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The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt and Wartime Statesman

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Huertgen Forest in the autumn of 1944 in any meaningful sense an American victory?), but any exaggeration on Perret's part is slight. Furthermore, he emphasizes that the American army did not win simply because of materiel superiority, but that skillful leadership, bravery, and a savvy rank and file were also responsible. Of course its achievement is even more remarkable because it was built on such a scant prewar foundation.

Perhaps the best passages of all are those that trace the Army's transformation from a clumsy force barely capable of sustained offensive action (as it was in the First World War) to the efficient fighting machine of the Second World War, and how much of that transformation is owed to one man, General George C. Marshall. Of his many accomplishments, this was probably his greatest. Indeed, much of the transformation took place during the interval between Marshall's appointment as Chief of Staff on 1 September 1939 and the eve of Pearl Harbor. "In twelve months [immediately preceding 7 December 1941] the Army had moved forward about twenty years."

Another exemplary quality of this work is Perret's well balanced discussion of the various theaters of war. In an army history, the war against Germany naturally claims more space than the war against Japan, because the bulk of the Army's fighting power was eventually deployed in Europe. Nevertheless, historians and naval and Marine Corps officers interested in the

Pacific War will find plenty to ponder, including much about their own services in joint operations.

Perret believes that the World War II "army was one of the supreme American achievements of the twentieth century and that it is filled with lessons about the people of this country." His army is a reflection of the nation. It is a flattering image that we should enjoy, especially since so much of the country's image is negative. It may even reinvigorate us to confront less satisfying military tasks ahead.

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Kimball, Warren F. *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman*. New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1991. 304pp. \$19.95

Professor Kimball has published numerous works on Franklin Roosevelt and American wartime foreign policy, among them *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, 1939-1945*, published in 1984. Following its completion, he published various essays that dealt with disparate aspects of Roosevelt's foreign policy. *The Juggler* is a collection of those essays, which were partially rewritten with the hope of illustrating the underlying theme of an internal consistency in Roosevelt's foreign policy during World War II.

Kimball borrowed the title from a remark made by Roosevelt in conversation with Treasury secretary Morgenthau

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in early 1942: "You know I am a juggler, and I never let my right hand know what my left hand does. . . . I may be entirely inconsistent, and furthermore I am perfectly willing to mislead and tell untruths if it will help win the war."

Given this outlook, it is little wonder that Roosevelt was often a perplexing figure to contemporary politicians, and to historians. In part, this is reflected in the broad consensus that he never articulated, or perhaps even formulated, a cohesive philosophy; he "had no foreign policy and merely reacted to day-by-day events." In a famous quote, Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote, "[FDR's] mind does not follow easily a consecutive chain of thought but he is full of stories and incidents and hops about in his discussions from suggestion to suggestion and it is very much like chasing a vagrant beam of sunshine around a vacant room." Professor Kimball's thesis is that this sentiment is exaggerated or has at least been accepted too uncritically. He states that "studying Roosevelt, particularly his foreign policy, can be 'like peering into a kaleidoscope,' but only if we never take it apart. Twist the end off that toy, and what seemed a random display, created by the outside force of spinning the tube, suddenly has internal logic."

He suggests that certain fundamental assumptions gave Roosevelt's long-term foreign policy goals a striking consistency that were necessarily "shrouded . . . in rhetoric and tactical maneuvering to accommodate

political realities on particular issues at particular times, often to such a degree as to obscure any broad, overriding objective or purpose. These realities included:

- The need to accommodate a fundamental shift of power from the Western European states to the Soviet Union, which was reflected both in Roosevelt's immediate and steady support of the USSR following the German invasion and continuing efforts throughout the war to preclude a German-Soviet separate peace.

- The imperative to establish stability and security on a worldwide scale. This might be illustrated by Roosevelt's heavy emphasis on the importance of a postwar United Nations structure that emphasized the role and participation of the major powers, even at the cost of significant concessions to Soviet interests, particularly at Yalta.

- The efficacy of American values in addressing the problem of preventing future wars by attacking root causes. For example, Roosevelt consistently maintained his strident anti-colonialism and pro-free trade ideology even at the cost of significant strains with Britain throughout the war, because of his belief that imperialism and economic protectionism had contributed heavily to instability and the outbreak of war.

Kimball uses these assumptions as the underlying theme in several essays dealing with Roosevelt's reaction to the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, Lend-Lease to Britain, the changes in U.S.-British relations after

Casablanca, Roosevelt's vision of the postwar world, American anticolonialism, and Roosevelt and Eastern Europe. Kimball's last essay is a moderately successful attempt to tie earlier essays together under the rubric of "This Persistent Evangel of Americanism." The author concludes that Roosevelt was an "Americanist"—a lifelong proselytizer of the American values from which his assumptions derived.

This book demands considerable knowledge of both mid-century American foreign policy and Franklin Roosevelt. It will not be particularly useful to the general reader, especially given its patchwork of disparate essays. It is aimed more at professional historians (indeed, many of the essays were originally presented at various conferences) who will also appreciate its copious notes. Nonetheless, the individual essays are coherent and well worth reading.

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Cooper, Matthew. *The German Army 1933–1945: Its Political and Military Failure*. Chelsea, Md.: Scarborough House, 1990. (Reprint 1978) 598pp. \$17.95

This unrevised paperback edition is welcome because of its innovative emphasis on two major points: the myths of Germany's military excellence and of its successful institutionalization of fighting power.

Cooper was among the first English-language scholars to challenge these prevailing ideas. Despite the German army's spectacular offensive successes between 1939 and 1941, and the tenacity of its defensive operations in the war's later years, that army incorporated fundamental deficiencies that were never overcome.

According to Cooper, *blitzkrieg* was not even a German military expression, much less a German war-fighting doctrine. The German way of war was initiated by Frederick the Great and refined in the nineteenth century under Moltke the Elder and Schlieffen. Germany's emphasis on quick, decisive "battles of annihilation" bore only a superficial similarity to the twentieth-century concept of armored warfare based on the indirect approach. One emphasized physical destruction, the other depended on paralysis. One required coordinated flanking and encircling movements, while the other demanded speed and unpredictability.

Cooper argues that the differences between the older concept and the new amounted to a complete reversal of the rules of warfare as understood and applied in the German army. It was hardly surprising that the officer corps was skeptical of such a revolutionary new concept, particularly since Germany lacked the material resources to implement an armored war. Instead, a limited amount of twentieth-century weaponry was incorporated into a massive conscript army that was organized on principles developed under Kaiser Wilhelm: