaching any of the participants in the free trade arrangement. Another approach worth study is to base reliability predictions on the strength of a nation's economic ties to the United States rather than traditional political-military relations. The assumption here is that some nations cannot afford to be unreliable. Japan and some other nations rely heavily upon access to the American market and have substantial economic investments in the United States. In the post–Cold War era, protecting that access and those investments could be more likely than political and military ties to motivate industrial cooperation.

In the end, however, the outlook with regard to foreign dependence may be much more reassuring than it has seemed to be, and thus the urgency of "doing something about it" may be rather less than has been thought. That becomes apparent when, as the post–Cold War regime requires, we view the world and its future through a lens that is principally economic, not exclusively political or ideological. We see then that the risks of a major trading partner proving unreliable during a crisis may be lower now than at any time in recent years. With the collapse of the Soviet Union there is no superpower that could pressure our trading partners into embargoing exports to the United States. Nations like Iraq and Iran that might, for their own purposes, wish to embargo the United States do not manufacture products essential to the American military. Their only essential export, oil, is a raw material that can be obtained from other sources or purchased through middlemen in Europe or South America. Thus, the ability of potentially unreliable sources to damage this nation materially is not what it once was; their exports must be sold somewhere, and, in the absence of a competing superpower, must ultimately become available to the United States.

That the true implications of reduced self-sufficiency are now uncertain ties the issue of reliability to that of protecting domestic suppliers. Of course, it stands to reason that a defense electronics factory in California buying semiconductors from a plant in Texas should be a more reliable military supplier than an equivalent firm in Korea that imports components from Malaysia. But the real question is whether the increased reliability that the California and Texas facilities offer—so important during the Cold War—remains as vital in its aftermath. Finally, then, is that greater reliability worth the high prices that the nation would have to pay (and in fact is now paying) to keep these domestic manufacturers in business? Or would the money be better spent keeping modern and diversified defense firms competitive, or in promoting research and development?

It may well be that neither "globalizing" the nation's defense industrial base nor "right-sizing" its present domestic one will create a significant vulnerability, even in the dangerous new world. If so, any actions the United States might take to hedge against those processes will inevitably siphon scarce resources away from more important national priorities.

Notes

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52   Naval War College Review

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Let us learn our lessons. Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. . . . Antiquated War Offices, weak, incompetent or arrogant Commanders, untrustworthy allies, hostile neutrals, malignant Fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscalculations—all take their seats at the Council Board on the morrow of a declaration of war. Always remember, however sure you are that you can easily win, that there would not be a war if the other man did not think he also had a chance.

Winston Churchill
A Roving Commission

The end of the short-lived distraction of the Cold War means that the Royal Navy can now get back to its proper business—fighting the French!

Rear-Admiral Guy F. Liardet, C.B., C.B.E., Royal Navy
(From "After Dinner Speech: Trend and Change," in
James Goldrick and John B. Hattendorf, eds., *Mahan Is Not
Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of
Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond*
(Newport: Naval War College Press, 1993), p. 117.

National Interests, National Security, and the Russian Navy

Captain First Rank Victor Potvorov, Russian Navy

IN RECENT YEARS RUSSIA FINDS ITSELF in a completely new geopolitical situation caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The disintegration of the USSR broke up the relatively stable world balance and led to the end of the bipolar system. What took the place of this system?

In the West, the United States, in the creation of the "new world order," has strengthened its role as an international leader, and there is a powerful, unified Germany. In the East, China and Japan have taken places among the most powerful states not only in the region but also the world. In the South, several states, each unified by the ideology of Islam, are seeking regional hegemony. Lastly, in the place of the USSR there is an unstable and unbalanced structure, the Commonwealth of Independent States (see map). At least fourteen states, former Soviet republics, surrounding Russia are trying to make good their independence, sometimes taking steps to the detriment of their common interest.

Nevertheless, Russia continues to influence the course of global events and policy. It is impossible to deny that changes in Russia cause changes throughout the world. As the main heir of the USSR, Russia has a powerful military-economic potential that can and should ensure not only Russia's status as a great power but its rebirth, in all areas, as one of the world's undoubted leaders.

This is why it is very important to define what Russia's national interests are, how we should view its national security, and what we can expect for Russia in the military area, specifically the naval.

Captain Potvorov graduated from the Nakhimov Naval College in 1972 and served as a surface warfare officer in the Black Sea Fleet. From 1981 to 1985 he commanded the Kashin-class antisubmarine destroyer *Provorny*. After graduation from the Kuznetsov Naval Academy in St. Petersburg in 1987, he pursued postgraduate studies and earned a scientific degree. In 1990 he became a professor of operations and tactics at the Kuznetsov Naval Academy. In August 1993 he became a student at the U.S. Naval War College, from which he graduated in June in the Naval Command College class of 1994.

This article reflects the author's personal views; it draws upon his studies at the U.S. Naval War College, particularly the National Security Decision Making course, as well as upon prior knowledge. The paper upon which it is based was the winner of the 1994 Batemans Prize.

National Interests

The concept of "national interest" is widely used, but at the same time it is a most difficult notion that has no formal, rigorous definition. According to Richmond M. Lloyd, a nation's "fundamental interests" are "the basic wants and needs of the nation."[1] But is this definition clear? What is meant by "basic wants and needs"? Who determines them, and how?

Let us turn to a standard textbook in the field, *Making Strategy*, by Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow. They begin from afar, with a definition of grand national strategy: "the process by which the nation's basic goals [is this different from Lloyd's "basic wants and needs"?] are realized in a world of conflicting goals and values." Further, "The ends of grand strategy are usually expressed in terms of national interests. The role of the strategy process is to translate those national interests into means for achieving those ends."[2] Are interests, then, at the same time both the *ends* of grand strategy and their *means*?

When all is said and done, we are where we began: what *are* national interests? But national and other interests do exist, and experience tells us that they are the main reason for the actions of people, societies, and states. Let us accept, then, a recent Russian definition of "national interests" as simply those factors that are fundamental for the purposeful actions of nations or states that are aimed at their survival, function, or development.[3]

Using this definition, let us see what "survival, function, and development" involve for Russia. Analysis of its external and internal conditions shows that at present and for the foreseeable future, they inescapably mean preserving and strengthening territorial integrity and independence, confirming the democratic regime, achieving political stability, creating an effective economy, establishing a regime of peaceful and friendly coexistence with states and nations around the world, and contributing to political, economic, and military stability. These factors are reflected in the declared policy, military doctrine, and behavior of the Russian Federation over the past two years; we can and should accordingly consider them to be the national interests of Russia.

There are three major observations to make here. First, the range of Russia's national interest—the country is connected directly or indirectly to the whole world—is extremely wide. It includes masses of people, huge socio-political structures, many states, and vast expanses of continental, maritime, aerial, and even extraterrestrial space. Second, Russia's national interests are the product of many underlying interests—economic, political, social, etc. But they are only the tip of the iceberg, and strategic and force planners should therefore probe this matter more deeply than is often the case. Last, but most importantly, as is well known and understandable, all interests, including national ones, can form, change, arise, and disappear; they can also be imposed, influenced, threatened,

KALININGRAD
OBLAST

ESTONIA
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
BELARUS

MOLDOVA

UKRAINE

R U S S I A

GEORGIA

ARMENIA

AZERBAIJAN

TURKMENISTAN

KAZAKHSTAN

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

Don't Just Look At
The Tip Of The Iceberg.

("SFP": Strategic Force Planning)

or suppressed from the outside. We must therefore conclude that national interests cannot be pursued unless national security is provided for.

We might consider national security one of the components of the national interest, and we would be right. But deeper thinking will inevitably force us to see it as a wider notion.

National Security

Analysis shows and history teaches that national security has traditionally been a matter of military force; the Cold War period seems proof enough of that. However, times are changing. The impossibility of victory in nuclear war and the senselessness of building up arms calls us to revise the role of force in the relationships between states. Priority should yield to political, economic, and technological factors; these, as well as geopolitical, ecological, ethnic, intellectual, and other considerations are essential today not only for survival but for successful functioning and development of societies, nations, and states.

Thus, we might define national security as the totality of the factors that contribute to a state's progress in the system of international relationships and to its ability to defend its independence and national interests.

The key phrase here is "system of international relationships." It is very clear that the national security of any state (whether large or small) in the post-confrontational world can be assured only within a framework of global stability and security. At the same time, however, in the present political and military-strategic international situation, most opportunities for solving conflicts through political, economic, or diplomatic means are effective only if supported by military power. For proof we need only look at present and past experience.

Thus, in view of the nature of the post-confrontational world, and in light of the national interests of a new Russia, it is impossible not to see that military power is still a tool of reasonable policy and, for Russia as for all nations, a guarantor of national security and rebirth (see diagram).

On the other hand, our very complicated world is also making it impossible for any state to provide alone for its national security, not to seek common interests with other states in political, economic, and military matters. The interests of national security are leading states to alliances and coalitions. Which way, then, will Russia turn? Who will become Russia's allies? What alliances and coalitions should we expect for Russia in the future?

Allies, Alliances, and Coalitions. To find the answers we must move from the abstract to the concrete, and first of all, to the past. Russia's pre-1917 history was one of great expansion. Its empire grew over centuries from the north to the south, and from the west to the east. Its geographic situation and national interests were reflected even in the state's emblem: the two-headed eagle, one head looking west, the other east. However, the Russian Empire's national interests in the East were not strong; though it maintained trade relations with eastern states, it had no strong allies or alliances there. Instead, Russia always sought its allies in the West—Europe played the most important role in the development of Russia. At different times the Russian Empire had different allies

Military Power in the System of National Security

and participated in different coalitions in Europe as its national interests and economic, political, and military problems required.

After 1917, the Russian Empire was transformed into the Soviet Republic, and then into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Soviet Union was organized with the same borders, except for Finland and Poland, that the Russian Empire had had before 1917. Until World War II, the Soviet Union had no allies and participated in no alliances or coalitions. This statement is contentious for some; there are Western historians who consider certain treaties of the USSR (such as the Rapallo Treaty with Weimar Germany, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939, etc.) to have been treaties of alliance. But they did not include all spheres of the state's life (economics, politics, military, etc.); they were short-term and were easily broken off for the sake of more important interests.

The first true alliance involving the Soviet Union was that with the United States and the United Kingdom during World War II. At first it was only a

military coalition against fascist Germany and its satellites, but in time it became an alliance involving all areas of state life. As such, it was an alliance that exactly accorded with theory: "a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues."[4]   However, when the question of national survival was resolved at the end of the war, other national interests acquired a more important role. As a result, this alliance slowly moved to the political arena.

Unfortunately, at that time no participant in this alliance wanted any other state to gain influence in the postwar period. As a result of this lack of understanding, the world was dramatically divided into two parts, capitalist and socialist, with two leaders, the U.S. and the USSR. Further, each leader-state, wishing to assure itself of its survival and to pursue its interests, tried to increase its strengths politically, economically, ideologically, and, certainly, militarily.

There were two main results of the political activity of that wartime alliance: a negative one (the Cold War), but also a positive one, the establishment of the Organization of the United Nations. Today the international community has overcome the negative aspects of the competition between the two leaders and the systems they led. But even though only its positive heritage remains, the world continues to be unbalanced and unstable. Multipolarity of forces in the world creates a threat for different states and nations, including Russia.

Let us not argue about the Warsaw Pact (organized in 1954) and Nato (organized in 1949), as to who created the threat to peace. The point is that though the USSR and the Warsaw Pact no longer exist, Nato's military structure and other military-political alliances still do. Their members surround the new Russia and the other former Soviet republics. What threat do Nato leaders see? How widely will Nato open its door to welcome new members? Who is deciding what countries will be admitted into the new "Partnership for Peace," and by what criteria? There is only one direction in which Nato membership can expand—closer to Russia. Perhaps Nato should say "goodbye" to all its members and lock its door forever. Why not? Would that decrease or increase international tensions? In the new world, all security questions should be decided under United Nations authority, not by the single superpower or a single treaty alliance.

Where Should Russia Look? Nevertheless, the fact is that different military-political alliances do exist. They must be judged by their capabilities for offensive action, not only by their officially benevolent intentions. Who can guarantee that no alliance or state might not consider that its survival or other national interests must be protected at the expense of Russia?

Alone, in our very complex world, Russia can neither pursue its national interest, ensure its security, strengthen its socio-political system, succeed eco-nomically, or ultimately, even survive. Where, then, should Russia look for

allies, alliances, and coalitions? Let's look at this problem in terms of the most important of the concentric rings, or circles, that surround Russia.

Circle I comprises the former Soviet republics, most of them now members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Beyond any doubt we could consider these to be potential allies of Russia in economic, policy, and military matters.

As to the first area, the USSR developed its economy centrally, by integrated planning. This is the major reason that the attempt of each former Soviet republic, including Russia, to establish economic independence has led to the collapse of its economy. Russia, however, has a large territory, rich natural resources, and a variety of well developed industries, which the former republics do not. That fact has already led the majority of these newly independent states into economic alliance. Centripetal economic forces are congruent with the survival and other vital national interests of each of them; therefore we can expect this integration to be long-lasting and to foster arrangements in other areas.

As to politics, all the new states, as they establish and develop new socio-political systems in the first years of their independence, have in common the same goals, the same national interests, the same problems. Also, we should not forget that their populations are connected by historical, family, ethnic, and social ties, among others. These shared challenges and values, as well as economic interests, are forcing their political leaders to take much the same steps. Therefore, in many questions of politics, both inside and outside of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the centrifugal forces of 1991–1993 are being replaced by centripetal ones.

Lastly, regarding military matters, it is well known that a state's armed forces are the product of its economic power. Under conditions of economic collapse, it is no easy task for an individual state to maintain the forces necessary. At present, of the "Circle I" nations it appears that only Russia, its economic difficulties notwithstanding, can support its armed forces adequately. Therefore, it would be easier for these states to base their national interests and security upon a military alliance with Russia than to try to solve these problems alone. It is easier also because military industry is dispersed throughout several states. So, the necessity to build political, economic, and diplomatic strength will eventually lead the "Circle I" states to form an alliance or coalition in the military area.

It does not matter what this assemblage is named, whether the Common-wealth, or the Alliance of Independent States; it already exists, and it will exist more visibly in the foreseeable future. Even so, for many reasons we should not consider this prospective development to amount to the rebirth of the USSR; those arguments, however, though convincing, are not within the scope of this article.

Circle II involves the former Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact. To the west and southwest, Russia has neighbors who are looking for Nato membership and are not displaying strong friendship for the new Russia. Notwithstanding, Russia and the Eastern European states have several common interests and objectives. It seems that the political area will dominate "Circle II," but, once again, let us not look only at the tip of the iceberg; all Eastern European states used to depend upon Russia's natural resources (above all, gas and oil), and their economies were integrated with that of the USSR. Russia and the Eastern European states see that the successful development and integration with the world community depend therefore on their cooperation in both politics and economics. The signing by Russia and the Eastern European states of treaties in these areas during Boris Yeltsin's visits there in September 1993 confirm that.

In the military area, the most probable scenario is collaboration for regional stability without formal bilateral or multilateral alliances or coalitions. Nothing resembling the Warsaw Pact should arise, nor should Nato expand its membership into this region. In that way, Russia and the Eastern European states will be successfully integrated into European as well as global politics and economics, which would fulfill the national interests of all powers concerned.

Circle III. The United States, Japan, and Western Europe make up the third "circle," one that could create either positive or negative results, depending on how it looks at Russia. It is a matter of Russia's survival and national interest to be considered an equal partner in all international associations, as was announced by Russia's leaders during a visit to Russia by the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Warren Christopher, in October 1993. This equality in partnership will lead the international community toward stability, ensure a favorable atmosphere for political collaboration with Russia, and aid Russia's integration into the world's market economy.

The times are changing, but not so rapidly that we should expect any direct political and economic alliances with "Circle III." However, there remains the possibility of short-term military collaboration or coalitions for peacekeeping or peacemaking under the authority of the United Nations. Even in the post–confrontational world, Russia and "Circle III" are still very different, with different orientations and different leaderships; accordingly, even such low–level interaction would make relations between them easier.

In analyzing each "circle" with regard to national security and interest, we have noted the military aspect. It is time, then, to take a look at that subject as a whole.

The Military Dimension. Russia's military doctrine is still the subject of definition and discussion. However, it is already clear that Russia's military doctrine is directed not to preparing the state for offensive action but to

preventing wars and broadening and strengthening confidence and mutual security. The essence of Russia's military doctrine lies not only in contributing to global and regional stability but also in ensuring that no state's armed forces gain such superiority, either offensive or defensive, that the state might be led to use it to achieve military-political objectives.[5]

Therefore, as could be expected, Russia's armed forces will be maintained and developed for the following objectives: to defend the national interests; to defend Russia's territorial integrity and national independence; and to fulfill Russia's obligations in maintaining peace and stability. The foremost objective is to convince the international community of the absence of any aggressive intention. There are many proofs that there are none: the freer discussion of military questions in Russian government and society, openness to military inspections, and the withdrawal of military troops from foreign countries. This list could be easily prolonged.

For its part, the Russian Navy, to which we now turn, has no separate doctrine or strategy; the Navy proceeds on the basis of the state's military doctrine. Therefore the overriding purpose of the Navy is the defense of Russia, of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Russian Navy

The new Russian Navy is situated differently than its Soviet predecessor. Its nation's coastline is shorter; Russia has only 22 percent of developed seacoast and 53 percent of the ports that the USSR had. Also, the Navy has lost infrastructure and bases in the Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas—in all, from 60 to 90 percent of the former Soviet naval base system. But it does still have the St. Petersburg (formerly Leningrad) and Kaliningrad regions in the Baltic, 350 kilometers of coastline on the Black Sea, and the northern shore of the Caspian; further, the northern and eastern seacoasts are unchanged.

Thus, oceans and seas continue to play an important role in the life of Russia. Consider the following statistics: Russia still has thirty-eight thousand kilometers of maritime boundaries; three oceans and thirteen seas lie adjacent to its territory; 70 percent of Russia's international trade is carried by sea; and Russia's maritime economic zones, with their natural resources, occupy an area equal to that of the Arctic Ocean, or of the land area of China, India, and Mongolia combined.

The national maritime interests of Russia arise from this dependence on oceans and seas. In the Baltic, where lie the shortest lines of communication with Western Europe and with North and South America, Russia's interests are, first, the development of regional relations on the principles of good-neighbor-liness, partnership, and nonparticipation in military alliances directed against other Baltic states; and second, establishment of a nuclear-free zone where

neither nuclear-propelled nor nuclear-armed ships may operate or visit. In the Black and the Mediterranean seas are the shortest lines of communication with the states of southern Europe, Asia, and Africa. There, the peacekeeping and peacemaking roles of the Russian and other primarily regional navies, and also the preservation of the Black Sea Fleet (and development of its infrastructure) are major Russian concerns. Goals in the Far East and the Pacific Ocean involve the unique natural resources of Russia's territorial and maritime economic zones, the highly developed lines of communication between the eastern Arctic and the Indian Ocean, and stabilization of the region, including peacekeeping and peacemaking. Finally, the Arctic offers large oil and gas fields and other natural resources, the Northern Sea Route (the shortest path from much of Europe to East Asia), and favorable operating conditions for naval strategic forces.[6]

Objectives. However, the activity of navies, both in war and peace, has become truly global; they are an important tool of international policy for maritime powers. A recent U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral C.A.H. Trost, once said, "Naval forces have proven to be the military force of choice for Presidents in more than 50 crises in the last decade, and in nearly 200 instances since World War II. This represents more than 80% of the crises which the United States has faced during this period."[7] Of course, this is an American admiral; he is talking about the United States. But are not Russia and the U.S. both maritime powers? Admiral Trost's statement depicts the objective reality for any maritime power, including Russia. Therefore, the Russian Navy may prove to be one of the most effective means of Russian foreign policy as it relates to national interests and security. Specifically, the integration of Russia into the world's economy is impossible without improvement of its maritime activities, commercial exchanges, and communications opportunities; these all require the use of ocean routes, the development of ocean resources, and the defense of such seaborne pursuits. Therefore, the Russian Navy aspires to a composition, structure, and level of power that ensures that other maritime powers will refrain from any unfriendly actions. The shape of the Russian Navy will be based on the possible threat to its national interests from the sea, and, of course, on the real capabilities of the economy.

Hence, the Russian Navy has the following operational-strategic objectives: maintaining the combat readiness of its strategic nuclear forces; defeating any enemy's naval strike groups entering the Russian naval operational zone; attacking and disrupting an enemy's sea lines of communications; protecting Russia's own sea lines; assisting ground troops in offensive and defensive actions; and defending areas, concentrations, and facilities of naval importance.[8]

To achieve these objectives and to take into consideration the geostrategic situation of Russia, it becomes clear that Russia needs the following naval

groupings: Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific Ocean fleets, and a formation of small ships and combatant craft in the Caspian Sea.[9] However, this familiar organization does not mean remilitarization or the reconstitution of the Soviet Navy under the Russian banner. It has been stated officially that each fleet is only to resist the actual and definite threats in its respective theater of operation; in any case, during the last few years more than four hundred combat ships and craft, including sixty nuclear submarines and 136 conventional ones, have been decommissioned; in 1995, 24 percent of surface and submarine units will be disposed of. The fleets will not compete with other states' navies for global power. The Russian Navy should, however, be able to participate in multi-national naval forces in the interests of the international community and under the authority of the United Nations.

Lines of Future Development. To accomplish its main mission and operational-strategic objectives, the Russian Navy has five branches: submarine forces, naval aviation, surface forces, coast defense troops, and shore-based missile and artillery troops.

Submarine forces. SSBNs, the naval component of the strategic forces, will be retained; however, their number will be reduced approximately 50 percent. There are no plans to launch additional SSGNs, that is, of the Oscar class. Also, the numbers of SSNs and SSs are to be reduced; new submarines will be commissioned, but only in one class of SSNs (Akula) and one of SSs (Kilo); according to plan, the number of SSNs and SSs will drop 20 percent by the end of the year 2000.

Naval air forces, which include both land-based and shipborne aircraft, will be reduced. As for the former, the number of land-based strike and attack aircraft will decrease in accordance with Russia's obligation to have no more than three hundred such aircraft in the European part of Russia. Also, there will be no further purchases of long-range attack and intelligence planes, fighters, or helicopters; only multipurpose land-based aircraft will be constructed. As for shipborne aircraft, development will continue, especially of helicopters for antisubmarine warfare and of fighters for air defense. In total, the number of combat planes and helicopters will be reduced 40 to 45 percent.

Surface forces will continue to be reduced in quantity and raised in quality by construction and commissioning of the most modern classes of ships. There are now only two aircraft-carrying cruisers, one of the *Kuznetsov* class and one of the *Kiev* class. Construction has ceased of the *Kirov*-class battlecruisers, of the *Slava*-class cruisers, and the *Udaloy*-class antisubmarine destroyers. Meanwhile, the construction and commissioning of destroyers of the *Sovremenny* class, the new destroyers of the *Neustrashimy* class, and certain frigate types, will carry on. Also, coastal and inshore minesweepers and missile craft will still be built. In all,

according to the plan, the number of combat ships and craft will be reduced by more than 20 percent in 1995.

Coast defense troops are represented by the 12,500-man naval infantry, organized into one brigade each for the Northern, Pacific Ocean, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets. The status of the Black Sea brigade is unclear at present.

Shore-based missile and artillery troops will be retained in the Russian Navy. They will be rearmed with new types of high-technology weaponry, including a new "land-to-surface" missile and new mobile 130mm artillery.

There are now 420,000 personnel in the Russian Navy. However, this number will be reduced by 25 to 30 percent in 1995. One of the ways that this plan will be realized is by a shift from conscription to a voluntary system.

All these changes require revision of the organizational structure of the Russian Navy. In light of geopolitical and strategic conditions, however, the present structure will probably be preserved, but with some alterations: first, in the location of bases in the Baltic and Black Sea fleets; second, in the number of formations in each fleet; third, in logistical and ship-repair facilities (which will be improved); and fourth, in the status of the Caspian Flotilla and the former Leningrad Naval Base.

Operations. The Russian Navy used to employ nuclear submarines (SSBNs and SSGNs) near the seacoasts of nuclear states, where the Soviet Navy did, but it does so no longer; and, the Russian Navy does not conduct war games or exercises in the central parts of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Previously, there were about fifteen submarines and twenty surface ships in the Mediterranean; now there are only from two to five. The Navy does still keep a few combat ships off the coast of the western Sahara region, where they protect the fishing and commercial activity of the Russian civilian fleet. Naval forces in Vietnam have been reduced; there is only a small formation of patrol ships and boats there now.

A modern navy is a very complicated and expensive national asset. Historically the Russian Navy has usually been able to build combat ships only during peacetime, and doing so often required decades. Also, a navy is maintained for long-term and future use. Its existence, therefore, should not depend on short-term objectives and current tasks. Since Russia cannot depart from its interests in the seas and oceans, it must continue to support and develop its navy. The members of the Commonwealth of Independent States understand this fact, and they will strive for economic cooperation in naval building programs, seeking protection by the Russian Navy and thereby supporting their own national interests at sea at less cost than would be possible were they to act alone.

Neither East nor West

Three hundred years ago, the famous Russian reformer–tsar Peter the Great declared, "A sovereign who has an army has one hand; one who moreover has a navy, has both hands." One of the first buildings in St. Petersburg, the new capital that Peter founded on the Baltic seacoast in 1702, was the Admiralty.

The Russian Navy was formed in November 1696. Since that time, in support of Russian policy and diplomacy, the regular Russian Navy has participated in twenty-two wars and has fought eighty-seven naval battles. Furthermore, the Russian Navy helped to decide many political and diplomatic issues even without combat; so it was for example in 1863, during the American Civil War, when two port visits by squadrons of the Russian Navy demonstrated Russia's support for the U.S. government and helped prevent European intervention on behalf of the South.

However, the historical perspective is not the only reason that Russians are so concerned with their navy. Though sometimes considered to be continental states, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union were nonetheless maritime powers; they each occupied a sixth of the planet and had about forty-two thousand kilometers of marine frontier. As regards the Navy, what in the new geopolitical situation has changed for the modern state, the Russian Federation? Essentially, nothing. Reduction of territory has not altered Russia's requirement for maritime power.

Russia is neither East nor West, but *Russia*. It has a different culture, a different understanding, and a different way of thinking. For its new and old allies, and its new and old rivals, to understand Russia for itself means finding avenues for constructive cooperation and interaction. In a word, everything is so different and yet so much the same. Only a strong Russia will be thought worthy of consideration as a partner; a weak Russia will be prey to violation of its interests.

It is allowable to disagree. However, let us not be too hasty. Let us think and rethink, analyze, and try to understand what has happened in the past, what we have to deal with at present, and what we will have. The future depends on our result.

Notes

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Third Workshop on Stand-Off Detection for Chemical and Biological Defense

The U.S. Army Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center (ERDEC) is sponsoring the Third Workshop on Stand-Off Detection for Chemical and Biological Defense. This workshop is being sponsored in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. It will be held at the Holiday Inn 1776, Williamsburg, Virginia, 17–21 October 1994. For additional information contact Sonya Herrin, Science and Technology Corporation, (804) 865-7604, facsimile (804) 865-8721.

Autonomous Vehicles in Mine Countermeasures Symposium, 4–6 April 1995

This unclassified symposium sponsored by the Office of Naval Research and the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School will be held at USNPGS, Monterey, California. Topics include operations, R&D, industry, MCM needs of the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, innovation, vehicles (air, surface, swimming, and crawling), sensors and mission packages, systems integration, and command and control. Contact Albert M. Bottoms, Visiting Professor of Mine Warfare, Code UA, Rm. 200A Root Hall, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., 93943-5000 (telephone (408) 646-3770).

Contact Prof. Bottoms also to subscribe to *Mine Lines*, a newsletter devoted to mine warfare.

Strategy for Increased Stability in Africa

Capitaine de Frégate Mégna M. Diomandé, Ivorian Navy

D URING THE 1960s, INDEPENDENCE swept Africa like fire on the savannah. As country after country threw off the yoke of imperialism and colonialism, nationalism and self-determination rose to replace them. Many intellectuals, economists, and philosophers, in both Africa and the more developed countries, firmly believed that the continent faced a brilliant future.

Thirty years later, the African dream has turned into a nightmare. Starvation, civil war, ethnic cleansing, and racial and political terrorism are serious problems that affect nearly every corner of the continent.

It is my belief that, although the proximate causes of most of Africa's problems are instability and insecurity provoked by military coups d'état, the true explanation for African ills lies in failed political and economic management. To eliminate mismanagement, African states need visionary leaders who can set realistic, achievable goals and a committed populace able to work toward those goals. I believe education is the primary factor that will allow Africa to move forward on the path to improvement. To support my argument I will:

- review briefly the background of the problems plaguing Africa today;
- review the general origin of African states and their military forces;
- examine the link between economic and political mismanagement and military coups;
- show the influence of education on security and stability;
- suggest the type of education needed in Africa and the possible contribution of African military forces to the continent's educational and economic goals; and,
- outline foreign assistance that could help African states achieve the educational goals that will improve their security and stability.

Commander Diomandé was commissioned into the Ivorian Navy from the French Naval Academy in 1974. He studied economics and physics at Abidjan National University from 1978 to 1980, commanded the landing ship *L'Elephant* from 1984 to 1987, and served at the Ivorian Navy Headquarters from 1987 to 1992. He is a June 1993 graduate of the Naval Command College of the U.S. Naval War College; this article was the winner of the 1993 Batemans Prize. In September 1993 he became Commander of the Ivorian Navy (Commandant de la Marine Ivoirienne).

Background

Today, Africa is home to the world's largest number of refugees, and the continent contains the majority of the world's poor and lesser-developed countries. In his June 1992 address to the Organization of African Unity summit in Dakar, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali spoke at length on the lamentable state of the continent. In his speech, he defined the "Seven Wounds of Africa": crushing debt, civil war, drought, refugees, famine, AIDS, and population explosion.

During the past thirty years, thirty-one of Africa's forty-nine states have suffered violent coups and subsequent military rule.[1] The history of the continent over the past three decades seems to suggest that military coups have been the cause of instability and insecurity. However, such a view fails to explain why states such as Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, states that have maintained civilian rule since independence, have failed to achieve a significant level of development and are now experiencing serious threats to stability. The cause of the current problems in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal is not the military; these two states, and most of Africa, are suffering from political ills due to economic bankruptcy.

In the 1960s, Africa could be divided into two politically and economically distinct groups. The socialist camp included states like Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana and Julius Nyerere's Tanzania. Socialist leaders turned away from what they perceived as inegalitarian Western capitalism and attempted to define a new African path to development. Capitalist leaders, like Houphouet Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, maintained strong ties with the West in order to receive the assistance they felt they needed to build up their new states. In general, the economic performance of the capitalist group outstripped that of the socialists, at least through the mid-1970s. A continuing slide in commodity prices that began in the late 1970s, combined with increases in petroleum prices, resulted in a deep economic downturn for all African states.

African states must act quickly to stop, or at least slow, their backward economic slide. The more developed nations of Europe and the Americas are growing frustrated with Africa's lack of progress and are now trying to cope with additional requests for assistance from Eastern Europe. Africa no longer seems to be a focus of world economic interest. The world has turned its attention to East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe. Africa, once viewed as a continent with a brilliant future, is now perceived as a continent with problems.

The Origins of African States and Their Military Forces

Many of the problems plaguing Africa today are a direct result of colonial rule. Since France was the predominant power in northern and equatorial Africa, it is interesting to contrast French colonial rule with the rule of another major colonial power—Great Britain.

The British colonial method was indirect rule of indigenous peoples. Typically, British mastery was exercised through native officials. British colonial practices were driven by trade, with trade objectives to be achieved with indigenous labor. Trade in spices, gold, "ebony labor," tea, etc., depended on the availability of a cheap local work force. To improve the output of local workers, the British exported technology to the colonies. The British mercantile approach, plus their early experience with decolonization in America, resulted in colonial policies that have been viewed as somewhat less disturbing to local social organizations than policies of other colonial regimes.

France approached her colonies in a way that was markedly different from Britain's. The French believed in direct rule of indigenous peoples through a highly centralized, hierarchical system. It can be argued that France's colonial philosophy was based on a French feeling of cultural superiority. They considered native inhabitants of the colonies to be primitives to whom they should bring the light of superior French civilization. The French sought to convince their subjects that it was important for them to cast aside their social organization and embrace the French way of life. French rule divided indigenous peoples into three groups: a few were granted citizenship, others became subjects, and the majority remained in a native status. Citizens and subjects were used by the small French colonial population to govern the masses of indigenous people. As a result, French-dominated areas, already divided by artificial borders, often became divided internally. At times, internal fragmentation led to problems like the 1958 revolt against Dahoman administrators in Côte d'Ivoire.

As a result of colonial-enforced separatism, independence in the 1960s was often beset by continued or further divisiveness. Under the French, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire were governed as a single colony, and Senegalese soldiers were used by the French in Côte d'Ivoire. At independence, Ivorians clamored for the removal of Senegalese troops and the total separation of the two states. Houphouet Boigny, firmly opposed to maintaining the Federation of French Occidental Africa, stated, "Côte d'Ivoire will not be the milk cow of Senegal." French colonial policies produced a confusion of peoples and borders, and the states that were born in this confusion faced major obstacles on the road to independence.

The military forces of most African states were the creations of colonial masters, designed to achieve European, not African, goals. The French government, for example, organized, trained, and equipped African units to help fight

France's wars in Europe as well as to help secure the French empire by fighting local resistance to French colonial rule. African troops were used extensively in World War I, World War II, and in the campaigns in French Indochina and Algeria. French colonial forces had well defined missions. Once French colonial states gained their independence, however, local military forces lost their *raisons d'être*. Except for externally supported mercenary invasions of Guinea and Benin, Tanzanian support of Ugandan opposition to Idi Amin Dada, and fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia in the Ogaden, there has been no real use of military force to settle disputes between African states. External threats to African state security have been nearly nonexistent. Unfortunately, a reassessment of military missions (in the absence of an external threat) has yet to be made by many African states.

Economic and Political Mismanagement and Military Coups

Most African military coups d'état have been reactions to economic and political mismanagement—mismanagement that often resulted in a very uneven distribution of power and wealth. New rulers swept in by coups have inevitably claimed that they overthrew the existing government in order to provide citizens a better life. Among the most often promised aspects of that better life have been improvements in housing, education, health, and general welfare, as well as the establishment of a new egalitarianism.[2] Mengistu in Ethiopia; Gowon, Muhammed, and Obassanjo in Nigeria; Ankrah, Acheampong, and Rawlings in Ghana; and Ouedraogo, Sankara, and Compaore in Burkina Faso all made similar promises.

The official claims of new rulers do not always explain the real reasons behind their coups. Samuel Decalo, in *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*, argues that redress of social grievances has often been used as a smokescreen to obscure the true motivation behind the overthrow of a government.[3] He holds that ethnic division, within both governments and militaries, was the real cause of coups. He is convinced that coups were not caused by economic failure or by actual political mismanagement. The weakness of Decalo's argument is that it does not explain those coups that have occurred within homogeneous groups. For example, Ibrahim Babaginda toppled Muhammad Bouary (both members of the Haoussa tribe in Nigeria), and, in the Republic of Central Africa, Bokassa staged a coup against Dacko, his own cousin. Obviously, ethnic grievances are not an all-encompassing explanation.

In fact, the seeds of instability for many African states were present at their very creation. Christopher Clapham traces those seeds to what he calls the ambivalent role of the ex-colonial states.[4] He defines three areas of so-called

ambivalence, or uncertainty, that he claims are key to understanding the problems that have beset African leaders and people since the 1960s.

The first of these is ambivalence of function. Many African states have an ill defined fundamental national purpose. Does the state exist to ensure the wealth and well-being of all citizens or just that of the rulers? All too often it is the second case that seems to hold true. When rulers appear to be too wealthy, the people tend to revolt against any decision that threatens individual income. When the government imposed an across-the-board salary reduction in 1990, Côte d'Ivoire experienced its first major riot since independence.

The second of Clapham's areas of ambivalence is power. What is the state able, or not able, to do? Colonial masters often combined with nationalist movements to build artificially strong central governments. The resulting power has often been misunderstood and misused by African leaders. As Clapham notes, rulers have tried to use their authoritarian power like an all-purpose Black and Decker drill onto which they could fit different attachments to serve different goals: health, literacy, national unity, and economic development.[5] Nkrumah's actions in Ghana are a good example; in the early 1960s, he attempted to enhance his country's prestige by making flashy, yet not very useful, investments in projects like the Akossombo Dam complex.

The last of Clapham's areas of ambivalence is accountability. By account-ability, Clapham means the relationship that exists between the state and the people. Despite efforts by the former colonial regimes to make the new order acceptable to the natives, many of the new states were considered foreign creations. The people viewed government as an alien and imposed institution, lacking responsibility to its own society. The response of the citizenry ranged from uninterest in governmental projects to outright resistance to governmental orders. The people either accepted their new rulers out of fear or rejected them completely and worked to overthrow those in power.

It is interesting to note that problems of role ambivalence extend to African military forces. On the one hand, the military was designed to protect the community, while on the other hand it often works to oppress the people.[6]

Even if the problems of ambivalence were solved, African states would not magically become more economically successful or more stable. In fact, Clapham's arguments are not pertinent to all African states. Countries such as Ethiopia and Liberia were never true colonies. Historically, they have been led by strong local rulers and have not been threatened by external foes, at least for the twenty years from 1950 to 1970. Nonetheless, they have experienced political mismanagement and economic failure—and military coups in their aftermath.

Military coups are characterized by complex cause-and-effect relationships. Every coup is the result of a particular leadership failure in either the civilian ruling team or the military, or both. No two countries and no two coups are

the same, but I believe that a common factor contributing to all military coups is poor education. The absence of properly educated civilian and military officials and populace leads to the myriad of problems that plague African states. Lack of education makes communication difficult, both between rulers and their people and between rulers themselves.

The Influence of Education on Security and Stability

Education, or the lack of education, can exert a powerful influence on the economic and political development of a state. This is just as true in Africa as it is in more developed areas of the world. The education of both civilians and the military can lead to a stable and economically healthy state.

The "tigers" and the "dragons"—the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN—provide a superb example of the role education can play in economic development. ASEAN nations have experienced spectacular economic growth rates over the past thirty years. The ASEAN economies, collectively, doubled in size during the 1970s and doubled again during the 1980s. In 1970, 60 percent of Indonesia's people lived below the absolute poverty level.[7] By 1980 the proportion had fallen to 29 percent; by 1990 it was down to 15 percent. For Thailand the equivalent figures were 26 percent, 17 percent, and 16 percent. Even the Philippines, which fell spectacularly from grace in the mid-1980s, managed to reduce its figures from 35 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 1980 and 21 percent in 1990. Malaysia and Singapore have prospered to the point that abject poverty is more or less illegal.[8]

Even Indochina, in spite of its communist past and its recent instability, is attracting investors, in large part because of its high literacy rate (almost 90 percent in Vietnam). Many businessmen in Bangkok and Singapore compare Indochina with the ASEAN of twenty years ago, but with a better work force.[9]

Western investment certainly has been a factor in the almost incredible economic growth of the ASEAN states. More important, however, has been the impact of education. Without the excellent educational programs of the tigers and dragons, economic progress would not have been so rapid and remarkable.[10]

Education is also a key factor in political stability. An educated citizenry can develop a basic standard of values within a state. A non-homogeneous society can learn about and come to accept ideas and values that transcend ethnic boundaries. Societies can be schooled in modern concepts such as national identity, national interests, democracy, and human rights. Throughout much of Africa, the absence of accepted national values is a serious obstacle to internal stability and security. There, because society as a whole does not understand or share modern values, particularly the concepts of peaceful democratic processes, changes in position or regime are often coupled with the death of the previous

appointee or ruler. Accordingly, those in power do their best to maintain their positions for as long a time as possible, by whatever means necessary. The ouster of those who eventually fail is generally violent. Those who are crafty or lucky enough to stay in power remain in place for life, no matter how successful or unsuccessful they are in their day-to-day work. Such a system leads to inefficiency and makes civil life complicated and unstable.

It can be argued that education itself cannot ensure stability if a state's social organization is based on ethnic relationships rather than the ideals of common well-being. This issue, the conflict between ethnic affinities and ties to the new nation-state, has been addressed by writers and political scientists. For example, T.O. Odetola, writing about Nigeria in particular and Africa in general, explains just how weak the national institutions of some African states can be when compared to their ethnic structures: "There are few structural links (such as political institutions) between the more traditional segments and the more westernized groups, between the elites and the masses, between the urban proletariats and the rural peasant masses, between the metropolis or centre (such as Lagos, Accra, Addis Ababa) and the periphery or the interior. Social links through which such values can spread are mere ethnic organizations whose orientations are particularistic."[11] Traditionally, many African leaders have used the existence of ethnic division to justify their highly centralized, personal control over every aspect of the state's structure. Centralized political control does not seem to lower the level of ethnic division. For example, ethnic tensions prevented certain candidates from campaigning in various parts of the country during the 1990 elections in Côte d'Ivoire.

Still, one must wonder whether the reliance on ethnic bonds instead of national ties is not the effect of a more serious weakness: the society's absence of education and knowledge about the organization and role of a modern state. Sometimes, such knowledge exists within a restricted circle, but these elite have no way of sharing it with the majority of the population, because the state does not have the infrastructure to dispense such information.

Even when a means of communicating with the masses exists, other problems may block the dissemination of important information. Rulers often do not respect their constitutions or their people and view themselves as royalty rather than public servants. They say one thing today and do the opposite tomorrow. Because of their own ignorance in political matters, such as elections and peaceful protest, the people believe they are powerless. An uneducated, uninformed populace does not participate in or react to the political process. The resulting "fantasy" elections simply compound the stability and security problems of the state—dictators, military coups, and foreign intervention are manifestations of those problems. Political ignorance is a roadblock to popular support and leads to the failure of many African development programs.

Education of the ruling class is just as important as education of the masses. Rulers who have no clear vision of the issues affecting their countries are likely to make decisions based on personal preference rather than national good. For example, many African rulers, uneducated in economics, prefer to secure much of the state's money in foreign banks, even though there is a dire need for foreign currency and wealth at home.

Within the military, education is important for several reasons. The most obvious is basic fighting skills. A weapon in the hands of a novice is a danger to him and his fellow soldiers. There is another reason for educating the military, and it may be even more important to the state. The military is a profession, and the training that leads to professional status is long and difficult. The ultimate goal of this training is to make specific actions and values a part of the trainee's everyday life. When the values to be inculcated are selected properly, the military education process becomes a process of nationalization, that is, can lead the military to see themselves as an integral part of national life.

Unfortunately, indigenous military forces have contributed little to nationalization. Many African militaries are provided little training. Accelerated promotions are based on service as an office worker, status in civilian society, or relationship to the rulers. Often, the political leader who controls the military (usually the minister of defense or the president) has little knowledge of military matters. President Houphouet Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, faced with a soldier's revolt in 1990, was surprised to discover that he knew little about the true nature of his military. Since 1960, his chiefs of staff had accepted his directions and assured him that the country had a professionally trained, well equipped, and well led army. Military leaders themselves often have only vague knowledge of civilian law and even their own regulations. They rarely attempt to oppose civilian mismanagement of military matters, and consequently, many African military organizations have been destabilizing forces rather than aids to nationalization and security.

A proper education for rulers and the people could break the cycle of African poverty and instability. Education would eventually allow everyone to share modern values and would help African states develop sound and growing economies.

Education for African Development:
Requirements and Military Role

According to a 1989 World Bank report on sub-Saharan Africa, the long-term development of African states depends on improvements in three areas.[12] The first is human development. States must improve their ability to provide the people with basic health, education, nutrition, and technical skills. Next, states

must restructure public and private institutions to create a context in which skilled workers can function effectively. Finally, political leadership must understand that institutions are fragile entities, painstakingly built up, easily destroyed, and therefore requiring sustained nurturing. In order to address these areas, Africa must first concentrate on education.

Africa's fundamental educational needs are simple. What Africans need is basic literacy in a common language (French, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, or any major African tongue), which will allow communication between various ethnic groups, between different countries, and between African states and the rest of the world. This would make possible the translation of African values into terms understandable both to African people and to Africa's helpers—the Western powers. Although some would argue that education in foreign languages would destroy African cultural identity, experience seems to show that the more knowledge people have about foreign cultures, the more they appreciate their own.

Each African ethnic group has its own social organization, its own way of living together, and its own way of dealing with common interests and issues. Only through education can Africa forge a smooth marriage between the organizational ways of the modern state and the traditional behaviors still strongly embedded in the majority of the population. Education can form the foundation for building stable, modern states in Africa.

Africa is not without writers, philosophers, scientists, engineers, and technicians. Unfortunately, their thoughts and their work affect only a minority of the population. The majority of the citizens cannot read or understand their messages and are left untouched by the ideas of African intellectuals and professionals.

Arguably, most African countries have not been able to afford large-scale education programs. African countries "may have to choose between immediate investment in intensive development of strategic manpower on a selective basis and the early elimination of illiteracy on a mass basis. This is a cruel, but compelling mandate for rapid development."[13] It is very true that educational programs may have been unaffordable early on, but that does not excuse the failure of many states at least to develop an educational policy. The lack of self-sufficiency does not explain the absence of a policy of self-reliance in such a vital matter.

Education is a long-term process without an easily measurable output, and these characteristics tend to make leaders shy away from educational investments. African rulers spend their money in areas that promise near-term payoffs. Industrial and agricultural projects are looked upon as ways to fulfill the people's desire for immediate, visible progress.

African states must develop grand strategies aimed at meeting short-term needs while addressing long-term improvement. African military forces can play a major role in this process. The situation faced by African states since the 1960s is similar to the one facing the United States today: what do you do with the

military when there is no defined threat? Do you create a new enemy in order to keep the military busy? Do you disband or drastically cut back military forces? Or do you find new uses for the forces you have? Because African leaders have never been able to answer those questions clearly, African military forces have ill defined missions, are poorly drilled, and are often misused. The military is a reservoir of potential skilled manpower that the state can tap to improve its capacity to function in a modern world.

The military could be used as a partial solution to the problem of balancing the need for long-term improvements with the call for short-term results. African military forces could participate in civic action to support a long-term educational effort. If political leaders developed a viable educational policy for their people, the military could provide extremely valuable support for that policy. An educated military would be well suited to teach basic literacy and hygiene classes to people in rural areas. Military units, with well educated and committed staffs, could be sent to remote areas, where they could stay for as long as they were needed. Alternatively, the military could establish central education sites. Students could be brought together, schooled, and then sent home.

Côte d'Ivoire ran a centralized training program in the early 1960s, the Service Civique. It recruited young men and women in the countryside and placed them in a special training camp run by the military. Training was provided by Ivorian, Taiwanese, and Israeli technicians. The subjects that were taught included farming, construction of inexpensive and modern houses, basic health care, nursing, and animal husbandry. After two or three years of training, participants were resettled in the countryside. Young people trained by the Service Civique made up much of the skilled work force responsible for improving Ivorian agricultural performance in the 1970s.

After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Côte d'Ivoire, like many other African states, broke off relations with Israel. As a result, the Israeli technicians dropped out of the training program. After the American recognition of the People's Republic of China in 1972, Ivorian policy, like that of the United States, changed with respect to Taiwan. Almost immediately, the Taiwanese technicians also left the Service Civique. The loss of outside technicians and lagging interest by civil and military leaders led to the program's end. Without enough properly educated Ivorian technicians and managers, the Service Civique was doomed to die.

Some military professionals assert that the military should be prepared only for defense and not employed for educational purposes. But if defense is looked at in a broader context—one that includes economic and political as well as military security—using the military to further education is perfectly natural.

The military can be used to build up a sense of national identity and a spirit of civic service. A conscription policy that calls a large number of youngsters to

a short term of service—one or two years—can be an effective nation-building tool. Military and civilian leaders, however, must ensure that recruits truly represent the state's population. Conscripts should be called from all sections of the country and from all tribes. Promotion rules must be made equitable so that all feel they are being treated fairly.

The military can also be used to launch state-owned companies. A committed, strong-willed military can provide necessary stability in the early stages of start-up, when doubt and hesitation are prone to kill the company's chances for survival. This concept was implemented quite successfully in Côte d'Ivoire during the mid-1970s. Military officials were appointed to a number of business and government economic positions, ranging from hospital managers in rural areas to high-level functionaries in the state bureaucracy.

Perhaps the best known example of the Ivorian use of military officers was the 1974 appointment of Lamine Fadika, a commander in the navy, to the position of Minister of Maritime Affairs. Fadika created a comprehensive and efficient national and regional maritime network. He founded SITRAM, the Ivorian national shipping company, and CEMEAOC, a western and central African maritime conference. Unfortunately, his impressive work and popularity led civilian politicians to fear his rising power. He was removed from his position in 1987, and subsequent poor civilian management has all but erased the gains he achieved.

The Fadika experience reflects the difficult civil-military relationship that exists in many African states. Civilian workers dislike military rule. The typical military authoritarian style is probably not compatible with the running of large, profit-making firms. Instead of dismissing military involvement in development projects, however, leaders should define strict rules for the management of state-owned companies and continue to use the best available talent, whether civil or military, to manage them. African states cannot afford the luxury of ignoring skilled, trained talent.

African military forces can also be used to stabilize state boundaries, improve confidence between political leaders, and promote peace. In the past, African military forces rarely exercised with those of neighboring states. Combined exercises could lead to improved communication and understanding between military forces, as well as between citizens and leaders of participating countries. Such exercises could also lead to a better understanding of military capabilities and missions in general. In 1991, the United States European Command organized and conducted a large-scale exercise for African military leaders. The ten-day event, held in Stuttgart, Germany, brought together senior naval representatives from nearly every African Atlantic coastal state. If Western allies really want to help African states become self-reliant, a well designed exercise program may be one of the best forms of assistance they can provide.

Foreign Involvement and Assistance

Technology is unfolding rapidly throughout Asia and Southeast Asia. The Asians are applying lessons learned by the Japanese; abroad, education and training is often a critical factor in the successful transition to a modern, economically stable state. The Japanese government invites over ten thousand ASEAN students annually to study in Japan.

Africa needs similar assistance in education, both at home and through exchange programs. Professional military exchanges, training of military students, and civilian education and training are among the best ways to help Africa recover from her long-term economic weakness.

Some might argue that African students might be unwelcome in Western countries, or that exchange programs inevitably lead to "brain-drain," whereby the best-educated people emigrate to developed countries or remain there after their training. The first of these issues is hardly worth discussing—well educated people are almost always welcome in any country. The second issue, however, deserves examination.

In the past, many exchange students have become semipermanent expatriates. The fact that a percentage of the students do not return home should not be used as an argument against exchange programs. Those who choose to stay in the country where they study become informal ambassadors who improve understanding of African issues in their adopted lands. Today, most experts and writers about Africa are not African. Consequently, they cannot view Africa's problems and propose solutions from an African point of view. Educated Africans, whether at home in Africa or at work abroad, will examine problems and devise solutions from an African frame of reference. There are at least two other important reasons why African states should not fear exportation of their work force. First, expatriate workers tend to increase the wealth of their home countries. Typically, they send home a portion of their salaries, usually in foreign currency. Second, many expatriates will eventually transfer necessary and suitable technology and ideas to Africa.

It can be argued that the countries that can provide the most help, such as the United States, have no real interest in Africa. Even though that may be true today, it will not necessarily remain true in the future. National interests evolve over time, based on the geopolitical situation and the international economy. African states may need to develop and market interests that will ultimately bring Western financial and technological resources to Africa. Tourism appears to be just such an interest.

A well planned and organized tourism policy in a secure and stable environment will, in the long run, bring people with talent, money, and imagination to Africa. To implement such a policy, African states must invest heavily in

advertising in certain countries. The richer countries—the U.S., Japan, and Germany for example—should be considered prime targets. Even the African military can be given a role in the tourism program. Military people can be used for safety and security purposes in zones of major tourist interest such as game parks, resorts, waterways, biodiversity sites, etc. Since 1989, the Ivorian Navy, with American assistance, has been developing a program for increased security on lagoons and waterways in the Azagny Reserve, as well as a plan to protect sea mammals. Among the projects associated with this program have been the construction of radio sites and the establishment of an air wing.

African states should not overlook any possibilities in their pursuit to develop as modern states. As the world order changes, political and military cooperation in the UN and its agencies may become even more important than it has been. Coalition-building and participation in peacekeeping forces could provide excellent opportunities for African states to improve their relations with the U.S. and other Western powers.

Because they did not invest properly and intensively in education at home and abroad, African states have few ties with the United States. New ties may be forged, and existing ones strengthened, by exploiting the potential friendship rooted in the history of slavery—a history represented by the large African-American community. Some will argue that the topic of black Americans and their supposed ties with Africa is too emotional an issue, one that can only act as a brake on the development of good relations between Africa and the United States. Such an argument should not stop African states from moving towards the United States. Certainly the issue of slavery is painful, but one should remember that much of American history is a story of people resettled in a painful way. The flight of the first European settlers to America was, sometimes, from life-threatening religious intolerance. The Jews sought escape from racial extermination when they left Europe. Even within the U.S. there has been severe religious and social intolerance between segments of the white population. The events of history, however, eventually overcome prejudice against each new wave of immigrants. It is time for Africans and African-Americans to overcome their historical pain and play their role in a world which belongs to all. Education is the key to success in this challenge also.

D espite their sacrifices and contribution to victory in World War II, African states unfortunately remained subjugated, first officially and then informally, by European countries. African history since the end of the Second World War might have been very different had Africa received a Marshall Plan and been granted most-favored-nation status by the United States. Postwar Soviet

moves in the eastern zone of Germany captured American attention, and the U.S. all but ignored European actions in Africa. Instead of supporting native African struggles for independence, the U.S. tacitly accepted recolonization. Now, with the collapse of communism, African states should seize the opportunity to open a direct dialogue with the United States.

African states should invest in education, advertising, and lobbying in the United States, Germany, Japan, Taiwan, and China. Africa needs to build on the experience of others. It needs not only to learn from modern states but also to teach them about Africa. Such an approach will take time—there are no quick solutions to Africa's problems.

Since military coups are the products of military minds, it is in the minds of the military that defenses must be built against coups d'état. The only way to reach man's mind is through education. Military and civilian training and education is the key to African development and stability.

Africans and their leaders must accept as a challenge the world's new view of an Africa with problems and begin the difficult task of rethinking the future and proposing new strategies for political and economic development. The new strategies must incorporate all means available to African states, including their military resources. Instead of limiting the military to classic defense roles, African states must use their forces to help develop national economic capacities.

International relations is not a game; it is an enduring challenge. A country that wants to survive and prosper must remain alert to enemies and cultivate allies. In the struggle for African development, our allies are those who share with us their knowledge. To be successful, African states must heed Clausewitz's advice—*one must know what kind of war he is fighting*—and Sun Tzu's counsel—*one must know his enemy as himself.*

Notes

1. John W. Harbeson, *The Military Rulers in African Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1987), p. 1. The number of states experiencing military coups has increased since Harbeson's work was published.

2. T.O. Odetola, *Military Regimes and Development: A Comparative Analysis of African States* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1982), p. 165.

3. Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 14–5.

4. Christopher Clapham, "The African States," in Douglas Rimmes, ed., *Africa 30 Years On* (London: The Royal African Society, 1991), p. 91.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

7. As defined by the World Bank, absolute poverty represents a standard of living providing less than 2,150 calories a day.

8. All the statistics in this paragraph were taken from *The Economist*, 20 March 1993. Sources: Asian Development Bank and World Bank.

9. *The Economist*, 20 March 1993.

10. Andrew Cowley sees several reasons for the success of emerging ASEAN economies: the choice of economic development as first priority for state action; government commitment to markets (properly guided but not controlled) and to private property; relatively equal distribution of income and low taxation, fostering

82   Naval War College Review

the feeling that everyone is "in the same boat"; and, above all, education. "The last lesson is probably the most important: investing in education pays in spades. The tigers' [i.e., powerful Asian economies] single biggest source of comparative advantage is their well educated workers." See Andrew Cowley, "Burning Bright," *The Economist*, 16 November 1991.

11. Odetola, p. 27.

12. Kenneth King, "Education and Training in Africa," in *Africa 30 Years On* (London: The Royal African Society, 1991), pp. 73–88.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

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If attendance here will serve, in any degree, to broaden an officer's views, extend his mental horizon on national and international questions, and give him a just appreciation of the great variety and extent of the requirements of his profession, the [Naval War] College will not have existed in vain.

Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce

Second International Congress for Maritime History, 5–8 June 1996

The Dutch Association for Maritime History, in cooperation with the Netherlands Maritime Museum in Amsterdam and the Maritime Museum Prins Hendrik in Rotterdam, wishes to announce its Second International Congress, on the theme of "Evolution and Revolution in the Maritime World in the 19th and 20th Centuries."

The congress will concentrate on three main topics focusing on the changes in the maritime world resulting from either dramatic new developments or continuation of long-term trends. Papers are invited in the following areas: nautical science and cartography; the construction, equipment, and propulsion of ships; and the management and infrastructure of navies, shipping companies, and ports.

Forward proposals and queries to Mrs. drs. C. Reinders Folmer, Box 102, 2350 AC Leiderdorp, The Netherlands, telephone . . .-31-71895382.

French Strategy and the American Revolution
A Reappraisal

James Pritchard

THE QUESTION OF FRENCH INVOLVEMENT in the American War of Independence frequently becomes entangled in much larger issues that often obscure the reasons France became involved in the first place and what the consequences were for subsequent French history. Overly simple assumptions are commonly asserted about eighteenth-century French foreign policy and Franco-British animosity, on the one hand, and excessively large, often undemonstrable, historical claims are frequently made on the other. Both are too easily accepted by scholars and students, with the result, among other things, that the question of French naval strategy during the war is poorly handled, treated only obliquely as an adjunct to British strategy, and frequently so misunderstood that only a caricature remains.

Historians often view France's chief strategical problem as defined by the nation's role as "a classical hybrid power," torn between its continental aims and its overseas ambitions.[1] By accepting the permanent existence and reality of this geopolitical model, they are drawn to conclude that even during the American War of Independence—when for once, in Paul Kennedy's phrases, the French "resisted the temptation to attack Hanover or to bully the Dutch," "fought *only* overseas," and "concentrated their resources upon a naval and colonial war"— they failed to conquer, and managed only to humiliate, their British foe.[2] In

these analyses, French war aims are never identified, except to say that somehow defeat of the enemy, as opposed to conquest, was not enough. Whatever the aims were, however, France in some way was unable to achieve them, accepting the discomfiture of its enemy as a sort of half-measure.[3] This is a summary of fairly common views concerning the role of France during the American War for Independence.

A second issue involves conclusions generally held about the connections between France's involvement in the war of American independence and, a few years later, the French Revolution: first, that France was chiefly responsible for the independence of the United States of America; and second, that the war's burdens led directly to the collapse of the monarchy and the advent of the Revolution.[4] The latter can be found even in distinguished and specialised works. The diplomatic historian Jonathan Dull, for example, claims to show how the war "raised dangers from within the monarchy far greater than those which threatened it from without"; nowhere, however, does he demonstrate that the war brought about the monarchy's downfall or even that it led to any internal destabilisation of the regime.[5]

In view of the ubiquity of such a flawed geopolitical model, and also having in mind the propensity of many (especially political economists) to ignore the roles in history of the particular and the idiosyncratic and to play down the factors of character and circumstance, we should guard against misleading generalisation and reductionism. In the case of France's involvement in the War of Independence, although France did not in fact threaten the Electorate of Hanover (whose ruler was also King of England) or any other part of Germany and, far from bullying the Dutch, struggled hard (for very good reasons) to ensure their neutrality, it did not fight only overseas. Further, though this was in fact a naval war and the French were able to apply their resources accordingly, it was never solely a colonial one (as Kennedy would have it), and they were not free to concentrate their naval forces in the American theater. Indeed, it was precisely because France had to retain so much of its naval strength in Europe that its strategy frequently appeared hesitant and ambiguous. Finally, France did not just "settle for" the humiliation of Great Britain in lieu of better; in fact, its leaders had never intended anything else. Indeed, they explicitly rejected any other plan.

The study of French naval strategy may well be an excellent introduction to certain larger issues, for it reveals that although French naval strategy may have appeared uncertain, ambiguous, and hesitant, that impression was due in part to the character and conduct of senior French naval commanders. One sees, however, that it was also a reflection of the internal weakness of the French political economy and the challenges and difficulties facing French political leaders as those men took the momentous decisions that led France to intervene in the rebellion of the British American colonies and join the latter's struggle for

independence. In the end, the French navy forced the surrender of the only large British field army remaining on American soil. Whether this achievement should be seen as the major cause of the independence of the United States, let alone as having anything to do with the French Revolution, is debatable. To study French naval strategy, then, is to deal rather with the events and campaigns of the war.

"A Strategy of Men"

French strategy in the American war was a product of men, whose character and perceptions of the world must be considered in order to understand their strategy's ambiguities and hesitations. Several recent studies of their careers also provide a more complete understanding than heretofore of French foreign and domestic policies that influenced strategy. Chief among the persona is Louis XVI himself, whose recent biographers have seen in him less the dullard of their predecessors than a ruler who was thoughtful, informed, and devoted, if neither strong-willed nor determined.[6] Three of his ministers as well have been subjects of new revisionist studies that are especially pertinent. The first is Jacques Necker, whose place (or position) in French history has been completely altered during the past thirty years. Louis XVI made him director-general of finances in 1776 after the only real opponent of the war, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, resigned from the Royal Council. A Protestant, commoner, and foreigner, Necker was responsible for a conscious policy decision to finance the war through borrowing rather than raising taxes. Historian Robert Harris has shown convincingly that Necker's conduct throughout the war was a model of fiscal restraint, financial responsibility, and prudent management.[7]

The second minister is Gabriel de Sartine, former lieutenant-general of the Paris police, who served as Louis XVI's first secretary of state for the navy from 1774 until 1780. He was primarily responsible for resuming the reform and rebuilding of the navy and the stockpiling of materiel in dockyards in anticipation of the coming war with Great Britain, a policy that had been suspended since the dismissal of the duc de Choiseul in 1770.[8] Sartine also succeeded in obtaining the largest French annual naval appropriations of the eighteenth century in order to accomplish his task, but he went too far when, in 1780, he allowed the treasurer-general of the navy to issue unauthorised *anticipations*, short-term notes issued by financiers on future revenues. These notes, in the amount of 21 million livres, forced up the interest rate on French government borrowings by half a percentage point, thereby upsetting Necker's calculations; in October of that year the director-general of finances engineered the downfall of Sartine and his replacement by an ally, Charles de la Croix, marquis de Castries, a lieutenant-general of the army.[9]

Castries was an excellent choice at the time, probably superior to Sartine, whose ambiguous instructions to naval commanders revealed the uncertainty of his aims.[10] A soldier and veteran of the mid-century wars, Castries was also a reformer; he introduced much-needed vigour and a personal interest in naval campaigning that had been lacking. He was chiefly responsible for the aggressive strategy of 1781 and for the selection of new commanders, especially Admiral de Grasse, for the fleets being readied that year.

Necker's success in replacing Sartine was matched two months later in December 1780 when he manoeuvred to replace the comte de Montbarey, the war minister, with the marquis de Ségur, like Castries an army lieutenant-general, a veteran of the mid-century wars, and an ally. But this demonstration of Necker's growing influence combined with his peace feelers to Great Britain to threaten the two most important men in the government, the elderly comte de Maurepas, the king's chief advisor, and the comte de Vergennes, secretary of state for foreign affairs and the chief architect of French war strategy.[11] When in February 1781 Necker published his famous *Comte rendu au roi*, which explained his financial policies to the French public, he roused the ire of both men, and his days were numbered. He was dismissed from office three months later, and his reforms and prudent management rapidly began to unravel.

In brief, then, French naval strategy was neither economically determined nor the product of geopolitical forces. It was designed by men. Just as historian Piers Mackesy showed, on the British side, that strategy itself must be restored to its place alongside diplomacy and military operations as a legitimate part of the history of the American War of Independence, so too must the perceptions and prejudices of the French political actors be given importance in accounting for the origins, features, and modifications of French war strategy in general and naval strategy in particular.[12] Of no one was this truer than Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes, the third of Louis's subordinates to receive recent attention. Louis XVI appointed Vergennes minister and secretary of state for foreign affairs in 1774 and relied on him until his death in 1787.[13]

Vergennes and His Strategy

Two conceptions of international politics dominated Vergennes's thinking, and it was both his strength and his weakness that they guided his foreign policy and war strategy. The first was an ambition to restore France to its traditional (in French eyes, rightful) place as arbiter of relations between the powers in the European competitive state system. Second was his understanding that France's reduced position in the 1770s was chiefly the result of the outcome of the great and multifarious mid-century struggles known collectively as the War of Austrian Succession (1740–1748) and the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). These

conflicts, by bringing France and Great Britain into direct confrontation over-seas, had undermined the traditional primacy of continental issues in the interstate system. The existence of a new and largely independent competitive arena overseas marked international affairs in the years leading up to the American War of Independence (and would continue to do so during and after that conflict). France, unable to break free from membership in an Eastern European anti-Prussian alliance, had few attractive continental options for improving directly its position in that theater. Therefore—though already trapped in other overseas commitments and although doing so further con-strained its role in European affairs—France directed its foreign policy overseas, against Great Britain.

The purpose of this anti-British policy, then, was to end British pre-ponderance and restore the "natural" balance of power in order to pursue more fully French interests on the continent. At no time was the comte de Vergennes interested in destroying Great Britain. He was far too experienced to imagine that the other great powers would permit such a thing, even had it been possible. His own words, written to the French ambassador to Spain, make this perfectly clear: "We must work resolutely to weaken this enemy of ours, but we must not display intentions which would only do us harm because the jealousy they would arouse against the House of Bourbon [i.e., the French crown] would give England friends and allies."[14]

The challenge to French strategy by the late 1770s was far greater than is sometimes imagined by those who see merely the need to resist the temptation to attack Hanover or the United Provinces (modern Holland) in order to concentrate resources on an overseas naval war. What needs to be made clear is that French naval strategy—and this key fact accounts for much of the real and apparent hesitation with which it was executed—could not be made by France alone. Vergennes was deeply aware in 1778 that, despite four years of naval rearmament, France remained too weak to proceed by itself. France required all the assistance that Spain, its Bourbon ally, could provide. Unfortunately, no one knew that better than the Spanish foreign minister, who had not the slightest interest in supporting American insurgents, acknowledging the independence of the United States, or serving as powder monkey to the French navy. Throughout the American War of Independence, Spain had its own agenda, one that included controlling and directing French strategy when and wherever possible.

Also, a strategy of striking at Great Britain overseas had serious limitations arising from the nature of the opponent.[15] Vergennes's view of the need to weaken Great Britain and his awareness of the need for the most subtle, complex diplomacy to restore French influence in Europe combined with his mercantilist outlook.[16] He assumed that British wealth and power were built on its flourish-ing distant overseas trade, which contributed to the nation's economic growth,

encouraged the development of naval power, provided valuable revenues to the state, and connected Britain to its colonies, where plentiful supplies of cheap raw materials were exchanged for valuable metropolitan manufactures. While this recipe for power was true (and has attracted navalists, including A.T. Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett, for two centuries and more), it was not the whole truth. The fundamental source of British wealth remained its expanding and diversified agriculture, increasing industrial production, and its rapidly growing domestic transportation network, which contributed to additional consumption. Also very important, as Napoleon's continental blockade later showed, was trade with other European nations.

> *"Finally, France did not just 'settle for' the humiliation of Great Britain in lieu of better; in fact, its leaders had never intended anything else."*

In fact, a critique along these lines had been offered—by Turgot, Necker's predecessor in finances and an opponent on principle of colonies and monopolies. Turgot's arguments, which were in favor of peace and continued until his dismissal in 1776, had been more perceptive than those of others. In the first place, he believed American independence would occur whether France intervened or not; second, he had argued that an independent America would contribute more rather than less to British trade.[17] Nevertheless, it was Vergennes's perceptions and not Turgot's that prevailed, and they account for the French naval strategy of sending major thrusts to America and the West Indies. For France's foreign minister, the independence of the American colonies was the specific overseas, or peripheral, lever that would help him achieve his greater goal, in two stages: restoring the colonial balance of power and thereby also restoring French influence in the central arena, the European competitive state system.

A key to understanding why Vergennes embarked upon so problematic a strategy was his own failure to comprehend the financial weakness of France that made naval and military reform very slow processes. A career diplomat who had spent all but two of the thirty-five years prior to his ministerial appointment outside France, he was a man with no family or social connections at court (except the king's aunt, to whom he owed his appointment). He had little awareness of the domestic political situation and no appreciation of the forces that had led in 1770 to the display of monarchical power that preceded his own appointment. Unlike Turgot, he had no grasp at all of socioeconomic conditions in the nation, nor did he have any interest in them; Vergennes saw domestic politics only in the context of international *raison d'état*. In his eyes, war with

Great Britain was unavoidable, because the latter's situation was so unnatural that peace could not last. The great strategic problem, then, was to control when, where, and under what conditions France would fight that war.

Vergennes's geopolitical view had other shortcomings as well that make the flaws in his strategy clear. First, his aim to fight Great Britain, in however limited a way, was based on his conviction that France's lost prestige and reduced position in Europe was entirely due to that nation's rise. In response, he sought for France the role of arbiter. He did not grasp that none of the five great powers could now control the conditions governing the relative strengths of the others. Second, the ideological paradox of an absolute monarchy aiding a republican uprising bothered Vergennes not a whit. For him the problem was not the independence of the United States but how France could benefit from intervening in Britain's growing troubles in America.

On the other hand, Vergennes was to achieve in this war a marriage of diplomacy and military strategy of a very high order, whereas even students of purely military strategy will grant (and Napoleon's career is the paramount demonstration) that strategy without diplomacy can have no long-term effect. His astuteness lay especially in five things, the first of which was his timing of the French intervention in America. Beginning by authorising secret financial and material assistance to the insurgents in May 1776, he gave diplomatic recognition to the United States at the end of 1777. A formal alliance committing France to achieving American independence followed shortly; finally, an expeditionary force was sent "when it became necessary" two years later.[18] The second was the subtle and difficult diplomacy used to develop the anti-British coalition. Vergennes's qualities of timing and astuteness towards the Americans were evident in their coordination in a continental initiative by which he coaxed Spain into war (1779), fostered the League of Armed Neutrality (1780), prevented a new German war from breaking out in Central Europe, and blocked the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire.[19]

Third, Vergennes never forgot that however questionable Spanish resources might be, they were indispensable; France had insufficient strength to attack Great Britain alone. Fourth, Vergennes knew when it was time to make peace, and the Treaty of Versailles (or of Paris, 1783) is his monument. Finally, it also needs to be remembered that Vergennes developed an original set of relations with the United States of America, foiling those Americans who sought a compromise peace with Great Britain while checking those in France and Spain who sought to negotiate with Great Britain, leaving American independence unachieved and France alone opposing Great Britain.

During 1778 and 1779, then, French naval strategy was ambivalent in essence and hesitant in execution for a variety of reasons, but its chief outlines are clear enough. Although a twelve-year-old plan to concentrate France's entire effort

during the coming war on an invasion of England had been updated as recently as 1777, the French naval ministry had quite different ideas. There is no evidence that Vergennes was attracted before the spring of 1779 to any invasion plan or even an attack on the British navy's chief base at Portsmouth.[20] Invasion required France to draw as many ships as possible away from the British home squadron, by feints or minor thrusts against British colonies and attacks on British overseas trade, and then to strike across the Channel. The actual French naval plan was precisely the opposite: to keep the attention of the British home forces riveted on Brest and launch the primary attacks overseas in America, the West Indies, and the Orient.[21]

The drafter of this plan remains virtually unknown: Charles–Pierre de Claret, chevalier (later comte) de Fleurieu, a former student of scientific navigation who occupied the position of director-general of ports and arsenals and served as the chief administrative assistant of Sartine, the naval minister. Though Piers Mackesy refers to "the French Admiralty's planning staff," there was no such body.[22] Fleurieu was the sole French naval officer of the day who might be called a general staff officer, and it was he who drew up for the minister's signature instructions for naval commanders during the war.[23]

Therein lay one of the major weaknesses of the French navy: the absence of a collective body of seagoing officers to advise the minister concerning policy on the conduct of operations. The results of this institutional shortcoming were that a great deal was left to improvisation, naval doctrine remained undeveloped, and, despite recent reform efforts, administrators continued to wield too much power over operations. The absence of a vehicle for the expression of professional opinion such as the Board of Admiralty in Great Britain's Royal Navy also exacerbated the savage factionalism that wracked the service throughout the eighteenth century and was unchecked during the American war.[24] Even the foremost French admirals of the war, d'Estaing and de Grasse, were both to suffer the effects of insubordination and the ill will, even hatred, of some of their captains.[25] Perhaps only in the French navy, where a corps of haughty, conservative nobles virtually ignored the hierarchy of rank in favor of that of birth, would a junior captain refer to Vice–Admiral d'Estaing, the senior officer afloat, as "chicken–hearted and witless" ("un poltron et un homme sans talents").[26]

The Campaigns of 1778 and 1779

The 1778 campaign mirrored Vergennes's strategy exactly, and by and large it was remarkably successful. Far from being examples of muddleheadedness and "oafish tactics," as has recently been claimed, the conduct of sixty-eight-year-old Admiral Louis-Guillouet, comte d'Orvilliers, off the west coast of France and that of the much younger but senior Admiral Jean-Baptiste-Charles-Henri,

Joseph R. Nunes, Jr.

comte d'Estaing, deserve examination.[27] Vice-Admiral d'Estaing left Toulon in April on a multiple mission: to attack the English in Delaware and New York or anywhere he thought practicable; to support American land operations (but only north of the United States, in Nova Scotia or Newfoundland); and, after the hurricane season had passed, to proceed to Martinique in the West Indies to

take British possessions in the Windward Islands and protect French islands and their shipping before leaving for France.[28]

In the Channel, French strategy was to divert British attention from d'Estaing's major thrust to America and, just as important, provoke a British attack. In order to prevent Britain from exercising the terms of its defensive alliance with Holland and thus bring the Dutch into the war, and also to avoid disturbing the extremely delicate state of Franco-Austrian relations, Vergennes needed to be able to point to British aggression. This is perhaps a good illustration of the limits of strategy designed by a diplomat; but it was no accident that France dated the outbreak of war with Great Britain at the attack of HMS *Arethusa*, frigate, on *La Belle Poule*, twenty-six guns, on 17 June 1778.[29] Throughout the next five years of war France maintained the fiction of British aggression, though not one power in Europe accepted the elaborate fraud.

When Admiral d'Orvilliers sailed from Brest in command of thirty-two ships of the line, his original instructions urging aggressive tactics were cancelled, and new ones from Sartine ordered him to avoid all risks. His chief tasks were to draw British attention to the Channel and hold it there, disguise the significance of d'Estaing's departure from Toulon, and prevent any morale-destroying British landings on the French coast.[30] Putting the best face on the events of the indecisive engagement that resulted, known to history as the Battle of Ouessant, scholar Etienne Taillemite recently concluded that although serious tactical weaknesses remained in matters of command, conception of operations, and handling of large forces, the engagement had an important effect on morale in demonstrating to the French navy that it could engage the largest navy in Europe with some success.[31] The main point, however, is that the French commander had acted as he had been instructed and trailed his coat.

The seemingly strange behaviour of d'Orvilliers at Ouessant does shed light on a larger issue bearing upon French naval performance during the eighteenth century, that quite contrary views on the purpose and aim of naval battles prevailed in France and in Great Britain. Whose views were the more valid is a separate issue; but it is clear from examples that can be drawn from the previous fifty years or more that the general French aims in war at sea were to attack seaborne trade, launch land assaults against enemy colonial possessions, reinforce French interests overseas, and escort French trade. As early as the 1730s senior French officers denied that any good could come from fleet actions, and a similar attitude prevailed throughout the American war.[32]

The hesitancy in the handling of the French fleets also owed much to their commanders' inexperience. Sartine's own uncertainty as secretary of state for the navy probably communicated itself as well. The latter may have stemmed from the enormous effort it had cost during the previous four years to rebuild the navy, and also from the contradictory policies advocated by colonial planters

on one hand and metropolitan merchants (who feared the threats war posed to their investments at sea) on the other. As a miserly French merchant might have been, Sartine was anxious to preserve the great horde of wealth that the navy represented. He may have feared to risk it without a guarantee of success.[33] His hesitation, and also his surprising orders to open the French West Indies to American and neutral shipping in response to the refusal (well before the war broke out) of metropolitan merchants to fit out new trading ventures, lend support for this view.

Admiral d'Estaing, once a lieutenant-general of the army, had been "parachuted" into the navy sixteen years before the American war and had never been in a naval battle, and neither he nor d'Orvilliers had ever before manoeuvred large squadrons of ships. His conduct in America has often been criticised on the basis of his refusal in July 1778 to engage Vice-Admiral Richard Howe near Sandy Hook at the entry to New York harbour and for failing to strike some positive blow to assist his American allies.[34] Recently, however, it has been appreciated that in pursuing, as instructed, his vaguely defined mission, d'Estaing on that occasion imposed upon the British a major change of strategy, one that greatly favoured the American insurgents. Despite his maladroitness and failure a second time to engage the British, off Newport in August, and though a major storm subsequently damaged both fleets, forcing the British into New York and the French into Boston, the mere presence of d'Estaing's squadron, with or without local superiority, forced the British to alter their own strategy of suppressing the insurgents and to abandon their blockade of the American coast.

By September the British navy had been reduced to defending three urban centres—New York, Newport, and Halifax—thus opening the entire coast as far south as Florida to insurgent trade and privateering.[35] French strategy had delivered a major blow to the British war effort. The news of d'Estaing's imminent arrival in the theater in the spring of 1778 had forced the evacuation of Philadelphia. By its presence alone, the French navy had reduced British counterinsurgency to a secondary priority, of which no clearer demonstration could be had than what followed.

When the French fleet finally sailed from Boston for the West Indies in November 1778, the British navy followed, taking five thousand troops and sending three thousand more to Florida the same month.[36] In short, the French had deprived the British navy of the strategic initiative and reduced it to reacting defensively. The French began the next year's campaign enjoying strategic freedom, controlling the pace of the maritime agenda. The question remains as to how well they used it.

In the event, in 1779 the need to rely on Spanish support forced France to turn from its overseas, or peripheral, strategy back to a European, or central, one. Although Sartine and Vergennes had believed that France enjoyed effective

naval parity with Britain for a few months in the spring of 1778, they had not expected French strength alone to bring results. From the beginning they knew that Spanish naval assistance was a prerequisite to success, and French diplomacy in the latter half of 1778 focused on Spain as never before. By early 1779, Spain's reluctance to enter the war had driven Vergennes to desperate eagerness to agree to any and all Spanish demands, including an invasion of Great Britain, in order to get an alliance. Fortunately, a combination of British ineptitude and arrogance pushed Spain towards France, and on 12 April the two nations signed an offensive alliance in the Convention of Aranjuez. Whether the Convention amounted to a great accomplishment of French diplomacy in that war, however, remains problematic; it allowed the Spanish to focus at will either at home or overseas, on Gibraltar and Minorca, or Jamaica and Florida, even Honduras and New-foundland if one wanted to stretch the point.[37] Spain had much more to lose overseas than France and lacked the resources for a long conflict. It was Spain's desire for a short and decisive war rather than a long-drawn-out one that was the basis of the Franco-Spanish plan ultimately settled upon for 1779—to invade Great Britain.[38]

"The absence of any vehicle for the expression of professional opinion also exacerbated the savage factionalism that wracked the navy throughout the eighteenth century. . . ."

The history of the "grand design," as the invasion became known, and of its deterioration into a naval and military disaster of tragic proportions, with thousands of lives lost, has been well told elsewhere.[39] However, the plan was the preference of neither French foreign policy nor naval strategy but a reflection of French military and economic weakness; it was the price for support elsewhere demanded by Spain, which had not the slightest interest in the reestablishment of French prestige in Europe. Aside from the enormous loss of human and material resources resulting from the failure of the invasion, Spanish aims produced two major detrimental effects. First, they ensured that France would have to fight a much longer war than originally planned and that the strain on the government's already weak financial structure would accordingly increase. Second, Spanish demands made it much more difficult from 1779 on for the French to concentrate sufficient resources overseas to achieve local superiority. Indeed, far from being a great accomplishment of French diplomacy, the Franco-Spanish alliance rendered French strategy after the failure in the Channel more ambiguous and hesitant than before. Support that had once been a prerequisite for victory had quickly become to some degree an impediment.

The 1779 campaign in America supports such an interpretation. On 30 December 1778, British naval reinforcements and troops from New York captured St. Lucia, to windward of Martinique, and provoked a counterattack by slow-sailing d'Estaing, who had arrived in the Antilles behind the British. Following an exchange of fire with the inferior British fleet, d'Estaing personally led his troops ashore, was repulsed by the new occupiers, and retreated to Martinique.[40] British possession of St. Lucia was of decisive tactical importance for the duration of the war. For a third time, and with superior numbers, d'Estaing had abandoned the scene of battle. At Martinique, d'Estaing quarrelled with the vigorous governor-general, the marquis de Bouillé, who three months earlier had captured, with local forces, the island of Dominica, lying between Martinique and Guadeloupe. Bouillé was justifiably angry about the threat posed to Martinique by the new British conquest.

During the winter and spring of 1779, the French lost tactical superiority in the West Indies as British ships arrived in substantial numbers but French reinforcements, because of the great demand for ships in Europe, only trickled in. Commodore (later Admiral) de Grasse arrived with five ships of the line in February, and two more escorting a convoy came in April. In June, with the aid of some of d'Estaing's ships, Bouillé captured the island of Saint Vincent, but more significant—though it had been accomplished only by cancelling the departure of a squadron destined for India—was Commodore Toussaint-Guil-laume de La Motte-Picquet's arrival soon after with five more ships, which gave d'Estaing local superiority.[41]

D'Estaing acted immediately, sailing to attack Barbados. Contrary winds forced him to a new destination, Grenada, and on 2 July he landed with his troops and took that island along with thirty richly laden merchantmen. Four days later d'Estaing successfully defended his conquest against an inferior British fleet. He did not then annihilate that force, and naturally he has been criticised for this; yet, he had carried out his mission. In fact, considering that the original twelve ships of his fleet had been away from France for fifteen months, his reluctance may well be deemed prudence.[42] In all of 1779 only twelve more ships of the line were sent to the Caribbean (and none to America). Thus, after d'Estaing received orders to bring his heavily fouled ships home in advance of the hurricane season, he left only twelve of the line in the West Indies.

During the winter of 1778–1779, urgent appeals from the Americans for aid against the British who had overrun Georgia and captured Savannah had reached d'Estaing at Martinique. He could do nothing at the time, for good reasons: his numbers were then inferior, and he could not leave Martinique except for the fortnight it took to attempt to retake St. Lucia. Also, the preservation of French possessions took priority over retaking Georgia, which he thought impossible in any case. Finally, he had plans to attack instead farther north, at Halifax or in

Newfoundland.[43] Nevertheless, later in August, on his way out of the Antilles, the much-maligned admiral responded generously. Ignoring his most recent orders, d'Estaing sailed with all his ships for Savannah on a mission more in accord with his original instructions, which had been to strike a blow in aid of his American allies. Perhaps his earlier failure to do so now rankled, but that is unknown. As he had at St. Lucia and Grenada, d'Estaing put his troops ashore and led them himself in a ground assault on the British entrenchments. The French attack failed, and the admiral was wounded.[44] Getting the troops back on board the ships de Grasse had brought in February to return to the West Indies, he collected his original squadron and sailed for France. Storms scattered his ships, and they reached France only a few at a time.

Such a miserable end has obscured for historians the strategic accomplishments of the 1779 campaign, its extraordinary duration, and the fact that d'Estaing had not lost one ship to the enemy. Nevertheless, d'Estaing had shown himself to be, to say the least, a strange naval leader. His chief military activity had been leading troops in land assaults. His naval actions were utterly undistinguished; he seemed never to have grasped the nature of sea power at all. "Much more noise than work is only too often the net product of naval engagements," he reported to Vergennes.[45] No better evidence could be had of the dominant French view of naval strategy.

On the other hand, such an attitude was no indication at all of the admiral's personal courage. "If only Monsieur d'Estaing was as able a naval officer as he is brave as a man," wrote one of his captains.[46] The author was Pierre-André de Suffren, who during this campaign may have learned the lessons that were to be reflected in his aggressive conduct in the Indian Ocean only a year later. One final irony remains: that d'Estaing's last appearance in America in fact accomplished what his earlier efforts had failed to do. On learning that the French admiral had appeared at Savannah, Sir Henry Clinton decided he could no longer hold both Rhode Island and New York, and he evacuated the former. The following summer, a French expeditionary force under the command of the comte de Rochambeau would occupy Narragansett Bay and Newport without firing a shot.

The 1780, 1781, and 1782 Campaigns

French naval tactics of 1779 have drawn much criticism, but the success of that year's strategy should not be overlooked. In 1780, however, French strategy became weaker and less focused. Dissension and military ineffectiveness among the Americans discouraged Vergennes, as did the continued vigorous response of the British. Spanish emphasis on besieging Gibraltar and refusal to cooperate in joint operations in the Caribbean also contributed to hesitancy and uncertainty.[47] The French navy returned to its American strategy but with even more

serious impediments to its coherence than before. In January, the British navy's successful relief of Gibraltar and destruction of the blockading force there delivered such a severe blow to morale that the Spanish government began to consider separate negotiations with Britain out of fear for the security of its overseas possessions.[48] Anticipating a threat there, Spain announced plans in February to send ten to twelve ships of the line and ten thousand men to the West Indies as early as May.[49] French naval strategy now acquired a new obligation, to prevent a defection or defeat of the Spanish, who well remembered the loss of Havana and Florida less than twenty years before. In keeping with their larger aims, the French saw as their first priority not aiding the Americans but ensuring the safety of their own and Spanish possessions in and around the Caribbean.

Sartine, the naval minister, planned to place a combined fleet off the Azores to intercept commerce and hold the attention of the enemy's home fleet, but to send his main strength once more to America. The need to contribute ten ships of the line to the mid-Atlantic Franco-Spanish force, however, strained French resources to the limit and made local superiority in the West Indies nearly impossible to achieve. Sixteen ships of the line, nine lighter warships, and eighty-three merchantmen and transports carrying 4,400 troops were sent to the West Indies under the command of sixty-seven-year-old Admiral de Guichen, whose instructions were exclusively defensive: to protect his convoy and colonial commerce, ensure free communication for French shipping, and guard the French islands from attack. As in the past, Sartine ordered him "ne rien entreprendre qu'avec la certitude du succès"—not to risk his fleet without the certainty of success.[50]

Luc-Urbain du Bouexic, comte de Guichen was (unlike d'Estaing) a typical French naval officer of the *ancien régime*. His provincial (i.e., Breton) origins, long service, lack of sea experience, slowness of promotion, and traditional tactics had all combined to earn him disdain and reproach for excessive caution and lack of initiative.[51] Guichen's orders in 1780 were "to keep the sea, so far as the force maintained by England in the Windward Islands would permit without too far compromising the fleet entrusted to him."[52] Mahan remarks that the French admiral had no alternative but to shrink from a decisive engagement; more to the point is that Guichen operated under defensive instructions that reflected not only the traditional mission-oriented strategy of the French navy—epitomized by d'Estaing's comment about naval engagements—but also the transformation of the Spanish from an asset to a liability, one that could not be ignored.

After reaching the Antilles and attaching the ships under Commodore de Grasse's command, Guichen had twenty-two ships of the line and enjoyed a slight superiority in numbers over British Admiral Sir George Rodney, who

arrived shortly after him. But virtually nothing would be accomplished, due to
the French admiral's instructions, which reinforced his habitual prudence. Under
the urging of the governor-general of the Windward Islands, the marquis de
Bouillé, Guichen planned to attack St. Lucia. The battle that ensued off
Martinique on 17 April occasioned much vilification from the British admiral
against his own captains and has been the subject of debate ever since; the chief
results, however, were that the future victor at the Battle of the Saintes failed to
put a crimp in the well handled French forces, whereas the cautious French
tactician withheld his attack from St. Lucia.[53] Guichen and Rodney met twice
again a month later, but after two weeks of manoeuvring to allow each to fight
on his own terms, they broke off and returned to Martinique and Barbados,
respectively. Rodney had successfully thwarted the planned French attack on
St. Lucia.[54]

All accounts of French operations here ignore the marquis de Bouillé, which
is a serious mistake. For although the naval strategy called for the capture of
British islands, in fact those that fell into French hands did so chiefly due to
the vigorous conduct of the governor, who spent most of the war—when he
was not himself capturing islands—railing against the excessive caution of naval

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*"Castries also wrote to Ternay, instructing him 'to be
more enterprising and not to sentence himself to a
punctilious residency in Newport harbour.'"*

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commanders.[55] Towards the end of the war, Bouillé wrote of the French
squadron, "Since the war [began], on the offensive as on the defensive, it has
been much more prejudicial than useful to the king's service in the colonies
where, in general, the navy has done only silly things."[56] Bouillé described one
of Guichen's divisional commanders, Commodore de Sade (cousin of the
notorious novelist and playwright), as a "seventy-year-old man, half-witted and
ignorant, but brave."[57]

Bouillé was a trifle hard on the navy. Guichen and Rodney met three times
during 1780, and in each case the British admiral accomplished little. For the
French, however, this campaign marked a turning point in the war, in that the
Spaniards would not have accepted another setback.[58] Guichen's eventual
success was owing not to his tactical manoeuvring against Rodney but to the
arrival off Martinique in June 1780 of the promised Spanish fleet, with twelve
ships of the line, 146 merchantmen and transports, and eleven thousand troops.
The French admiral now slipped out of Fort Royal (modern Fort-de-France)
with fifteen sail and joined the Spaniards; but the latter, who had many sick on
board, had no thought of joint operations and insisted instead on being escorted
northward. Early in July the allied fleet departed the Windward Islands and

separated at the eastern end of Cuba, the Spaniards to make for Havana and the French for Cap François (today Cap Haitien) on the northern coast of Hispaniola. There Guichen found entreaties from Lafayette and the French minister to the United States to bring his forces to the American mainland, but the ever-cautious admiral refused to disobey his orders, which made no mention of North American waters. Convoying a home-bound fleet of nearly one hundred heavily laden merchantmen that he had escorted from Martinique to St. Domingue (present-day Haiti), in mid-August he sailed for Cadiz to avoid the onset of the hurricane season.

By July 1780, however, another French force had arrived, this time at Narragansett Bay. It was commanded by Commodore chevalier d'Arsac de Ternay, and it carried a French expeditionary force under the comte de Rochambeau. Where the outcome in the West Indies had been unclear, the French strategy in America now met with success. That these seven ships of the line and thirty-two transports with 5,500 troops had arrived safely indicated that even on the defensive and in an uncertain situation the peripheral strategy remained effective—certainly Rodney's appearance in mid-September at Sandy Hook with fourteen ships confirms that the British thought it was.[59] Although the British now had three times the number of French ships in America, their commanders chose to quarrel among themselves. (The French were not the only ones whose personal animosities affected outcomes, which suggests that too much weight should not be given to the factional divisions among French officers.)

At Narragansett Bay, Ternay was astride the communications between New York and Halifax and for that matter in position to strike anywhere along the coast to the south. As autumn wore on and the danger of hurricanes subsided, he also presented a growing threat to the West Indies. The strategy was clearly intended to force the British navy to react, leaving the French in control of the pace of the war. Ternay had to be watched, and during the last six months of 1780 the Royal Navy did little else. In November, Rodney returned, like Guichen before him, to Europe; but a superior British field force remained at New York keeping an eye on the French at Newport, this at a time when British forces in the southern colonies were becoming ever more deeply mired in a murderous war of terror and counterinsurgency. Nevertheless, the French did not develop their strategic initiative in America; that failure proved deeply disappointing and combined with altered circumstances in Europe to increase the need to seek a resolution.

In France, political events that autumn also led to important changes. Some in the Royal Council favoured initiating peace, but others, accepting that any hope for a short war was already a thing of the past, advocated expanding the conflict. Though earlier in the year the combined Franco-Spanish fleet (which

had spent the campaign season in Cadiz and off the western approaches to Europe) had made the largest capture of a British convoy in the eighteenth century, French policy makers had become deeply dissatisfied with its non-tactical role. Also, the secretary of state for the navy was becoming difficult; Sartine's request for the enormous sum of 173 million livres for the 1781 campaign suggested that he had become uncontrollable. This perception, combined with serious flaws in his programme of naval rearmament and his choice of commanders, left him politically vulnerable. The Spanish alliance, too, continued to be a problem; in September 1780 the Spanish foreign minister had proposed a combined attack on Jamaica, which would force the French to abandon their current strategy in favour of a Spanish aim of reconquest.[60] Finally, the growing war of attrition had become unbearably costly. Even Vergennes agreed that the coming campaign must be the last: "The means to support it are daily becoming exhausted," he wrote in February 1781.[61]

The marquis de Castries, secretary of the navy after October 1780, demanded an escalation of the war, but he was totally opposed to Spanish demands for a combined attack on Jamaica and also to those in the Royal Council who dared even consider it. He was also adamantly opposed to the current chiefs, d'Estaing and Guichen. In one of his first moves Castries ordered home all the French naval units at Cadiz, including Guichen's ships recently arrived from the West Indies. For Castries, the American war must be expanded and a new commander in chief given new freedom to determine strategy in the field. Louis XVI had promised command of the West Indies squadron to the older, more senior Admiral Charles-Auguste de La Touche-Tréville, but Castries successfully imposed his will in Council, and the king named the fifty-eight-year-old comte de Grasse.[62] The naval minister travelled to Brest in March 1781 to inspect the new rear admiral's fleet. Castries also wrote to Ternay, instructing him "to be more enterprising and not to sentence himself to a punctilious residency in Newport harbour."[63]

With no military reinforcements available (in part because of a deteriorating situation in Europe) for Rochambeau at Newport, Castries directed de Grasse to act according to a new strategy of aggression and expansion, operating in coordination with the land commanders in America to strike a strong blow during the coming fourth campaign of the war. Commodore Barras de Saint-Laurent, who went out in the spring to take command of the Newport force, was ordered to send to the West Indies American pilots familiar with the Chesapeake. A week after leaving Brest for the West Indies with his enormous convoy, de Grasse dispatched a frigate to Newport with proposals addressed to Rochambeau and General George Washington for coordinated action later in 1781. At that point he parted company also with Captain the chevalier de

Suffren, who was to expand Castries's peripheral strategy to the South Atlantic and India.[64]

Before de Grasse sailed for the West Indies, however, the French strategic situation had worsened. The British declared war against the United Provinces, which led to the seizure of St. Eustatius and other Dutch islands in the West Indies. France had always sought to preserve Dutch neutrality, knowing full well that the Dutch colonies and commitment to neutral rights and trade were of far greater strategic advantage to both France and the United States than any alliance.[65]

During the four months after de Grasse appeared at Martinique in April 1781, little occurred beyond the French capture of Tobago. The campaign appeared to be heading towards a repeat of the previous year's passive strategy, preserving the fleet rather than striking a blow. In August the onset of the hurricane season led de Grasse to seek more northerly seas. Reaching St. Domingue after leaving the Windward Islands, however, de Grasse found replies from the American military commanders to his earlier letters and also their pleas for immediate assistance. De Grasse obtained an additional 3,300 troops from the governor of St. Domingue and, in response to Rochambeau's news that French troops had not been paid for two months, he sent a frigate to Havana where, on his personal promise to pay, five million livres were raised from Spanish merchants in a single day.[66] French merchants had previously refused to provide the necessary funds. Less than two weeks later, on 30 August, Admiral de Grasse entered Chesapeake Bay, and the prelude to one of the most significant naval battles in history was over.

The subject of French naval strategy does not require any examination of the battle of the Virginia Capes or the conduct there of Admiral de Grasse. If his military capacity was not conspicuous, his energetic response to the news awaiting him at St. Domingue contributed to the speed and concentration that left the enemy outnumbered and conditioned the successful outcome of French strategy. It is also true, however, that the European half of French strategy in 1781 severely modified the American half—but also reinforced its success. That is, and although the marquis de Castries favoured expanding the war overseas, Spanish demands (and Vergennes's larger concerns) forced modification of a strategy so obviously in the French interest.

Meanwhile, growing pressure among the allies for peace challenged the strategy in yet another way. France had gone to war not to destroy Great Britain or its international influence, or to further Spanish interests, but to regain its position in Europe, which it hoped to achieve by redressing the colonial balance of power. By the end of 1781, both had been largely accomplished, the latter owing in part to the successful achievement of the half of French strategy concerned with the centre, that is, Europe.

During the summer of 1781 allied naval forces achieved success in European waters. In the North Sea, the Dutch usefully kept a British squadron occupied and contributed to stretching British naval resources to their limits.[67] More dramatically, a combined Franco–Spanish assault carried the island of Minorca. The expeditionary force was larger than anything in American waters; in July the French naval component, eighteen ships of the line from Brest under the comte de Guichen, placed itself under the overall command of Admiral Don Luis de Córdoba, whose combined fleet of thirty sail and one hundred transports safely landed fourteen thousand men on the island. Thereafter, the ships of the combined fleet spent most of the summer of 1781 cruising on the Soundings, westward of the English Channel and far from Minorca. Its aim was primarily to prevent the British from operating in the Mediterranean, but also to intercept British convoys and, in view of its own numerical superiority, to provoke a general fleet action.

It was in fact a fateful year in both theaters, and early that autumn, despite Spanish aims that concentrated resources against the British in Europe, French fortunes overseas also seemed to be at a crest. In October 1781 the British surrendered their last remaining field army in the American colonies, at York-town, but by then Britain had lost more than that to its allied enemies. Spanish colonial forces from Cuba and Louisiana, culminating in May a two-year effort, had seized (with the assistance of French ships and troops) Pensacola, on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico.[68] Also, during the autumn the ever–active marquis de Bouillé recaptured St. Eustatius.

Already, however, reverses were occurring. In early September the Spanish contingent of the combined fleet returned to Cadiz, forcing the now inferior French fleet to fall back into Brest. The whole Spanish alliance was thrown into jeopardy. The French reaction, at the insistence of Castries, was to plan a return in 1782 to the peripheral strategy; the focus would be on the West Indies and India, and even the cancelled attack on Hudson Bay was to go forward. In rapid preparation, reinforcements for these overseas campaigns were readied in the autumn and dispatched from France in December. Now occurred a second series of setbacks: over 80 percent of those reinforcements intended for de Grasse in the West Indies were captured, and in early 1782 a second convoy, bound for Suffren in India, was also lost.[69]

The consequences of these losses were severe. They redoubled financial strain on the government brought on by Necker's removal from office; and the defeat of de Grasse at the Battle of the Saintes in April 1782 (about which more presently) was due in some part to the missing guns, munitions, spars, and naval stores. Just how much his defeat can be blamed on this cause is unclear, but a strong argument can be made in the case of Commodore de Suffren in India.

His campaign was to be continually checked and inhibited by lack of manpower and materiel (as well as by disobedient subordinates).

Despite these disasters, French strategy for 1782 remained to attack on the periphery, but now its aim became three-fold: to force Great Britain to the peace table, keep Spain in the war, and prevent the Americans from leaving it. The French navy, however, was strained to its limits; no growing "military-industrial complex" existed at home to replace its losses. Manpower, materiel, and financial resources were exhausted.[70] And if Vergennes, Castries, and the Spanish foreign minister controlled strategy at the centre, in 1782 de Grasse had chief direction of the campaign in the West Indies, and he clearly failed.

On returning to Martinique after the battle off Chesapeake Bay, de Grasse and the marquis de Bouillé decided upon a campaign to conquer all of the British possessions in the Windward Islands. In January came the French attack on St. Kitts (St. Christophe); Admiral Samuel Hood's attempt to raise the siege was beaten off, and the island's fortress surrendered on 12 February.[71] At the end of March, de Grasse received some reinforcements, three ships of the line, but they carried new instructions that French forces were to effect a juncture with a Spanish force of warships and transports en route to the Antilles and attack Jamaica. The French had to agree; Castries left it to de Grasse, however, to choose the time of the landings. In the event, Admiral Rodney's arrival at Barbados in February gave the British numerical superiority and defensive advantage in the British Windward Islands.

According to John Creswell, more has been printed about the engagement that followed, known as the Battle of the Saintes and fought off the island of Dominica on 12 April 1782, than any other British naval battle except Trafalgar.[72] In short, it was a disaster for the French, who suffered the capture of the admiral commanding and three captains, and also the deaths of eight captains. In the aftermath, command of the French forces passed to the marquis de Vaudreuil. He gathered the surviving vessels around the convoy carrying troops of the expeditionary force that had been the original reason for sailing and made off for Cap François, which he reached on 25 April. Vaudreuil had but sixteen vessels and, following a council of war between French and Spanish officers and officials, he organised two convoys of homeward-bound merchantmen escorted by eight ships of the line, keeping with him only those ships that were copper-bottomed (and, with less bottom fouling, were therefore faster). Although the planned rendezvous with fifteen Spanish vessels now occurred, giving the allies numerical superiority, the entire offensive strategy had been shattered. Dissension and recrimination greatly increased within the French officers in the wake of the battle, and the planned attack on Jamaica was called off.[73] The French pursuit of an offensive strategy in the Western Hemisphere

ended; the fleets in the West Indies remained on the defensive until the end of the war.

Franco-Spanish strategy at the centre now focused again on Gibraltar, but with the failure of yet another assault on 13 September the naval war effectively came to an end. A month later the British successfully relieved the fortress once again.[74] The ensuing engagement decided nothing; the signing of the preliminaries of peace on 20 January 1783 was exactly three months away.

France's involvement in the American war neither caused American independence, though it made a major contribution, nor made the French Revolution inevitable. The war certainly weakened France's financial system, as had previous crises, but this time the government proved unable to gain control of its debt—not because the task was impossible but because political opposition prohibited the employment of usual solutions. Men, not fate or historical forces, led France toward the Revolution.[75] This article has sought to demonstrate that French intervention in American affairs and the effect of purely military factors on French objectives in the American war were never as important as the influence exerted on the intervention itself by domestic politics, the Spanish alliance, and the exigencies of the colonial situation.

French intervention in the American War of Independence did allow France to resume, however briefly, the position in the competitive state system that it had lost twenty years earlier. From the comte de Vergennes's point of view, intervention succeeded magnificently. The decision to aid the American insurgents, the choice to fight the war against Great Britain overseas while struggling against Spanish efforts to co-opt France in its own interests, and the dispatch of the several French expeditionary corps were all primarily due to him. The 1783 Treaty of Paris not only acknowledged the independence of the United States but reestablished the prestige of France, by restraining the appetites of Prussia and the Hapsburg house of Austria, playing off the Ottoman Empire against the steadily mounting pressure of Russia and also the United Provinces against the Hapsburgs, and by reinforcing the Spanish alliance to counterbalance British power.

This was no mean feat, considering that Vergennes, unable to rely on French resources alone, had been forced to depend upon strength outside French control. Notwithstanding, and although the French seized a high degree of strategic initiative at the beginning of the war, in general their operations were inhibited. They never succeeded in shaking off the moral advantage possessed by the enemy, with his experience, skill, and arrogance. Nor did they shake off their own traditional strategic and tactical doctrines, which rejected fleet actions to destroy enemy sea forces—though it remains debatable whether the latter

deserved the outright condemnation it has received from later navalists. French naval strategy also failed to rise above the ambitions and collective interests, insubordination, and inexperience of the officer corps. While this aspect needs to be taken into account, it seems scarcely surprising; strategy, after all, is socially as well as politically constructed. Personal factors neither prevented (nor caused) final French success. In fact, French naval strategy during the American War of Independence was more than a matter of keeping peace in Europe and sending major naval forces to America. Its success was due to something else entirely.

During the American War, French naval strategy took the form of an interlocking relationship between the centre and periphery, between the European and American theaters. French naval planners initially called for major thrusts to America, chiefly to the West Indies. Having to assign naval resources to the centre seemed to them a constraint, the price paid for the Spanish support that filled the vacuum of French naval weakness. Historians without exception have accepted this notion, finding that France achieved success in proportion to the degree to which it freed itself from European entanglements. But it can be argued that this "price," the invasion of England and later the conquests of Gibraltar and Minorca, may not have been detrimental to French naval strategy after all. Rather than weighing against the effectiveness of naval forces deployed to the periphery, that large French forces remained in Europe in support of the Spanish was the key to the former's effectiveness. Had the Spanish insisted instead on protection of their own colonial possessions or conquest of British possessions in the Caribbean (e.g., Jamaica) as their primary demand, it is unlikely that French naval resources would have been so available to support the Americans. At the same time, the Spanish aims, pursued with French support, considerably increased British uncertainty throughout the war, forcing the latter to retain forces in home waters beyond what the French alone would have tied up. France had not disengaged itself from Europe in order to concentrate resources in America, but rather owed its final success in America to its continued involvement in Europe. It locked the central and peripheral strategies into one.

It is not surprising that the French displayed no strategic boldness during the five years of war. French naval strategy was never clear-cut or straightforward, as many historians assume it was or ought to have been. It operated with considerable success when focused on North America, where options abounded; at the same time, it led naturally to the conduct of French admirals, which—like that of the British commanders in America, who also faced many choices— reflected cautiousness, uncertainty, and hesitation.

Notes

1. See, e.g., Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 88–90, 169.

106   Naval War College Review

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 117–8, my italics.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 89.

4. For the first claim see, e.g., William J. Eccles, *France in America*, rev. ed. (Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1990), p. 251.

5. Jonathan Dull, *The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774–1787* (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975), pp. 11 and 343–4.

6. J.F. Bosher, *The French Revolution* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988), p. 67; also Simon Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), pp. 51–9.

7. Robert D. Harris, *Necker: Reform Statesman of the Ancien Regime* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1979) is the most complete study; but see also J.F. Bosher, *French Finances, 1770–1795: From Business to Bureaucracy* (United Kingdom: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970), chap. 8, pp. 142–65.

8. For a somewhat uncritical view of Sartine, see Dull, *The French Navy*, pp. 14–5, 23–5, and 58–60. See Jacques Michel, *Du Paris de Louis XV à la marine de Louis XVI, l'oeuvre de Monsieur de Sartine*, 2 vols. (Paris: Edition de l'Erudit, 1984) for a more complete study.

9. Dull, *The French Navy*, admits Necker's influence (pp. 199–202) but attributes Sartine's dismissal to the secretary of state for foreign affairs, Vergennes, who sacrificed him to the demands of Franco-Spanish diplomacy. Harris, *Necker*, is more convincing in arguing that the reasons were financial (pp. 208–9).

10. On Castries see René de la Croix, duc de Castries, *Le Maréchal de Castries (1727–1800)* (Paris: Flammarion, 1956).

11. One of the most enigmatic and controversial figures of eighteenth-century French governments, Maurepas has never been the subject of a scholarly biography; a good source of insight into his pervasive influence in government and at court during the reign of Louis XVI, however, is Jehan de Witte, ed., *Journal de l'Abbé de Véri*, 2 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1933).

12. Piers Mackesy, *The War for America, 1775–1783* (London: Longmans, 1964).

13. In addition to Dull's sketch of Vergennes in *The French Navy*, pp. 6–8, 294–5, and 334–5, see Orville T. Murphy, *Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes: French Diplomacy in the Age of Revolution, 1719–1787* (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1982), for the most complete study; and also J.-F. Labourdette, *Vergennes, Ministre principal de Louis XVI* (Paris: Editions Desjonquières, 1990), whose work complements Murphy's by focusing on the politics of the French court and Royal Council.

14. Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Espagne, tome 590, folio 141. Vergennes to comte de Montmorin, 31 July 1778, quoted in A.T. Patterson, *The Other Armada: The Franco-Spanish Attempt to Invade Britain in 1779* (United Kingdom: Manchester Univ. Press, 1960), p. 37; also Dull, *The French Navy*, p. 165 for a similar expression to the same correspondent fourteen months later.

15. For a broad overview and comparison of the French and British economies during the half-century before the American war, see François Crouzet, "England and France in the Eighteenth Century: A Comparative Analysis of Two Economic Growths," reprinted in his *Britain Ascendant: Comparative Studies in Franco-British Economic History* (United Kingdom: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990), pp. 12–43 (French original in *Annales E.S.C.*, v. 2 [1966], pp. 254–91); see also Ralph Davis, *The Rise of the Atlantic Economies* (London: Methuen, 1973) chaps. 17 and 18, pp. 288–316, for a critical variation on the same theme.

16. Murphy, *Vergennes*, p. 256; and Dull, *The French Navy*, pp. 138–9.

17. Schama, *Citizens*, pp. 79–87; also Dull, *The French Navy*, pp. 46–7.

18. Harris, *Necker*, p. 119.

19. Murphy, *Vergennes*, chaps. 21 to 25, pp. 261–330.

20. See, E.H. Jenkins, *A History of the French Navy* (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1973), p. 151.

21. See Patterson, *The Other Armada*, pp. 37–9, for an excellent brief discussion; also Mackesy, *War for America*, pp. 190–2.

22. Mackesy, *War for America*, p. 324.

23. G. Lacour-Gayet, *La Marine militaire de la France sous le règne de Louis XVI* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1905), pp. 19–20; also Raoul Castex, *Les idées militaires de la marine du xviiie siècle, de Ruyter à Suffren* (Paris: L. Fournier, 1911), p. 165.

24. See E. Taillemite, *L'Histoire ignorée de la marine française* (Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1988), pp. 175–6, for a more complete discussion.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 169, 173.

26. Quoted in Michel Vergé-Franceschi, *La Royale au temps de l'amiral d'Estaing* (Paris: La Pensée Universelle, 1977), p. 44.

27. See John A. Tilley, *The British Navy and the American Revolution* (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1987), p. 150.

28. See Henri Doniol, *Histoire de la participation de la France à l'établissement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique: correspondance diplomatique et documents*, 5 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1886–92), v. 3, pp. 237–52, for summaries of instructions in d'Estaing's own hand sent to the French minister to the United States in June

1778. Of the historians who have heaped so much opprobrium on the admiral, few have ever referred to his instructions.

29. Dull, *The French Navy*, p. 119.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 121; also Jenkins, *A History of the French Navy*, pp. 150–2.

31. Taillemite, *L'Histoire ignorée*, pp. 185–6.

32. V.F. Brun, *Guerres maritimes de la France: port de Toulon, ses armements, son administration depuis son origine jusqu'à nos jours*, 2 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1861), v. 1, pp. 243–4, quoting Admiral René Duguay-Trouin that sea battles cost France infinitely and decided nothing.

33. Jean Tarrade, *Le Commerce coloniale de la France à la fin de l'ancien régime: l'évolution du régime de "l'Exclusif" de 1763 à 1789*, 2 vols. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972) v. 1, pp. 466–8, esp. note 67.

34. Jenkins, *History of the French Navy*, p. 153; and Dull, *The French Navy*, pp. 123–4.

35. For the best discussion of the campaign in America, see David Syrett, *The Royal Navy in American Waters, 1775–1783* (Aldershot, Hants, U.K.: Scolar Press, 1989), pp. 92–116.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

37. See Dull, *The French Navy*, pp. 126–43; also Murphy, *Vergennes*, pp. 261–79, for the complex diplomacy leading to the Convention.

38. Mackesy, *War for America*, pp. 279–80.

39. See Patterson, *The Other Armada*.

40. A.T. Mahan, *Major Operations of the Navies in the War of Independence* (London: S. Low, Marston, 1913), pp. 101–4; also Mackesy, *War for America*, pp. 231–2.

41. Dull, *The French Navy*, p. 159.

42. See Mahan, *Major Operations*, pp. 105–12, for the best overall account; but see John Creswell, *British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century: Tactics in Battle* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972) chap. 9, pp. 132–40, for a more detailed, tactical discussion based on the *Barrington Papers* (Navy Records Society, 1941).

43. Doniol, *Histoire de la participation*, v. 4, pp. 160–1, d'Estaing to Gérard, Fort Royal, 9 March 1779.

44. See A.A. Lawrence, *Storm over Savannah: The Story of Count d'Estaing and the Siege of the Town in 1779* (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1951); and C.C. Jones, Jr., ed., *The Siege of Savannah by the Fleet of Count d'Estaing in 1779* (New York: New York Times [1874], 1968).

45. Doniol, *Histoire de la participation*, v. 5, p. 295.

46. Quoted in Jenkins, *A History of the French Navy*, p. 158.

47. Mackesy, *War for America*, p. 324.

48. See David Spinney, *Rodney* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), pp. 196–312; and Murphy, *Vergennes*, p. 330.

49. Patrick Villiers, *Marine royal, corsaires et trafic dans l'Atlantique de Louis XIV à Louis XVI*, 2 vols. (Dunkerque: Société Dunkerquoise d'Histoire et d'Archéologie, 1991), v. 2, pp. 582–3.

50. Taillemite, *L'Histoire ignorée*, p. 204; and Villiers, *Marine royal*, v. 2, p. 583.

51. See Castex, *Les idées militaires*, pp. 79–97, for a highly critical assessment of Guichen's three battles.

52. Quoted in Mahan, *Major Operations*, p. 141; see also Taillemite, *L'Histoire ignorée*, pp. 200–9, for a recent favourable appreciation of Guichen.

53. See Mahan, *Major Operations*, pp. 128–58, for the classic account of Guichen's and Rodney's campaign; but see also Creswell, *British Admirals*, pp. 141–51, for a different and superior appreciation.

54. Spinney, *Rodney*, pp. 317–44; and also Mahan, *Major Operations*, p. 140.

55. Bouillé's 480-page report on the war in the West Indies, which can be found in Archives des colonies, Série C^{8}A, v. 82, contains a valuable commentary on the behaviour of the navy.

56. Quoted in Tarrade, *Le Commerce coloniale*, v. 1, p. 472, note 82.

57. Quoted in Taillemite, *L'Histoire ignorée*, p. 171.

58. Dull, *The French Navy* p. 188.

59. See Syrett, *The Royal Navy*, pp. 142, 144–6 for the clearest discussion of Ternay's threat to the British war effort. See Maurice Linyer de la Barbée, *Le Chevalier de Ternay: vie de Charles-Henry-Louis d'Arsac de Ternay, chef d'escadre des armées navales*, 2 vols. (Grenoble: Editions des 4 seigneurs 1972), v. 2, pp. 529–642, for a recent account of the French campaign.

60. Dull, *The French Navy*, pp. 197–9.

61. Doniol, *Histoire de la participation*, v. 4, pp. 544–5.

62. Dull, *The French Navy*, pp. 217–8.

63. Castries, *Le Maréchal de Castries*, p. 89.

64. Doniol, *Histoire de la participation*, v. 5, pp. 469–70, Castries to Rochambeau, Brest, 21 March 1781.

65. See Murphy, *Vergennes*, pp. 280–8; and Dull, *The French Navy*, pp. 211–6.

66. Dull, *The French Navy*, pp. 239–48, for a good summary of the movements of the French forces; but see also Mahan, *Major Operations*, pp. 176–8.

67. Mackesy, *War for America*, pp. 394–5.

68. In one of the strangest events of the war, on 12 February 1781 a small Spanish force captured Fort St. Joseph, near present-day Niles, Michigan, as part of the overall Spanish attack on the British in America. See the proclamation of conquest printed in Joseph L. Peyser, ed. and trans., *Letters from New France: The Upper Country, 1686–1783* (Urbana and Chicago: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1992), pp. 220–1.

69. Mahan, *Major Operations*, pp. 227–8.

70. Dull, *The French Navy*, pp. 279–80.

71. Some historians ignore these preliminaries, which were primarily responsible for rendering the British naval victory nugatory; for example, see Creswell, *British Admirals*, pp. 163–5.

72. Creswell, *British Admirals*, p. 163.

73. Villiers, *Marine royal*, v. 2, p. 603; Dull, *The French Navy*, pp. 283–4.

74. T.H. McGuffie, *The Siege of Gibraltar 1779–1783* (London: Batsford, 1965), pp. 139–67.

75. J.F. Bosher, *French Finances*, pp. 166–82; also Harris, *Necker*, p. 216.

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IN MY VIEW . . .

"A Decision Is Coming Due"

Sir:

The United States has been intimately involved in the Law of the Sea (LOS) process for almost four decades—beginning with the initial United Nations Law of the Sea Conference in 1958. Just over a decade ago, the Reagan administration decided against signing the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which represented the culmination of this process. This was followed several months later by the final conference vote on the long and detailed treaty, when the U.S. became one of only four nations to vote against the final Convention. In every sense, the U.S. made a major foreign policy statement by not signing a treaty that had taken nearly a decade to produce and was the culminating result of the largest single international negotiating project undertaken before or since.

By late 1982, as the final sessions were held, the treaty had become much more than a piece of paper. It was an international state of mind—it codified much of what had been customary international law in the Law of the Sea and established new norms in the negotiation of multistate treaty agreements. It therefore came as a great disappointment to large segments of the international community when the newly inaugurated Reagan administration decided not to sign the final accord. To much of the world, it appeared that the U.S. wanted to select from among specific benefits of the treaty without accepting the negotiated compromise portions in the document.

We may be witnessing a unique and valuable window of opportunity for the emergence of a new period of ocean development. Momentous political, economic, and military changes have occurred since the Convention was signed by 159 nations. Many of the ideological, political, and economic issues that drove the U.S. refusal to sign the treaty have changed dramatically as we move through the 1990s. On 30 June 1994, Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced that various amendments to the Convention had been accepted by enough nations that the previous U.S. concerns (particularly about seabed mining and technology transfer) were now satisfactorily addressed, and that the U.S. would join the more than sixty nations that had already signed the treaty. The next step in the process, of course, would be for the U.S. Senate to consider and either ratify or reject the treaty. Ten reasons suggest that the U.S. should be a party to the amended 1982 LOS Cenvention; taken together, they underscore the desirability of continuing to pursue the orderly development of the international regime of the Law of the Sea. These ten reasons are:

• The nation has a common-sense obligation to evaluate carefully all important policies affecting U.S. foreign relations and to accept those which, on balance, advance the nation's interests.

• The passage of time since the UNCLOS process ended has allowed issues to be seen from a wider perspective, with more historical balance and a clearer sense of what actually is at stake and what is technologically feasible.

• The changing situation with respect to seabed mining has dramatically decreased the importance of that issue. The likelihood of economically feasible deep seabed mining of metallic nodules in the next several decades now appears remote, presenting a unique opportunity to defuse this once-contentious issue.

• The growing international concern with the environment and over the ability of the Law of the Sea framework to address many worldwide environmental issues makes acceptance of the Law of the Sea Convention a virtual prerequisite for meaningful international discussion on the environment.

• The growing U.S. rapprochement with much of the developing world makes the Law of the Sea a much less polarizing issue than the early 1980s, when much of the Third World was firmly aligned against U.S. desires on the treaty, oftentimes for primarily ideological reasons.

• The willingness of many nations to address the concerns of the U.S. and make the treaty more acceptable, particularily in the area of seabed mining, indicates that there is strong support in the international community for meaningful U.S. participation.

• The changing global security environment, which will place an even greater premium on freedom of the seas and maritime flexibility and mobility than is the case today, makes it even more imperative that the U.S. operate within a stable maritime environment.

• The significant decrease in the size of the United States Navy, as part of the overall downsizing of the U.S. military, could significantly limit our ability to address challenges to the unhampered use of the oceans by the growing navies of a host of nations, unless a strong Law of the Sea treaty (as presently written) lent further international weight to our position.

• The growing political, economic, and military costs of the U.S. Freedom of Navigation (FON) program in the face of the increasing number of FON challenges to the escalating maritime assertions of a growing number of states make it highly desirous for the U.S. to decrease the number of contentious ocean issues.

• The position of the United States as a world leader may be brought into question through its refusal to agree to one of the most important international agreements ever negotiated—but it could be enhanced by our taking a more proactive role in shepherding the treaty into its implementation phase.

When all is said and done, the United States is a maritime nation tied to the oceans and the intelligent use of the seas for political, economic, and military purposes. We have the most to gain from stability in laws governing the use of the seas, and this stability over the long term can best be ensured by a widely ratified Law of the Sea Convention. Accession to the Convention by the United States will not be a panacea. Its rules are not perfect. But widespread ratification is likely to increase order and predictability, enhance adaptation to new cir-cumstances, narrow the scope of disputes to more manageable proportions, and provide means to resolve them. Clearly, the United States holds the key to this widespread ratification.

There is a finite half-life within which to accomplish a U.S. review of, and ultimate accession to, the Law of the Sea Convention. On November 16, 1993, Guyana became the sixtieth nation to ratify the treaty. In accordance with the treaty's ratification provisions, it will go into effect one year from that date. Having the treaty go into effect without U.S. accession would not be in our best interest politically, economically, or militarily. Viewed in this context, the need for acceptance of the treaty (by formal ratification) is indeed compelling.

George Galdorisi
Captain, U.S. Navy

B-17 Gun Ships

Sir:

I must take exception with I.B. Holley's statement that "the B-17 never mounted *five* turrets." [See Professor Holley's review of Michael E. Brown's *Flying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Program*, in the Summer

112   Naval War College Review

1993 *Naval War College Review,* pp. 152–3.] Although I arrived in England after the 8th Air Force had passed the high attrition rates, I was made aware that the 8th did attempt to counter the German fighter attacks by making gun ships out of a limited number of B–17s. Additional turrets were installed for a total of five. Unfortunately the experiment was not successful and was soon abandoned.

I'm sure official Air Force records will confirm my hearsay comments.

Peter Boyes
Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Professor Holley replies:

Mea Culpa! Colonel Boyes is correct but only by a slender margin. Brown's book says the original 1935 B-17 had five turrets. That version had *no* turrets, only five flexible mounts. The B-17 in its final production configuration had three turrets: upper, lower (ball), and chin. The tail guns, often mistakenly regarded as a turret, were in a flexible mount. The experiment with "escort bombers", the XB-40 and YB-40, added a Martin upper turret aft of the Sperry upper one and forward of the ball. Only seven of these YB-40 escorts were produced, all with *four* turrets. However, some bomb groups in the 8th Air Force experimented with various configurations including one with a power turret in the tail. Colonel Boyes must have seen one of these. So I was wrong in saying the B-17 *never* had five turrets, thinking only of the officially designated models. For details see 12 *Air Power Historian* (July 1965) 1992–1994.

I.B. Holley, Jr.
Major General, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

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BOOK REVIEWS

A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

"More Than Just Semantics"

Huang, J.H., trans. *Sun Tzu: The New Translation of the Art of War*. New York: William Morrow, 1993. 299pp. $10

THE STUDY OF SUN TZU'S *The Art of War* began a renaissance of sorts after the discovery in 1972 in an ancient tomb near Linyi in Shandong of a text of that classic that antedated, by perhaps a millennium, the versions previously known. Although the discovery has confirmed the historicity of much about Sun Tzu that had previously been doubted, the new text has also provided impetus for new translations.

One of the new translations has been produced by J.H. Huang, a California-based scholar whose previous book, written in Chinese, explored the origins and changing meanings of Chinese characters. For those accustomed to the standard version of *The Art of War* by General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC, published in 1963, much in Huang's translation will be striking, even disconcerting. To give just one example, the key term *shi* 勢 (used in the title of the fifth book): Griffith read it as "energy," but Huang translates it as "combat power." To make things even more confusing, another new translation, by Professor Roger Ames of the University of Hawaii, with whom Huang is bound to be compared, renders the same character as "strategic advantage."

This disagreement is more than a matter of philological or semantic quibbling. It brings us to one of the fundamental questions about Chinese "strategic culture." Some interpreters are impressed by the differences between Western and Chinese ways of thinking about war. They note that the lack of attention to force (*li* 力 a character that occurs only nine times in the thirteen chapters of the book) emphasizes the extent to which Sun Tzu makes warfare a matter of psychology. Broadly, they place him in the world of Taoist philosophy, with its

conviction that only by moving with "the way" can human success, including military success, be secured. More narrowly, they look at his emphasis on intelligence, assessments, and deception (*gui* 詭), based on psychological insight.

But many people (military specialists not least) are reluctant to accept the idea that war is really all that different from culture to culture. They would argue that force is force and violence is violence, whether one is in Sun Tzu's China or Napoleon's Europe. Huang manifests some sympathy for this line of interpretation in his rendition of *shi* as "combat power." He is, furthermore, on solid ground philologically: usages contained in the ancient etymological treatise the *Shuowen* and other classics show the word meaning something like force or power as understood in the West, whether latent (as in a set crossbow) or unleashed (as in a flood so powerful as to sweep boulders along).

Nonspecialists in Chinese will probably be impatient with this sort of close linguistic analysis, but it has a real point. The choice of translation for *shi* is only one of a number of possible examples that mark Huang's Sun Tzu as, in modern terms, a rather "realist" reading. Whether, as such, it can capture all the implications and resonances of the text is a matter for scholars to debate. For the general reader, however, it has one great advantage: the realist approach to Sun Tzu helps to dispel the air of exoticism that sometimes envelops Oriental military classics. It is probably not coincidental that Huang is the son of a Republic of China air force colonel and presumably did military service himself.

Huang presents his text in double columns, in modern English; on the right are the translated words of Sun Tzu, and on the left is Huang's analysis. An introduction and extensive notes further clarify the text. However, Huang's publishers have done him a real disservice by omitting Chinese characters in his work—Ames's publishers saw fit to include them. A desk-top computer can now handle Chinese graphics, so there is no excuse for a leading publisher not to provide them in a book of this quality.

<div align="right">
Arthur Waldron
Naval War College and
Brown University
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Castex, Raoul. *Strategic Theories.* Eugenia C. Kiesling, editor and translator. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 438pp. (No price given)

In the history of strategic thought, few theorists have demonstrated the sweeping command of broad concepts that characterizes the work of Raoul Castex. Nevertheless, while Clausewitz, Jomini, and Mahan retain prominent positions in the strategic pantheon, Castex remains obscure, though he is every bit their equal, and more contemporary.

He wrote largely of sea power, but from the perspective of a naval officer in the service of a declining continental power. Writing during the turbulent period between the world wars, he urged retrenchment upon a heedless France that would soon suffer defeat, first at the hands of Nazis, then in two humiliating colonial wars. That he could not steer his countrymen off these shoals may have contributed to the discounting of his efforts; but, in the main, it is simply inaccessibility that has kept him so little known. Heretofore published only in French, Castex's masterwork ran some 2,500 pages in length.

Eugenia Kiesling, with her lucid translation and skillful editing, which present the distilled essence of Castex in well under five hundred pages, has made the obscure accessible. Her selections illuminate his many insights and remarkable grasp of both strategy and the deep currents that guide international politics. Kiesling presents writings in which Castex addresses a number of issues that are timely once again, such as joint warfare, information dominance, and civil-military relations. Finally, her trenchant introductory essay and the explanatory footnotes throughout the text strongly support her assertion that "no author has wrestled more earnestly than Castex with the methodological questions that ought to underpin the study of strategy."

In the realm of strategy, Castex does provide what historian Theodore Ropp referred to as a "synthesis" of the competing theories of the *jeune école* and Alfred T. Mahan. Taking their guidance from French Admiral Aube,

the reformers of the *jeune école* sought what has been called "sea denial"—in effect, "negative sea control"—the ability to deny via commerce raiding and the use of advanced technology (the torpedo, in that era) an opponent the benefits of naval mastery. Mahan attacked them vigorously in his "influence" books, arguing that the only form of mastery that mattered was positive sea control. Castex stood astride both positions. He agreed with Mahan about the need for positive control, but he also argued that in order to achieve naval mastery, a challenger would need to blend skillfully a mix of negative and positive maritime initiatives.

This insight led Castex to his concept of *manoeuvre*, the combination of efforts to create an opportunity to confront the leading naval power under favorable circumstances. Seen in this light, commerce and other forms of naval raiding would serve to disperse and wear down the opponent, creating the necessary conditions for a more direct challenge. In a brilliant critique of German naval strategy during World War I, Castex pointed out the manner in which both submarine and cruiser operations had dispersed and weakened the Royal Navy to a point at which the High Seas Fleet could have engaged the British Grand Fleet on virtually equal terms in the fall of 1914. That it did not, but was relegated instead to await interminably the fulfillment of a half-completed *manoeuvre*, led to Castex's explanation that though "the disparity in force should not have been paralyzing, the Germans were from the beginning convinced of their impotence against the British navy."

Sensitive to the role of fear in weakening German operational strategy against the Royal Navy, Castex also showed a keen awareness of the effect of pride in keeping France's grand strategic colonial commitments very much out of line with its capabilities. His prescient call for retrenchment, in particular a withdrawal from Southeast Asia, could, had it been heeded, have saved France much humiliation. Indeed, Castex's thoughts on overseas involvements, the enduring importance of geographic factors, and the need to keep a balance between capabilities, costs, and commitments all seem particularly applicable to the American strategic position in the wake of the Cold War.

With his grand strategist's eye for spotting the key elements that characterize international rivalries, Castex also introduced the notion of the *perturbateur*, the state that seeks to overturn the politico-military status quo. He noted that this challenger is usually a continental power, driven toward conflict with the dominant maritime power, but whose strivings always end in defeat. Castex's ideas about land-sea rivalry are neatly juxtaposed with the geopolitical theories of the British geographer (and champion of land power) Halford Mackinder. He also clearly anticipates German historian Ludwig Dehio's sea-oriented theory about why continental challengers consistently lose their wars against maritime powers.

Indeed, Castex's interest in the land-sea nexus of conflict led him to a series of compelling hypotheses about the effects of maritime power upon land operations and vice versa. Where Mahan explored this theme somewhat obliquely, using primarily the Second Punic War for his theoretical framework, Castex tackled the problem quite systematically. He devoted considerable attention to combined operations as well, generating a number of insights that still seem applicable in what is fast becoming an era of joint and littoral warfare. For Mahan, combined operations often seemed a dangerous distraction from the overarching objective of attaining, and maintaining, command of the sea. Castex, on the other hand, recognized the crucially important role that the exercise of naval mastery often has in strategically positioning land forces against even the most redoubtable continental opponent. In this regard, much of Castex's thinking resonates well with ". . . From the Sea."

In addition to commenting sagaciously on land-sea operations, Castex introduced the key theme of interservice coordination to achieve dominance of the information spectrum. He envisioned a sea-air-land communication network that would keep naval combatants apprised of the whereabouts of their opposite numbers. Needless to say, an advantage in this area would be a substantial force multiplier, particularly when employed in conjunction with tactical surprise. Castex's chapters on naval operations during World War I include a wealth of examples of German aerial and electronic reconnaissance in pursuit of a decisive information advantage over the Royal Navy. That the High Seas Fleet failed to use the results

to its ultimate benefit arose partly from its organizational inferiority complex, and partly from Britain's own highly effective information-warfare campaign of cryptanalysis.

In terms of understanding organizational influences, Castex was well ahead of his time. His work shows a remarkable sensitivity to the ways in which military institutional interests may distort political policy at the highest levels. For example, he pointed out that German naval leaders in 1914 devoted considerable effort to rationalizations for avoiding direct confrontations with the Royal Navy. Citing primary sources, he noted the general agreement among the naval hierarchy that the High Seas Fleet must remain "in being," which really meant "in port," so that it would have sufficient bargaining power in the inevitable peace negotiations.

For all his merits, however, Castex does suffer from a few flaws, one of them what Kiesling describes as "exaggeratedly scientific" claims. For example, in describing the ability of regionally hegemonic powers to absorb their smaller neighbors, Castex holds in pseudo-Newtonian fashion that "the attractive force is, as in physics, proportional to the mass of the larger power and the reciprocal of the square of the distance."

Other problems arise from Castex's apparent inability to think about tactical matters or their interaction with strategy. Thus, he seems askew in labeling commerce raiding as essentially a defensive doctrine rather than as tactically offensive, even in strategically defensive circumstances. His self-limitation to a strategic level

of analysis also seems responsible for his too-gloomy predictions about the future of amphibious warfare. His conclusions might have been more accurate had he undertaken a tactics-oriented appraisal, sensitive to the need for fire support and appropriate landing craft, as the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps did during the interwar period.

Despite such limitations, Castex presents a broad, intellectually engaging and persuasive perspective on strategy, both general and naval. Notwithstanding Ropp's notion that he merely synthesized the competing views of his time, there is a wealth here of genuinely original insights that will likely have implications for policy in areas as diverse as joint warfare, civil-military relations, strategy, and information dominance. Eugenia Kiesling, for her part, has presented Castex's work in a fashion truly worthy of inclusion among the *Classics of Sea Power*, rendering it with clarity, verve, and more than a modicum of literary elegance.

JOHN ARQUILLA
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

Odom, William E. *America's Military Revolution: Strategy and Structure after the Cold War.* Washington, D.C.: The American Univ. Press, 1993. 186pp. $22.95

In this work, Lieutenant General William E. Odom has set out to explore military strategy in the larger context of grand strategy and to examine the impact of the Cold War's end. He begins by saying that he wants to broaden the

defense debate rather than deepen it, and that he will be didactic at times. In doing so, he sums up the strengths and weaknesses of his book.

Odom is at his best when discussing national security management and what he calls the new strategic environment. In Part One, there is a discussion of the newly emerging international system, economic trends, and current treaties and alliances, and also a review of potential strategies for the United States and of the forces needed to support them. The first of these strategies, "Pax Americana," posits a U.S. that maintains a strong military and dominates the international community. The second, "America First," envisions preoccupation with domestic issues and retreat from the international arena. In the third strategy, "Economy of Force and Comparative Advantage," U.S. military power is used sparingly, with a heavy reliance on cooperative action. Odom himself recommends this view, but he seems to ignore the likelihood that without a clear threat the United States will not develop any coherent international strategy at all.

Odom discusses different world regions and the possible threat of each to the United States and to world peace. He pegs the success of future U.S. strategy on maintaining close alliances with two key nations, Germany and Japan, and argues cogently in support of this assertion. He then looks at technological developments that will shape future conflicts, in an analysis that draws many of its arguments from lessons of the Gulf War.

The book's fifth chapter, "Implications for Future Force Structure," is almost guaranteed to raise the ire of the seagoing officer. The author falls into the old Army stereotype of believing that the Navy's primary role is safely transporting troops and their stores. After a fairly mild review of the other services, Odom finds that the Navy's fleet can be cut "perhaps by half." He concludes that land-based aviation is far superior to sea-based aviation, that the former can be deployed "in most parts of the world," and that the carrier force should be cut to provide funds for "restructuring." He identifies the Navy's future functions as "limited actions, support to land operations, and show-the-flag missions"—a sweeping reduction of the Navy's role to a secondary one. He saves his most draconian criticism, however, for the "obsolescent" Marines, stating that amphibious assault is increasingly irrelevant; he therefore recommends a reduction of the Marine Corps from four divisions to one. (Odom is not a proponent of ". . . From the Sea.") The Coast Guard (perhaps fortunately, given the trend here) escapes any mention at all.

Part Two covers national security management and returns to the topics on which Odom is most effective. He presents a balanced look at coalition diplomacy and military actions, and, although his analysis of the intelligence community is clear, his recommendations are controversial. There is a nice discussion of our military space efforts; however, there is no mention of the prototype DCX single-stage-to-orbit rocket, which might make attainable the reusable launch system Odom recommends.

The author recommends drastic changes to Pentagon organization, significantly reducing civilian defense agencies and turning the Joint Chiefs into a general staff. This reviewer, for one, remains unconvinced that this is necessary and fears the impact that Odom's recommendations would have on civilian control of the military. Also, his discussion of the industrial base is rather cursory; he is more successful at identifying problems than solutions.

This work is most effective in broadening the defense debate and putting military issues in a larger context. In this respect it is a welcome addition to the literature. For the Navy and the other sea services, however, it should be a call to action. It is a sign that we still have not done enough to educate and convince the defense community about the real and lasting role of naval forces in both peace and war, of the importance of freedom of the seas, and of the significant role naval forces will have in shaping the world's future.

ALAN L. BROWN
Commander (Sel.),
U.S. Coast Guard Reserve

Miller, Paul David. *Both Swords and Plowshares: Military Roles in the 1990s.* Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1992. 58pp. $7.50

Peters, John E. *The U.S. Military: Ready for the New World Order?* Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993. 176pp. $49.95

Both Swords and Plowshares was derived from Admiral Paul David Miller's presentation at the "Naval Forward Presence and the National Military Strategy" conference organized by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The title page reminds us that Paul Miller is Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command and, in the Nato structure, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and it contains no disclaimer. The book is a high-level vision of the future.

Miller's major messages are that America's basic national interests, objectives, and leadership role have not changed; that elements of our national power, including military, can be used to shape the future; that in building a consensus on a new national security strategy, the military must be proactive and involve all interested parties, including the American public; that core competencies, deterrence, crisis response, and war fighting should form the basis for programming American general forces; and that "jointness is the name of the game." Free from service parochialism, the book is evidence that Goldwater-Nichols is working at the higher levels of military leadership.

This work is a welcome addition to the professional's bookshelf. As more serving naval officers make such public contributions, the debate over the emerging national security, military strategy, and naval doctrine will be strengthened. This reviewer wholeheartedly agrees with the author that "we now have the rare chance—a window of opportunity that opens only once in two or three generations—to

restructure our military forces fundamentally."

The author of the second book under review is also an active-duty officer, but one of vastly different seniority and background. Lieutenant Colonel John E. Peters, U.S. Army, is a published author who has substantially cut down his 1990 doctoral dissertation in *The U.S. Military: Ready for the New World Order?* This thoroughly documented work clearly establishes Peters's credentials to enter the debate as a serious contender with his own views on how to restructure fundamentally our military forces.

Peters first examines the concerns that make change in the military probable and necessary: the new international security environment, limits on the deterrence of subconventional war, emerging threats, the impact of technology, the budget, arms control, and domestic attitudes towards defense. After examining these elements, he concludes that the redirection of the budget away from defense will affect military programming more than any other factor. Peters might have concluded that the emerging post–Cold War national security strategy is in fact budget-driven, rather than stuck to the alternative paradigms of goal-oriented (active) or threat-based (reactive) strategies.

This reviewer agrees with Peters that in the absence of the Cold War, future crises will not automatically solicit urgent or specifically military responses from the United States and that a fire brigade-type "central reserve of forces" can largely substitute for forward–based combat-capable forces.

Peters's conclusion that the U.S. should focus more attention on the Asia-Pacific region is refreshing, and unusual for a serving Army officer.

He includes four illustrative case studies to help describe the Department of Defense's deliberate program planning process. His assessment is that the existing system "seems marginal at best" and "that the current strategic planning process is unlikely to produce the optimal force structure" that the nation requires for the future. Peters recommends a small professional National Defense Staff and a new strategic planning system, as well as a force structure that has an active army smaller than Les Aspin's "C" force but a reserve component that exceeds George Bush's Base Force. (Miller, however, supports the ongoing military reform efforts, which are not reflected in *The U.S. Military*.)

Whereas *Both Swords and Plowshares* was updated to reflect the rise in Bill Clinton's fortunes in November 1992, John Peters was probably too busy as a working action officer to do more than give a modest updating (threats and Desert Storm) to research that was largely completed in early 1990. Unfortunately this means that *The U.S. Military* does not reflect the Bush speech at Aspen; the 1991 and 1993 *National Security Strategy of the United States;* the 1991 Nato "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept"; the 1992 *National Military Strategy of the United States;* the 1992 *New York Times* and *Washington Post* leaks of the post–Cold War Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) scenarios; Representative Les Aspin's 1992 "An Approach to Sizing

American Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era"; and a host of primary and secondary sources describing the 1990–1991 defense review that resulted in the major changes Peters feared would never be made.

The U.S. Military is really a book about the United States Army. But in spite of its emphasis on Army matters, Peters does manage to present an objective case and even to gore the ox of the Army Corps of Engineers by suggesting that "such functions may be better performed by the U.S. Department of the Interior or by private enterprise." On the other hand, his original dissertation recommended an Army Contingency Corps of five divisions in the continental United States, which is increased to seven in the book.

Neither book devotes serious attention to offensive or defensive strategic nuclear forces. In Miller's case this is understandable, given the purpose of the original conference presentation. However, in the case of *The U.S. Military*, it exemplifies the separation of nuclear and general strategic planning typical of the armed forces—a bifurcation that this reviewer disagrees with strongly. Neither does either work truly address the Bush administration's redefinition of overseas presence (to include virtually anything) or the implication of the fact that reduction in forces requires host-nation support and alliances or coalitions at the operational level of warfare. It is not surprising, however, that the authors pay serious attention to reconstitution against a "resurgent-emergent global threat."

Both books advocate a particular future rather than deal with the regionally focused defense strategy first defined by George Bush and later modified by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. By failing to rework his initial research and address the development of the Bush strategy, Peters lost the opportunity to revise his overly pessimistic view of the strategic planning process. Had he done so, he would have had to conclude that the "system" had devised an "off-line" way to produce a radically new military strategy—one fairly in line with what he recommended.

Both books are valuable contributions to the literature and serve to document the depth of the ongoing debate. Neither is the last word on the subject, but both are welcome.

JAMES J. TRITTEN
Virginia Beach, Virginia

Rosati, Jerel A. *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy.* Fort Worth, Tex.: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1993. 621p. (No price given)

This volume by Jerel Rosati, a former research associate in the Congressional Research Service and currently associate professor of government at the University of South Carolina, is an ambitious undertaking. He cites four goals in the preface: "to be comprehensive in topical coverage, to address central themes in U.S. foreign policy, to provide a strong sense for the actual workings of politics, and to be accessible and interesting to the reader." The author succeeds in all but one; he falls

short on central themes in foreign policy.

The book's strength lies in its comprehensive examination of the numerous institutions and groups that influence the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy and the political struggles that ensue. The reader gains good insight into the power struggles between the president and Congress and between their subordinate agencies and committees as they wrestle with foreign and national security issues. Rosati also looks at the roles of the states, the judiciary, public interest groups, and the media. His stated desire to produce a textbook that gives students a clear understanding of the political dynamics in Washington is fulfilled. In addition, the book's utility is enhanced by essays (short narratives) interspersed throughout the text.

Its shortcomings as a comprehensive textbook on foreign policy lie in the absence of serious discussion of two major issues in U.S. foreign policy. The first is the dispute over which of two guiding principles, idealism or realism, should direct the making of foreign policy—particularly whether considerations of "human rights" or "national interest" have primacy. (An examination of how presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush handled these concepts would have been helpful.) The second issue is the controversy over whether Ronald Reagan's military buildup and tough anti-Soviet policies caused the Soviet leaders to abandon the Cold War or whether its economic crisis forced Moscow to do so without U.S. pressure. One finds no attempt here to analyze why Reagan was a

radical cold-warrior in his first term but suddenly became a peacemaker in his second.

The subject of "national interest" as a guiding principle in U.S. foreign policy from the beginning of the Republic is dismissed with the statement, "However, the national interest is clearly a subjective concept, for different people define the national interest differently." For a textbook that concentrates on the policy process and the politics of making foreign policy, this is a rather strange way of dealing with a concept that continues to influence the State Department, Defense Department, and the National Security Council.

A bothersome theme that runs through this lengthy study is what the author refers to as the "constant tension between democracy and national security." One senses that the author thinks the two are basically incompatible. He elaborates Senator Joseph McCarthy's anticommunist impact on foreign policy in the early 1950s, the CIA excesses in the 1950s and 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson's deceitfulness in the Vietnam War, Nixon's Watergate scandal, and Reagan's Iran-Contra dealings. He suggests that since democracy and considerations of national security are in conflict, a large reduction in the nation's national security structure is imperative in this post–Cold War period.

This reviewer had hoped that a book on foreign policy published in 1993 would have offered some ideas on what role the United States should play in this post–Cold War world. Should

the United States continue in a major world role, or should it concentrate on rebuilding its economy after years of neglect, improving its education system, enacting a national health program, and saving American cities? Instead, the author ends by suggesting twelve questions for the reader to think about as history unfolds. One really expected more on the subject from this ambitious book.

DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN
Charlottesville, Virginia

Grunawalt, Richard J., ed. *The Law of Naval Warfare: Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping.* International Law Studies, Vol. 65. Newport, R. I.: U.S. Naval War College, 1993. (Available from the Library of Congress Repository)

In this carefully edited and handsomely produced collection of professional papers, Jack Grunawalt has rendered a valuable service to the admiralty lawyers and serious miltary historians of our time.

The essays and commentary that constitute the basic text of this volume were presented at a symposium on naval warfare in 1990 hosted by the U.S. Naval War College. The authors are the preeminent experts in the law of naval warfare. The quality of their scholarship and the extent of their research in the particular subject of this volume, targeting enemy merchant shipping, is evident throughout.

Each paper examines in its own way the issues involved in targeting enemy shipping, with particular attention to

the validity of a 1936 London Protocol (still on the books) that states, in essence, that a warship may not sink a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of safety, considering the existing sea and weather conditions, the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.

Given this focus, the volume could have become a legal copybook exercise on an archaic custom of questionable relevance in today's complex environment of war at sea. Fortunately, it did not. Each paper is developed with a lawyer's logic and supported with historical facts. The essays are so well written and artfully presented that this volume is more than an essential reference work for admiralty law libraries and historians' research shelves. Taken in its entirety, it is a thoroughly readable examination in depth of an element of naval warfare that has recently been brought to the attention of the general public by several popular writers. Pulitzer Prize–winning author Barbara Tuchman, in "The First Salute," pursues the importance of commerce raiding as an element of sea power that was influential in shaping the outcome of the American Revolutionary War. In a less scholarly context, Patrick O'Brian's immensely popular series of historical "Jack Aubrey" novels about the British navy during the Napoleonic Wars deals extensively with the seizure of merchant shipping and the importance of prize money in the Royal Navy.

In general, the essays draw on more recent examples of contemporary

history, such as the German U-boats
in the Battle of the Atlantic and the
U.S. Navy's campaigns in the Pacific
against Japan in World War II, the
Falklands conflict of 1982, and the Per-
sian Gulf "tanker war" of 1982–1988.
Each paper and its commentary is com-
plete within itself but also is related to
the overall theme. The serious reader
will be delighted to find each paper
carefully documented with extensive
footnotes.

Taken as a whole, Volume 65 of
the U.S. Naval War College Interna-
tional Law Studies presents a thorough
examination, from a number of
varied perspectives, of targeting
enemy merchant shipping. It is this
comprehensive quality of the book,
along with its excellent summary,
extensive bibliography, and detailed
index, that makes the volume espe-
cially valuable to students of contem-
porary warfare as well as to naval
historians and admiralty lawyers.
Professor Grunawalt is especially well
qualified to serve as editor. He is cur-
rently the director of the Oceans
Law and Policy Department in the
Center for Naval Warfare Studies at
the Naval War College. He has the
invaluable perpsective of a Navy lawyer
who, during his active duty days, served
as the senior advisor to both the joint
theater commander in the Pacific and
the Chief of Naval Operations. His
preface is an especially articulate and
useful summary of the issues covered in
this volume.

Clearly, this book will be appealing
to more than just a circle of lawyers and
historians; these professionals, however,
will certainly find this excellent volume

an indispensable component of their
libraries.

J.L. HOLLOWAY III
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Ocean Studies Board, National
Research Council. *Oceanography in
the Next Decade: Building New
Partnerships.* Washington, D.C.:
National Academy Press, 1992. (No
price given)

It is paramount for a military leader to
appreciate and understand the field on
which he fights. The naval commander
is unique in that he conducts operations
in four dimensions: underwater, on
the surface of the water, on the land
adjacent to the water, and in the air
above water and land. Oceanography is the
science of analyzing the undersea and its
dynamic relationship to the air and land.
This short volume of 170 pages is an
assessment of U.S. oceanography over
the last twenty years and a projection of
emerging priorities.

This book provides a sketch of
the organization of ocean science:
budgets, priorities, the roles of various
institutions, scientific direction within
the subfields of oceanography, and the
relevance of ocean science to civilian
and military national priorities. It also
contains informative comparative charts
and graphs delineating trends in man-
power, funding, and direction of
oceanography over the last decade.

The volume offers an excellent
description of the architecture of
federally funded oceanography. Since

World War II, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) have been at the forefront of ocean studies. Until 1970, ONR was the dominant source of ocean science funding and was largely responsible for the early development and maintenance of oceanography. ONR has always taken a long-term view toward the U.S. commitment to oceanography, and it is still the lead agency in supporting several areas of basic science, such as ocean acoustics.

Currently, ONR and NSF share responsibility for funding the majority of oceanographic research, primarily by awarding grants to such university and private laboratories as the Scripps Institution of Oceanography and the University of California (both university affiliated) and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (private). In this regard, the National Research Council has characterized the partnership between the federal granting agencies and their private and university patron laboratories as productive and mutually beneficial.

This work is a good primer on the direction of U.S. ocean science and its contribution and relevance to U.S. economic, environmental, and national security planning. It describes significant research areas of oceanography, such as geology and geophysics, biology, chemistry, and coastal sciences, and their impact on national economic, environmental, and defense priorities. Much oceanographic research is related directly or indirectly to national security. With the end of the Cold War and the introduction of the white paper

". . . From the Sea," the focus of U.S. Navy ocean science is expected to shift toward the coastline or littoral regions of the world. The war in the Persian Gulf emphasized the need for near-shore data and research, and ONR has already begun to direct more resources toward shallow-water science.

A concise and highly accessible review of the U.S. effort in oceanography, the book details the relevance of ocean science to a broad range of national priorities and offers an excellent depiction of the Navy's programs and contributions within the context of ocean science generally.

JAMES KRASKA
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution

Watts, Anthony J., ed. *Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems, 1993–1994*. United Kingdom: Jane's Information Group, 1993. 348pp. $245

The original annual naval review, *Jane's Fighting Ships*, first issued in 1897, has been so expanded over the past decade that there are now some twenty different Jane's annuals covering a broad variety of subjects, most of them military. This growth reflects both the rapid development in technology and the Jane's Information Group's effort to chronicle this technological expansion. Thus, *Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems*, fifth edition, is devoted to the latest status of antisubmarine warfare, underwater weapons, mine warfare, and associated underwater warfare systems—subjects little considered in 1897.

Furthermore, the underwater technology, particularly as developed by the major world naval powers, often involves sensitive information that is reluctantly revealed. Anthony J. Watts, the editor, therefore does not rely heavily on an elaborate intelligence service, either within Jane's organization or of leaks by competing powers. Most of the definitive information presented in this pricey volume comes from the subsystem manufacturers—the contractors who remain anxious to export the results of their research, in properly desensitized form.

As an unclassified reference source, the book is very good, if not necessarily complete. The editor acknowledges drawing on the excellent British *Navy International's* files as well as on *International Defense Review* and *Jane's Defense Weekly*, both of which provide periodic, thoughtful reviews on the material covered in this book. While the foreword is global in nature, discussing broad international political and technical trends, the body of the book, despite the encompassing titles, deals with component systems below the vehicle level.

Thus, the first section, "Antisubmarine Warfare," starts with the submarine integrated combat and weapon control systems, all computer based, of the European countries and the United States, the latter including the BSY-1 and BSY-2. There are system descriptions, some diagrams, photos of the operators' displays, a summary of operational status, and a list of the contractors involved. In the following U.S. section on underwater weapon control, only the Trident fire control system is included. None of the former

Soviet bloc naval control systems are listed, although they may appear in later editions, as Russia in particular attempts to sell its technology on the world market.

Airborne integrated systems are covered in the same format but only for Europe and the United States. The LAMPS MK III system for only the SH-60B helicopter is covered; that for the SH-60F is not. Shipboard sonar systems, both hull-mounted and towed, are discussed more thoroughly and in the same format. The submarine sonar section does include a summary of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) types but with little in the way of specifics. Those for the U.S. include the BQQ-5, BQQ-6, BQR-19, and the BQS-13, BQS-14A, and BQS-15.

More generally, underwater weapons, mine warfare, and associated underwater weapons systems are discussed in the same selective manner. In the foreword, the editor emphasizes that mine warfare, both laying and sweeping, will be a major concern in the future, particularly for amphibious and other near-shore forces. This point has been emphasized by the mine damage incurred by U.S. forces during the Iran-Iraq war as well as Desert Storm. This section's coverage includes CIS mines; and while twenty-two types are listed, the information is brief and, for the newer mines, not as complete as for other types. U.S. mines are covered up through the Mark 67; the Advanced Sea Mine program receives mention. The processes of detecting, destroying, and sweeping mines are given good coverage, primarily for those systems of European or North American origin. A

final section on "Associated Underwater Warfare Systems" discusses ancillary technology considerations, such as acoustic analysis, hydrographic surveys, acoustic ranges, training, and simulation.

The conclusion is an extensive series of tables, which can serve as points of departure and reference. There is a complete sonar listing by country, designation, description, and manufacturer; a torpedo table with characteristics including warhead, type of guidance, speed, and range; mines and depth charges, with information similar to the sonar table; and, similarly listed, acoustic and electronic countermeasures. Next is a contractor's table, which is of considerable value to those entering the field, complete with addresses, telephone, and fax numbers. The last table is a listing of all manufacturers mentioned, with page numbers for their respective products. Finally, there is a comprehensive list of all equipment covered in the book—an impressive number of entries.

Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems, a breakoff from *Jane's Weapons Systems*, is a good unclassified summary of much of the world's underwater technology. It does not have it all, but nothing compares at this price. It is ideal for those entering the field, and it makes an excellent reference. The closest publication to it in the U.S. is *World Naval Weapons Systems*, published by the Naval Institute Press, which, with its 1993 supplement, is less expensive and, in the same warfare area, less complete.

RICHARD CROSS III
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Codevilla, Angelo. *Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century.* New York: The Free Press, 1992. 491pp. $24.95

Angelo Codevilla's book, *Informing Statecraft*, should be required reading for policy makers, military commanders, and all intelligence professionals. Codevilla has produced a very readable, informative work on the intelligence business, intended to enlighten and guide the restructuring of the U.S. intelligence community for the twenty-first century. He begins his preface by stating that conflict is an "ineradicable part of international affairs. Knowledge of friends and enemies can be decisive in conflict. In statecraft such knowledge is called 'intelligence.'" This simple opening sets the tone for his book, which is a back-to-basics approach that examines all aspects of intelligence, particularly the areas of collection, counterintelligence, covert action, and research and analysis. He discusses successes and failures, draws on lessons learned from history, and then, in the end, offers some principles to use as a basis for fixing the "system."

Codevilla's primary aim is to remove intelligence from the "grip of the bureaucrat." He charges that the bureaucratization of intelligence has largely contributed to the inability of the United States to respond to crises, and he also claims that bureaucrats often view intelligence largely in terms of how it benefits their agency.

Codevilla is an academic, a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, California. Although

he defines himself as an outsider to government, his work has often placed him on the inside. He served as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy (both at sea and at Fleet Intelligence Center, Atlantic) before returning to civilian life to pursue his doctorate. He then taught international conflict and political philosophy. During this period he continued to serve in the Naval Reserve, receiving training in counterintelligence investigations and counterinsurgency. Codevilla's first civilian intelligence assignment was as an analyst in the Bureau for Intelligence and Research in the U.S. Foreign Service. He was later selected to the staff of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, serving as a personal representative to Republican Senator Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming. In 1985 Codevilla returned to academic life, but he still remains involved in intelligence issues.

Codevilla, therefore, comes to the task as a credible source. He does not show any bias toward a particular agency or program; indeed, no agency escapes his stinging criticism. The flaw in this approach is that in his zeal to expose the dirty little secrets of the intelligence community, he sometimes comes across as a religious crusader with a mission. (Occasionally, the reader is left wondering if he is trying to avenge old scores.) There are no "leaks" here (if you're concerned that this is another example of U.S. classified information being compromised); in fact at times there appear to be no new revelations. Do not be put off by this, however. He does highlight several areas that most

people are not regularly privy to and adds freshness to the more familiar tales.

The core of the book is Part II, in which Codevilla issues a scathing indictment of the intelligence community's lock-step way of doing business and describes failures of the most embarrassing kind. While reading of U.S. bumbling in areas of sensitive diplomacy, this reviewer was alternately appalled and dismayed. Chapter Three, on "spying," covers both human and technical collection. He focuses on the CIA, discussing its organization, its training apparatus, and how the agency recruits and "runs" agents. Codevilla worries that the young case officers currently being recruited, intended to be the backbone of the force in the 1990s, will be ill prepared to handle the unique intelligence problems posed by the Third World. He views these new recruits as representing the upper-middle-class, white "Everyman" who has not studied any foreign cultures or languages and is certainly not a person who can easily initiate a conversation with a farmer in rural Colombia. When discussing technical collection, he is not as harsh. Yet, while impressed with some U.S. capabilities, he believes that high-technology "collectors" are not being modified as quickly as the technology they are collecting against. (Although, in the post–Cold War world, as the United States shifts more of its technical collection away from the former Soviet Union and toward the Third World, one may wonder if this criticism is still valid.)

Chapter Five deals with research and analysis; here, the author identifies bureaucratic tendencies that he claims are

characteristic of all agencies—bridging gaps in data with personal opinion, taking into account only what can be formally accounted for or identified, and dealing with uncertainty by using what you know about your own side to make up for what you do not know about the other.

He also states that national-level intelligence products are guilty of "aggressive ignorance," that is, ignorance of basic facts coupled with a lack of curiosity. Finally, Codevilla charges the policymakers with the responsibility of stressing integrity in the analysis process, even if it tells them what they do not want to hear.

In Part III, Codevilla recommends fixes for intelligence problems and makes suggestions for restructuring for the 1990s. Just when the reader has lost all hope for the intelligence community, he is assured that the system can be fixed and made worthy of the super-power-type policies it must support. Codevilla brings the reader back to the fundamentals and offers basic guidelines for research and analysis, collection, counterintelligence, and covert action.

All in all, Codevilla's book is one of solid scholarship. I can find fault in only one regard—on occasion he shows his political bias and makes sweeping generalizations. In a discussion of CIA involvement in South Vietnam, he states that the "liberals in America," when in charge of "government at any level," are likely to hire "likeminded folk and exclude others." Surely, most readers would agree that liberals and conservatives alike are guilty of that—that's politics. He expresses utter disapproval of the McNamara era

by saying that where military officers before McNamara were the type to get the job done first and discuss it later, all since McNamara have been reduced to systems analysts. The Colin Powells, William Crowes, Norman Schwarzkopfs, and James Stockdales probably would take issue with that. Regardless of political persuasion, once such a bias emerges, readers feel a vague unease as to whether they are getting the "straight scoop" elsewhere in the work. Although minor, this fault should have been caught in the editing process.

Overall, Codevilla's *Informing Statecraft* is an excellent work. It reads like a novel, yet it is sure to become one of the most useful reference books in the libraries of anyone who works with or benefits from intelligence. I will return to it again and again. Read it at your first opportunity.

JULIE NEUMANN
Major, U.S. Air Force

Kennedy, William V. *The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War.* Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993. 167pp. $45

Few in the military consider reporters qualified to cover military affairs. Though a reporter for the past seventeen years, William Kennedy shares that view. In *The Military and the Media,* Kennedy argues that the press does not invest enough in the defense beat for accurate assessment of military affairs. Reporters, he says, "begin the Pentagon assignment innocent of any prior contact with or instruction about the

military whatsoever and receive as little as possible thereafter."

Kennedy argues that as a result the military must tightly control reporters on the battlefield because their incompetence can put lives and operations at risk. Noting that the Associated Press sent its theater critic to the Gulf War, Kennedy states: "Ten months after the war [AP] still [did not] understand that when the press sends a drama critic to cover a war, the closely controlled pool system is the only means of assuring the safety of both the reporter and the military."

Finally, according to Kennedy, reporters' incompetence enables the military to manipulate both them and the public. In this regard, Kennedy thinks the media fails in its responsibility to act as a watchdog over governmental actions. He believes that defense journalists, in general, have "neither the organization nor the training to comprehend stories that, given timely exposure, could lead to the savings of millions and ultimately billions of dollars." Kennedy argues that since the U.S. government has erected the "right to lie" as its way of doing business and uses the classification system to hide embarrassing truths, journalists need better training to dig up the truth behind official lies.

Despite some interesting proposals, however, Kennedy obscures his thesis by his own biases and prejudices. First of all, *Military and the Media* is an angry diatribe against the press. The author qualifies the press as "an elitist, extravagantly paid, anti-military" institution, and thinks that "its reliance on English, sociology, and political

'science' majors simply cannot cope with the pace and the intricacies of the twentieth century." In the same vein, he believes that an "absurd mass of ill-informed, genuine, quasi-genuine and outright fake journalists have plagued every U.S. military operation since Vietnam." With such statements, Kennedy provides a good example of what he is critiquing the press for: making judgments founded on impression rather than careful inquiry.

Moreover, Kennedy asserts that the press missed two essential lessons from the Gulf War. First, it failed to understand (much less report) that early in August 1990 nuclear weapons provided the only usable U.S. defense against an Iraqi assault in Saudi Arabia; second, following official statements, it attributed the victory to a "daring armored assault" and neglected to report that air cavalry units provided the decisive element for victory. These views are open to reasonable disagreement and to this reviewer reflect more Kennedy's own opinion (if not bias) than any media incompetence.

I also fault Kennedy on his methodology and research. He draws his general conclusions from oddly selected cases rather than any systematic treatment, and even in these cases he ignores well recognized sources. In his chapter on Vietnam, for example, Kennedy does not even mention Peter Braestrup, Daniel Hallin, William Hammond, or John Mueller—all major contributors to the analysis of the media's role in Vietnam.

Though he does make sound recommendations to improve the media's defense coverage, his work is weakened

by his own prejudices and such obnoxious statements as that "the author has been able to anticipate every major trend, every major weakness in U.S. national defense."

PASCALE COMBELLES
Université de Toulouse

Atkinson, Rick. *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993. 575pp. $24.95

In war, history is seldom generous to the vanquished—nor is it always kind to the victor, as evident in this work by Rick Atkinson. Written to answer the question "What really happened?" the narrative draws upon a wide array of after-action reports, personal interviews, and investigative reports. Not surprisingly, then, *Crusade* contains a degree of journalistic sensationalism that focuses on personality quirks and interservice bickering, sometimes at the expense of thoughtful analysis.

Atkinson concentrates almost exclusively on the period following George Bush's decision to launch a war against Iraq, and although the subtitle suggests new information, much of it has been repeatedly told. Many will readily recognize the dialogue regarding the special operation forces in Iraq, the multiple cases of fratricide, and the debate over the efficacy of the Patriot air defense systems; but less known, and not as well covered by Atkinson, are the contributions of the U.S. Navy and that of the Arab members of the coalition. What Atkinson does bring to the reader, however, is detail on frustrations within the coalition headquarters and some excellent accounts of personal combat.

By far the most interesting aspect of *Crusade* is Atkinson's provocative analysis of the political and military personalities who waged the one-sided conflict. According to the author, the war enabled George Bush to rise above the limitations of his character and political philosophy to become, briefly, an extraordinary man. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney fares equally well in Atkinson's chronicle. At times a reluctant supporter of Schwarzkopf, Cheney developed a special partnership with Joint Chiefs chairman Colin Powell, one that evolved into a total commitment to the armed forces in pursuit of military and political victory.

Like most observers, Atkinson has his personal heroes. Seventh Corps commander Frederick Franks emerges as the personification of the American Army. To many admirers, the author among them, Barry McCaffrey represents the officer *par excellence*: bright, articulate, and flamboyant. First Marine Expeditionary Force commander Walt Boomer and air campaign chief Chuck Horner also receive honorable mention for their monumental contributions to allied victory. And of course there is Powell, the ultimate Clausewitzian strategist who manages a temperamental theater commander and serves as the brakeman to ensure political leaders use their military force in a humane and judicious manner.

Towering over all the decision makers, however, is the enigmatic figure of Norman Schwarzkopf. Long known for his fiery temper and

volcanic personality, Schwarzkopf emerges as a modern Achilles, horrible in war to friend and foe alike. His Riyadh headquarters, states the author, was unique in its misery. Rarely dispensing praise, Schwarzkopf could be, and was, publicly abusive to subordinates whom he deemed insufficiently aggressive. More than once he threatened to relieve most of his principal subordinates and so intimidated his staff that they were reluctant to report information that might lead to another explosive outburst.

However, tension between a commanding general, his staff, and subordinate commanders hardly constitutes an "untold story." Also, Schwarzkopf's temperament has long been a matter of public record. What Atkinson brings to the Schwarzkopf legend is a journalistic flair that weaves what a *New York Times* reviewer termed "the storm within the [Desert] Storm" into a coherent narrative that captures the drama of waging coalition warfare in the modern era.

Less sensational than the commander in chief's vitriolic outbursts is the other side of Schwarzkopf, which the author addresses fairly well. Though his generalship was sometimes flawed and he allegedly failed to comprehend the political ramifications of the Scud missile attacks against Israel, Schwarzkopf rose to the task as CinC, Central Command. If America's armed forces were stellar in the Gulf War, it was largely due to a command vision that encouraged initiative and audacity among his chief lieutenants. Given the fact that he achieved all the president's

political objectives and that he achieved this victory at minimal human cost, Schwarzkopf's emotional tirades shrink to insignificance. Schwarzkopf may have been an "S.O.B." to his staff and commanders, but as Ernest J. King allegedly claimed, "When they get in trouble, they send for the sonsabitches."

In the final analysis, Atkinson has produced a useful analysis of certain aspects of the war. Not prone to oversimplification, Atkinson cautions the reader to draw back and examine the Gulf War through the lens of history. Only then can the real costs and achievements be determined. Until someone has access and time to analyse the veritable avalanche of official reports on the conflict, a complete history is not likely to appear. *Crusade* is certainly a start.

As such, Atkinson's work is a brush with history from the perspective of Central Command headquarters and many small-unit leaders. A number of key participants receive scant attention. Vital contributions of intermediate headquarters, including VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps, are virtually ignored as a result of the author's concentration on Washington and Central Command. Additionally, the author's frequent use of colorful quotations to maintain the reader's interest, such as that attributed to Colonel Tom Hill when he crossed the Iraqi border, makes for interesting reading, but one wonders about their authenticity.

What, then, are we to think of the recent conflict and of *Crusade*? To his credit, Atkinson provides at least a portion of the answer to the first question. Despite the president's rhetoric,

the war was not the greatest moral challenge this nation has faced since World War II; perhaps that challenge lies closer, on America's shores. Still, once in a generation, it is enough and sufficient to know that this nation's armed forces were ready when called upon and that the United States and its military reaffirmed their sense of common purpose and mutual respect. That in itself was a remarkable achievement—and a story that remains to be told.

COLE C. KINGSEED
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Winnefeld, James A. and Johnson, Dana J. *Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942–1991.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993. 199pp. $29.95

Joint Air Operations has a narrow purpose: "to determine how unity of effort has been achieved in joint air operations." The authors treat air operations as distinct from surface, land, and sea operations; this keeps the book to a manageable size, although one may question whether air operations can properly be studied if separated from associated ground and naval action. Notwithstanding that caveat and the criticisms which follow, *Joint Air Operations* is on the whole a superb book. It is an excellent starting point for serious study, as it provides both the appropriate cases and criteria for analyzing them.

Joint operations date from antiquity, but they originally tended not to require much coordination between land and sea forces. The ease with which aircraft, however, pass across the boundary between land and sea has made air warfare a focal point for multiservice coordination and contention since World War I.

In the introduction the authors define some critical conventions and definitions, and they explain their methodology for analysis of joint air operations. The latter enables the reader to judge how well the authors meet their own criteria. Unfortunately, as they are applied to cases, these criteria undergo significant changes. For example, in the introduction Unity of Effort is considered in terms of "evidence of unity of command or, in the absence of such unity, the command arrangements used to broker various interests." Nine chapters later, Unity of Command is evaluated in terms of "meddling by senior command echelons," "single command for land and sea-based air," and "single commander for land-based air forces of different services." These reveal Winnefeld and Johnson's general support for the traditional Air Force viewpoint that—at least where air operations are involved—"unity of effort" is synonymous with "unity of command" under a single air commander. This view is not commonly shared by the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, or the post–World War II U.S. Army. In Chapter Two, the authors provide a concise overview of the philosophical approaches to aviation of the U.S. Army Air Corps, Army Air Forces, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Understanding these competing, often antagonistic, philosophies is critical to understanding

the resulting service orientations toward aviation in the examples Winnefeld and Johnson examine.

The issue of "meddling" by "higher echelons" is a recurrent theme throughout this book. It is odd that complaints about too much centralized control (meddling) originate from those at the theater level, since they themselves exercise minutely detailed tactical control, down to the sortie of a single aircraft. Apparently, centralized command and control is desirable or even necessary, but only up through the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) level!

In addition, imprecise or incorrect terminology bedevils this work, as in the authors' frequent misuse of the terms "strategic" and "operational." For example, "Operational decisions on the employment of air forces generally should not be made by theater commanders—or even component commanders in many cases." Operational (theater-level) decisions are precisely what unified and specified commanders in chief are supposed to make.

Winnefeld and Johnson's decision not to include analysis of post–World War II Army aviation in their analysis is regrettable. They make a number of references to the need for the JFACC to control Army and Marine Corps helicopters but give no supporting reason. As the Army and Marine Corps both use helicopters not only as "flying trucks" but also as direct support weapons and reconnaissance platforms for troops engaged with the enemy in fluid situations, any effort to control these assets through the JFACC Air

Tasking Order would be exceptionally burdensome to the JFACC and would still yield unacceptable results at the front lines.

The authors have chosen six campaigns that included significant joint air operations: the Battle of Midway, the Solomons Campaign (1942–1944), the Korean War (1950–1953), Vietnam (1960–1965), El Dorado Canyon (the Libyan bombing), and Desert Storm. The authors devote a full chapter to detailed analysis, against their criteria, of each of the campaigns. They present their overall conclusions and lessons learned in both narrative and tabular form in Chapter Nine.

At the core of all discussions of airpower is the question of its purpose. If one accepts the Air Force view, then acceptance of centralized command follows logically. If, however, one sees other purposes and missions for aviation, centralized control may be the wrong answer. As the authors note, "The diversity of the air services—in doctrine, training, and hardware—is a weakness, but also represents a profound strength."

In their final recommendations the authors call for "acceptance of the fact that unity of effort does not always require unity of air command; control may be sufficient." Many would contend that the El Dorado Canyon case study illustrates that this should be amended to "*coordination* may be sufficient." The case for centralized control of all aircraft in a theater is evident to the authors of *Joint Air Operations*, but they do not adequately argue the case in this book, which implies, without satisfactory support, that

the JFACC should control all aircraft in a theater regardless of their mission or purpose. Some would see the evolution of Army aviation since the end of World War II, particularly its reliance on helicopters, as a response to inadequate air support from the Army Air Force and the United States Air Force, whose warfighting priorities were, and often continue to be, different from the ground commander's.

The imperfections of *Joint Air Operations* reflect the complexities and contradictions of its subject. This book will not settle the question of the need for centralized control of all air operations, but it is an outstanding collection of cases and methodologies for studying the subject. *Joint Air Operations* should be a core textbook at every war college and required reading for all military officers and defense civilians. The resulting, and often heated, discussions will be instructive to all participants.

ROBERT PINNELL
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Frame, Tom. *Where Fate Calls: The HMAS Voyager Tragedy.* Sydney: Hodder and Stoughton, 1992. 447pp. $A 14.95

During naval exercises off the coast of New South Wales on the night of 10 February 1964, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) aircraft carrier HMAS *Melbourne* sliced in two the destroyer HMAS *Voyager*. Moments before the collision, *Voyager*

had inexplicably cut across the bows of the carrier in the process of taking up planeguard station. Within minutes, *Voyager* had sunk, taking with it eighty-two crew members and all present on the bridge, including the captain. In view of the magnitude of the disaster and a series of accidents that had recently occurred in the RAN, the Australian government broke with all legal precedent and instituted a Royal Commission to investigate the tragedy. So controversial was the finding of the First Royal Commission in 1964 that a second had to be conducted in 1967.

It would be a mistake to conclude that Tom Frame is concerned only with this terrible naval tragedy and judicial morass. He has presented not only an excellent chronicle of the events but, more importantly, a social history of the RAN, its practices, and its growing isolation from Australian society. Moreover, the author has written an exhaustive analysis and interpretation of what happened the night of the collision.

This is fine history of a rather difficult time in the proud history of the RAN. While the work does suffer from the charge that it is probably a better Ph.D. dissertation than book (it is heavy reading at times), it is still a superb analysis and narrative. The absence of an index is, however, incomprehensible for a work of this magnitude. As the *Voyager* tragedy continues to this day to loom large in the collective minds and spirit of the RAN and Australia (personal legal claims against the government are still being filed), anyone wishing to

understand the RAN would be well advised to read this work carefully.

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Yerxa, Donald A. *Admirals and Empire: The United States Navy and the Caribbean, 1898–1945.* Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1991. 202pp. $34.95

A century ago, Alfred T. Mahan repeatedly reminded Americans that the Caribbean was a vital area for the United States. He envisioned it as an "American Lake." While not rejecting Mahan's view overtly, Donald Yerxa uses another maritime concept as the basis for his investigation. Interpreting American interests in the region as imperial ones, he focuses on two of them: protection of the area from external threats, and the removal of threats within the area to imperial stability.

Yerxa has dug deeply into archival sources to describe fifty years of U.S. naval activity that ranges from gunboat diplomacy and support of armed intervention to goodwill visits and wartime operations against German threats in the region during 1917–1918 and 1941–1945. His conceptual structure provides a strong focus and an explicit argument around which he skillfully organizes his narrative. In doing this, he has written a valuable narrative that will be useful for all who work in the history of American naval strategy. Nevertheless, Yerxa does not answer every question regarding the U.S. Navy's activities in the region. Because of the structure of

his thesis, the author was forced to omit a range of naval activities in the Caribbean that do not fall into his dual categories. Notwithstanding, and although the volume makes no pretense of being definitive, it is the closest yet to such a work. With that in mind, and with no other sources to which one can readily turn, it would have been convenient to have had a list of the various commanders of the naval forces in that region along with their dates of command, as well as lists or graphs showing the forces' changing strengths and character. A deeper understanding of the administrative structures of the naval commands is needed.

Readers of the *Naval War College Review* will readily recognize one of the chapters of this book, which appeared earlier as an article in these pages (Autumn 1986, pp. 60–72).

This is an important book. Although not a full history of the U.S. Navy's activities in the Caribbean, it is a strong work in its focus at the level of broad grand strategy and foreign policy.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

Grover, David H. *American Merchant Ships on the Yangtze, 1920–1941.* Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992. 234pp. $47.95

This book focuses on American mariners in China between the two world wars. It illuminates the lives of individual crew members, the organizations of which they were a part, and the turbulent environment in which they

worked. Its author, David Grover, was a career merchant mariner and naval officer before becoming a dean at the California Maritime Academy. He has written four other books, two about the American frontier and two that deal with American vessels in World War II. In this volume he tries to marry those two interests to describe the American merchant fleet on the Yangtze and chronicle the adventures of those who sailed it.

The American merchant fleet was as much a product of government policy as of private initiative. Without the tax incentives provided by the 1922 China Trade Act, American firms would not have acquired ships built in Shanghai that were especially designed to ply the Yangtze's often dangerous waters. These long (up to 210 feet), shallow-draft vessels were underpowered, but they had hulls compartmentalized to resist flooding, armor-plated bridges, and officers quarters arranged to provide defense against pirates, marauding soldiers, and attacking mobs. These ships operated with credentials provided by the Department of State and were entitled to protection by Navy gunboats and U.S. Marines. Their presence on the Yangtze proved less a source of private profit than a source of public policy dilemmas; they deepened American involvement in China at a time when political turmoil suggested that withdrawal from the river trade was the wiser course of action.

Grover presents detailed and colorful descriptions of the three principal American firms' operations. Standard Oil (later Standard Vacuum) was the first U.S. company to appear on the

river. It had the largest fleet, stayed longest, and derived the biggest profits from carrying oil and its byproducts on the Yangtze and its tributaries. The Dollar Line ships were originally sent to provide reliable and comfortable passenger service on the river. They never made money, however, and their eccentric owner quickly lost interest. Those who ran the Yangtze Rapid Steamship Company resembled business buccaneers. They ran opium and guns for Chinese customers, borrowing so much money that they went bankrupt in 1935; they generally embarrassed the more staid diplomats, naval officers, and missionaries by their conduct.

Two aspects of Grover's story will draw the particular attention of those interested in national security matters. One is the demonstration of how and why a gap developed between declared policy and actual practice. There was friction between merchant captains and senior naval officers that grew out of different mind-sets, the lack of clear guidance from Washington, rapid turnover of naval commanders, and excessive concern for "not losing face" before the Chinese. Grover suggests that this tension, far more than a paucity of naval resources, made naval protection for American Yangtze mariners a sometime thing and, more importantly, rendered the often stated naval mission of "protecting American lives and property" in China a platitude rather than an "operative policy" on the Yangtze.

The second important aspect is the book's unorthodox treatment of the *Panay* incident of December 1937.

Grover argues that the Japanese bombing of the American gunboat, often termed a "prelude to war," was the consequence of error, just as Tokyo claimed then and after the Pacific War. The mistake was not misidentification of *Panay* but rather the presumption that the Standard Vacuum merchant vessels it was convoying were carrying Chinese troops. It was the merchant fleet, not its American naval protector, that was precisely the sort of target on which highly motivated Japanese naval aviators hoped to hone their bombing and strafing skills.

That argument, like several others which Grover advances, struck this reviewer as suggestive but incomplete. Despite his extensive archival research and interviews, he marshalls few details on civil-naval frictions or Japanese actions to support it. Strikingly little is said about the nature of the revolution and the subsequent Nationalist-Communist struggles in China that made the Yangtze so dangerous a place for both merchant mariners and the U.S. Navy.

Grover serves up a rich diet of anecdotes rather than a careful analysis of what was going on. One can savor his "sea stories" and usefully digest the snippets of data he offers about ships, captains, and companies. But serious readers will leave this book hungry for a fuller portrait of American lives on the Yangtze and a more thorough analysis of the policies that put them there.

ROGER DINGMAN
University of Southern California

Sligh, Robert B. *The National Guard and National Defense: The Mobilization of the Guard in World War II.* New York: Praeger, 1992. 208pp. $45

Robert Sligh is a historian at the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force at Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas. This book is the culmination of a manuscript prepared during his advanced academic program at Texas A & M University. Although he is not an established historian, Sligh's use of sources lends credibility to this work. It is a well documented study and easy to read.

As a means of eliminating the requirement to raise, arm, and pay large standing armies, governments have utilized the citizen-soldier concept. The strengths and weaknesses of such a system are well known. In this excellent historical study of America's National Guard, Robert Sligh has provided an in-depth look at the development and transition of the Guard prior to America's participation in the Second World War.

Sligh briefly describes the Guard's transition from the militia of the founding fathers, its virtual collapse after the Civil War, and the development in 1879 of the National Guard Association (NGA). Not satisfied with its constabulary role, the NGA fought to establish the Guard in the national defense structure and secured congressional appropriations to help prepare it to assume this role. However, this increase in responsibility and funding did not mean that the Guard wanted more supervision or for control to be passed on to Congress or the War Department. The dilemma between the states'

desire for increased federal funding while retaining control of the Guard created several problems during mobilization in 1940–1941. It would be 1990 before the Supreme Court would resolve this dilemma.

The one major flaw in this work occurs in the last pages. After carefully documenting the salient factors affecting the Guard's mobilization during a two-year period, Sligh attempts to explain the remaining history of the Guard in only six pages. There are only one or two paragraphs covering the Cold War, Korea, Vietnam, and their intervening periods; they do not add to this study but only confuse the reader as to what the author's main thesis actually is.

With this one exception, however, this work will be of use to force planners and the national security community. It is a highly specialized work and fills a void in the history of the National Guard.

GARY A. TROGDON
Major, U.S. Air Force

Davis, Kenneth C. *FDR: Into the Storm, 1937–1940: A History.* New York: Random House, 1993. 691pp. (No price given)

We tend to think of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as the great president who almost singlehandedly brought America back from the depths of despair during the Depression, or as the triumphant commander in chief who successfully led the country through World War II. What we forget is that Franklin Roosevelt was also an often ineffective politician who was unable to get his

policy objectives implemented, particularly during his second term.

Although part of a larger work (this book is the fourth in a projected five-volume biography of FDR), it stands alone. It covers those years when, for various reasons, FDR was less than effective in a variety of areas.

Davis starts by posing the question of how the seemingly invincible winner of the 1936 landslide could, by the end of 1937, be considered by many to have lost his political potency. He argues that hubris regarding the Supreme Court "packing" plan (which was unexpectedly and strongly opposed by many who were otherwise political allies) caused FDR to persist for an unreasonably long time in the unsuccessful attempt to force it through an unwilling Congress. The passions within his own party created by that fight cost him the leverage needed to get other cherished initiatives enacted. (There is an interesting parallel here with current politics regarding the cascading effect of a major policy error early in a term.) FDR further exacerbated his problems by campaigning vigorously in the 1938 primaries against those Democrats who had opposed him on the Court plan. When he almost wholly failed in his purge attempts, his relations with Congress were further strained. Economically, Roosevelt made a number of policy decisions which significantly aggravated the 1937–1938 recession, driving unemployment up and further reducing his effectiveness.

Davis argues that these considerations affected more than just domestic policy but were a marked factor in FDR's less than stirring performance in

foreign policy during the critical years leading up to the war. Roosevelt's perception of his limited political freedom to maneuver led him to apply the neutrality law so strictly during the Spanish Civil War that in effect he sided with the Franco forces. When he made his famous "quarantine the aggressors" speech in October 1937, he almost immediately defanged it to forestall anticipated protest.

On the moral level, Davis argues that Roosevelt's performance was almost shameful at times, citing the Spanish case and also pointing out that when Neville Chamberlain stated he was going to Munich to negotiate Czechoslovakia's doom, FDR sent him a two–word telegram, "Good Man!" Davis gives FDR credit for at least attempting, as events became grimmer in 1939, to prevent the war. However, his actions were often self-limited by an excessively pessimistic perception of what the public would accept in the way of support to the Allies. This would not change even when the cataclysmic events of spring 1940 caused him to decide to run for a third term. Arguably, his caution was due in no small part to the consequences of the major errors he had made early in his second term, at a time when he seemed to be at the height of his power.

Within the framework of the larger issues, Davis adds frequent anecdotes and vignettes to show the reader the man, as well as the politician. The author's skillful interweaving of the "big picture" and "small details" make this an exceptionally intimate and thorough portrayal of Roosevelt.

On the negative side, Davis too frequently makes what have to be considered ideological assertions that, whatever their truth, he does not defend. For example, he gratuitously describes Republican conventions as those "quadrennial Republican exercises . . . having as their main purpose the packaging in attractive disguise of candidates and programs which, frankly exposed to public view, would be seen to serve very few at the expense of very many." Davis is an enthusiastic critic of the "profit system," more so than was his subject. The author is also given to stereotyping, ascribing to Wendell Wilkie's mother a "typically Germanic power lust." On specifically military matters, his account of the May 1940 German attack in the West betrays a significant lack of deep knowledge which, though not a great problem for this volume, may cause him difficulties with volume five, which must inevitably be more concerned with such matters.

Davis has had considerable experience as a biographer, having written books on Dwight D. Eisenhower, Charles Lindbergh, and Adlai Stevenson. He has had a variety of different jobs, including as a war correspondent attached to General Eisenhower's personal headquarters, journalism instructor, State Department staffer, and professor of English and history. Also, having grown up during Roosevelt's time, he has a personal sense of that era that younger historians perforce cannot.

Despite the author's clear political bias and an occasional tendency to be too close to his subject, Davis's biography is

engaging, well written, and paints a picture that is sympathetic, if critical when necessary, of one of the giant figures of this century. If this volume is the measure of the full opus, the whole set will be well worth reading.

JAN VAN TOL
Commander, U.S. Navy

Goldstein, Donald M. and Dillon, Katherine V., eds. *The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans.* New York: Brassey's (US), 1993. 384pp. $30

Ah, yes, yet another book about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Next to the Battle of the Bulge and D-Day in Normandy, surely Pearl Harbor has attracted the most writers, scholars, books, and articles of any U.S. battle in World War II. This work adds to that growing list of histories, but there is a difference.

The editors of *The Pearl Harbor Papers* attempt to view Pearl Harbor exclusively through Japanese eyes. Using a wide variety of official and unofficial letters, interviews, diaries, ships' logs, and other "memory" documents, they have done a creditable job and provide fascinating insight into the Japanese plans for the attack that launched America into World War II.

Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon have coauthored numerous World War II histories, with at least four books on Pearl Harbor. They worked with the late Gordon W. Prange on the enormously successful Pearl Harbor history, *At Dawn We Slept* (1981). All of the documents contained in the work under review were actually researched and obtained by Prange, when he was MacArthur's historian in occupied Japan. Goldstein and Dillon have compiled Prange's documents into a readable and interesting sourcebook of the Japanese buildup for and planning, execution, and aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Besides portraying the Japanese side of the attack, the editors also offer evidence that neither President Roosevelt nor Winston Churchill knew in advance of the impending attack, as is frequently asserted and popularly believed. Other historians have claimed that the Americans and British had intercepted Imperial Japanese Navy radio messages prior to 7 December that indicated their intentions. Goldstein and Dillon contend that it is not true, because the Japanese naval attack force never broke radio silence. Several Japanese ships' logs cited in this book support that contention. However, this reviewer is not convinced that the editors offer conclusive proof; after all, only a few ships' logs are cited, all the others having been lost in the war. Additionally, even if the Japanese navy did not break radio silence while en route to Hawaii, there is always the possibility that Roosevelt and Churchill knew through some other intelligence source.

That aside, this book does contain some remarkable information. There are personal and professional letters written by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the architect of the Pearl Harbor attack, including several sensitive and poignant ones to his *geisha*. A Japanese admiral's notes include references to a spy ring

and a corruption scandal within the navy. On board one destroyer escorting the Japanese attack force to Hawaii, the executive officer kept a diary that reflected his efforts to raise crew morale through daily scheduled singing of war songs, gymnastics, and wearing bellybands to prevent catching cold. There is also a copy of the color map that was used to brief Emperor Hirohito after the attack.

In addition are war diaries of a carrier division, a battleship division, and a destroyer squadron. There is also an interesting section on submarine operations in support of the attack. Actually, the best parts of this book are the last two chapters, "Japanese Study of the Pearl Harbor Operations" and "An Intimate Look at the Japanese Navy." Both chapters are worth the price of the book and the reader's time to study them.

In their after-action study of the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese concluded that their success was due to a combination of tangible factors, and the intangibles of "providential help" and "supremacy of mental power." Before Pearl Harbor, both the Japanese and the Americans believed in the supremacy of the battleship. Only carriers, however, could carry off an attack on Pearl Harbor and, if unwittingly, by destroying the battleships there force the U.S. Navy to change its own emphasis to aircraft carriers. The result we know very well— the U.S. Navy and its carrier force crushed the Imperial Japanese Navy. In the end, writes a Japanese, the U.S. "finally sent us an atomic bomb instead

of a referee with a whistle, just to close the lid."

<div style="text-align: right;">

W.D. BUSHNELL
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

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Hoyt, Edwin P. *The Last Kamikaze: The Story of Admiral Matome Ugaki.* Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993. 256pp. $22.95

This book is essentially a short narrative history of the Second World War in the Pacific, with the wartime career of Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki superficially embossed on it. The work's primary value is that it provides another vehicle for increasing Admiral Ugaki's recognition among Western readers.

Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki aptly represents the best and the worst of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and the character of the Japanese of his generation. He entered the naval academy at Etajima in 1909, and his career spanned from the glory days of the IJN until its ultimate destruction.

Following graduation from Etajima in 1913, his career progressed normally. Ugaki studied in Germany during the 1930s, commanded the battleship *Hyuga*, and was promoted to rear admiral in 1938. In August 1941, Admiral Ugaki was appointed chief of staff of the Combined Fleet and served in that capacity until 18 April 1943, when his aircraft was shot down into the sea during the famous air ambush of Admiral Yamamoto. One of only two survivors (he was not in Yamamoto's aircraft), Ugaki was seriously wounded.

As Yamamoto's chief of staff, Ugaki had participated in the planning of

the Pearl Harbor attack and all other major Japanese fleet actions from the invasion of Malaya to the Solomons battles. Following his recuperation from his injuries, Admiral Ugaki commanded Battleship Division One, which included super-battleships *Yamato* and *Musashi*. After the battle of Leyte Gulf, he remained unassigned until February 1945, when he assumed command of the Fifth Air Fleet in Kyushu.

Ugaki was witness to the most disastrous Japanese naval defeats. He was at Midway in *Yamato*, the Marianas Turkey Shoot in *Musashi*, and at Leyte Gulf he was transferred from the sinking *Musashi* to *Yamato*. He was next entrusted with the air defense of Okinawa and the southern Japanese home islands. The ten famous *"Kikusen"* kamikaze raids against the Allied naval forces off Okinawa were planned and executed under his direction.

During the war years, Ugaki kept a detailed diary that encompassed fifteen volumes in its original form. He was the only senior member of the IJN to leave any significant record of his and his service's wartime endeavors. The diary was published in Japan in 1953 under the title *Senso roku: Ugaki Matome nikki* (Seaweeds of War: The Diary of Matome Ugaki). In 1987 it was published in this country as *Fading Victory*, translated under the aegis of the late Gordon Prange and his colleagues.

Unfortunately, Mr. Hoyt's effort seldom brings forth the richness of the sentiment and commentary of the diary itself. *The Last Kamikaze* treats Ugaki, his diary, and his wartime career superficially. Matome Ugaki was a proud,

intelligent, articulate man. He saw his beloved navy wither from a powerful, unbeatable juggernaut to a floating junkyard and deathtrap. A devoted family man and patriot, he mourned the disasters befalling his country and the fruitless sacrifices of his young sailors and airmen, whose deaths he rationalized by his personal determination to share that sacrifice. On 15 August 1945, in violation of the emperor's expressed wishes, he removed his rank insignia and, surrounded by a cadre of dedicated young volunteer airmen, launched a last, meaningless, and unsuccessful kamikaze raid against the U.S. fleet.

Mr. Hoyt has written much and often on the war in the Pacific (indeed, half of the book's bibliographic entries are his own works); however, this work is not up to the standards of his earlier efforts. There are numerous textual and editing errors throughout the book. The USS *Hornet* (CV 8) is sunk twice, in August and in October 1942. Allied cruiser losses at the battle of Tassafaronga are confused with those of the earlier battle of Savo Island. The dates and data of Japanese destroyer and U.S. PT boat losses are frequently in error. Lingga Roads anchorage near Singapore is confused with Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. Kamimbo Bay is also spelled "Camimbo." The author implies that battleship *Hyuga* was a hermaphrodite battleship carrier in 1937 when Ugaki was in command (it was converted in mid-1943). Hoyt also perpetuates the myth that Rear Admiral Masafumi Arima, commander of the 26th Air Flotilla in the Philippines, was the first successful kamikaze; he credits Arima with crashing into USS *Franklin*

144   Naval War College Review

(CV 13) on 13 October 1944. In fact, that glancing flight-deck strike was by a damaged Betty medium bomber; Arima flew his intended suicide mission, in a dive bomber, on 15 October.

Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki is a fascinating character who left in his diary a historical gem. Sadly, this book does neither the man nor his legacy justice.

JOHN J. DOYLE
Commander, U.S. Navy

Tarrant, V.E. *King George V Class Battleships.* London: Arms and Armour Press, 1991. 288 pp. $39.95

King George V Class Battleships is an attempt to marry a popularly written operational history with comprehensive photographic coverage and with a design and development analysis based on archival research. The result is essentially successful. Victor Tarrant has produced a book that will be of general interest to historians and enthusiasts of the Second World War at sea and, perhaps just as important, to those who study the impact of strategic and financial policy upon warship design. Tarrant's analysis of the *King George V* class (known as the *KGVs*) in action leads logically to a discussion of the design deficiencies that were revealed in each unit. Particular emphasis is given to the less-than-successful quadruple fourteen-inch turrets, an attempt to beat the 35,000-ton treaty limit by mounting as many weapons as possible—an attempt that was defeated by the over-complicated machinery the installations required. Tarrant also says much, although his analysis is less

sophisticated in this area, about engineering, endurance, and habitability limitations. The *Prince of Wales* proved grievously unprepared for tropical service during her ill fated 1941 deployment to the Far East, particularly by comparison with contemporary American designs.

Tarrant's work suggests questions about the quality of ship and engineering design in the Royal Navy between 1919 and 1939, questions which are now also being raised elsewhere. It is likely that historians will come to agree that the Royal Navy was rather better prepared in its intended tactics for a war with Japan than it was in other areas. Tarrant makes it quite apparent that despite the years of preparation for the "Main Fleet to Singapore" strategy, the design implications were in no way addressed in the *KGVs*. The irony—perhaps a result of the widely differing approaches to officer training and careers—is that there is equal evidence, some of which is apparent in this book, that the United States Navy's performance was quite the reverse. Even in Arctic operations, the much greater endurance of USS *Washington*, a design developed under similar (though perhaps less strictly observed) constraints, came as an unpleasant surprise to the commander in chief of the Home Fleet. The Royal Navy would learn a lot more about U.S. naval engineering in the Pacific in 1944 and 1945.

The illustrations in the book are generally well chosen, although there are a few errors in the captions. It would have been useful had a few more postwar photographs been included, together with more

narrative concerning the employment of the ships of the class in their short, semiactive postwar lives. These are, however, minor criticisms. Tarrant's work is, as Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach notes in his foreword, "a balanced work of absorbing interest, technical accuracy and which is highly readable." *King George V Class Battleships* says little that will be wholly new to the deep specialist, but it is a lively and sensible account that will satisfy many tastes.

JAMES GOLDRICK
Commander, Royal Australian Navy
OIC Warfare
RAN Surface Warfare School

Royster, Charles. *The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans*. New York: Knopf, 1991. 523pp. $30

This well written book is a dual biography as well as a history of the Civil War and its effect on American society. With a biography of Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson and William T. Sherman, Royster shows that the military origins of the destructive nature of the Civil War lay with both armies. This argument stands in contrast to that of historians who contend that while the North sought victory through a destructive and brutal strategy of exhaustion, the South strove to validate its independence through maneuver and elegant, decisive battles. It is by adding an assessment of the third party, the American people, that Royster's work makes its most unique contribution.

The author argues for the existence of a relationship between generals like Jackson and Sherman and the people, whereby public opinion directly contributed to the escalating level of violence.

Royster uses the relationship between Jackson and the civilian populace of both sides to prove that the seeds of a destructive war were present from the very beginning. The author then contends that the public's desire to share vicariously the experience of war combined with Sherman's growing realization that the South's will had to be destroyed through attacks on its resources and population. The net effect was to bring "soldiers and civilians together in joint determination to make a successful society by force—[this] became the destructive war."

One of the book's greatest strengths is Royster's ability to portray the burning of Columbia, South Carolina, and the near-hopeless Federal assault up Kennesaw Mountain. The author asserts that the American people sought to live the war through their soldiers' experiences in order to understand what the war meant for their country. It appears that Royster intends for us to live the war vicariously too, through startlingly clear images. In making his case, Royster offers us proofs of historical relationships between American society and its armed forces that are of use to both Civil War historians and the national security community.

Perhaps the author's most provocative argument begins with the assertion that the public's desire to share the war with its soldiers did not extend to the war's confusion, horror, pain, and

futility. The press of the era, in order to build readership, portrayed the conflict in the decisive, romantic, and well defined manner the public expected. Public opinion, as shaped by the press in this case, demanded more of the war; that meant more press coverage; and that fueled the designs of General Sherman. The synergistic effect culminated in the famous march to the sea and up through the Carolinas.

Certainly one need look only as far back as the Gulf War and CNN's high ratings to see the continued existence of at least part of this relationship. In a similar vein, some observers question whether United States involvement in Somalia was driven more by policy or the media's attention to an issue of its own choosing. An additional caution this sub-thesis raises is that if the military carelessly shapes the image the press presents to the people, or hides factors inherent in warfare such as confusion and horror, the people may soon demand more of a war that does not really exist and that the military may not want.

Royster's forays into intellectual history are not as easy to read as the rest of the book, but they do help to place this work within the literature. With its cultural, intellectual, biographical, and military facets, this book is of the "drum and bugles" school; it easily qualifies as part of the new military history exemplified by such authors as Gerald Linderman and John Keegan. Having written extensively on earlier aspects of the American military tradition and edited the most recent edition of Sherman's *Memoirs*, Royster is well prepared for this venture into the mid-

nineteenth-century American military experience. The author's interesting system of notation makes the book "reader-friendly" while retaining its utility, albeit with minor difficulty, for the scholar.

STEVE C. HAWLEY
U.S. Military Academy
West Point, New York

Tucker, Spencer C. *The Jeffersonian Gunboat Navy*. Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1993. 265pp. $24.95

Few episodes in U.S. naval history have been more criticized than the decision during the administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison to substitute a force of coast-defense gunboats, manned primarily by militia, for a regular fleet of blue-water warships. Alfred Thayer Mahan summed up the gunboat experiment as showing that these vessels were "not only excessively costly in expenditure, and lamentably inefficient in results, as compared with seagoing cruisers, but were also deleterious to the professional character of officers and seamen." Historian Fletcher Pratt called them "wretched" and "useless."

Spencer C. Tucker, chair of the History Department at Texas Christian University, takes a more balanced (and charitable) view of the gunboats, concluding that they "do not represent the triumph of a weapons system, nor were they a total failure." Thus he distances himself from Pratt while at the same time substantiating all of Mahan's charges.

The failure of the gunboat strategy was clearly shown in the War of 1812, to which Tucker devotes five chapters. His detailed examination of gunboat operations in each theater fills an important gap in the literature. However, he also devotes three chapters to the use of gunboats prior to 1812, and a chapter to their deployment after the war to show that their service was more useful than usually recorded.

The first gunboats were built to support an offensive strategy. They were to operate in and around the mouth of the Mississippi River, as a show of force to persuade the Spanish and French to keep that vital waterway open. It helped to prompt the Louisiana Purchase. A force of gunboats was sent to the Mediterranean to operate inshore of the frigates operating against the Barbary pirates, after Commodore Edward Preble had successfully employed gunboats he had purchased in Europe.

Tucker argues that the Russian defeat of the Turks in 1788 near the mouth of the Dnieper River convinced Jefferson that a flotilla of small ships could repel a conventional battle fleet.

However, Tucker makes no mention of Jefferson's philosophical bias towards a minimalist defense posture. Without such a reference, Tucker's argument that no alternative to a gunboat program was politically feasible hangs in mid-air. Tucker does cite Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin's argument that gunboats would be cheaper than either frigates or fortifications. Gallatin's claim has a familiar ring—"If the sums to be expended to build and maintain the frigates were applied to paying a part of our national debt, the payment would make us more respectable in the eyes of foreign nations than all the frigates we can build." Tucker refutes Gallatin by citing the observations of Secretary of the Navy William Jones in 1814 that the gunboat fleet, "from its scattered, irregular and irresponsible nature, [was] much more expensive and wasteful than that of the regular navy." Jones also stated that the gunboats used up enough manpower to equip thirteen ships of the line, "enough to paralyze [British] efforts on this continent," had these capital ships been built instead.

For coast defense, Tucker believes that a mix of fortifications and mobile batteries would have been more effective than the gunboats. He does recount a number of valiant battles fought by gunboats that do credit to the brave men who manned them. In several instances, the American boats got the better of British small craft in shallow waters or rivers, but outside these restricted areas the Royal Navy deployed its heavy ships with impunity.

Tucker devotes two chapters to the construction of the gunboats and to their equipment. These chapters are enhanced by a dozen line drawings showing their designs and sail plans.

He concludes that the experience of war "was not so much a condemnation of gunboats as it is an argument for a strong navy." The lack of a battle fleet "played into the hands of Britons who pursued an aggressive maritime policy." He goes on to say that "one unforgettable lesson . . . was that capital ships were essential to protect American commerce."

When employed as in the Mediterranean with the support of stronger warships, the gunboats did valuable work. Tucker writes, "Small vessels continued to play important roles in the world's navies and do so at the present, but only in conjunction with, not in place of, larger warships." This is something to keep in mind as the Navy is called upon in the aftermath of the Cold War to shift from a blue-water strategy to one more oriented toward seaboard operations. Successful performance in coastal waters depends on maintaining superiority in the primary naval environment of the oceans.

WILLIAM R. HAWKINS
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Hamilton Center for National Strategy
Knoxville, Tennessee

Guttridge, Leonard F. *Mutiny: A History of Naval Insurrection*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992. 318pp. $26.95

A fascinating work of synthesis, this first-rate, historically accurate casebook captures the reader's interest through its vivid and detailed depiction of the wide spectrum of recorded "mutinous" naval activity of the last two hundred years. Guttridge expertly presents a study that reveals the common threads among incidents of naval uprising as disparate as the classic mutiny on HMS *Bounty*, the hijacking of the Krivak-class Soviet missile frigate *Storozhevoy*, and the Vietnam-era sitdown strikes aboard the United States aircraft carriers *Constellation* and *Kitty Hawk*.

Guttridge exposes throughout his captivating examination of these sometimes bloody events the universal inability of governments and their respective courts to codify uniquely the act of mutiny. Historically we have called "mutiny" not only violent, chaotic, and murderous rampages but simple disobedience, cooperative acts of fleetwide insubordination, a group's refusal to do one particular job, and "carefully orchestrated acts of passive resistance." Guttridge insightfully deals with them all. He relates how society's semantic and legal reluctance actually determined the course of events during several incidents of large-scale disobedience. He also examines how punishment following those incidents was inconsistent, sometimes involving mass commutation of death sentences, sometimes immediate, unappealed execution, and sometimes total amnesty.

Each episode, with its wealth of action-packed detail and often colorful characters, is meticulously placed within the context of its historical period. The distinction is always clearly drawn between isolated responses to truly barbaric or insensitive leadership, acts tied up with national, regional, racial, or labor movements of the day, and reactions to specific circumstances. Guttridge's masterful use of historical perspective and his well researched characterization of the players make every page come alive. For example, we see Captain William Bligh as a total human being whose career was haunted by controversy—during his employment as sailing master with Captain Cook during Cook's fateful

last voyage; in the events related to his command of HMS *Bounty*; mutinous incidents in HMS *Defiance* and during the widespread rising at the Nore; and his imprisonment for seventeen months while governor of New South Wales during the Rum Rebellion.

My only disappointment was that Guttridge did not begin his history further back than Georgian times. The discipline problems encountered by Magellan are only briefly covered in the first chapter. Drake's problems that led to the execution of Thomas Doughty in the southwest Atlantic are not discussed at all, but they would seem to offer an additional and different slant on the officer-as-mutineer subtheme so aptly covered in *Mutiny*. I know Guttridge could have told those stories well.

The author avoids lecturing his readers on leadership and communication; rather, he straightforwardly uncovers the situations leading up to each incident. André Marty's entrance into French naval service as a known anarchist, a captain's refusal to acknowledge (or correct) the serving of maggot-infested meat to the men in *Potemkin*, and the German government's inability to connect lower-deck labor movements and the Independent Social Democratic Party in 1917—all are presented without the pedantic twenty-twenty hindsight so often seen in works like this. Additionally, the author uses repeated examples showing that the characteristics and temperament of leadership that brought success to wartime naval commanders were not necessarily those needed for effective

action when confronted with hostility from those commanded.

In an effort to put the worldwide post-Bolshevik reaction in perspective, Guttridge cleverly uses the ironic though non-mutinous tale of Captain Clark Sterns, USN, whose egalitarian initiatives as captain of USS *Roanoke* won acclaim for efficiency; the ship's performance earned him a Distinguished Service Medal in 1918. Three years later, Captain Sterns, after only 107 days in command of USS *Michigan*, was relieved by the Secretary of the Navy for reflecting "a Soviet spirit [which] had crept into the Navy," as evidenced by his establishment of Morale and Discipline Committees within the enlisted ranks, one of the keys to his former success.

This book takes a hard look at how throughout the last two hundred years the common and often repeated errors of good men ignited volatile situations. The events so well documented in this book actually happened; they happened to real people in ships deployed afar, and in ships alongside their home berth. The art of communication has not changed with the ages, nor has human nature. Every commander should read and understand the lessons of *Mutiny*.

MORRIS E. ELSEN
Captain, U.S. Navy

Taylor, Robert L. and Rosenbach, William E. *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992. 204pp. $49.95

The quality of leadership is critical in any organization, and its significance

grows as resources become scarcer. However, our national culture is ambivalent toward leadership. As a result, it is difficult to learn how to be an effective leader. This book, a collection of essays by practitioners and behavioral scientists, can help in this task.

A major theme throughout the book is the question of whether leadership can in fact be learned or if the potential is innate. The editors of the anthology hold that while leadership requires inner qualities such as intelligence and character, it must be fined-tuned if one is to be able to lead. The articles they chose for this volume support that position.

A significant contribution of this volume is its emphasis on the otherwise neglected subject of "followership." Taking as given that every leader is a follower to the next echelon and that one cannot be a leader without the consent of those who follow, several essays examine this side of the equation. Robert E. Kelley's valuable "In Praise of Followers" points out that "follower" and "subordinate" are not synonymous. Kelly argues that all subordinates can be assessed according to two variables: first, independent and critical thinking, and second, the extent to which they are active rather than passive. Effective followers are those who rate highly in both areas. They are by no means inferior to those who lead. Followers, then, are the key to the success of any organization, and follower-development programs should be instituted.

The conclusion of the section on followership is that factors which contribute to developing a good follower are the same as those necessary for a good leader.

A passage from James MacGregor Burn's 1978 book, *Leadership*, presents two opposing forms of leadership. "Transactional" leadership exists when two parties, one a subordinate, enter a *quid pro quo* transaction, such as an exchange of labor for wages. "Transformational" leadership, on the other hand, occurs when a leader-follower relationship results in both becoming better people and their organization being advanced. Several of the essays in this book take this analysis as a starting point for their own presentations on the subject.

Another issue the book extensively addresses is the difference between management (which aims to control complexity) and leadership (which deals in vision and in moving the organization toward it). Management seeks to eliminate the unpredictable, while leadership deliberately rocks the boat or directs it into uncharted waters. All organizations need a combination of both, in a state of dynamic tension that gives an appropriate mix of stability and movement.

This book addresses many facets of leadership, but it is not comprehensive, nor was it intended to be. However, it can be used to develop a checklist of necessary characteristics of military leadership.

One surprise is that, despite the subtitle, the authors do not mention Tom Peters's landmark works on organizational quality, or Total Quality Management (or Leadership), which is an important subject in today's military.

Some may get a case of sticker shock from the price. Nevertheless, the attention paid to followership is itself a service to military leaders.

WALTER J. JOHANSON
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Oliver, Dave, Jr. *Lead On! A Practical Approach to Leadership.* Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1992. 207pp. $9.95

This is the best book on naval leadership currently in print. It is also, without question, one of the most honest assessments of shipboard leadership techniques—both good and bad—ever published. Rear Admiral Oliver, the director of the General Planning and Programing Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, makes it clear in the opening sentence that he is going to pull no punches: "I was inordinately fortunate during my early professional career. I worked for some truly awful leaders." What follows are the lessons learned from a career in the submarine service, written in a style most short-story writers would envy.

Lead On! consists of twenty chapters of ideas on leadership, each based on a major incident that Oliver either experienced or investigated. These are not dry case studies— although I would recommend them for any business school—but lively and carefully crafted tales reminiscent of a nautical Aesop. No officer who reads this book will fail to find at least one situation, complete with leadership dilemma, that he or she has had to face without help. If only we had had this source of patient wisdom beforehand! Each chapter focuses first on situations and issues that demanded dynamic leadership but instead got inept management. It then provides a nugget of wisdom—hence the allusion to the morals of Aesop's Fables. These summarize Oliver's thoughtful insights into what motivates people in general, and naval personnel in particular, to achieve (or not achieve) excellence.

The tone of the book is one of a penetrating and warm conversation, the caring advice of a sage mentor. Along the way, the reader learns a great deal about basic submarining, but in a way that is understandable and enjoyable and makes the book an equally fine introduction to everyday submarine operations.

Oliver also examines the limits to leadership and how the Navy decided that urinalysis was the only practical way to enforce zero tolerance of drugs. Moreover, he offers evidence for the argument that many have long suspected: that enlisted retention, the subject of competitive unit awards, is a poor indicator of a commanding officer's leadership skills. (Officer retention, on the other hand, is probably the best.) The book also discusses injustices that occur within the naval bureaucracy—how "the bad guys win"—when "briefing in color" vanquishes the truth. I suspect the author's willingness to be this honest may have deterred a few potential publishers before Presidio accepted.

Clearly the message is one of leadership by example and by involvement, with the requirement for the leader

152   Naval War College Review

to use ethical and moral reasoning. For example, the author spends considerable effort exploring why subordinates frequently protect alcoholic commanders. Many officers may see leadership as a matter of common sense, and it is, but no one (I say again, no one, including the overall Total Quality Leadership program) has expressed it quite as well as Oliver. If plebes (and all officer candidates) are not receiving this volume in their initial outfit seabag, we are making a mistake. This is the career-molding introduction that will make all those leadership statistics they will soon be subjected to seem truly relevant. For the rest of us, my advice is, don't go to sea without it.

SAM J. TANGREDI
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Krol, Ed. *The Whole Internet: User's Guide and Catalogue.* Sebastopol, Calif.: O'Reilly, 1992. 376pp. $24.95

Internet is the world's largest computer network. It is the result of nearly twenty years of development, much of which was sponsored by the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency. The purpose was initially to develop communications and computer networks. This effort was in parallel with the explosive advances in electronics and computer hardware that have led to affordable and widespread personal computers. Collectively, all of these developments are embodied in what is called information technology.

Ed Krol set out to provide a guide for the "garden variety" computer user,

the individual who simply has a job to do. He has succeeded admirably. He has also succeeded in minimizing jargon and "computerese." This book helps to bring the world of information technology within the grasp of those who are not computer science professionals. With this book at hand, those of us who are minimally computer literate can enter into discourse on a variety of subjects and on a worldwide basis.

With a personal computer or a lap-top, a modem (a device that connects the computer with the telephone network), and an affiliation with Internet, one can enjoy electronic mail (e-mail), electronic bulletin boards, and access to university libraries and to individuals who share hobbies or intellectual interests. But there is more in this for professional national security specialists, be they military or civilian.

Information technology, specifically large-scale computer nets, has brought operational and acquisition elements of the military departments to the threshold of revolutionary change. Modeling and simulation will be used by the operational forces and commands to evaluate, train, plan operations, and rehearse for them; the defense systems acquisition community has been enabled to revolutionize and shorten the acquisition process and reduce the costs associated with it. The promise of information technology has been recognized at the level of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the service secretaries and chiefs. This reviewer urges readers who have access to the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office to become familiar with its

activities—particularly with the Advanced Technology Demonstration Projects of Advanced Distributed Simulation. Familiarity with this book (even better, using its recipes for becoming an e-mail and electronic bulletin–board user) will create better understanding and appreciation of such programs and of how trainers "embedded" aboard ship, in aviation squadrons, in operational control centers, and at Navy colleges and schools can be netted to exercise naval, Navy-Marine, and joint force operational concepts.

Krol makes the point in Appendix A that many individuals have access to Internet through their schools, companies, or government agencies *and don't know it*. The "how to" nature

of this book starts with important information on how to gain access, including how to find the commercial "service providers" such as Prodigy and Compuserve.

There is a full description of how to use e-mail—a confidence-building chapter. As one tries things, one gains familiarity, understanding, and appreciation. One of the chapters of the book describes how to find an individual who is thought to have an e-mail address. Another shows how to locate generalized resources.

This reviewer invites responses to this review or comments on any subject via e-mail. Please address amb2m@virginia.edu.

ALBERT M. BOTTOMS
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Ψ

Of making many books there is no end, and much study wearies the body.

Ecclesiastes 12:12b (NIV)

Recent Books

Bevan, Denys. *United States Forces in New Zealand, 1942–1945.* **Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Assoc. Bookstore, 1992. 408pp. $22.45**

Labors of love can be either wonderful works of infatuation or terribly tedious. This work lies somewhere in between, depending solely upon one's interests. Denys Bevan has written what must be the most factual history so far of the substantial U.S. military presence in New Zealand during the Second World War. While it is not widely recognized here, the large numbers of, particularly, U.S. Marine Corps and Army personnel who were stationed in or passed through New Zealand had a significant impact on that small country. When this book was published, a comprehensive history of the American presence in New Zealand had yet to appear: Denys Bevan has admirably filled this important gap. To be sure, the potential readership of this exhaustive study will be small, which is unfortunate, given the effort and time the author has dedicated to it. However, this book will find a very receptive audience not only among those with an interest in New Zealand but also, and particularly, those whose units spent time in *Aotearoa*, "the island of the long white cloud," during the Second World War.

Bobrick, Benson. *East of the Sun: The Epic Conquest and Tragic History of Siberia.* **New York: Poseidon Press, 1992. 543pp. $28**

Few place-names are as widely known as Siberia, and none—unless it is Timbuktu—is more evocative. For all such familiarity, however, and for all its size and potential wealth, few Westerners, or even European Russians, know much about Siberia, still less about its history. Until the first Russian (actually Cossack) trans-Urals forays in the late sixteenth century, it had been settled by a myriad of peoples recalled today almost solely by place-names: the Yakuts, Kamchadals, Chukchi. The European settlement of Siberia, the presumed ancient home of the American Indians, proceeded in ways strikingly like and yet unlike that of the American West. Bobrick, the author of other popular histories, speaks with the authority of extensive Siberian travel and tells compellingly the Siberian story—which is, inextricably, that of Russia itself. Naval readers will be especially struck by the settling of the Okhotsk and Kamchatka regions, and by the decades-long effort to feel out the shape of the Chukchi Peninsula and the location of Japan and of Alaska as well as to confirm finally the absence of a mythical North Pacific landmass. Map, photographs, index.

Brandon, Henry, ed. *In Search of a New World Order: The Future of U.S.-European Relations.* **Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992. 171pp. $19.95**

Edited by the longtime Washington correspondent for the *London Sunday Times*, this collection of essays presents the views of eight experts (seven Europeans, one American) on the future of U.S.-European relations. These pundits differ widely as to the prospective course of that relationship in light of the collapse of the Soviet threat and the growing economic power of an increasingly unified Western Europe, but the predictive value of their collective effort is seriously weakened by two shaky assumptions that undergird the analytical foundations of this book: first, that an East Bloc in disarray is far less threatening to European security than was the Soviet monolith; and second, that European integration is irreversible, only its pace and geographic scope being in question.

The Serbian rape of Bosnia has made a mockery of such comfortable thinking. And Bosnia's fate is only the starkest example of the poisonous nationalistic, ethnic, and religious tensions no longer kept in check throughout Europe by the antidote of the Cold War. These tensions have painfully exposed the European Community's (and Nato's) impotence in the face of a virulent new threat to Europe's hard-won security and hoped-for unity—and have called into question the moral authority of the very concept of a European Community. All of that is not to say that the search for new world order based on a continuing partnership between the United States and Europe is doomed to fail; but it is to say that, in early 1992, this book's contributors seriously underestimated how much more difficult, dangerous, and uncertain that search would become.

Clancy, Tom. *Submarine: A Guided Tour inside a Nuclear Warship.* **New York: Berkeley, 1993. 328pp. $14.95**

Tom Clancy (with acknowledged assistance from the U.S. Navy) presents a solid account of the workings of today's nuclear attack submarines. After a short history of submarines and submarining, Clancy gets right to it with guided tours of USS *Miami* (SSN 755) and HMS *Triumph* (S 93). The level of technical, operational, and mission detail—all of it done to charm the initiated and educate the novice—is really quite extraordinary. Inclusion of the British submarine force and of some first-rate operational scenarios (mock, of course) adds to the excitement. A lively primer on submariners, the crews, and what they do in today's navies.

Kaplan, Philip and Currie, Jack. *Round the Clock.* **New York: Random House, 1993. 232pp. $50**

In 1942 the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) and the Royal Air Force (RAF) set out to bomb Germany "round the clock"—the USAAF by day and

the RAF by night. This beautifully composed and illustrated book recaptures the men, the airbases, the bombing runs, and the aircraft. It focuses appropriately on the brave and impossibly young men, in 250 photographs, nearly half of them in color and many previously unpublished. The text, with sidebars from the time, is unabashedly nostalgic and evocative. This is a book for those who were there, or whose fathers, uncles, or elder brothers were.

Lynch, Barbara A. and Vajda, John E., comps. *United States Naval History: A Bibliography.* **7th ed. Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1993. 173pp. (Available from the Supt. of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.)**

Under the direction of Dean C. Allard, the Director of Naval History, a team led by Barbara Lynch and John Vajda of the Navy Department Library have updated this basic bibliography, which last appeared in 1972. The present work appears as the first of a "Naval History Bibliographies" series. The 450 entries (generally not annotated) are not meant to be exhaustive but to list references most likely to be available through libraries; a few items in the 1972 edition have been deleted, and new ones have been added through September 1992. In making their selections, the compilers had in mind more the needs of "naval professionals, students, and the public" than those of specialists. The cited works are given (once each) under the following major headings: general, chronologies, pictorial histories, specific periods (twenty-four of them), organizational histories, particular topics (seventeen), the U.S. Coast Guard, biographies, and memoirs. The work ends with sections on lists, registers, periodicals, research aids, and an index of authors.

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THE NEWPORT PAPERS

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