Naval War College Review

Volume 47
Number 4 *Autumn*

Article 4

1994

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ON 25 JUNE 1950, THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY surged across the 38th parallel under the cover of darkness and massive artillery fire. The same day, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution naming North Korea an aggressor and calling for withdrawal of its armed forces. Two days later, another resolution asked UN members to "furnish such assistance . . . as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."[1] The United States was designated the UN's executive agent for military action in Korea, and in short order a United Nations Command was established under U.S. leadership.[2]

The invasion of South Korea galvanized the world community into a remarkable display of collective support. Forty-nine nations and scores of private organizations contributed supplies, food, and equipment. Five more countries provided medical units. Most important, fifteen nations from Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas joined the United States in sending armed forces to Korea.[3] This was the first example in history of such a diverse coalition fighting under the auspices of an international organization. The nations joined together neither from strategic interest based on geographical proximity, nor the threat of imminent attack, nor any potential for economic gain. Rather, they shared the political goals of resisting aggression and halting the spread of communism.

In terms strictly of the number of fighting men who served in Korea, the contribution of coalition countries was small. In fact, just eleven years after the end of the war, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff advised against relying on allies in Vietnam on the grounds that America had received "no significant support in Korea. . . . The U.S. did essentially all of the fighting, took all the casualties, and paid all the bills."[4] At first glance, therefore, it could be argued that our coalition partners added nothing of value to military operations in Korea.

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A more pragmatic view, however, holds that without the coalition, the United States would have had to field in Korea another two divisions (the coalition's contribution) and would have borne another fifteen thousand casualties (the number the coalition suffered). In reality, the coalition forces made an important contribution; they participated in all the major battles, acquitted themselves well in combat, bore heavy casualties in proportion to their strength, and reimbursed the United States for the logistical support they received. After a visit to the front in 1951, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall was "impressed with the complete amalgamation of the various United Nations units . . . into an integrated, coordinated fighting force."[5]

Forty years after Korea, the United States has come to appreciate the value of coalition partners, as its National Military Strategy reflects: "We expect to strengthen world response to crises through multilateral operations under the auspices of international security organizations [and we] must be prepared to fight as part of an ad hoc coalition . . . where no formal security relationships exist."[6] Notwithstanding, and although we fought successfully in 1991 with a coalition in Desert Storm, the conditions that made a "hundred-hour war" possible then may not exist next time. Instead, the Korean War—a protracted ground campaign—could be the paradigm for future conflict. It is essential that operational commanders be aware of the unique characteristics of that war if they are to be prepared to employ coalition forces effectively in a similar situation in the future.

Toward that end, this article uses the Korean War as a case study showing that coalition forces can make a positive contribution on the battlefield but that there are factors that make the employment of these forces a challenge. After summarizing the key aspects of the ground, naval, and air operations in Korea and the contributions made by our coalition partners, the article explores issues relating to coalition force employment and then extracts the "lessons learned."

The Coalition Contribution

The presence of coalition partners added much to the military effort in Korea. They gave the war an international legitimacy it may have otherwise lacked, and they helped keep it limited at a time when some American voices (such as General Douglas MacArthur's) were calling for escalation. Moreover, the coalition forces fought hard in battle. Their courage and ability were recognized by U.S. commanders, who awarded citations for bravery to many coalition units.

The Ground War. The ground war in Korea consisted of four distinct phases. The first phase, from the North Korean invasion to the Inchon landing, involved the defense of the Pusan perimeter. The second, comprising the push to the Yalu

River and the subsequent Chinese intervention, ended with the withdrawal of UN forces to the 38th parallel. The third, the Chinese spring offensive and UN counteroffensive, ended in relatively fixed battlefield positions. The final phase, which spanned the two years of armistice negotiations, involved primarily positional warfare reminiscent of World War I.[7] Coalition forces fought in the key battles of each period. By 1953, 15 percent of the 155-mile front was held by non-U.S. and non–Republic of Korea troops.[8]

The British Commonwealth contributed a large share of those forces; its ground units operated in Korea throughout the war. First attached as independent units to U.S. divisions, these forces were later unified as the 1st British Commonwealth Division and were assigned as a body to the U.S. I Corps.[9] The United Kingdom was the first non-U.S. nation to send ground forces to Korea, and its 27th Brigade helped defend the Pusan perimeter. Over the course of the war, nine British regiments were represented. One of these, the Gloucestershires, was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for its stand on Gloucester Hill, called "the most outstanding example of unit bravery in modern warfare."[10] Australia provided an infantry battalion, New Zealand an artillery battalion, and Canada a three-battalion infantry brigade.[11] The Canadians and Australians were all volunteers, recruited from the general population. Battalions from both countries were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for heroism in the battle of Kapyong.[12]

Ten other countries supplied brigade and battalion-size formations to Korea; these were attached directly to U.S. regiments and divisions. Belgium's volunteer infantry battalion was accompanied by a forty-four-man detachment from Luxembourg. The Belgians' and Luxembourgers' most significant fighting was at the battle of Imjin River, for which they received the Presidential Unit Citation.[13] Colombia was the only Latin American country to send forces to Korea. Its infantry battalion, made up of volunteers from the regular Colombian army, saw its heaviest fighting in the Kumsong offensive and at Pork Chop Hill.[14] In one three-month period, the Colombians inflicted losses on the enemy estimated at fifty times their own.[15] The only African nation to send ground forces to Korea was Ethiopia. It provided an infantry battalion, a volunteer force from the Imperial Bodyguard.[16] The Ethiopians were the only troops in Korea that did not lose a prisoner or leave a single man unaccounted for.[17] As the U.S. Army Chief of Staff put it, "No braver or finer troops ever fought in Korea. They were never driven from the battlefield. They returned as they went out—all together—whether they were living or wounded or dead."[18]

France sent an all-volunteer infantry battalion of professional soldiers led by a highly decorated general who reverted to the rank of lieutenant colonel to command in Korea. The French battalion saw hard fighting at the Twin Tunnels, Chipyong-ni, Hongchon, and Heartbreak Ridge.[19] Within three months of

entering combat, it had suffered the highest proportion of casualties of any nation but the United States and the Republic of Korea.[20] Altogether, the battalion earned three Presidential Unit Citations.[21] There was also a battalion of Dutch infantry, which first saw action at Wonju, where it earned the Presidential Unit Citation for its "courageous four-day stand" against the enemy.[22]

Turkey, for its part, was the third-largest contributor of combat forces to Korea (after the U.S. and U.K.). Its brigade took part in some of the hardest fighting in the war, losing one-fifth of its personnel at Kunu-ri.[23] The Turkish brigade was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for gallantry during the battle of Kumyanjang-ni.[24] Finally, Greece, Thailand, and the Philippines each sent infantry battalions to Korea, and they all saw hard fighting.[25]

The Naval War. On 4 July 1950 President Harry S. Truman ordered a blockade of the Korean coast; the United Nations Blockade and Escort Force was quickly organized as part of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. It included separate task groups to cover Korea's east and west coasts. The east coast group was under U.S. operational control and contained all the U.S. naval units; the west coast force was under the command of a British admiral, and it included all the Commonwealth naval vessels and most of the coalition units.[26] There was close coordination between the U.S. and British staffs, and the two task groups regularly shared assets.[27]

The North Korean "gunboat navy" was disposed of soon after the blockade was declared.[28] For the duration of the war, the coalition naval forces maintained control of the sea, provided fire support to ground forces, bombarded lines of communication and other targets ashore, conducted antisubmarine patrols, escorted aircraft carriers, supported commando raids behind enemy lines, and protected islands along the coasts.[29] Coalition aircraft from one Australian and four British aircraft carriers flew direct support missions, performed reconnaissance for ground troops, spotted for naval bombardment, and provided air cover for UN ships.[30] The Inchon landing and the evacuation of Hungnam were both supported by coalition naval forces.[31]

There was concern at the time that the UN blockade of North Korea might be ineffective, since the enemy continued to be supplied even though (as was mistakenly believed) air force bombing had cut the enemy's overland supply routes.[32] In reality, the land routes had not been cut, but the naval blockade was highly effective. A study conducted by the Chief of Naval Operations determined that any "leakage" through the blockade was in the form of small craft passing through the coastal islands and that it amounted at most to a "trickle" of troops and supplies.[33]

Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom supplied a total of five aircraft carriers, five cruisers, seventeen

destroyers, seventeen frigates, and numerous support vessels. The Canadian destroyer HMCS *Nootka* had the honor of capturing a North Korean minelayer, the only enemy vessel taken during the war.[34]

The Air War. The Commander, U.S. Far East Air Force, controlled all air operations in Korea.[35] Although the United States provided the majority of air assets, coalition air forces were present as well. The primary contributions of coalition air forces were in the close air support of ground troops and the interdiction of enemy lines of supply and communication; bomber escort, reconnaissance, transportation, and combat air patrol missions were also undertaken.

Canada, Thailand, and Greece provided transportation aircraft; Greece's C-47 Skytrain group earned the Presidential Unit Citation for action at the Chosin Reservoir just after the Chinese intervention.[36] The United Kingdom provided artillery spotter aircraft and three squadrons of Sunderland seaplanes for maritime reconnaissance.[37] Australia's 77th Squadron was the first non-U.S. force to fight in Korea, and it was instrumental in defending the Pusan perimeter.[38] South Africa's "Flying Cheetah" Squadron demonstrated "classic examples of airmanship and courage" in its frontline support and interdiction operations.[39] Finally, Canadian pilots flew combat missions as part of the U.S. Fifth Air Force.

Political Considerations

Politics can have a fundamental impact on military operations, particularly when the cooperation of many nations is required for success. The interaction of multiple Clausewitzian "trinities" of governments, peoples, and militaries creates a changeable and fragile partnership that can be fractured if the interests of individual nations are threatened. The Korean War coalition held together for over three years of conflict. Our coalition partners were reliable; they had strong political reasons for participating in the war; and their military contributions had a significance for each nation that went beyond the comparatively small number of the troops sent.

Each of the coalition partners joined the war effort because it supported the United Nations goals of resisting aggression and halting the spread of communism. In addition, many had political reasons of their own. Britain wanted to return to the level of influence with the United States that it had enjoyed in World War II.[40] Colombia wanted to assert itself as a "player" on the world stage. Others, like Turkey, felt they might need UN help in the future.[41] Ethiopia wanted to express solidarity with the collective effort because it had felt abandoned by the League of Nations in 1935.[42] Unity of effort in Korea was thus the result of a synergy of collective purpose and national objectives.

Despite the demonstrated commitment of our coalition partners, however, the American public at the time felt that their contributions were not enough. In reality, for some of the countries to field even a small force was a burden. Luxembourg's forty-four-man detachment may have seemed a token contribution, but its total armed forces were only a few hundred strong.[43] Colombia supplied only an infantry battalion and a frigate, but they cost every week what the nation had spent on its entire army and navy in a year.[44] It must also be remembered that many of our partners were simultaneously fighting regional conflicts of their own. The British were trying to contain an insurrection in Malaya and the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, France was deeply embroiled in Indochina, and the Philippines was dealing with the Huk Rebellion.[45] Most important, these partners and some of the others were willing to join the war effort even though they were just beginning to recover from World War II.[46]

Korea was a war of "firsts" for many of the coalition countries. The dispatch of its destroyers marked the first time Canada had placed a military force under a foreign commander in peacetime.[47] It was the first action the Turkish army had seen since 1923, the first time in 127 years that Colombian troops had fought on foreign soil, and the first war Ethiopia had waged outside of Africa in thirteen centuries.[48] Nevertheless, there was vigorous support in these countries for the troop commitments. In Canada, fifteen thousand men applied for Korean service, in a time of full national employment;[49] in Ethiopia, for every man in the volunteer force, ten had been rejected who wanted to come.[50]

As the UN's executive agent, the United States was responsible for accepting or rejecting offers of military assistance from potential coalition members, and such decisions often had political significance that superseded operational considerations. For example, the U.S. turned down an offer of thirty-three thousand troops from Taiwan in part because their use would have been provocative to Communist China.[51] Our reliance on Japan for equipment and logistical support may have given color to the Soviet Union's accusation that we were employing Japanese troops in the field.[52] The desire to limit contributions to formations of operationally significant size (i.e., battalion or higher) precluded accepting the offers of Cuba and Bolivia, who would have given smaller contingents, and of Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Panama, who would have let men volunteer on an individual basis.[53] Such nations protested the limitation on the ground that it prevented them from performing their "legal and moral obligations to the United Nations."[54] On the other hand, the presence of at least some forces from Latin America and Africa helped to allay any perception by newly independent states that the Korean War was an "imperialist campaign."[55]

The actual employment of coalition forces could also be a politically sensitive issue, one with repercussions far beyond the immediate operation. Britain was assigned control of the west coast portion of the naval blockade primarily because

it recognized the People's Republic of China—if a Commonwealth vessel strayed into Chinese waters, the situation could be addressed diplomatically.[56] But it was also possible to give offense in this way. For instance, British and Canadian troops were sent to guard the POW camp on Koje-do Island soon after an insurrection in which the camp commander had been captured; both governments accused the U.S. of trying to spread the blame for the condition of the camp.[57] Many coalition partners were determined to keep the war limited and vigorously protested anything done without full consultation that they feared might escalate the conflict.[58] In one case, pilots were denied permission for "hot pursuit" of enemy aircraft across the Chinese border because five allies thought it would be provocative.[59] In another case, the bombing of power plants on the Yalu River provoked serious diplomatic tension because the U.S. had failed to consult with Britain beforehand.[60] Fortunately, no incidents of this type ever proved serious enough to disrupt the coalition.

Logistics

The United States provided nearly all of the clothing, rations, equipment, and weapons used by the coalition partners, except for the Commonwealth nations. The latter were provisioned through a separate British supply line (although a portion of their supplies was furnished by the U.S.).[61] Despite the complexity of the coalition force, logistical problems never became crippling, although there were some remarkable challenges to overcome.[62]

Cultural and religious preferences dictated certain modifications to combat rations to accommodate the coalition forces. The Turks, who were Muslims, required a pork-free ration. Thais were given an allowance of two and one-half ounces of tabasco sauce per man per week. The Filipinos did not like the local rice, so theirs had to be shipped in from Manila. The French insisted on baking their own bread, and the Ethiopians cooked their own meals in accordance with Ethiopian Orthodox (Coptic) tradition.[63]

Most of the coalition forces wound up wearing U.S. uniforms at some point, if only assuming them piece by piece as their national uniforms wore out.[64] Problems ranged from the objection of the Argyll Highlanders to brown combat boots (they had worn black ones for over a century) to the Thai soldiers' need for specially made shoes to fit their extra-wide feet.[65] The real challenge, however, was outfitting for cold weather. The subzero winter was a surprise for the Ethiopians and Australians, who had never seen snow, and the Canadians, who had expected tropical conditions.[66] Several of the units, including the Ethiopians and the British 27th Brigade, had arrived in summer uniforms. It was generally felt that Americans "did a fine job" providing cold weather gear, although many of the coalition troops had to be trained in its use.[67]

Transportation was a major concern for coalition partners, many of whom either lacked equipment or brought antiquated, pre–World War II vehicles. Even with the proper equipment, movements of smaller units would be delayed for hours or days while road priority was given to U.S. convoys.[68] Maintenance and operation were also problems, as some coalition units were deemed mechanically incompetent and in others there was a shortage of trained drivers.[69] As a result, the U.S. provided most of the transportation within the theater.

The problems that might be encountered were epitomized by the experience of the Turkish brigade. The Turks brought with them obsolete trucks, which became a traffic menace when they broke down.[70] As a result, in the battle of Kunu-ri the brigade requested American equipment; unfortunately, the vehicles provided were fewer than promised, were delivered late, and had to be given back before the Turks actually reached the battle area.[71] Had the vehicles been left at the Turks' disposal, the brigade's mobility and firepower would have increased, and its casualties might have been fewer.[72]

The United States signed formal agreements with the coalition partners on reimbursement for logistical support provided during the war and, four days after the war broke out, specified how material was to be controlled and accounted for.[73] However, it was not until the summer of 1951 that satisfactory administrative procedures were in place and working.[74] Keeping track of what the individual coalition partners used remained a significant burden to the quartermasters, since units attached to U.S. formations drew from their common resources.[75] A different problem resulted from the Commonwealth division's pool accounting system for its countries who drew American supplies: reimbursement would be funneled to the U.S. through Britain. Britain at first refused to settle its account, and it was not until 1964, after protracted negotiations, that it finally did so.[76]

The Challenge of Diversity

The presence of multinational forces in Korea, with different languages, cultures, and command and control procedures, posed a particular problem for operational commanders. Its effects were largely mitigated by the preponderance of U.S. forces in the theater and in the United Nations command structure, but there were certainly opportunities for improvement.

The UN Command specified English as the basic language for operations in Korea.[77] All orders, instructions, and directives were accordingly issued in English; the burden of translation fell on each unit.[78] Some countries selected officers for their English skills, and liaison personnel were exchanged between the coalition forces and U.S. units. Notwithstanding, translation resources were usually inadequate; at least thirteen languages plus a number of regional dialects

were spoken by UN forces in Korea.[79] The Command tried to ease the situation of the Philippine and Colombian battalions by assigning them to the Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican regiment. Unfortunately, of course, the Filipinos spoke Tagalog; as for the Colombians, they were eventually assigned elsewhere in the name of more equitable distribution of UN forces.[80] The Turkish brigade had a more tragic experience: after their heroic stand at Kunu-ri, the Turks were unable to ask for directions back to the U.S. lines. By the time they straggled back in, the Americans had assumed the Turks had fled the battle; instead of promptly sending forward a relief force, the Americans had written off the Turks as lost.[81]

The presence of coalition forces resulted in a certain amount of cultural friction as well. The Ethiopian commander insisted that his troops not be called "Negroes"; a U.S. officer referred to the Thai regimental commander as a "gook."[82] Notwithstanding such isolated incidents, however, the policy of keeping other UN units attached to American divisions or corps helped to develop mutual understanding and esprit de corps.[83] Probably the most striking accommodation to cultural requirements occurred when the UN Command flew in a flock of sheep so that the Greeks could perform their customary Easter sacrifice.[84]

Cultural differences can be exploited by an enemy to split a coalition, and the Chinese tried to do so in Korea. First, they focused attacks against frontline coalition units, as happened to the Ethiopians repeatedly, thinking perhaps to demoralize these troops or to find a weak link.[85] Second, coalition prisoners were sometimes treated more leniently than Americans in the hopes of creating POW turncoats and thereby a propaganda coup. Thanks to the firm cohesion of the coalition troops, however, these attempts at disrupting the UN effort failed.[86]

Command relationships within the coalition were established from the very beginning; they included formal agreements between the U.S. and its partners that coalition forces would obey the orders of U.S. commanders.[87] At all times, the senior military representative of each nation had direct access to the UN commander on matters of major policy and could contact his government directly on administrative issues affecting his force.[88]

The United States and Britain, whose command structures were the predominant ones in Korea, were able to iron out differences in staff concepts, communication procedures, and military terminology because of their shared experiences in the Second World War.[89] Examples were naval signalling procedures, maneuvering instructions, and the adoption of standard-size maps that units could reproduce.[90] Notwithstanding, the need for simplicity in communication—even among partners who speak the same language—was demonstrated once again. For instance, the U.S. and Britain differed in how they prepared operational orders.[91] On at least one occasion, a Commonwealth naval commander did not like the U.S. version; for the Inchon landing, he was given

"two enormous volumes" of operations orders that specified many matters in excruciating detail but had "no reference to the nature of enemy resistance, adverse weather conditions, actions to be taken in the event of heavy minelaying, or other considerations of basic interest to the operational commander."[92]

Tactical Issues

The military doctrinal concepts of the two major UN powers in Korea—the United States and Great Britain—being largely in congruence, there were no tactical mismatches serious enough to jeopardize the war effort. There were, however, occasions in which the coalition was strained by poor American leadership on the battlefield.

The combat readiness of coalition forces ranged from that of the Greeks, who were experienced mountain fighters, to the New Zealanders, who had never handled artillery before their regiment was formed a few months earlier.[93] Some of the forces, including the Colombians, Ethiopians, and Canadians, had undergone preliminary training with U.S. Army advisers before deploying to Korea.[94] The U.S. and Canadian navies had developed combined tactical doctrine and had carried out battle workups for the Canadian destroyers headed to Korea.[95] In the theater, the U.S. Army set up the UN Reception Center (UNRC), whose mission was in part to "provide familiarization training with U.S. Army weapons and equipment."[96] UNRC services ranged from brief indoctrination to major unit training, and many problems would "shake out" there before units went into combat.[97] The amount of training a coalition force received at UNRC depended on its previous preparation; but most were given additional training once they reached their assigned U.S. units.[98] No Commonwealth troops passed through the UNRC, the British having set up their own reception and training center.[99]

Despite such preparation, however, some of the coalition forces retained tactical idiosyncracies that were disruptive to operations. The French disliked marching at night, and they lit huge campfires even when near enemy positions.[100] The Turks marched in closely packed columns, providing prime targets for ambushes.[101] On the other hand, the U.S. found many coalition practices superior to its own and adopted them, such as Turkish bayonet techniques, British methods of consolidating ground, and Commonwealth artillery communications.[102]

A greater problem than minor tactical differences was the inferior performance on the battlefield of some U.S. forces working with the coalition. Agreements were signed with some partners not to hold the other liable for deaths of personnel or destruction of property;[103] however, morale of the coalition forces was weakened when the losses were seen as resulting from U.S. mistakes. Fratricide

is a prime example; almost every frontline unit on the Pusan perimeter was attacked by friendly aircraft at some point.[104] Notably, the British 27th Brigade, which had called for air support, was hit by a U.S. napalm strike; although many British troops were killed, both sides appear to have attributed the incident to the "fog of war," and no ill will was harbored.[105] Unfortunately, the problem seems not to have been rectified; in 1951, the U.S. napalmed Australian positions at Kapyong.[106] American forces also were prone to abandon comrades in arms when, as the troops put it at the time, they "bugged out" in wholesale retreat from the invading Chinese. On at least three occasions U.S. troops withdrew without warning the Turks, who became encircled by the enemy and had to fight their way out with horrendous losses.[107] The British were forced time and again to cover the retreat of U.S. forces and at times suffered friendly fire from panicking American soldiers.[108] Eventually the British and Turks began to protest U.S. decisions to withdraw; at one point, the French, Dutch, Greek, and Turkish contingents requested to be placed under British rather than U.S. command.[109] It eventually became U.S. policy that American troops, not coalition partners, would be the last to withdraw.[110]

Legally, there is today only an armistice in Korea. The UN Command is still in existence, and periodic reports of its activities are made to the Security Council.[111] Korea has continued to be one of the world's "hot spots"—very much so at this writing—and the U.S. National Military Strategy takes specific note of it: "The Korean Peninsula remains divided in stark contrast with the end of the Cold War in Europe. Logic dictates that change is inevitable, but the transition period is likely to be fraught with great risks."[112] Nevertheless, the UN forces of 1950–1953 accomplished the political objectives expressed by President Truman at the time, "to repel attack and to restore peace."[113] That demonstration of effective collective action may also have deterred aggression elsewhere in the world.[114]

In two respects, however, the U.S. was fortunate in Korea in ways that might not be true at a future time—its coalition achieved unity through strongly shared collective and national objectives, and its partners maintained their commitment throughout the war. Also, the overwhelming predominance of U.S. forces in Korea, with the accompanying authority of being the UN's executive agent, allowed U.S. leadership to overcome many of the coalition-related problems that arose. However, those could easily have been magnified and their resolutions made more difficult had the United States been anything other than the dominant member.

A number of lessons can be drawn from Korea. First, the use of coalition forces inevitably involves political factors that can influence operations. Offers of assistance might have to be turned down in spite of operational need because of the political statement that acceptance would make; on the other hand, to refuse an offer could cost that country's support at a time when political cohesion is as important as success on the battlefield. In addition, political considerations can affect the operational commander's ability to employ coalition forces in specific situations.

Logisticians must take into account the unique requirements of coalition forces in areas such as food, clothing, and transportation. Providing for these needs is essential for preserving morale and ensuring the combat effectiveness of coalition partners. Communication is the key to working with diversity, on the battlefield as in the office. The lack of translators in Korea placed an undue burden on the multilingual force and hampered its training and operations. In the probable absence of manuals and training aids available in all the languages of potential partners, the problem may be expected to recur; however, there is a clear need for foreign language skills as part of U.S. officers' professional development. Even among forces that speak the same language, differences in tactical doctrine, military terminology, planning procedures, and equipment skills can lead to confusion on the battlefield. Standardization should continue to be developed through combined exercises and training of foreign officers at American military schools and should be expanded to include as wide a range of potential coalition partners as possible.[115]

Finally, the "eyes of the world" watch how we employ the troops entrusted to our command. It is therefore critical that, to the greatest extent possible, coalition forces receive equitable treatment and proportionate combat exposure.[116]

In a world as interconnected by political and economic interests as at present, it is difficult to imagine a future conflict not involving a coalition. Despite the vast strength of American armed forces, one must not underestimate the value even small nations can provide. "The contribution of a single weak nation is often overlooked, and yet the sum of the weak nations' contributions may conceivably be the balancing factor among irreconcilable giants."[117] Whether the next war looks like Korea, Desert Storm, or something in between, U.S. forces must be prepared to fight beside soldiers of every nationality, race, and religion.[118] As the Korean War showed, diversity can be a source of strength on the battlefield.

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Ψ

We need the wit that nature gave us
To face our foes as all men must,
But from the ones we love and trust,
From our good friends, may Heaven save us!

Alexander Pushkin
Eugene Onegin
(trans. Deutsch)