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Victor Potvorov  
*Russian Navy*

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# National Interests, National Security, and the Russian Navy

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Captain First Rank Victor Potvorov, Russian Navy

**I**N RECENT YEARS RUSSIA FINDS ITSELF in a completely new geopolitical situation caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The disintegration of the USSR broke up the relatively stable world balance and led to the end of the bipolar system. What took the place of this system?

In the West, the United States, in the creation of the “new world order,” has strengthened its role as an international leader, and there is a powerful, unified Germany. In the East, China and Japan have taken places among the most powerful states not only in the region but also the world. In the South, several states, each unified by the ideology of Islam, are seeking regional hegemony. Lastly, in the place of the USSR there is an unstable and unbalanced structure, the Commonwealth of Independent States (see map). At least fourteen states, former Soviet republics, surrounding Russia are trying to make good their independence, sometimes taking steps to the detriment of their common interest.

Nevertheless, Russia continues to influence the course of global events and policy. It is impossible to deny that changes in Russia cause changes throughout the world. As the main heir of the USSR, Russia has a powerful military-economic potential that can and should ensure not only Russia’s status as a great power but its rebirth, in all areas, as one of the world’s undoubted leaders.

This is why it is very important to define what Russia’s national interests are, how we should view its national security, and what we can expect for Russia in the military area, specifically the naval.

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Captain Potvorov graduated from the Nakhimov Naval College in 1972 and served as a surface warfare officer in the Black Sea Fleet. From 1981 to 1985 he commanded the Kashin-class antisubmarine destroyer *Provorny*. After graduation from the Kuznetsov Naval Academy in St. Petersburg in 1987, he pursued postgraduate studies and earned a scientific degree. In 1990 he became a professor of operations and tactics at the Kuznetsov Naval Academy. In August 1993 he became a student at the U.S. Naval War College, from which he graduated in June in the Naval Command College class of 1994.

This article reflects the author’s personal views; it draws upon his studies at the U.S. Naval War College, particularly the National Security Decision Making course, as well as upon prior knowledge. The paper upon which it is based was the winner of the 1994 Batemans Prize.

## National Interests

The concept of “national interest” is widely used, but at the same time it is a most difficult notion that has no formal, rigorous definition. According to Richmond M. Lloyd, a nation’s “fundamental interests” are “the basic wants and needs of the nation.”<sup>1</sup> But is this definition clear? What is meant by “basic wants and needs”? Who determines them, and how?

Let us turn to a standard textbook in the field, *Making Strategy*, by Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow. They begin from afar, with a definition of grand national strategy: “the process by which the nation’s basic goals [is this different from Lloyd’s “basic wants and needs”?] are realized in a world of conflicting goals and values.” Further, “The ends of grand strategy are usually expressed in terms of national interests. The role of the strategy process is to translate those national interests into means for achieving those ends.”<sup>2</sup> Are interests, then, at the same time both the *ends* of grand strategy and their *means*?


When all is said and done, we are where we began: what *are* national interests? But national and other interests do exist, and experience tells us that they are the main reason for the actions of people, societies, and states. Let us accept, then, a recent Russian definition of “national interests” as simply those factors that are fundamental for the purposeful actions of nations or states that are aimed at their survival, function, or development.<sup>3</sup>

Using this definition, let us see what “survival, function, and development” involve for Russia. Analysis of its external and internal conditions shows that at present and for the foreseeable future, they inescapably mean preserving and strengthening territorial integrity and independence, confirming the democratic regime, achieving political stability, creating an effective economy, establishing a regime of peaceful and friendly coexistence with states and nations around the world, and contributing to political, economic, and military stability. These factors are reflected in the declared policy, military doctrine, and behavior of the Russian Federation over the past two years; we can and should accordingly consider them to be the national interests of Russia.

There are three major observations to make here. First, the range of Russia’s national interest—the country is connected directly or indirectly to the whole world—is extremely wide. It includes masses of people, huge socio-political structures, many states, and vast expanses of continental, maritime, aerial, and even extraterrestrial space. Second, Russia’s national interests are the product of many underlying interests—economic, political, social, etc. But they are only the tip of the iceberg, and strategic and force planners should therefore probe this matter more deeply than is often the case. Last, but most importantly, as is well known and understandable, all interests, including national ones, can form, change, arise, and disappear; they can also be imposed, influenced, threatened,



# Don't Just Look At The Tip Of The Iceberg.



("SFP": Strategic Force Planning)

or suppressed from the outside. We must therefore conclude that national interests cannot be pursued unless national security is provided for.

We might consider national security one of the components of the national interest, and we would be right. But deeper thinking will inevitably force us to see it as a wider notion.

## National Security

Analysis shows and history teaches that national security has traditionally been a matter of military force; the Cold War period seems proof enough of that. However, times are changing. The impossibility of victory in nuclear war and the senselessness of building up arms calls us to revise the role of force in the relationships between states. Priority should yield to political, economic, and technological factors; these, as well as geopolitical, ecological, ethnic, intellectual, and other considerations are essential today not only for survival but for successful functioning and development of societies, nations, and states.


Thus, we might define national security as the totality of the factors that contribute to a state's progress in the system of international relationships and to its ability to defend its independence and national interests.

The key phrase here is "system of international relationships." It is very clear that the national security of any state (whether large or small) in the post-confrontational world can be assured only within a framework of global stability and security. At the same time, however, in the present political and military-strategic international situation, most opportunities for solving conflicts through political, economic, or diplomatic means are effective only if supported by military power. For proof we need only look at present and past experience.

Thus, in view of the nature of the post-confrontational world, and in light of the national interests of a new Russia, it is impossible not to see that military power is still a tool of reasonable policy and, for Russia as for all nations, a guarantor of national security and rebirth (see diagram).

On the other hand, our very complicated world is also making it impossible for any state to provide alone for its national security, not to seek common interests with other states in political, economic, and military matters. The interests of national security are leading states to alliances and coalitions. Which way, then, will Russia turn? Who will become Russia's allies? What alliances and coalitions should we expect for Russia in the future?

*Allies, Alliances, and Coalitions.* To find the answers we must move from the abstract to the concrete, and first of all, to the past. Russia's pre-1917 history was one of great expansion. Its empire grew over centuries from the north to the south, and from the west to the east. Its geographic situation and national interests were reflected even in the state's emblem: the two-headed eagle, one head looking west, the other east. However, the Russian Empire's national interests in the East were not strong; though it maintained trade relations with eastern states, it had no strong allies or alliances there. Instead, Russia always sought its allies in the West—Europe played the most important role in the development of Russia. At different times the Russian Empire had different allies



## Military Power in the System of National Security

and participated in different coalitions in Europe as its national interests and economic, political, and military problems required.

After 1917, the Russian Empire was transformed into the Soviet Republic, and then into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Soviet Union was organized with the same borders, except for Finland and Poland, that the Russian Empire had had before 1917. Until World War II, the Soviet Union had no allies and participated in no alliances or coalitions. This statement is contentious for some; there are Western historians who consider certain treaties of the USSR (such as the Rapallo Treaty with Weimar Germany, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939, etc.) to have been treaties of alliance. But they did not include all spheres of the state's life (economics, politics, military, etc.); they were short-term and were easily broken off for the sake of more important interests.

The first true alliance involving the Soviet Union was that with the United States and the United Kingdom during World War II. At first it was only a

military coalition against fascist Germany and its satellites, but in time it became an alliance involving all areas of state life. As such, it was an alliance that exactly accorded with theory: "a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues."<sup>4</sup> However, when the question of national survival was resolved at the end of the war, other national interests acquired a more important role. As a result, this alliance slowly moved to the political arena.

Unfortunately, at that time no participant in this alliance wanted any other state to gain influence in the postwar period. As a result of this lack of understanding, the world was dramatically divided into two parts, capitalist and socialist, with two leaders, the U.S. and the USSR. Further, each leader-state, wishing to assure itself of its survival and to pursue its interests, tried to increase its strengths politically, economically, ideologically, and, certainly, militarily.

There were two main results of the political activity of that wartime alliance: a negative one (the Cold War), but also a positive one, the establishment of the Organization of the United Nations. Today the international community has overcome the negative aspects of the competition between the two leaders and the systems they led. But even though only its positive heritage remains, the world continues to be unbalanced and unstable. Multipolarity of forces in the world creates a threat for different states and nations, including Russia.

Let us not argue about the Warsaw Pact (organized in 1954) and Nato (organized in 1949), as to who created the threat to peace. The point is that though the USSR and the Warsaw Pact no longer exist, Nato's military structure and other military-political alliances still do. Their members surround the new Russia and the other former Soviet republics. What threat do Nato leaders see? How widely will Nato open its door to welcome new members? Who is deciding what countries will be admitted into the new "Partnership for Peace," and by what criteria? There is only one direction in which Nato membership can expand—closer to Russia. Perhaps Nato should say "goodbye" to all its members and lock its door forever. Why not? Would that decrease or increase international tensions? In the new world, all security questions should be decided under United Nations authority, not by the single superpower or a single treaty alliance.

***Where Should Russia Look?*** Nevertheless, the fact is that different military-political alliances do exist. They must be judged by their capabilities for offensive action, not only by their officially benevolent intentions. Who can guarantee that no alliance or state might not consider that its survival or other national interests must be protected at the expense of Russia?

Alone, in our very complex world, Russia can neither pursue its national interest, ensure its security, strengthen its socio-political system, succeed economically, or ultimately, even survive. Where, then, should Russia look for



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allies, alliances, and coalitions? Let's look at this problem in terms of the most important of the concentric rings, or circles, that surround Russia.

*Circle I* comprises the former Soviet republics, most of them now members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Beyond any doubt we could consider these to be potential allies of Russia in economic, policy, and military matters.

As to the first area, the USSR developed its economy centrally, by integrated planning. This is the major reason that the attempt of each former Soviet republic, including Russia, to establish economic independence has led to the collapse of its economy. Russia, however, has a large territory, rich natural resources, and a variety of well developed industries, which the former republics do not. That fact has already led the majority of these newly independent states into economic alliance. Centripetal economic forces are congruent with the survival and other vital national interests of each of them; therefore we can expect this integration to be long-lasting and to foster arrangements in other areas.

As to politics, all the new states, as they establish and develop new socio-political systems in the first years of their independence, have in common the same goals, the same national interests, the same problems. Also, we should not forget that their populations are connected by historical, family, ethnic, and social ties, among others. These shared challenges and values, as well as economic interests, are forcing their political leaders to take much the same steps. Therefore, in many questions of politics, both inside and outside of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the centrifugal forces of 1991–1993 are being replaced by centripetal ones.

Lastly, regarding military matters, it is well known that a state's armed forces are the product of its economic power. Under conditions of economic collapse, it is no easy task for an individual state to maintain the forces necessary. At present, of the "Circle I" nations it appears that only Russia, its economic difficulties notwithstanding, can support its armed forces adequately. Therefore, it would be easier for these states to base their national interests and security upon a military alliance with Russia than to try to solve these problems alone. It is easier also because military industry is dispersed throughout several states. So, the necessity to build political, economic, and diplomatic strength will eventually lead the "Circle I" states to form an alliance or coalition in the military area.

It does not matter what this assemblage is named, whether the Commonwealth, or the Alliance of Independent States; it already exists, and it will exist more visibly in the foreseeable future. Even so, for many reasons we should not consider this prospective development to amount to the rebirth of the USSR; those arguments, however, though convincing, are not within the scope of this article.

*Circle II* involves the former Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact. To the west and southwest, Russia has neighbors who are looking for Nato membership and are not displaying strong friendship for the new Russia. Notwithstanding, Russia and the Eastern European states have several common interests and objectives. It seems that the political area will dominate "Circle II," but, once again, let us not look only at the tip of the iceberg; all Eastern European states used to depend upon Russia's natural resources (above all, gas and oil), and their economies were integrated with that of the USSR. Russia and the Eastern European states see that the successful development and integration with the world community depend therefore on their cooperation in both politics and economics. The signing by Russia and the Eastern European states of treaties in these areas during Boris Yeltsin's visits there in September 1993 confirm that.

In the military area, the most probable scenario is collaboration for regional stability without formal bilateral or multilateral alliances or coalitions. Nothing resembling the Warsaw Pact should arise, nor should Nato expand its membership into this region. In that way, Russia and the Eastern European states will be successfully integrated into European as well as global politics and economics, which would fulfill the national interests of all powers concerned.

*Circle III.* The United States, Japan, and Western Europe make up the third "circle," one that could create either positive or negative results, depending on how it looks at Russia. It is a matter of Russia's survival and national interest to be considered an equal partner in all international associations, as was announced by Russia's leaders during a visit to Russia by the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Warren Christopher, in October 1993. This equality in partnership will lead the international community toward stability, ensure a favorable atmosphere for political collaboration with Russia, and aid Russia's integration into the world's market economy.

The times are changing, but not so rapidly that we should expect any direct political and economic alliances with "Circle III." However, there remains the possibility of short-term military collaboration or coalitions for peacekeeping or peacemaking under the authority of the United Nations. Even in the post-confrontational world, Russia and "Circle III" are still very different, with different orientations and different leaderships; accordingly, even such low-level interaction would make relations between them easier.

In analyzing each "circle" with regard to national security and interest, we have noted the military aspect. It is time, then, to take a look at that subject as a whole.

***The Military Dimension.*** Russia's military doctrine is still the subject of definition and discussion. However, it is already clear that Russia's military doctrine is directed not to preparing the state for offensive action but to

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preventing wars and broadening and strengthening confidence and mutual security. The essence of Russia's military doctrine lies not only in contributing to global and regional stability but also in ensuring that no state's armed forces gain such superiority, either offensive or defensive, that the state might be led to use it to achieve military-political objectives.<sup>5</sup>

Therefore, as could be expected, Russia's armed forces will be maintained and developed for the following objectives: to defend the national interests; to defend Russia's territorial integrity and national independence; and to fulfill Russia's obligations in maintaining peace and stability. The foremost objective is to convince the international community of the absence of any aggressive intention. There are many proofs that there are none: the freer discussion of military questions in Russian government and society, openness to military inspections, and the withdrawal of military troops from foreign countries. This list could be easily prolonged.

For its part, the Russian Navy, to which we now turn, has no separate doctrine or strategy; the Navy proceeds on the basis of the state's military doctrine. Therefore the overriding purpose of the Navy is the defense of Russia, of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

### The Russian Navy

The new Russian Navy is situated differently than its Soviet predecessor. Its nation's coastline is shorter; Russia has only 22 percent of developed seacoast and 53 percent of the ports that the USSR had. Also, the Navy has lost infrastructure and bases in the Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas—in all, from 60 to 90 percent of the former Soviet naval base system. But it does still have the St. Petersburg (formerly Leningrad) and Kaliningrad regions in the Baltic, 350 kilometers of coastline on the Black Sea, and the northern shore of the Caspian; further, the northern and eastern seacoasts are unchanged.

Thus, oceans and seas continue to play an important role in the life of Russia. Consider the following statistics: Russia still has thirty-eight thousand kilometers of maritime boundaries; three oceans and thirteen seas lie adjacent to its territory; 70 percent of Russia's international trade is carried by sea; and Russia's maritime economic zones, with their natural resources, occupy an area equal to that of the Arctic Ocean, or of the land area of China, India, and Mongolia combined.

The national maritime interests of Russia arise from this dependence on oceans and seas. In the Baltic, where lie the shortest lines of communication with Western Europe and with North and South America, Russia's interests are, first, the development of regional relations on the principles of good-neighborliness, partnership, and nonparticipation in military alliances directed against other Baltic states; and second, establishment of a nuclear-free zone where

neither nuclear-propelled nor nuclear-armed ships may operate or visit. In the Black and the Mediterranean seas are the shortest lines of communication with the states of southern Europe, Asia, and Africa. There, the peacekeeping and peacemaking roles of the Russian and other primarily regional navies, and also the preservation of the Black Sea Fleet (and development of its infrastructure) are major Russian concerns. Goals in the Far East and the Pacific Ocean involve the unique natural resources of Russia's territorial and maritime economic zones, the highly developed lines of communication between the eastern Arctic and the Indian Ocean, and stabilization of the region, including peacekeeping and peacemaking. Finally, the Arctic offers large oil and gas fields and other natural resources, the Northern Sea Route (the shortest path from much of Europe to East Asia), and favorable operating conditions for naval strategic forces.<sup>6</sup>

**Objectives.** However, the activity of navies, both in war and peace, has become truly global; they are an important tool of international policy for maritime powers. A recent U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral C.A.H. Trost, once said, "Naval forces have proven to be the military force of choice for Presidents in more than 50 crises in the last decade, and in nearly 200 instances since World War II. This represents more than 80% of the crises which the United States has faced during this period."<sup>7</sup> Of course, this is an American admiral; he is talking about the United States. But are not Russia and the U.S. both maritime powers? Admiral Trost's statement depicts the objective reality for any maritime power, including Russia. Therefore, the Russian Navy may prove to be one of the most effective means of Russian foreign policy as it relates to national interests and security. Specifically, the integration of Russia into the world's economy is impossible without improvement of its maritime activities, commercial exchanges, and communications opportunities; these all require the use of ocean routes, the development of ocean resources, and the defense of such seaborne pursuits. Therefore, the Russian Navy aspires to a composition, structure, and level of power that ensures that other maritime powers will refrain from any unfriendly actions. The shape of the Russian Navy will be based on the possible threat to its national interests from the sea, and, of course, on the real capabilities of the economy.

Hence, the Russian Navy has the following operational-strategic objectives: maintaining the combat readiness of its strategic nuclear forces; defeating any enemy's naval strike groups entering the Russian naval operational zone; attacking and disrupting an enemy's sea lines of communications; protecting Russia's own sea lines; assisting ground troops in offensive and defensive actions; and defending areas, concentrations, and facilities of naval importance.<sup>8</sup>

To achieve these objectives and to take into consideration the geostrategic situation of Russia, it becomes clear that Russia needs the following naval

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groupings: Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific Ocean fleets, and a formation of small ships and combatant craft in the Caspian Sea.<sup>9</sup> However, this familiar organization does not mean remilitarization or the reconstitution of the Soviet Navy under the Russian banner. It has been stated officially that each fleet is only to resist the actual and definite threats in its respective theater of operation; in any case, during the last few years more than four hundred combat ships and craft, including sixty nuclear submarines and 136 conventional ones, have been decommissioned; in 1995, 24 percent of surface and submarine units will be disposed of. The fleets will not compete with other states' navies for global power. The Russian Navy should, however, be able to participate in multinational naval forces in the interests of the international community and under the authority of the United Nations.

**Lines of Future Development.** To accomplish its main mission and operational-strategic objectives, the Russian Navy has five branches: submarine forces, naval aviation, surface forces, coast defense troops, and shore-based missile and artillery troops.

**Submarine forces.** SSBNs, the naval component of the strategic forces, will be retained; however, their number will be reduced approximately 50 percent. There are no plans to launch additional SSGNs, that is, of the Oscar class. Also, the numbers of SSNs and SSs are to be reduced; new submarines will be commissioned, but only in one class of SSNs (Akula) and one of SSs (Kilo); according to plan, the number of SSNs and SSs will drop 20 percent by the end of the year 2000.

**Naval air forces,** which include both land-based and shipborne aircraft, will be reduced. As for the former, the number of land-based strike and attack aircraft will decrease in accordance with Russia's obligation to have no more than three hundred such aircraft in the European part of Russia. Also, there will be no further purchases of long-range attack and intelligence planes, fighters, or helicopters; only multipurpose land-based aircraft will be constructed. As for shipborne aircraft, development will continue, especially of helicopters for antisubmarine warfare and of fighters for air defense. In total, the number of combat planes and helicopters will be reduced 40 to 45 percent.

**Surface forces** will continue to be reduced in quantity and raised in quality by construction and commissioning of the most modern classes of ships. There are now only two aircraft-carrying cruisers, one of the *Kuznetsov* class and one of the *Kiev* class. Construction has ceased of the *Kirov*-class battlecruisers, of the *Slava*-class cruisers, and the *Udaloy*-class antisubmarine destroyers. Meanwhile, the construction and commissioning of destroyers of the *Sovremenny* class, the new destroyers of the *Neustrashimy* class, and certain frigate types, will carry on. Also, coastal and inshore minesweepers and missile craft will still be built. In all,

according to the plan, the number of combat ships and craft will be reduced by more than 20 percent in 1995.

*Coast defense troops* are represented by the 12,500-man naval infantry, organized into one brigade each for the Northern, Pacific Ocean, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets. The status of the Black Sea brigade is unclear at present.

*Shore-based missile and artillery troops* will be retained in the Russian Navy. They will be rearmed with new types of high-technology weaponry, including a new "land-to-surface" missile and new mobile 130mm artillery.

There are now 420,000 personnel in the Russian Navy. However, this number will be reduced by 25 to 30 percent in 1995. One of the ways that this plan will be realized is by a shift from conscription to a voluntary system.

All these changes require revision of the organizational structure of the Russian Navy. In light of geopolitical and strategic conditions, however, the present structure will probably be preserved, but with some alterations: first, in the location of bases in the Baltic and Black Sea fleets; second, in the number of formations in each fleet; third, in logistical and ship-repair facilities (which will be improved); and fourth, in the status of the Caspian Flotilla and the former Leningrad Naval Base.

**Operations.** The Russian Navy used to employ nuclear submarines (SSBNs and SSGNs) near the seacoasts of nuclear states, where the Soviet Navy did, but it does so no longer; and, the Russian Navy does not conduct war games or exercises in the central parts of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Previously, there were about fifteen submarines and twenty surface ships in the Mediterranean; now there are only from two to five. The Navy does still keep a few combat ships off the coast of the western Sahara region, where they protect the fishing and commercial activity of the Russian civilian fleet. Naval forces in Vietnam have been reduced; there is only a small formation of patrol ships and boats there now.

A modern navy is a very complicated and expensive national asset. Historically the Russian Navy has usually been able to build combat ships only during peacetime, and doing so often required decades. Also, a navy is maintained for long-term and future use. Its existence, therefore, should not depend on short-term objectives and current tasks. Since Russia cannot depart from its interests in the seas and oceans, it must continue to support and develop its navy. The members of the Commonwealth of Independent States understand this fact, and they will strive for economic cooperation in naval building programs, seeking protection by the Russian Navy and thereby supporting their own national interests at sea at less cost than would be possible were they to act alone.

## Neither East nor West

Three hundred years ago, the famous Russian reformer-tsar Peter the Great declared, "A sovereign who has an army has one hand; one who moreover has a navy, has both hands." One of the first buildings in St. Petersburg, the new capital that Peter founded on the Baltic seacoast in 1702, was the Admiralty.

The Russian Navy was formed in November 1696. Since that time, in support of Russian policy and diplomacy, the regular Russian Navy has participated in twenty-two wars and has fought eighty-seven naval battles. Furthermore, the Russian Navy helped to decide many political and diplomatic issues even without combat; so it was for example in 1863, during the American Civil War, when two port visits by squadrons of the Russian Navy demonstrated Russia's support for the U.S. government and helped prevent European intervention on behalf of the South.

However, the historical perspective is not the only reason that Russians are so concerned with their navy. Though sometimes considered to be continental states, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union were nonetheless maritime powers; they each occupied a sixth of the planet and had about forty-two thousand kilometers of marine frontier. As regards the Navy, what in the new geopolitical situation has changed for the modern state, the Russian Federation? Essentially, nothing. Reduction of territory has not altered Russia's requirement for maritime power.

Russia is neither East nor West, but *Russia*. It has a different culture, a different understanding, and a different way of thinking. For its new and old allies, and its new and old rivals, to understand Russia for itself means finding avenues for constructive cooperation and interaction. In a word, everything is so different and yet so much the same. Only a strong Russia will be thought worthy of consideration as a partner; a weak Russia will be prey to violation of its interests.

It is allowable to disagree. However, let us not be too hasty. Let us think and rethink, analyze, and try to understand what has happened in the past, what we have to deal with at present, and what we will have. The future depends on our result.

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### Notes

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7. Carlisle A. H. Trost, "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1990, pp. 97-8.
8. V. Selivanov (Chief of Staff of the Russian Navy), "Development of the Navy: Problems and Directions," *Morskoy sbornik*, no. 8, 1993, p. 3.
9. F. Gromov, "Russia's Navy: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow," *Morskoy sbornik*, no. 1, 1993, pp. 3-8.

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### **Third Workshop on Stand-Off Detection for Chemical and Biological Defense**

The U.S. Army Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center (ERDEC) is sponsoring the Third Workshop on Stand-Off Detection for Chemical and Biological Defense. This workshop is being sponsored in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. It will be held at the Holiday Inn 1776, Williamsburg, Virginia, 17-21 October 1994. For additional information contact Sonya Herrin, Science and Technology Corporation, (804) 865-7604, facsimile (804) 865-8721.

### **Autonomous Vehicles in Mine Countermeasures Symposium, 4-6 April 1995**

This unclassified symposium sponsored by the Office of Naval Research and the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School will be held at USNPGS, Monterey, California. Topics include operations, R&D, industry, MCM needs of the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, innovation, vehicles (air, surface, swimming, and crawling), sensors and mission packages, systems integration, and command and control. Contact Albert M. Bottoms, Visiting Professor of Mine Warfare, Code UA, Rm. 200A Root Hall, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., 93943-5000 (telephone (408) 646-3770).

Contact Prof. Bottoms also to subscribe to *Mine Lines*, a newsletter devoted to mine warfare.