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The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans

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engaging, well written, and paints a picture that is sympathetic, if critical when necessary, of one of the giant figures of this century. If this volume is the measure of the full opus, the whole set will be well worth reading.

JAN VAN TOL
Commander, U.S. Navy

Goldstein, Donald M. and Dillon, Katherine V., eds. *The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans*. New York: Brassey's (US), 1993. 384pp. \$30

Ah, yes, yet another book about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Next to the Battle of the Bulge and D-Day in Normandy, surely Pearl Harbor has attracted the most writers, scholars, books, and articles of any U.S. battle in World War II. This work adds to that growing list of histories, but there is a difference.

The editors of *The Pearl Harbor Papers* attempt to view Pearl Harbor exclusively through Japanese eyes. Using a wide variety of official and unofficial letters, interviews, diaries, ships' logs, and other "memory" documents, they have done a creditable job and provide fascinating insight into the Japanese plans for the attack that launched America into World War II.

Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon have coauthored numerous World War II histories, with at least four books on Pearl Harbor. They worked with the late Gordon W. Prange on the enormously successful Pearl Harbor history, *At Dawn We Slept* (1981). All of the documents contained

in the work under review were actually researched and obtained by Prange, when he was MacArthur's historian in occupied Japan. Goldstein and Dillon have compiled Prange's documents into a readable and interesting sourcebook of the Japanese buildup for and planning, execution, and aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Besides portraying the Japanese side of the attack, the editors also offer evidence that neither President Roosevelt nor Winston Churchill knew in advance of the impending attack, as is frequently asserted and popularly believed. Other historians have claimed that the Americans and British had intercepted Imperial Japanese Navy radio messages prior to 7 December that indicated their intentions. Goldstein and Dillon contend that it is not true, because the Japanese naval attack force never broke radio silence. Several Japanese ships' logs cited in this book support that contention. However, this reviewer is not convinced that the editors offer conclusive proof; after all, only a few ships' logs are cited, all the others having been lost in the war. Additionally, even if the Japanese navy did not break radio silence while en route to Hawaii, there is always the possibility that Roosevelt and Churchill knew through some other intelligence source.

That aside, this book does contain some remarkable information. There are personal and professional letters written by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the architect of the Pearl Harbor attack, including several sensitive and poignant ones to his *geisha*. A Japanese admiral's notes include references to a spy ring

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and a corruption scandal within the navy. On board one destroyer escorting the Japanese attack force to Hawaii, the executive officer kept a diary that reflected his efforts to raise crew morale through daily scheduled singing of war songs, gymnastics, and wearing bellybands to prevent catching cold. There is also a copy of the color map that was used to brief Emperor Hirohito after the attack.

In addition are war diaries of a carrier division, a battleship division, and a destroyer squadron. There is also an interesting section on submarine operations in support of the attack. Actually, the best parts of this book are the last two chapters, "Japanese Study of the Pearl Harbor Operations" and "An Intimate Look at the Japanese Navy." Both chapters are worth the price of the book and the reader's time to study them.

In their after-action study of the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese concluded that their success was due to a combination of tangible factors, and the intangibles of "providential help" and "supremacy of mental power." Before Pearl Harbor, both the Japanese and the Americans believed in the supremacy of the battleship. Only carriers, however, could carry off an attack on Pearl Harbor and, if unwittingly, by destroying the battleships there force the U.S. Navy to change its own emphasis to aircraft carriers. The result we know very well—the U.S. Navy and its carrier force crushed the Imperial Japanese Navy. In the end, writes a Japanese, the U.S. "finally sent us an atomic bomb instead

of a referee with a whistle, just to close the lid."

W.D. BUSHNELL
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Hoyt, Edwin P. *The Last Kamikaze: The Story of Admiral Matome Ugaki*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993. 256pp. \$22.95

This book is essentially a short narrative history of the Second World War in the Pacific, with the wartime career of Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki superficially embossed on it. The work's primary value is that it provides another vehicle for increasing Admiral Ugaki's recognition among Western readers.

Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki aptly represents the best and the worst of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and the character of the Japanese of his generation. He entered the naval academy at Etajima in 1909, and his career spanned from the glory days of the IJN until its ultimate destruction.

Following graduation from Etajima in 1913, his career progressed normally. Ugaki studied in Germany during the 1930s, commanded the battleship *Hyuga*, and was promoted to rear admiral in 1938. In August 1941, Admiral Ugaki was appointed chief of staff of the Combined Fleet and served in that capacity until 18 April 1943, when his aircraft was shot down into the sea during the famous air ambush of Admiral Yamamoto. One of only two survivors (he was not in Yamamoto's aircraft), Ugaki was seriously wounded.

As Yamamoto's chief of staff, Ugaki had participated in the planning of