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Book Review

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BOOK REVIEWS

A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

"Information Warriors"

Toffler, Alvin and Toffler, Heidi. *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. New York: Little, Brown, 1993. 302pp. $22.95

THIS IS NOT AS GOOD a book as it should have been. Yet it is useful and should be read and debated. The Tofflers, authors of *Future Shock* and *The Third Wave*, contend that "the way we make war reflects the way we make wealth." They posit that the commanding wealth in the world today is generated by the production, manipulation, and distribution of knowledge and information and that this is characteristic of "Third Wave" countries such as the United States.

In the Tofflers' taxonomy, First Wave societies are agricultural and make war in the off-season with surplus labor. Second Wave nations are industrial and wage war with massive armies and machines. Third Wave nations use their skills in information management to dominate modern warfare and are able to control situations so that they know what is happening while the enemy does not. The Tofflers suggest that the American capability for information warfare was the critical edge in the Gulf War.

Information has been developing in the defense community as a new and powerful dimension in warfare. Of late, the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University have taken the lead in formulating and enunciating its concepts under the rubric of the Military Technical Revolution. The National War College offers a course in information warfare, and the Air Force has a new information warfare center. As with any new warfare concept, information warfare has many themes, not all of which are tightly connected. The Tofflers' contribution is to introduce those themes into the public discourse.

The authors hold that the Gulf War was a dual war, both industrial and informational. The latter is illustrated by the role of such systems as AWACS and J-STARS, and by three thousand computers in-theater linked to others in the United States, an enormous information net that did not exist at the start of the war but was created by a new breed of soldiers—information warriors.

Soldiers who are intelligent, physically able, and have the education and training to use sophisticated, information-based systems will prevail in future wars. These "smart soldiers" will fight in a more decentralized command structure allowing much greater local initiative. At the same time, extensive use of information technologies by "smart soldiers" will change the scale of warfare toward smaller but more precise and telling engagements. Cruise missiles, precision guided munitions, and accurate targeting are all products of information-based technologies, and they allow modern soldiers to hit the right target the first time. Wars of mass destruction could become a thing of the past, with the destructive portion of warfare confined to where it really makes a difference.

There is a dark side to this, however. Most information technology is in the public realm and can easily be exported to Second Wave countries. If they are able to train their soldiers to use it, the game may turn. Consider the prospect of "info-terrorism," where an enemy uses computer viruses, "black holes," and trapdoors to play with the world's banking networks and databases.

Whether information warfare is a revolution or an evolution is still an open question, but the trend is there, and warfare is changing.

Unfortunately the Tofflers' approach to such an important subject is largely anecdotal and offers little evidence and substantive analysis. Their work is a collection of interesting ideas and stories, but the connective tissue and synthesis are left up to the reader. There are important questions left unaddressed by the Tofflers. To what extent does a growing reliance on information warfare expose us to new vulnerabilities? How robust is information warfare? Can we realistically expect to defeat an enemy without resort to heavy destruction, or at least having in place the potential to do such destruction? The Gulf War began the debate but by no means finished it.

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Gray, Colin S. *Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology*. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1993. 236pp. $29.95

Colin Gray is one of the most articulate, provocative, and prolific conservative strategic thinkers. Author of a dozen books on international security, national

strategy, and arms control, he is currently director of the European office of the National Institute for Public Policy in Washington, D.C. He previously served for five years on President Reagan's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. He writes with authority and forcefulness, challenging many of the premises and assumptions that undergird contemporary popular perceptions and public policy positions.

Weapons Don't Make War puts forward several interrelated arguments about the reciprocal relationships between military technology, weapons, strategy, and policy. Gray states at the outset that "policy has to be supreme in and over war, but war has its own 'grammar' and can reshape policy. It is the connections between the logic of policy and the alleged 'grammar' of strategies, weapons, arms races, and arms control processes that form the basis of this book." In his concluding words, "Weapons do not win or lose wars. . . . Weapons have a meaning imposed only by the policy that directs them. . . . Weapons do not make war, and their control or elimination does not make peace. War and peace are a political subject."

Gray advances seven key arguments, devoting a chapter to each, and then summarizes them cogently in the final chapter. Paraphrased simply, they are: (1) policy governs strategy and defines the purposes of weapons, not the other way around; (2) the concept of arms races is spurious and misleading (though arms competitions do occur); (3) the weapons acquisition process requires clear policy guidance but often proceeds without it or under the tyranny of micromanagement; (4) uncertainty is not a problem begging for answers to every conceivable threat but a necessary condition of defense planning that can be accommodated by a flexible grand strategy; (5) the theory of arms control is wrong, and its practice is irrelevant or even dangerous to the extent that it substitutes technical for political and strategic analysis; (6) nuclear strategy and arms control during the Cold War neither validated nor invalidated deterrence theory (which in any event does not account for cultural variations), and nuclear disarmament cannot be a U.S. policy objective; and (7) military technology is only one of many policy tools, and not the most important. Gray also contends that even temporary success in war is based not on weapons themselves but on the innovative use of new or newly combined weapons.

Some of his points are likely to resonate widely, but one could contest Gray's interconnected arguments about arms races, arms control, and the lessons of the nuclear age. Dismissing the idea of arms races, he selectively cites literature that tends to corroborate his views. He discounts the possibility of making useful distinctions between the acquisition or modernization of reasonable defense capabilities, and excessive or destabilizing arms accumulations. Conversely, his distrust and disparagement of arms control, and particularly the prospects for nuclear disarmament, seem too cynical and pessimistic.

Weapons Don't Make War is more a series of critical essays than a systematic attempt to develop a singular thesis. That weapons by themselves do not make war is clear, but they certainly do embody military capabilities and raise questions about intentions, and they can generate quests for countervailing capabilities and produce at least perceptions of arms races. Gray insists that politics and policy are (or ought to be) supreme, but he admits they are part of an intricate system in which military technology, weapons, policy, and strategy interact. Although he asserts that his fundamental lessons and arguments are not time-bound and should therefore guide U.S. national security policy regardless of changes in the international system, he constructs little to replace what he sought to demolish with his sharp pen. Indeed, in many ways this is a negative book: weapons don't make war, arms races do not exist, and arms control does not work.

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Ion, A. Hamish and Errington, E.J., eds. *Great Powers and Little Wars: The Limits of Power.* New York: Praeger, 1993. 246pp. $49.95

Levite, Ariel E.; Jentleson, Bruce W.; and Berman, Larry. *Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict.* New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1992. 334pp. $32.50

These two books provide odd counterweights to each other. Both seek to examine questions surrounding the intervention of one state into another's affairs, and both are edited works, with each chapter written by a different author. Yet there the similarity ends, for one book provides a sterling example of a well edited book, and the other provides a blueprint of what not to do.

Great Powers and Little Wars is a compilation of papers from the March 1991 Military History Symposium at the Royal Military College of Canada. To begin with, I do not recommend reading first (if at all) chapters one through four. The introduction reads like an *ad hominem* attack on the legitimacy of military force as a tool—for anything. Many other aspects of the editors' discussion distressed me as well, such as the claim that "the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) War, the invasions of Grenada and Panama, and the Gulf War could not have taken place without the threat of nuclear retaliation, which prevented other Great Powers from actively supporting the underdog." Which "other Great Power" did the United States deter from intervening with nuclear weapons during the Gulf War? Certainly not the Soviet Union or China, either of which could have vetoed any of the U.N. resolutions against Iraq. A.P. Thornton's essay, "Limits of Power," is sprinkled with such gems as that during war, "politicians, hoping to become statesmen once more, can do nothing except wait for the military, their own military, to *finish*." Thornton either has not heard of or rejects the Clausewitzian conception that "war is the continuation of politics by other means."

Edward Ingram's discussion of the First Afghan War provides a post-modernist approach to military history, and, as with much of post-modernist thought, it can confuse as much as enlighten. I am still not sure that I understand the author's contention that "victories are not victories, nor defeats, defeats, because wars are not fought where they are fought.... Colin Powell and General Norman Schwarzkopf recently won a great victory in Arabia, but at the end of an imaginary war. The enemy they were pretending to fight was not present. It was somebody else, to be found elsewhere. Military and diplomatic history, both the events themselves and the historian's account of them, takes place in secret, imaginary worlds (doubtless soon to be called texts), though no more secret and imaginary than all the other worlds around." Elsewhere, Ingram argues that intelligence history is a silly fad. My respect for Ingram's scholarship does not extend to this essay.

J.I. Bakker's essay follows, with an anthropological approach to the Aceh War, in which the Netherlands conquered the northwestern part of Sumatra. Bakker's work shows how anthropologists and historians view history differently. For example, he provides an example of "a contemporary Islamic reformer" to illuminate the events of 1873–1913; the reformer, however, was active in the 1940s and 1950s, not during the Aceh War.

I found one feature of *Great Powers and Little Wars* especially frustrating. The authors come at their subjects from a wide range of historical disciplines and philosophies (post-modernism, anthropology, economic history, narrative, and others). Thus, the book has virtually no continuity. In this vein, Gordon Martel's "Aftermath" impressed me—he created a logic-stream tying together six of the seven case studies. But even Martel could not bring all of them together—he does not mention the chapter on the Russo-Japanese War (which is totally out of place here in any event, though well written and interesting). The authors' varied methodologies might have been more successfully employed in approaching the same conflict; readers would then have found the differing perspectives illuminating rather than aggravating.

I should not exaggerate my diatribe against this work. There are parts worth reading—too bad that it takes half the book to reach them. Particularly worth attention are Anthony Clayton's discussion of the French campaigns in Madagascar and Brian Sullivan's treatment of the Italian-Ethiopian War. Both bring light to conflicts little acknowledged in English-language scholarship.

Notwithstanding, *Great Powers and Little Wars* has no real theme, uses no common questions of any sort, and has no common structure unifying the case studies. Virtually any reader will find the mix of essays and their quality disappointing at best.

However, my frustrations disappeared when I turned to *Foreign Military Intervention*. The book's genesis was lunchtime discussions among the

editors about the commonalities between the experiences of the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Israelis in Lebanon, and the U.S. in Vietnam. While each conflict certainly differs, it was their commonalities that intrigued Berman, Jentleson, and Levite enough to spur a major research project on "protracted foreign military intervention." As their discussions progressed, the editors added three more cases for study (Syria in Lebanon, India in Sri Lanka, and Cuba and South Africa in Angola), set up an analytical framework, and commissioned experts to each case.

Each study focuses particularly on how the military intervention began, how it progressed, and how (with the exception of Syria in Lebanon) the intervening power disengaged. While none of the chapters is definitive, all are well written by scholars who could (with more pages) have come close to making that definitive statement. Reading the six historical studies will provide readers a basic understanding of the interventions and their courses of events. The inclusion of abbreviation lists and chronologies at the end of each chapter is a good service and indicates the sort of attention the editors gave the work. My only grievance is that I think there should have been a bibliography.

Far from haphazardly throwing together papers from a conference, the editors took five years and two workshop conferences, from the initial lunchtime talks to the book's publication—a long haul, but worthwhile from this reader's perspective.

The result is six case studies with a common structure that truly provides a basis for the three analytical chapters examining in turn the questions on which the case studies focused. These analytical chapters draw conclusions that seem to confirm long-held conceptions, such as that it is easier to get into an intervention than out of one. On the other hand, some conclusions might surprise readers; for example, according to Charles Kupchan, interventions are driven not by an intervening power's change in objectives but by changes in the "target state." Yet much of the value of the book lies not in these conclusions but in the structured path it provides toward examination of military intervention. In this regard, the editors' introductory and concluding chapters clearly articulate the reasoning for the six selected case studies, highlight some of the more important conclusions from the work, and raise many other related and important issues that await further study.

We can hope that decision makers are taking the time to give *Foreign Military Intervention* the attention it deserves. This book is well worth reading for those in the "foreign policy loop" at the White House, State Department, and Pentagon (or in other governments). Anyone interested in the dilemmas surrounding military intervention should consider this a must-read book. As a historian, then, I am disappointed to have to report: skip the historians (*Great Powers and Little Wars*) and read the political scientists (*Foreign Military Intervention*). For once, they

have provided much more insight from the past for the present.

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O'Hanlon, Michael E. *The Art of War in the Age of Peace: U.S. Military Posture for the Post–Cold War World.* New York: Praeger, 1992. 159pp. $42.95

Michael O'Hanlon's *The Art of War in the Age of Peace* is a fairly brief analysis of the military posture of the United States at the beginning of the 1990s. O'Hanlon attempts to cover a breathtaking landscape in 107 pages (exclusive of appendix and bibliography), from defining missions for U.S. military forces, redesigning the conventional force posture, and proposing alternative force postures, to examining alternative force postures and conventional arms control. He also deals with nuclear weapons and budgetary issues. This is a familiar set of themes for works of this genre, if of a range rarely attempted in a book of this length.

The author's suggestion is a familiar one too. O'Hanlon says that U.S. interests can be protected at minimal risk with a military reduced by roughly 40–50 percent in most types of major combatant forces and by a greater amount in nuclear-capable forces. Although he disclaims similarity between this book and the recent work of William Kaufmann and John Steinbruner, *Decisions for Defense: Prospects for a New Order*—calling their book "better characterized as the reflections of seasoned and thoughtful experts than as detailed analytical studies"—he arrives at his conclusions in much the same manner as do Kaufmann and Steinbruner, citing them often in his work.

While acknowledging that his proposed cuts in many areas would be twice as deep as those proposed by former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, he does recommend maintaining and even expanding our capabilities in logistics, intelligence and communications, special forces, and research and development. The appendix contains many mathematical formulae for calculating such things as required amounts of resupply shipping, tonnage lifted by air, and attack-at-sea exchange ratios. His mathematical conclusions all appear to be precise and correct.

As a weapons and arms control analyst with the National Security Division of the Congressional Budget Office, O'Hanlon brings excellent credentials to such a study. This work is extensively footnoted and should serve as an excellent research reference for students.

Broad in scope and clearly written, *The Art of War* is filled with authoritative information, much of it in easy-to-understand tables. A reader looking for a brief review of the strategic landscape will find it particularly appealing. On the other hand, because this is a very short book, the author rarely presents his arguments in great depth, a particular problem in that he proposes radical changes to force structures that have withstood the crucible of interservice negotiation, executive department scrutiny, and finally, congressional voting. His analysis would have been

more convincing had it been in greater depth and detail.

The greatest value of *The Art of War in the Age of Peace* to the national security community is as a brief, thought-provoking work that whets appetites for further reading among its readers, who can then use the extensive footnotes and bibliography to find comprehensive works.

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Gray, Colin S. *The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War.* New York: The Free Press, 1992. 372pp. $24.95

Considering its source, this is a disappointing book. First, it is virtually the same in subject and format as Colin Gray's and Roger Barnett's considerably better-edited work, *Seapower and Strategy*—which is, incidentally, not even listed in the lengthy bibliography. Second, anyone looking for answers in the post–Cold War world will find none here. Third, American readers should be forewarned that the book has a decidedly British, actually a Eurocentric, almost Channel-centric, viewpoint. Finally, the historical case study chapters are at times devoid of naval analysis.

The book opens with introductory chapters on the nature, uses, and practice of sea power and goes on to discuss land power. The book's thesis, and unfortunately also its weakness, is spelled out in the Prologue. Gray explains, "I develop the thesis that superior sea power generates a strategic leverage which enables wars to be won." However, he also writes, "I have no brief for sea power in general [a rather strange comment], a particular navy, a particular naval strategy, or this or that class of naval weapon"—which certainly limits its value to the national security community. Gray uses ten historical case studies: Persia and the Greeks, the Peloponnesian War, Rome and Carthage, the defense of the Byzantine Empire, the rise and fall of Venice, England and Spain (1568–1604), Britain and France (1688–1815), World War I, World War II, and the Cold War.

The earlier *Seapower and Strategy* opened in a similar way with discussions of sea power compared to land power. However, while in *Seapower* the lessons are laid out as easily read themes, the opening chapters in *Leverage* are rambling and somewhat difficult to decipher. Both books use similar historical case studies. *Seapower*, for example, has a chapter on "England and Spain: 1567–1604," by Robin Ranger. In *Seapower* the case studies are in separate chapters, while in *Leverage* the first five are in a chapter on "The Age of Galley Warfare," the next two in "the Age of Sail," with separate chapters on World Wars I and II and the Cold War. While *Seapower* is concise, readable, and emphasizes sea power, the same can not be said for *Leverage*. The reader had better brush up on late sixteenth and seventeenth-century European history, because there seems an inordinate amount of reference to this period throughout the book; it dominates the "Age of Sail" chapter, leaving

little space even for Nelson and ignoring the leverage of British sea power over the French in the New World.

Many of these chapters are almost without naval slant. The chapters on World Wars I and II have more detailed descriptions of the land forces and strategies than of naval. Gallipoli, for example, is only mentioned in passing, and some naval references are only included to prove the thesis of sea versus land forces. Although there are some interesting descriptions of the disposition of German divisions between the Eastern and Western fronts, Gray does not fully develop his thesis of the counter-use of the sea. Readers from the Army War College would not be convinced of the leverage of sea power.

Some naval omissions are glaring. Submarine warfare is barely mentioned, which is strange in that submarine *guerre de course* has been a land power's greatest weapon against sea powers. Naval air power is also omitted. The U.S. Navy's war in the Pacific is similarly slighted, although it involved two sea powers; Gray has it that Japan was actually a land power and had most of its forces in China and Manchuria. Most American contributions, in fact, are given rather short shrift.

Most disappointing, however, is the very short chapter on the Cold War. It is really just a discussion of what might have been—a U.S.-Soviet nuclear war. Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm are all lumped together in a single sentence! The leverage of sea power was crucial in Korea and certainly useful in both Vietnam and Desert Storm. In any case, how can anyone write about sea power in the post–World War II period without quoting the Brookings study on crisis response? Finally, although this work is based on history, it might have nonetheless been interesting to have Colin Gray's opinions on the use of sea power in the new post–Cold War era; none is forthcoming.

In short, if you already have Colin Gray's *Seapower and Strategy*, you can probably skip *Leverage*, and if not, get the original.

JAMES L. GEORGE
author, *The U.S. Navy in the 1990s: Alternatives for Action*

Aspin, Les and Dickinson, William. *Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War*. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's (US), 1992. 93pp. (No price given)

This brief work is the product of a study of the Persian Gulf War initiated by Les Aspin and William Dickinson when they were, respectively, the chairman and the ranking Republican member of the House Armed Services Committee. It was originally published by Congress as a memorandum for members of the committee. This book is significant not only for understanding military operations in the Persian Gulf War but also for what the lessons of that war imply for future U.S. defense budgets and strategy. Aspin and Dickinson enumerate key findings from the operations in the Persian Gulf and note issues for the future of the U.S. defense establishment.

The Persian Gulf War must rate as one of the most successful military

operations in U.S. history. Aspin and Dickinson identify reasons why the U.S.-led coalition had such great success in expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait and defeating them in battle. As any viewer of television news must be aware, the artful application of air power was a key element. Centralized control of fixed-wing aircraft through the Joint Forces Air Component Commander was found to be important in optimizing the use of air assets; but such centralized control was not without its problems. The Marines felt that not enough missions were devoted to battlefield preparation, and over time Marine aircraft were diverted from centralized control so that more ground support missions could be flown.

In spite of the highly successful air campaign, however, ground forces were necessary to push the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. The success of U.S. Army and Marine units owed much to the clever use of deception, by which the Iraqi army was led to expect an amphibious invasion of Kuwait City and kept six divisions on Kuwaiti beaches and thus out of the fight. Notwithstanding, if an amphibious invasion had taken place, it would have been jeopardized by Iraqi minefields. The U.S. and its allies were handicapped in dealing with the mine threat because of incomplete intelligence (resulting in damage to the USS *Princeton* and the USS *Tripoli*) and problems with U.S. minesweeping and countermeasures equipment. Aspin and Dickinson identify mine countermeasures capability as one of the issues for the future which need to be addressed by the U.S. Navy.

Overall, the authors conclude that the great success of American land and air forces was based largely on the effective use of advanced technology. As examples they discuss precision guided munitions, better target acquisition and fire control, use of the Global Positioning System for land navigation, and night-vision equipment, which permitted twenty-four-hour combat operations. Although high-technology equipment made a major difference in fighting the Gulf War, high-quality people were just as important, or even more so. The war tested the All Volunteer Force, which replaced the draft in the early 1970s, and showed "the wisdom of recruiting a professional military and maintaining exacting and realistic peacetime training schedules." This major conclusion should be kept in mind as post–Cold War defense budgets cut into personnel and funds for training.

The use of reserve components showed the contributions they can make under conditions short of general mobilization. Aspin and Dickinson devote over a quarter of their book to the role of the reserves and find both successes and problems. One major difficulty in using them was that pre-war mobilization planning focused on use of the reserves in a Nato European scenario, not in circumstances like the Gulf War. Mobilization therefore was incremental and improvised, and experiences differed among the services. The major contributions of Army

reserve components were made by combat support and combat service support units like the military police, civil affairs, medical, and transportation groups. Three mechanized infantry and armor brigades were eventually mobilized, but training kept them from the theater. However, two reserve field artillery brigades fought well in Desert Storm. The Marines mobilized much of their selected reserve, including combat units. The combat units fought well, but generally in no larger than company-size units. The lack of support troops in the Marines, both active and reserve, resulted in a number of Marine support units being assigned duties which were not their normal missions. As for the Air Force, even before official mobilization, reserve components were supporting Desert Shield in areas such as airlift and refueling operations. These units played an essential role, and three reserve combat squadrons also were employed effectively. The Navy used fewer reservists than the other services and emphasized individual skills more than unit capabilities. Most of the reservists mobilized were medical personnel, about half of the Navy's medical reservists. They made it possible for the Navy to provide over half the hospital beds supporting the Central Command. Naval reserve minesweeping ships also accounted for much of the Navy's minesweeping strength in the Persian Gulf.

The items discussed above do not exhaust the topics addressed in *Defense for a New Era*. This book will not provide the reader with a detailed analysis of the strategy and tactics of the Persian Gulf War, but no better source is available to highlight major lessons learned and their implications for the future of the United States military establishment.

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Ward, Nigel D. *Sea Harrier over the Falklands: A Maverick at War*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992. 299pp. $25.95

Commander Nigel "Sharkey" Ward commanded 801 Sea Harrier Squadron embarked in HMS *Invincible* during the 1982 Falklands War. In this work he recalls his experiences before and during the war in order to convey a sense of what it is like to be a fighter pilot in battle, something he believes is essential to understanding the air war in the Falklands.

The publisher calls the book an "extraordinary first hand account," and in many ways it is. Authoritative descriptions of the mental and physical work performed by a fighter pilot in flight and genuinely exciting combat scenes give the book its immediacy and much of its appeal. Particularly vivid and memorable is the picture of *Invincible* under missile attack, as witnessed from the cockpit of a Sea Harrier helplessly chained to the ship's deck. "It was a magnificent sight, one always to be remembered."

Throughout the narrative, Ward vigorously argues two themes. First, the Sea Harrier demonstrated exceptional performance and made a vital contribution to the successful outcome of the

war. Achieving command of the skies over the fleet and islands, it made victory possible. "Without the jump-jet's [Sea Harrier's] extraordinary . . . combat results in defense of San Carlos, the amphibious landings would probably have realised insupportable casualties." While Ward is far from an impartial reporter (and exaggerations have entered the story), the simple facts are compelling. Two-and-a-half-dozen Sea Harriers, including the eleven in 801 Squadron, dominated two hundred Argentine aircraft. But the record was not unblemished; it could have been better.

Hence Ward's second point. Throughout the war "I had two battles to fight, one against the enemy and one against the Flag." Admiral Sir John Woodward and his staff (collectively "the Flag") not only doubted the Sea Harrier's capacity to defend the fleet and beachhead and stubbornly refused to acknowledge its achievements, in Ward's view, but actually interfered with its contribution to the war effort. Its own doubts reinforced by 800 Squadron (which was embarked in HMS *Hermes*, the flagship, and whose assessment of the aircraft's performance was pessimistic), the Flag took actions that made those doubts self-fulfilling prophecies. *Sheffield* was hit by an Exocet missile and sank after the defending Sea Harriers were ordered away from proper stations by the Flag to conduct a useless visual search for Argentine surface ships.

Reader caution is advisable here. Ward reports he heard later that the Flag sent a message to *Invincible* after *Sheffield* went down expressing concern over 801's air defense performance, and "if such a signal was sent, . . . it strikes me as most inappropriate, and little more than an attempt to rewrite history." Indirectly, he admits the signal may not have been sent, but few readers are likely to notice that this point is based on hearsay. How much of the book rests on similarly shaky ground?

The real story is Ward himself, the "Maverick over the Falklands." He carefully cultivates his own image as an individualist and nonconformist. Constantly in conflict with nearly all authority with which he comes in contact—the Flag, the Ministry of Defense, the Royal Air Force, etc.—he presents himself as the victim of a system that does not understand contemporary combat, schemes to discredit aviation in the Royal Navy, rewards yes-men, and punishes those who speak good sense forthrightly. This is the perspective of an officer selling excuses to himself.

The book includes an expanded table of contents, a useful glossary, good photographs, an appendix with diagrams of the most significant air-to-air engagements, another appendix that tries (not very successfully) to explain fighter combat in layman's terms, and an index.

Aviation buffs will be delighted by the combat action and Ward's irreverence, and they will ignore the book's imperfections. Serious readers should approach it with the caution due any memoir written years later by a

controversial participant out to set the record straight.

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Macdonald, Peter. *Giap: The Victor in Vietnam*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1993. 352pp. $25

Moore, Harold G. and Galloway, Joseph L. *We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young*. New York: Random House, 1992. 412pp. $25

Spector, Ronald H. *After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam*. New York: The Free Press, 1992. 390pp. $24.95

A quarter of a century after the Tet offensive and nearly two decades since the fall of Saigon, the Vietnam War still haunts us. Even as diplomatic relations thaw between the United States and Vietnam, the images of our involvement in that tragic conflict remain seared into the American consciousness. These three books shed new light on the war and provide valuable insights into the men and women who answered their country's call a generation ago.

In *Giap: The Victor in Vietnam*, British author Peter Macdonald paints a highly favorable portrait of the North Vietnamese commander of the People's Army of Vietnam. Relying extensively on interviews with Giap and other Vietnamese officers, this biography is hardly an unbiased assessment of its subject, but Macdonald presents an intriguing portrayal of the enigmatic figure who commanded an army that eventually humbled two foreign powers. Tracing Giap's career from his youth through his nationalist battles with the Japanese, the French, and ultimately the Americans, Macdonald concludes that Giap was "a man unique in military annals . . . and the most tactically successful guerrilla leader of all time."

Concentrating primarily on his life from 1944, when he led his initial raids against the Japanese, through the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, the author states that Giap's life can best be summarized in battles, offensives, and enterprises. In a military career that spanned three decades, Giap experienced his share of both defeats and victories. His Red River Valley offensive of 1951, his 1967–1968 winter-spring offensive (of which Tet was an integral part), and his Easter Offensive of 1972 were dismal failures from the military perspective. Offsetting these defeats were his victory at Dien Bien Phu, the climatic battle of the First Indochina War; the construction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which he meticulously supervised; aid to the insurgency in South Vietnam; the creation of the air defense network of Hanoi and Haiphong; and Vietnam's successful invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, which Giap masterminded and controlled. As a strategist, Giap far exceeded his adversaries in understanding the true nature of the Indochina war.

The author is best in analyzing Giap's contribution to guerrilla warfare. Synthesizing the theories of both Mao and Sun Tzu, Giap refined guerrilla warfare to an art, which he successfully practiced for thirty years. Equally interesting is Macdonald's appraisal of some of Giap's opponents. According to the

author, Westmoreland deserved a better hand than the one he was dealt, but he played it skillfully, "considering some of the cards were missing from the deck." As for Lyndon Johnson, he was a man who tried hard but got it wrong.

Giap, on the other hand, for the most part got it right. Whether his victories place the Vietnamese general in the pantheon of "the great captains of all time," as Macdonald claims, is certainly debatable; few can argue with Giap's ultimate success. If the book contains a flaw, it lies with the author's over-identification with his subject.

Perhaps Vietnam author Bernard Fall comes closest to the mark in describing Giap as "at best only an adequate military tactician, but a logistical genius." Frequently underestimating his opponents, Giap sacrificed thousands of his men needlessly when different strategies might have achieved his goals. The life of an individual soldier meant nothing to him. Just as he had dared to compete with the French in a set-piece battle of attrition in the Red River Delta, Giap made similar mistakes in risking all against the Americans in 1968. Fortunately, the sudden collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in 1975 salvaged his military reputation. Yet there is something to be said about singleness of political purpose, and in this Giap was a master.

On the tactical level of war, authors Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway have produced perhaps the finest book in recent years on the Vietnam conflict. Focusing on the battle of the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965, Moore and Galloway have written the *Red Badge of Courage* of the Vietnam War. The author's credentials are impressive: Moore commanded the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) at Landing Zone X-Ray along the Ia Drang, and Galloway was the only war correspondent who accompanied the 7th Cavalry for most of the subsequent action. What makes the Ia Drang battle so important is that it was the first major campaign in which American forces engaged large-scale North Vietnamese (NVA) regular units.

We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young is the story of remarkable human courage; Moore's men outfought three NVA regiments, inflicting catastrophic casualties on the enemy, only to see the NVA nearly overwhelm Moore's sister unit a few days later. By the time the campaign ended, 305 Americans and an estimated 3,561 North Vietnamese had perished in the bloodiest campaign since Lyndon Johnson dispatched American ground troops to Vietnam. While this 12:1 casualty ratio might have pleased American military commanders and confirmed that the search-and-destroy operation was an effective strategy to achieve this nation's political objective, the authors assert that the real message of the Ia Drang battles was that only an open-ended, massive commitment of American resources could swing the war in favor of the United States.

Moore and Galloway pull no punches in assessing the effectiveness of American airmobile doctrine, the

personalities of the men and their commanders, and the tactical judgments that occurred in the Central Highlands in 1965. Their findings, particularly their conclusion that American political and military leaders simply lost sight of their objective, may disturb many readers, but the authors' candor is indeed refreshing. In presenting the war from the soldier's perspective, the authors call into question the policies of senior commanders, who never seemed to grasp the true nature of the conflict. A strategy of attrition might produce tactical victories, such as in the Ia Drang Valley, but would only lead to a war "mired in stalemate," to use Walter Cronkite's words, against an intractable foe who was willing to sustain unlimited casualties to achieve his political goals.

If there are any heroes to be found in this narrative, they are the American soldier and his NVA counterpart. Moore and Galloway focus primarily on the American fighting men but also pay tribute to the thousands of soldiers from the People's Army of Vietnam who died in the Ia Drang's Valley of Death. In the final analysis, it was the American soldier, operating individually or as a member of a fire team or squad, who eventually won America's first pitched battle of the Vietnam War.

Three years after Moore led the 7th Cavalry Regiment into the Central Highlands, the NVA and the Viet Cong launched the Tet Offensive. In *After Tet*, noted military historian Ronald Spector interprets the American experience in Vietnam through a close examination of a single year, a year that witnessed the largest and most costly battles of the war. In 1968, the author, a field historian on special assignment from the Commandant of the Marine Corps, attempts to answer this question: if Tet was such a turning point, why did the war continue for five additional years?

Spector concludes that the battles of 1968 *were* decisive—because they were so indecisive. Until the United States withdrew its forces, the Vietnam War remained what it had been: a bloody stalemate. The reason it continued was that both sides persisted in their optimistic belief that with additional pressure the enemy would eventually collapse. Small wonder that the carnage continued, as neither side, despite Johnson's call for a negotiated settlement, was willing to compromise its war aims.

While Spector's thesis is nothing new, he does make a major contribution to our understanding of the war with his analysis of the competing armies. He examines in turn what he terms the American "Vietnam-only" army, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, and finally the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). As with most historians, he is laudatory about the tenacity of the NVA but much less so with the ARVN, which had learned a great deal since 1963 about how to rule but too little about how to fight.

The most interesting aspect of this book is the author's analysis of the American army that fought in Vietnam. Not confining his study to 1968, Spector

views Johnson's decision not to mobilize the reserves as a crucial step that evolved by 1968 into a Vietnam-only force that consisted of an entirely new army of draftees, one-term volunteers, "instant" non-commissioned officers, and recent graduates of the Reserve Office Training Corps and Officer Candidate School. This army was hardly a cross-section of American youth, and was, in Spector's words, "especially sensitive to the social and political controversies and changes in the society it served." The chapters on the "disintegration" of the American army in the latter stages of the war are particularly frightening.

Like Macdonald, Moore, and Galloway, Spector is critical of the manner in which the Johnson administration and senior military commanders fought the war. Too little attention was paid to the war in the countryside; Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) focused almost exclusively on the "big-unit" war with the NVA, relegating the pacification role to the government of South Vietnam. The American failure, states Spector, was a failure of understanding and imagination. American leaders simply did not see that what was for them a limited war for limited ends, was for the Vietnamese, both North and South, an unlimited war for national survival.

Even more disheartening is the allegation that senior commanders, supposedly schooled in Clausewitzian theory, virtually ignored the Prussian's basic dictum that "no one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by the war and how he intends to conduct it." Whereas American commanders used military forces to achieve tactical victories, the North Vietnamese employed their forces to achieve political objectives. In short, American leaders neither understood the true nature of the war nor developed a military and political strategy to achieve their war aims. Therein lay the true tragedy of Vietnam.

COLE C. KINGSEED
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U.S. Military Academy

Schreadley, R.L. *From the Rivers to the Sea: The U.S. Navy in Vietnam*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992. 418pp. (No price given)

It is no secret that journalists are frequently better at recounting history than historians are at understanding it. Such is the case with Commander R.L. Schreadley's engaging chronology of the brown-water navy's successes, disappointments, and frustrations in the Vietnam War. One of the best books in a growing library of accounts of U.S. naval operations in that ill-fated conflict, it places the brown-water sailors in chronological context without exhaustively analysing the war's origins. Happily, the book concentrates on the years between 1968 and 1971, neatly bracketing the most intense phase of riverine operations. It was during this period that Schreadley served with COMNAVFORV as director of the Navy's special history project.

The breadth and variety of subjects interviewed and the perceptiveness of the author's personal notes are both evocative and informative, particularly for those who served with Task Force 116 or 117. That the book is encyclopedic and episodic rather than primarily analytic in nature is a particular strength. Few soldiers involved in the gritty details of day-to-day operations have time to seek out, much less understand, the larger context of what they are doing. Understanding often comes only after years have dimmed the details of personal endeavors. During my own rotation "in-country," a period that corresponded roughly to Schreadley's, I frequently visited Breezy Cove and Song Ong Doc as the Navy's primary Registered Publications System custodian in the delta. Despite my geographic familiarity with the base and also its manifest vulnerabilities, I understood the larger context of its *raison d'être* only after closing Schreadley's book. Indeed, whether talking about the congenial atmosphere of An Thio or describing the Byzantine nature of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), *From the Rivers to the Sea* produces a flood of memories and reflection.

It would be a historical injustice, however, to view Schreadley's effort as merely one of sentimentality for graying veterans of Vietnam. It is a fine source of primary information for any student—and there are many—seeking to understand fully the Navy's inshore role, particularly in relation to the post-Tet process of "Vietnamization." Schreadley paints a clear picture of U.S. commanders appalled by the political decisions forcing them to turn over an incomplete mission to a corrupt, incompetent, and unsustainable South Vietnamese regime. More importantly, he tracks the sense of futility down the chain of command from General Creighton Abrams and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt to unit commanders such as Cyrus Christensen, who were desperately trying to breathe life into a moribund, often deadly, policy. There is a sense of frustration throughout the book that Schreadley shares rather than creates.

Schreadley does not attempt to conceal his opinions about why the crusade in Vietnam was a failure. At the outset he declares the military advice to have been sound but U.S. political will weak. The media, State Department, and, in fairness, incompetent leadership in the field are all presented as components in the debacle. But here his analysis ends. He is quite content to leave larger questions about the efficacy of U.S. policy in the first place, or the likely results of a militarily directed war, to historians such as George Herring and James Gibson. Schreadley's purpose is to tell the reader about the accomplishments of the black berets, and this he does with pride.

The author does not preach, he engages. I have referred a number of my students wishing to do projects on the economics of the Vietnam War to Schreadley's account of the military currency fiasco, and they have returned incredulous at the economic lunacy he

wryly describes. More importantly, the humor and wisdom of this chapter has lured them deeper into the book, and I have had some difficulty retrieving it from them. That Schreadley can command the attention of students who balk at attempts to read Lynn White or even Garrett Mattingly underscores the readability of *From the Rivers to the Sea.*

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Melvin, Michael J. *Minesweeper: The Role of the Motor Minesweeper in World War II.* Worcester, England: Square One, 1992. 174pp. $20

Mine warfare had a significant if unheralded impact on naval operations in World War II. Germany's minelaying efforts were especially effective, given that the Allies in general, and the Royal Navy in particular, were not prepared to conduct a major mine countermeasures campaign. That the Royal Navy defeated the Axis mine threat is a testament to the courage and determination of its minesweeping crews, who were predominantly civilian trawlermen mobilized along with their trawlers to fight the war in the United Kingdom's territorial waters. The shift from a defensive war at home to power projection operations throughout the world forced the Royal Navy to expand this force dramatically. *Minesweeper* is the story of the Motor Minesweeper Units, or the coastal waters mine countermeasures force, which grew from less than eighteen part-time reserve units in 1939 to over nine hundred boats, built in yards located all over the world, by 1945.

Written by a veteran of the motor minesweepers, Michael Melvin, the book traces the history of the force from its start in the pre-war period, to the design debates in the war's early days over the new motor minesweepers, the construction and employment of the force as it grew, the Allies' dependence upon the mine countermeasures effort, and finally its dissolution in 1946.

This work is an interesting record of the achievements, sacrifice, and courage of a little-known group of men, whose fight began the first day of the war and did not end until the last known minefield was swept—over one year after the official end of World War II.

CARL O. SCHUSTER
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Drea, Edward J. *MacArthur's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942–1945.* Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1992. 296pp. (No price given)

Much has been published regarding the exploits of Allied codebreakers in the European and Pacific theaters of World War II, and also about the operational uses of cryptologically derived information, which became known as "ULTRA" in both theaters of war—at sea in the Battle of the Atlantic and in the Central Pacific, as well as in the ground wars in Africa and also western and southern Europe. However, little has appeared on the handling and use of ULTRA in the Pacific ground war, especially in the forgotten campaign

waged by General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) command. Edward Drea has filled this void admirably. Of particular interest to intelligence professionals is Drea's narrative of how special intelligence was analyzed, handled, and incorporated into operational planning.

The success of naval cryptologists in the Pacific theater is well known; the U.S. victories in the Coral Sea and at Midway were to a great degree victories of intelligence. In the SWPA, despite an uneven beginning, analysts had by 1943 broken several Japanese codes, which contributed to the turning of the tide in New Guinea. The ULTRA contribution to strangling Japanese reinforcement of New Guinea was best demonstrated in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, during which a large Japanese convoy bound for Lae, New Guinea, was shattered and the Japanese lost the initiative in New Guinea forever. By 1944 ULTRA was reliable enough to be fully integrated into operational planning. MacArthur's masterpiece—his move in April 1944 to Hollandia, New Guinea, which bypassed prepared Japanese defenses and saved thousands of American casualties and many months of fighting—was ULTRA's greatest contribution in the Southwest Pacific.

Even with a veritable flood of ULTRA, there were still intelligence failures in which operational disasters were avoided only by MacArthur's remarkably consistent luck. From the high point of the Hollandia operation, there were several occasions when intelligence failed to predict Japanese attacks or was inaccurate in ascertaining the size of Japanese garrisons. But here the fault lay with the interpretation of intelligence, not with its availability. Ultimately, as MacArthur reached his personal objective, the reconquest of the Philippines, ULTRA again demonstrated its value. The relatively quick capture of Leyte, MacArthur's first landing in the Philippines, was due in large part to ULTRA's ability to guide U.S. aircraft and submarines in cutting the flow of Japanese reinforcements.

After an uneven performance on Luzon (the largest U.S.-Japanese ground battle of the war), during which MacArthur ignored intelligence that conflicted with his operational plan, ULTRA again demonstrated its unique capability to supply insight into Japanese operational planning by providing an exceptionally clear (and almost sole-source) picture of Japanese defensive preparations on the home island of Kyushu. But again, for reasons of personal vanity, MacArthur ignored it. Fortunately his largest and final battle was destined never to be fought. ULTRA made available to national decision makers the bulk of the evidence indicating that the Japanese had made extensive preparations to defend their homeland and that they could be overcome only at the price of thousands of Americans lives. It can thus be said that ULTRA was central to the decision to employ atomic weapons.

In addition to being a fine history of the efforts of SWPA codebreakers, this

work provides insight that remains relevant today in the interrelationship of intelligence and operational planning. Even after January 1944, when SWPA codebreakers were producing a flood of timely ULTRA information, rarely were the enemy's intentions evident from ULTRA alone. Analysis and evaluation were central to exploiting it to full advantage. Although MacArthur's boldness after January 1944 can be partly attributed to the success of SWPA intelligence analysts, the availability of intelligence, however good, was not the deciding factor in any operational plan, but MacArthur's views and desires. He consistently dismissed ULTRA evidence when it failed to accord with his preconceived strategic vision.

Even the intelligence professionals were unable to translate the bounty of ULTRA-derived information into consistently accurate intelligence estimates. In part this effort was affected by bureaucratic infighting and the egos of the individuals involved, which was to some extent reflected in the periodic gaps in ULTRA information. Inaccuracy also reflected to some degree the penchant of analysts to attribute to or superimpose on the Japanese their own concept of tactics and strategy (a problem not unknown to intelligence analysts of any era).

Drea's work is in the first rank of ULTRA-related books and clearly demonstrates the impact it had on the war in the Southwest Pacific. While ULTRA's performance was uneven regarding the ground war, there can be no doubt that the early breaking of Japanese army shipping codes provided great payoffs to U.S. air and naval forces, by giving the precise location of Japanese convoys. Also, the victory at Hollandia itself had a major impact on the Southwest Pacific drive: it shortened the war and probably affected the outcome of the Pacific campaign.

In addition to being a more than adequate history of the campaign in New Guinea (a topic little covered), this book is now the definitive work on the subject of intelligence and its influence on the Southwest Pacific campaign.

MARK STILLE
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Boyd, Carl. *Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and Magic Intelligence, 1941–1945*. Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1993. 270pp. $25

The key to this fascinating book can be found in the word *confidant* in the title. General Oshima served in Berlin from 1934 to 1938, first as the Japanese military attaché and then as ambassador. Recalled to Japan in 1939, he was soon reappointed as ambassador, apparently because he was indeed a confidant of Hitler. Oshima not only spoke fluent German but was ideologically attuned to the Nazi regime. An ardent imperialist, his pro-Axis speeches repeatedly stressed Japan's desire to share in the "redistribution of European colonies." As a consequence, Hitler trusted him, gave him ready access, and discussed German long-range plans and policies with remarkable candor. The ambassador's stature in Nazi eyes is

perhaps best reflected by an entry in the diary of propaganda minister Goebbels: "Oshima is really one of the most successful champions of Axis policies. A monument ought later to be erected in his honor in Germany." Only with the knowledge of the intimate, inside relationship that Oshima enjoyed with the Nazi hierarchy can one appreciate the full significance of the breakthrough achieved by British and American intelligence services in cracking the German and Japanese codes.

A week before Hitler invaded Russia in June 1941, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring outlined for Oshima the Nazi plan of attack, freely listing the number of aircraft and divisions involved. When the ambassador radioed this information back to Tokyo, it was promptly deciphered, translated, and relayed not only to British and American officials but also to the Russians, who, unfortunately, failed to take the report seriously. This was only the beginning. The Germans gave Oshima daily reports on the progress of the war. When they were radioed to Tokyo, U.S. leaders had accurate data on the staggering scale of Russian losses (millions of men and thousands of planes), which helped shape U.S. requirements planning months before Pearl Harbor.

Although Oshima's reports provided an immense amount of information about German tactical-level concerns, his window into Hitler's secrets was of greatest value to the Allies at the strategic level. Sometimes the reverse message traffic, from Tokyo to Berlin, provided vital strategic intelligence, as when Foreign Minister Togo informed Oshima that the Japanese would not attack Russia while engaging the Allied powers. A similar message relieved Allied anxieties when Stalin categorically rebuffed Japanese efforts to arrange peace between Germany and Russia. In September 1942, when Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop admitted to Oshima that Germany's oil reserves were barely enough for military operations, the Allied decision to launch a large-scale bomber raid on the Rumanian refineries at Ploesti was the logical consequence.

Probably the greatest value of Oshima's reports came from his observations on the English Channel and the Atlantic coastal defenses. With Hitler's approval he toured these areas not long before the Allied invasion of Normandy (Operation OVERLORD). He sent Tokyo detailed reports not only on the fortifications and obstacles along the coast but also the German order of battle, location of mobile reserves, and the like. This priceless intelligence was used to persuade Churchill of the soundness of OVERLORD and to plan the feint at Pas de Calais.

Carl Boyd devotes one whole chapter to the inherent difficulties encountered in exploiting cryptographic intercepts: the enduring dilemmas of safeguarding security by limiting distribution versus getting intelligence into the hands of those who can best use it; the need to identify the critical issues from the mass of chaff; securing adequate numbers of translators sufficiently sensitive to the nuances of the language; and many other problems common to

intelligence operations. This is a book rich with insights; not least among them is its blunt reminder that it is always a mistake to assume your channels of communication are secure.

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Levine, Alan J. *The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940–1945*. New York: Praeger, 1992. 235pp.

Dr. Levine is a historian specializing primarily in Russian history and international relations. Though he is not a specialist in the subject of airpower in World War II, he has produced a worthwhile, compact account of the air war over Germany. Despite the subject's exceeding complexity, Levine has managed to address virtually all of the significant strategic, operational, tactical, and technical issues that arose, as well as the constant interplay between them.

The Strategic Bombing of Germany concerns one of the most controversial campaigns of the war. Fifty years later, this campaign still provokes passionate arguments, because the issues it raised remain central to the debate that has raged incessantly since the 1920s over the proper role of airpower in national military strategy. This debate is once more crucial to current arguments over what kinds of post–Cold War forces the United States needs.

Levine presents a multilevel overview of the British and American bombing campaigns against Germany. After an introductory discussion of all three countries' airpower doctrines and capabilities, the author describes the generally ineffective British area bombardment campaigns through March 1944, which resulted in heavy losses without commensurate effect on the German war effort, and also the equally dismal "12 o'Clock High" period of the American "precision" bombing campaign. He notes the shift of emphasis from industrial bombing (read city-smashing) to D-Day invasion support and finishes with the ultimately successful campaigns against transportation and oil production systems.

Levine argues that strategically the central question was what the air campaign could achieve, hence what resources should be allocated to it and at what cost in opportunities foregone. Many British and American airpower enthusiasts—followers of Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell—were convinced that airpower by itself could defeat Germany and render major ground fighting unnecessary. Even as late as March 1944, the United States Army Air Force's General Carl Spaatz did not believe that the D-Day invasion could succeed, remarking, "After it fails, we can show them how we can win by bombing." Of course it did not hurt the airpower case that between 1940 and 1943 there was little else that could be done to engage the Germans directly. Their views prevailed to the extent that a disproportionate amount of Britain's war effort went to support Bomber Command, while the crucial Battle of the Atlantic hung in the balance as late as spring 1943 due in large part to the reluctance of the air

chiefs to release even a handful of long-range bombers to support antisubmarine efforts.

The author argues that much of the strategic bombing campaign was marked by failure. Its goal was to destroy Germany's war-making potential through destruction of key industries and, ideally, of civilian morale. The former was not accomplished until near the end of the war, the latter never. The planners were unable to determine the "right" target sets, not least because of fundamental flaws in their economic intelligence. One of the huge postwar surprises was the revelation that Germany had not fully mobilized its economy for war until well into 1942, with the consequence that there had been considerable slack to ameliorate the limited effects of bomb damage. Searching for targets that were vulnerable—i.e., whose destruction bombers could actually achieve and the loss of which the Germans could not work around—Allied planners mistakenly chose industrial sectors like aircraft and ball-bearing production, of which those things were not true. At the same time, for much of the war they ignored true bottlenecks, such as electrical generation, tank transmission factories, and the western inland water transportation system. When such truly vulnerable targets were on occasion attacked, it was usually for an insufficient time and with insufficient force, and by the time they were re-engaged, the Germans had had time to react. During the last year of the war, air planners finally went after two key sectors, transportation and oil production, with marked effect. By that time, however, Soviet and Western ground forces were closing in on the Reich, and it is hard to say what real value these last bombing campaigns had.

On the technical level, Levine notes that throughout there were significant disparities between what planners wanted to do and what the capabilities of their weapons allowed them to do. Early in the war for example, poor aircraft design, weak ordnance, and abominable navigation drove the British from daylight precision bombing to night area bombing. Later in the war, the Americans had scarcely better results in terms of bomber defense and bombing accuracy, the famed Flying Fortress and Norden bombsight notwithstanding. Adequate bomber defense, crucial to the ability to conduct daytime bombing effectively, became possible only after the long-delayed introduction of long-range, high-performance fighters.

The author then compares what the strategic bombing campaign actually accomplished to its proponents' *a priori* claims. It almost certainly failed in its stated goal of destroying German war industry and breaking civilian morale. However, apart from accomplishing the political objective of engaging Germany militarily *somewhere* before Western ground forces could invade Europe, it undoubtedly forced the diversion of major German resources to defend against air attacks and repair bomb damage, effectively destroyed the Luftwaffe through attrition, delayed deployment

of the V-weapons, and materially aided the ground campaign by its destruction of the transportation and oil production sectors in 1944–45.

Though written primarily as a campaign history, this book is a worthwhile case study of the way an earlier "military-technical revolution" developed and how military leaders a half-century ago groped for ways to use new capabilities and ideas effectively. The tantalizing question for historians of the air campaign is—as is now said about socialism by its friends—whether the idea was wrong or whether it was merely executed badly. Could airpower by itself have been decisive if the "right" target sets had been chosen and the technology had been up to the task? The same question is particularly germane today as airpower proponents bask in the afterglow of undoubted successes in Desert Storm while defense planners engage in fundamental discussions about future service roles and missions. "Smart" ordnance has taken care of the bombing accuracy problem and the need for huge streams of bombers. But is there a "right" set of targets, and is their destruction decisive in war termination? The campaign of fifty years ago is a sobering reminder that there is a high cost in guessing wrong.

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Gelb, Norman. *Desperate Venture: The Story of Operation Torch, the Allied Invasion of North Africa.* New York: William Morrow, 1992. 366pp. $25

The year 1942 was a worrisome one for the United States and its beleaguered allies. Still reeling from the Axis onslaught and short of resources on every front, the Allies had yet to agree on a coordinated, war-winning offensive strategy. Although the U.S. Navy (supported by public opinion) urged an all-out campaign against Japan, President Roosevelt (backed by General Marshall) eventually sided with Churchill and Stalin: Germany, the more dangerous enemy, had to be defeated first.

Agreement on "Germany first," however, settled only half the strategic debate. With the Russians hard pressed all along the Eastern Front, Stalin was demanding that his allies quickly open a second front in Europe. Roosevelt favored a massive cross-Channel assault—but not until 1943, at the earliest. Churchill, fearful of another Dunkirk, much preferred to attack Hitler's "soft underbelly" in the Mediterranean. It is against this background that historian Norman Gelb opens his account of Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942.

The book's title comes from a statement of General George S. Patton as his task force prepared to embark for French Morocco: "The job I am going on is about as desperate a venture as has ever been undertaken by any force in the world's history." Patton had a talent for self-dramatization, but this time he was not exaggerating.

Patton's anxieties began with the Anglo-American differences over how best to defeat Germany. Like most senior U.S. officers, he felt strongly that

Churchill's peripheral strategy violated the first principle of war (the Objective), and he realized that Roosevelt's assent to the prime minister's plan for Operation TORCH—the only hope for a second front in 1942—meant both a year's postponement of the cross-Channel invasion and, very likely, of Hitler's downfall.

TORCH's senior commanders had much else to worry about as well. Could this huge armada, consisting of one task force sailing from the U.S. and two more from the U.K., evade the U-boat gauntlet and rendezvous undetected off Gibraltar? As the Algeria-bound U.K. contingent of warships and transports headed into the Mediterranean, what would the German spies in neutral Spain report to Berlin? Would they fall for the cover story that these were only reinforcements for Britain's Eighth Army, battling Rommel in Egypt? Would the troops have to fight their way ashore? Whether the Vichy French defenders of Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers would die for Hitler's cause or surrender quickly was a question the gung-ho, amateur OSS agents operating in those cities could not answer. If there was resistance, how would the green U.S. contingent acquit itself? Most American soldiers had never seen combat; some were just learning how to board a landing craft—en route, in mid-Atlantic.

There was one worry that British officers hid from their American counterparts: "Who *is* this Eisenhower chap?" they asked each other. "Amiable fellow, perhaps, but dreadfully inexperienced to command TORCH, don't you know . . .?"

Despite all these concerns—and plenty of snafus during the landings—TORCH was a smashing success. At a cost of less than 1,500 American and British casualties, the Allies opened a second front, and though it was of little immediate help to Stalin, they now had Rommel's Afrika Korps in a strategic vise. When the Tunisia campaign ended in May 1943, the Axis had lost nearly 300,000 men. Additional Allied losses came to 70,000 killed, wounded, or missing.

Norman Gelb, whose previous books include *Dunkirk* and *The Berlin Wall*, covers all these varied aspects of the story (and more) in twenty crisply written chapters. Gelb is particularly good at describing how Churchill and his well prepared military advisors were able to take control of the direction of Allied strategy away from their less experienced American compatriots—a "highjacking," Gelb calls it. His chapters on the political intrigues and espionage capers that preceded the invasion are the most entertaining, and those describing the blundering confusion of the landings are the most vivid. The portrayal of Eisenhower is impressionistic, but leaves no doubt he was the right man for the job.

However, this is not the *definitive* history of Operation TORCH. Gelb tells us little about the actual joint and combined planning process for what was to be the largest amphibious invasion up to that time. The same goes

for the miracles of logistics it took to mount the landing and for the Navy's role in getting it all there. The generals in the story, with the exception of Eisenhower, come across as cardboard figures—which is hard to do with the likes of Patton and Rommel. Nor do we get much feel for what the campaign was like for the average GI or Tommy; the one map, good as it is for an overview, does not help tell their part of the story.

Make no mistake, *Desperate Venture* is an enjoyable read. The photographs add a lot, and the research is solid—as far as it goes. I just wish Norman Gelb had written a more ambitious book.

HEATH TWICHELL
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D'Este, Carlo. *Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, 1943.* New York: Harper, 1991. 666pp. $14.95

D'Este, Carlo. *Decision in Normandy.* New York: Harper, 1991. 557pp. $14.95

Amphibious operations are conceded to be the most difficult to plan and execute. Their success requires the fullest coordination of land, sea, and air forces; each is at great risk unless that coordination is achieved. Successful coordination permits the strengths of each component to offset the weaknesses of the others.

Operations involving two or more sovereign states also represent a high level of risk and reward. They are difficult because the forces are dependent on one another to achieve results that neither can achieve alone.

Lieutenant Colonel Carlo D'Este, U.S. Army, Retired, discusses two of the largest amphibious operations in the European Theater in World War II: Operation HUSKY in Sicily, July 1943, and Operation OVERLORD in Normandy, June 1944. Both studies illuminate the problems encountered by the British and the Americans in their bilateral and joint operational planning efforts.

The author emphasizes the importance of operational planners being in close communication with each other and with those who execute their plans. It is therefore critical that all planners speak the same doctrinal "language," which can otherwise be a barrier between forces of the same nation or divide those of different nations, even if they speak the same actual language.

Mark Twain's observation that the Americans and the British are two people divided by the same language was, during World War II, true in more ways than one. The two allies often used different terms for the same concept, and their combat doctrines differed as well. Moreover, the Americans (except for Patton) were either unable or unwilling to participate in a seminar offered by the British about what they had learned fighting the Wehrmacht between 1939 and 1942.

As the war progressed, the planning and execution of bilateral amphibious operations grew in quality and extent. Their beginnings—in Operation TORCH of November 1942, conducted along a dispersed front on the Atlantic and Mediterranean—had been

poor. D'Este points out that although planning was deficient from the outset, TORCH succeeded because the landings were far from the concentrated Axis forces to the east. On the other hand, both HUSKY and OVERLORD were conducted against an enemy who was ready and waiting. Greater force had to be applied to ensure the success of the landings, which meant using air power to isolate the battlefield. There was far less room for inadequate planning.

Because Sicily is an island, Operation HUSKY required the use of tactical air power to blockade the sea lines of communication between the Axis and the Italian mainland. For its part, OVERLORD, which was executed against mainland France, required a larger, more prolonged air effort to achieve maximum possible isolation of the battlefield before and during the landing operation.

D'Este does not hide the blemishes in men who have become legendary after half a century. For example, George C. Marshall comes across as naive in pushing for a landing in France in 1942. On the other hand, early in 1942 it was Marshall who suggested to Eisenhower the option of a hasty landing in Sicily to take place as soon as possible after the conclusion of operations in Africa but before the Axis could be ready to defend it. D'Este remarks that his suggestion (which became HUSKY) "held no appeal to Eisenhower's conservative nature." This operational conservatism functioned in tandem with an organizational predilection to use firepower rather than maneuver to defeat Germany.

A conservative outlook in planning HUSKY is understandable, given the complexities of the bilateral amphibious operation and the tenuous success of TORCH, but less comprehensible is that planners were hampered by a lack of communication with the senior decision makers. The latter were occupied with the final offensive against the Axis in northeast Tunisia until mid-May 1943, but, as D'Este points out, they should have improved their division of labor between near-term and future operations. The author sees Montgomery (never a favorite with Americans, at that time or since) as superior to the other major figures since he at least paid attention to the planning effort. He saw it as leading to complete disaster; HUSKY succeeded in large part because Montgomery agitated for major changes in the operations and got them. But his abrasive behavior toward those whom he regarded as neophytes was not an endearing quality. In fact, most of Montgomery's British and American colleagues fell into that category. D'Este believes that personality conflicts played a large role in operational history.

When planning for OVERLORD began in late 1943, some of these conflicts had not abated, and they hindered both operational planning and execution. On the other hand, planners were able to learn and apply many of the lessons of HUSKY as well as the landings at Salerno and Anzio. Of especial importance was the need for planners to

have access to the senior officers who would be responsible for its execution. Planning was also centralized for OVERLORD, as opposed to HUSKY, with some half-dozen locations from Washington to Cairo.

Operations HUSKY and OVERLORD have produced a shelf of books over the last half-century. Most are popular histories, which look at strategic issues, tactical anecdotes, or both, but avoid operational details of little interest to the nonprofessional. The British and American official histories do get into the minutiae of planning, but they tend to gloss over the role of dominant personalities, especially when unflattering, and the contributions of the other partner, respectively. D'Este has brought these elements into balance in works that are highly readable, professionally informative. They are strongly recommended for inclusion on one's "purple" bookshelf.

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McKee, Alexander. *Against the Odds: Battles at Sea, 1591–1949.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 268pp. (No price given)

Stephen, Martin. *The Fighting Admirals: British Admirals of the Second World War.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 209pp. (No price given)

Both these books deal with leadership in war at sea. Both are written by British authors and draw heavily, though not exclusively, on the British experience. The *dramatis personae* are, to a considerable extent, common to both books and the authors have a shared interest in many of the same historical events. That said, the purposes of the two authors are very different, and their works are aimed at very different readerships.

We have little sympathy these days for the "gallant attempt." Heroic failure somehow seems to have lost its romantic appeal. Therefore, many may find that *Against the Odds* has a strangely Edwardian ring to it. The author gives us an anthology of gallant attempts from the history of naval warfare (twenty-six episodes in all), some familiar (*Revenge*, 1591 and *Bismarck*, 1941) and others too often neglected, like Admiral Cowan's raid on Kronstadt in 1919.

Alexander McKee is a noted marine archeologist, with a score of books to his credit, and a prolific author on maritime subjects. He is a compelling storyteller with an eye for the dramatic and a nose for contemporary scuttlebutt—a trait which, in fact, both authors share. Readers should look on McKee's work as a collection of rattling good yarns. If there is a deeper message, it is a simple one: that individual ingenuity or, failing that, dour intransigence can beat the odds. McKee favours the David-and-Goliath formula, but other conventions of the storyteller's art are in evidence too. His heroes win in spite of (or lose because of) irresolute and ignorant superiors, deskbound admirals, and the armchair strategists who jog their elbows. Philip of Spain, Louis XIV, Winston Churchill, Jackie Fisher, and Dudley Pound are, for McKee, all of a piece.

Little need be said about the author's choice of material. This is a personal anthology, and readers can scarcely complain if some of their own favourite stories are missing. It is clear, however, that the formula works best when applied to simple and clear-cut episodes like the cruise of the raider *Emden* or the chronicle of Italian midget-submarine operations in 1941. Larger themes are less successful; it is hard to do justice to Jutland in a dozen pages.

Against the Odds is aimed at the general reader, and the author has made a deliberate attempt to avoid what he calls "any excessively nautical term." Naval professionals will find much to criticise. McKee claims familiarity with naval matters, but his grasp of strategy, tactics, and naval material is unimpressive. His portrayal of British strategy during Hitler's invasion of Norway is misleadingly simplistic, and his excursions into air navigation, direction finding, and radar intercept in the context of the *Bismarck* operation will fail to convince anyone with a general knowledge of these topics.

Historians will find McKee's research unacceptably thin and his writing slipshod. Sir Reginald Hall was hardly "head of Room 40," and Sir Philip L. Vian was a captain at the time of the *Bismarck* episode. The description of Admiral Sir John Tovey as "the commander of the Home Fleet at Scapa during the Second World War" scarcely does justice to the other holders of that appointment. McKee's glib generalisations and unsubstantiated conclusions will rankle. What are we to make of this olympian judgment on the Zeebrugge raid? "Like Admiral Bacon before him, and Bomber Command at one stage of the Second World War, Keyes refused to face unpalatable facts: that he had matched Nelson only in his bloody failure at Tenerife not his overwhelming victory at Trafalgar." Streams of consciousness like this should make the sleepiest editor reach for his pen.

The Fighting Admirals is a more serious and a far more ambitious work. Martin Stephen is a historian, an academic, and an established writer on naval matters. In this work he sets out to reevaluate and, perhaps less wisely, to compare the British combat commanders of World War II. His major subjects are Admiral Sir John Cunningham, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, and Admiral Sir James F. Somerville, but he examines certain lesser-known figures too, including Vian, Thomas Phillips, and Burnett.

He has set himself a difficult task. It is easier to define what united these men—a common social background, naval training, and a shared experience of destroyer command during World War I—than to identify the qualities that distinguished one from another. In high command, no one was a free agent. Fate dealt each man a very different hand. Their grip on the hearts and minds of a navy rested on a human chemistry that can hardly be recaptured in the printed word.

Despite these difficulties, Dr. Stephen leaves little doubt where his preferences lie. The raw spirit of aggression is not enough, nor is the gambler's

instinct, no matter how well tuned; nor, apparently, are those extraordinary powers of leadership that could hold a fleet together through thick and thin. The author judges his subjects on their depth of intellect, breadth of vision, administrative skills, technical grasp, and on their ability to cooperate with other services and with allies.

On these criteria, Admiral Cunningham, commander in chief in the Mediterranean during some of the darkest days of the war and long acknowledged as the archetypal British fighting admiral, loses pride of place to Ramsay, who commanded at Dover during the Dunkirk evacuation and who later masterminded the TORCH and OVERLORD landings. In the end, Stephen's judgements are largely subjective. Cunningham's reputation rested (like Halsey's) on an indomitable fighting spirit and on steadfastness in the face of adversity. His approach to war was essentially opportunistic. Forward planning was not his strong suit, and administration bored him. Ramsay, despite his breadth of vision, his foresight, and his grasp of detail, was never tested by fleet command. Comparisons seem inappropriate.

While *Fighting Admirals* is stimulating and introduces new material from the private papers of the admirals concerned, few readers will be persuaded to abandon traditional assessments. The author has an insatiable urge to overturn accepted judgments and often tries to do so without adequate foundation. His grasp of the tactical and operational problems facing admirals of the day is not as strong as it should be. His comments, for instance, on the stationing of British cruisers during the battle of the River Plate, and on fire distribution during the action between the *Hood* and the *Bismarck*, are unconvincing. Few will agree that in the latter case Admiral Tovey should have gambled all on the Denmark Strait. Hunches are seldom an adequate basis for decision in naval warfare. The author expects admirals to be psychic, when all evidence shows that they are not.

Stephen's revisionist urge is nowhere more evident than in his attempt to restore the reputation of Tom Phillips, scapegoat for the loss of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* in December 1941. There is no doubting Phillips' administrative capabilities or his moral courage in standing up to Churchill. There is also no reason to challenge the author's view that he was the victim of strategic misjudgments made at the highest level. To argue, however, that Phillips understood the risks and that he had reached a full, if belated, appreciation of the air threat hardly helps his case. In this light, his decision to investigate the reported landing at Kuantan without assuring himself that air cover would meet him on arrival seems less judicious than ever. There is little here to overturn S.W. Roskill's verdict on the matter; and herein lies the fundamental difficulty. The British official histories are works of impressive scholarship; they remain proof against this scale of attack.

There are many errors in terminology in this book that have raised the

hackles of British naval readers but need not spoil the enjoyment of an American audience. Many may find it ironical that beside a caption that reads, "Cunningham was a firm traditionalist and a stickler for uniform in particular," stands a photograph of the Admiral with his medal ribbons pinned, apparently, on the right-hand side.

GRAHAM RHYS-JONES
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Kalbfus, Edward C. *Sound Military Decision*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992. 286pp. $32.95 (originally published 1936)

The road that leads to the Naval War College gate is called Admiral Kalbfus Road. Edward C. Kalbfus was a fleet commander too old for glory in World War II; the legacy he left is this strange book, *Sound Military Decision*.

Kalbfus was twice president of the College, in the mid-1930s and again from 1939 to 1942. There a process of planning for naval action, called the Estimate of the Situation, had been taught since 1910. However, Kalbfus was not content with lectures and short outlines, so in 1936 he manufactured this lengthy cookbook, which because of its emerald covers the students dubbed "the Green Hornet" after a bizarre radio hero. The Naval Institute Press has reprinted it in its Classics of Sea Power series with an introduction by Captain Frank Snyder—an apologetic introduction, because the book, like a computer manual, is virtually unreadable.

The portly Kalbfus—chairs were known to collapse under him—was a nineteenth-century rationalist living in an uncertain era. He had complete faith that "painstaking mental effort" would always produce sound military decisions, and he scoffed at the notion of genius or intuition. Human thought, he said, was virtually mathematical. He swamped future admirals with hundreds of abstruse rules for writing action plans, with hardly a tangible example to chew on.

Still, what he says is intriguing once you breast the torrent of sermonizing. Kalbfus believed that a single principle governs the attainment of ends in human affairs; in the profession of arms it is called the Fundamental Military Principle. It is the one true process by which commanders, from squad leaders to theater commanders in chief, make decisions. According to Kalbfus, the leader's mind must march through four rigid steps. The first and "paramount matter" is to identify the effect sought—today we call it the mission. A commander coins his mission by pondering the demands of higher authority. Next he weighs its suitability: will it accomplish the goal? The third step, determining feasibility, is the heavy labor of the process. The commander analyzes the physical theater, logistics, and many other matters, but above all, he compares the strengths and frailties of his own and enemy forces, stressing quantifiable units because moral factors are vague. (This typically American approach yielded some bad estimates in Vietnam and the Persian

Gulf.) The commanders must survey everything the foe may do, not just his probable course, and list alternative actions to parry them. Finally, the wise leader tallies up the "costs and consequences" of success or failure, weighs them against those of other courses, and revises as needed. Along the way, Kalbfus instructs on minutiae of comparative tablets and the grammar of orders.

The book has many flaws. Kalbfus demands plans for every contingency combination yet gives no clue as to how many iterations are manageable, even by mental prodigies. (The brain, it is said, can evaluate seven ideas at one time.) This work's worst drawback is verbosity. No disciple of the admiral would dare issue a crisp directive like Grant's "Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also," or Nelson's "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy."

Is the Green Hornet a classic for all times, as some say of the work of Clausewitz or Mahan or Sun Tzu? Kalbfus was pontificating during the heyday of War Plan Orange. By the 1930s the grand strategy of this scheme to defeat Japan by economic ruination had long been fixed, and American planners had turned to specific campaigns. Kalbfus was addressing future designs of naval campaigns to seize an island, raid a base, engage a fleet, or interrupt trade. He lauds the "initiative" (read offensive) as the American way of war, a hallmark of the Orange Plan that was actually employed to win in the Pacific.

The Green Hornet was not the law of Moses but an artifact of its moment in history. As Admiral Spruance's chief of staff remarked, everything in it is correct, "but to get what you want out of it is extremely difficult." America's current guideline for military decision is five paragraphs long.

EDWARD S. MILLER
author, *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945.*

Flayhart, William Henry. *Counterpoint to Trafalgar: The Anglo-Russian Invasion of Naples, 1805–1806.* Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1992. 198pp. (No price given)

When Admiral Villeneuve sailed reluctantly from Cadiz in October 1805, he knew that his relief was posting from Paris and that Nelson was waiting for him over the horizon. The two admirals had been within a hundred miles of one another during the West Indian chase, which had spoiled Napoleon's plan to invade England. Bonaparte turned his Grand Army eastward and on the eve of Trafalgar would defeat the Austrians at Ulm almost as decisively as Nelson was to beat the combined fleets of France and Spain within the week. Meanwhile, Napoleon suspected that the destination of the considerable Anglo-Russian expeditionary force in the Mediterranean could only be either Naples or Sicily, and he appreciated that its destruction could only facilitate his new deployment on land. This was to be Villeneuve's task.

That mission is not generally perceived to have been the immediate cause of Trafalgar, and to that extent the

somewhat exaggerated title of this book is justified. An account of this early Anglo-Russian cooperation is welcome, and its subtitle defends its author from any suggestion that it might have been better had he extended his study to include Anglo-Russian cooperation to include the efforts of Admiral Seniavin and Sir John Duckworth in 1807. The whole work is richly annotated with references, some of which might have been condensed, if not taken for granted.

However, the maps are not very clear and are of little help, and the contemporary illustrations, though charming, contribute little to the understanding of so scholarly a text. This work devotes all its eight chapters to an episode which, though interesting in itself, has nevertheless been dealt with, elegantly and more economically, by Piers Mackesy in chapters two and three of *The War in the Mediterranean 1803–1810* (1957). Flayhart devotes his first three chapters to the outbreak of the War of the Third Coalition, to the war itself, and then to the formation of the coalition, in that order. This takes almost one-third of his text and as many pages as Mackesy needed to deal with the entire affair.

One wonders whether the book suffers from a desire to associate the Mediterranean fleet with the Mediterranean expedition to an unrealistic extent: "It is unlikely that Pitt in his wildest imagination ever expected that the most important outcome of sending a British expedition to the Mediterranean in 1805 would be the annihilation of the French fleet." Quite so.

The nub of the thesis is neatly put in two sentences on page 120: "The Battle of Trafalgar cost the British fleet its admiral and the French admiral his fleet," and "The Anglo-Russian invasion of the Two Sicilies commenced, approximately three weeks after the French troops left the country." It is the treatment of the relationship between these two propositions that is perplexing as regards the relevance of the book. It is interesting to read the book, and it does reflect creditably on the industry and interests of its author. But he perhaps makes too much of the connection implied in his title, while his text is rather slender as a study of Anglo-Russian cooperation. It is nevertheless a very useful essay on an all-too-neglected episode in the long fight against France, which until this century was known as the Great War.

A second edition should remove inconsistencies about the dates of Ulm and of Trafalgar, and delete the given name of Admiral Collingwood, which he ceased to sign on his elevation to the peerage.

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Hattendorf, John B. et al., eds. *British Naval Documents 1204–1960.* Brookfield, Vt.: Scolar Press, 1993. 1,196pp. $109.95

In 1986 the Council of the Navy Records Society, looking ahead to the Society's centennial year, voted to have prepared

and published one volume of British naval documents. It is mindboggling to think of selecting, from virtually unlimited documentary resources spanning more than seven centuries from the Middle Ages to the nuclear age, a mere handful that will be considered most representative of Britain's naval history.

Five editors were selected to undertake this herculean task. Each is a recognized scholar and uniquely qualified by experience: John B. Hattendorf of the United States Naval War College; R.J.B. Knight, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich; A.W.H. Pearsall, also the National Maritime Museum; N.A.M. Rodger, Public Record Office; and Geoffrey Till, Royal Naval College. The editors' stated purpose was "to produce a collection, as comprehensive as could be within a single volume, intended to serve as an introduction to British naval history for the beginner and as a basis for further enquiry for the more expert." They have achieved that goal admirably. A total of 535 documents were chosen to trace Britain's sea heritage from 1204 to 1960.

The volume is divided into seven chronological parts, for example Part I with 1204–1485, and Part VII with 1900–1960. The choice of years included in each section was not arbitrary but was determined by the density of significant naval developments; Part III examines only forty-five years, whereas others review a century or more. Each section, after a general introduction, comprises topical breakdowns (the same ones for all): Policy and Strategy, Tactics and Operations, Administration, Materiel and Weapons, and Personnel. Under each heading is a short summary of the documents selected, and then the documents themselves. The introductions and the topic summaries are well written and informative. A user of this volume will gain a basic understanding and appreciation of British naval history.

The documents are numbered consecutively, and the source of each is listed separately near the end of the book. My preference would have been to give the source in a footnote immediately below the document, rather than several hundred pages away, but this is a minor complaint.

The Public Record Office is the holder of the great majority of the documents, which are the heart of this work. Other depositories also are well represented, including the National Maritime Museum, British Library, Imperial War Museum, and university libraries. Most of the documents are of an official nature, with such concerns as fleet strength and deployment, cost estimates, women in the navy, ship design, Admiralty Board minutes, strategy, the responses of flag officers to criticisms of their actions, reports of mutinies, and morale.

Although severely constrained by a one-volume limit, the editors—wisely, in my view—managed to include several letters from seamen to parents or wives describing shipboard life or damning having to wear the tropical white uniform while coaling ship.

There is also an amusing document (written, I surmise, with tongue in cheek) labeled "Care of an Office Cat." It is proof positive that bureaucracy is not a new phenomenon: the keeper of the Admiralty Office, citing increased cost of milk and food, requested a small increase in the amount allowed to sustain a cat kept in the office to control the rodent population. The keeper's request was bucked up through the Admiralty chain of command for comment and recommendations for two months before it reached the First Lord, who gave his approval "on considerations of humanity," which precluded any further delay.

A scattering of maps, a bibliography, notes on contributors, indexes, and an extensive glossary round out this work. The glossary will be particularly helpful to readers unfamiliar with nautical terminology, as well as to all those unfamiliar with British usage.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the continuation of Britain's naval supremacy seemed assured. By mid-century, after the two world wars, this had changed dramatically. No longer the worldwide, independent arbiter, the Royal Navy operated with other national navies. Professor Till writes in his introduction to Part VII: "The Navy also had to accept that it was now part of the western maritime team, and although an important player, it was not necessarily the captain. . . . By 1960 [Britain] was still a great power, if not a superpower."

From the Middle Ages to the Atomic Age, from wooden ships and smoothbore cannon to nuclear propulsion and guided missiles, one constant thread runs through this study. That is, the never-changing ingredient of national survival is to keep the sea lanes open, and that this aim is realized through naval strength.

A resounding "well done" goes to all who have contributed to bringing an assignment of the first order of difficulty to a successful conclusion. This work is of enduring value and impeccable scholarship.

WILLIAM JAMES MORGAN
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Trumpy, Sigurd H., comp. and ed. *Naval Prints from the Beverley R. Robinson Collection. Volume I, 1514–1791.* Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Academy Museum, 1991. 419pp. $65

Since 1933, when Beverley Robinson first offered to loan (ultimately to donate) his collection of prints to the U.S. Naval Academy, American naval scholars have recognized the collection's importance. In the passing years, it has become more widely known through the 1953 publication of a catalog and through use in exhibitions and book illustrations. Following the establishment of a trust fund for preserving and expanding the collection, its managers have found the resources to publish an illustrated catalog. This is the first in a projected series of four volumes that will not only catalog the collection in detail but also provide a richly illustrated overview of the era of fighting sail, from about 1514 to 1873.

Volume I reproduces 268 prints (thirty-two in color) for the 277 years

between 1545 and 1791. This beautifully produced book, slip-cased and oblong in shape, presents each print on its own page followed by a detailed description on the facing page. The compiler has transcribed, and where necessary obtained a translation of, the text appearing on the original prints and has listed with it the artists, publishers, and other relevant details. Dr. Sari Hornstein has provided a readable general introduction to the events of naval history, supplementing it with twenty one-page essays apportioned throughout the volume, giving background and explanations of the wars and battles depicted. The illustrations are arranged in rough chronological order according to the subject depicted. At the end of the book, there is a concordance of catalog and accession numbers, and also indices to subjects, ships, artists, and publishers.

The casual user of this catalog may easily be led astray by its organization. One must look closely to determine exactly how old an illustration is. While the subjects may stretch as far back as 1514, there is no print here made before 1599. Some, indeed, are nineteenth-century conjectures, revealing the romanticism of the Victorian era. While such depictions are relatively obvious to the practiced eye, the uninitiated will, in some cases, have to ponder long and hard to determine what is or is not a contemporary print. With a little effort, they may be able to answer their question by reference to the dates in the artist index, but dates are not given in all cases for the books in which prints appeared or for their publishers and print sellers. In addition, there are a number of cases in which users of this volume could have benefited from the editor's learned conjecture as to dating, paper marks, type of print, use, or place of origin. In addition, one hopes that future volumes in so beautiful a series of books will expand beyond the basics of naval history to include essays on changing printmaking techniques and their use by naval artists, choices of theme and subject matter, schools of artists and publishers, political propaganda techniques, reflections on taste and interpretation, as well as the uses and limitations of naval prints as historical evidence.

For this early period, the Robinson Collection does not provide, by any means, an exhaustive catalog for the entire field of European naval prints in the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. Nevertheless, the book is representative of many important aspects of it. The scholarship and beauty of this pilot volume make an important contribution to the study of naval iconography. One looks forward to future volumes of this series in the hope that they will not only do the valuable and important service of beautifully and accurately reproducing naval prints but also further our understanding and analysis of them.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

Ebbert, Jean and Hall, Marie-Beth. *Crossed Currents: Navy Women from WWI to Tailhook.* New York: Brassey's (US), 1993. 356pp. $24

On 21 March 1917 Loretta Perfectus Walsh was sworn into the Naval

Reserve, becoming the first non-nurse woman in an American military service. With her, Jean Ebbert and Marie-Beth Hall begin the first published history of women in the Navy. It is the story of two currents: the Navy's gradual inclusion of women (as it attempts to balance changing realities with traditional values), and the struggle of women to find acceptance in a male-dominated profession and their frustration as their aspirations outpace their slowly widening opportunities.

Crossed Currents focuses on line officers and enlisted women and does not cover the Nurse Corps. It begins with the almost 12,000 female yeomen who served in World War I and moves on through the service of nearly 86,000 WAVES in World War II. The authors show how the first women in the regular Navy, who were few in numbers, struggled to survive the "peace" of the Korean War and the Vietnam conflict. The book continues by examining the opportunities that began to expand for the increasing numbers of women in the early 1970s. It chronicles women's advances as they became commanding officers, rear admirals, ships' crew members, and aircraft pilots, and it concludes with a look at contemporary issues, including a straightforward account of Tailhook.

Both authors have long-standing ties with the Navy and are well informed observers. Ebbert is a former naval officer who is the author of naval books and a columnist for *Navy Times*. Hall is the daughter of a naval officer and the mother of two more.

The authors spent years poring through documents in the Naval Historical Center, the National Archives, and the Division of Naval History at the Smithsonian Institution, among other places. They delved into little-known memoirs, newspaper and magazine stories, articles in professional journals, oral histories at the U.S. Naval Institute, and in addition they interviewed a number of women. With this vast amount of information they could have written a very long, dry treatise, but instead they concentrated on major themes that enable the events to flow without getting bogged down in minutiae. Nevertheless, enough details are included to make even the most knowledgeable reader say occasionally, "I didn't know that!" The authors also provide the "why" behind events and policies. There are a few factual errors, but they are minor and do not adversely affect the overall quality of the book.

Ebbert and Hall have effectively used their research to put faces on the history. That first woman who enlisted, Loretta Perfectus Walsh, had worked as a civilian clerk in the naval recruiting station in Philadelphia. Mildred MacAfee, the first director of the WAVES, objected when the Navy tried to put red, white, and blue stripes on women officers' uniforms. Kathleen Amick worked in her uncle's small North Carolina store, enlisted in the Navy in 1943, and was an aviation machinist's mate and later an aviation electrician's mate. She was one of the first women to be selected to Master Chief Petty Officer. Fran McKee, the first woman

line rear admiral, faced the realities of serving during the 1950s and 1960s, when women had to either accept the Navy's parameters or go home.

Ebbert and Hall are evenhanded in their treatment of both the women and the Navy. They understand the women's views and their frustrations but are not radical feminists who arbitrarily bash the Navy. In their description of the inequities that the Navy has imposed on women, they also show the genuine professional concerns beneath the Navy's cautious attitudes and decisions. They point out the Navy's reluctance in accepting women in certain roles while acknowledging the service's innovations, commitment, and pride in its women.

Crossed Currents is a highly readable and interesting history of Navy women. It fills a void in naval history and should be read by everyone in, or interested in, the U.S. Navy.

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Holm, Jeanne. *Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1992. 544pp. $27.50 (originally published 1982)

About eleven years ago, I sat at the same dinner table as General Jeanne Holm. Although that was my sole personal contact with her, when I read her revised and updated book on women in the military service I met there an old friend—or rather, a group of old friends.

Holm entered the Air Force as an enlisted truck driver and rose to the grade of major general—through thirty-three years of action, hard work, change, war, and uneasy peace—with a rock-solid sense of the capabilities of America's women. In her book she chronicles from its beginnings the uniformed service of American women. Her style is easy and well presented. In short, the book is a "good read."

Holm has provided a valuable and thorough history of women in the military. She readily addresses issues of national concern, such as drafting women, women in combat, sexual harassment, and battlefield casualties, and also the absurdly inconsequential issues that sometimes seem important to bureaucracies, such as black or tan uniform stockings. She speaks with particular authority on the decisions in the late 1960s to assign women to the Republic of Vietnam, and on the negative responses of some field units in the Pacific and Southeast Asian theaters. For example, when one of the services sent a woman to fill a public affairs billet, the local personnel officer tried to cancel her orders: he said that she could not deal with the "aggressive newsmen" in Vietnam. Only when told that some of the reporters and camera crew were women did the personnel officer back down.

This work was originally published in 1982. The revision includes sections on Grenada, Panama, and Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and it brings us into the last decade of the twentieth century. Along the way, some minds have been changed, and some opponents of women in the military have begun to

rethink their positions. However, other opponents have sharpened their thinking and honed their logic. There are some senior leaders in the Department of Defense who argue that they cannot act to further the opportunities of uniformed women until Congress and the American people tell them to do so, and others have decided that changing the names of units would keep out the women. The Navy, for example, changed the name of the Mobile Logistics Support Force (MLSF) to the Combat Support Force so that uniformed women could not serve on these "combatant" ships, even though the Military Sealift Command had had civilian women crewmembers on its MLSF ships. For years the Air Force kept women out of the missile silos, and the Army, even as late as 1989 in Operation Just Cause in Panama, broke up unit integrity by leaving individual women behind when their units deployed.

With the latest moves to put women in the cockpits of combat aircraft and aboard combatant ships, it appears that General Holm's marvelous chronicle will need yet a subsequent revision. I hope she updates the existing material in addition to adding new information.

Her book is, with its great good humor and unblinking honesty, a superb view of military women and how they are faring in the armed forces of the country.

E.G. WYLIE
Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired

Call for Papers
World War II—A 50-Year Perspective
1–2 June 1995

Siena College is sponsoring its ninth annual, international, multidisciplinary conference on the 50th anniversary of World War II. The focus for 1995 will be 1945—though papers dealing with broad issues of earlier years will be welcomed. A wide variety of topics of relevance are of interest; inquiries re chairs and commentators are invited as well.

Replies and inquires to: Professor Thomas O. Kelly II, Department of History, Siena College, 515 Loudon Road, Loudonville, NY, 12211-1462, (518) 783-2595, fax (518) 783-4293. Deadline for submission: 1 December 1994.