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Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada's Armed Forces

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This work will leave the reader saddened, but proud of those few who began the comeback trail from the dismal days of Pearl Harbor.

PETER CHARLES UNSINGER
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Hyslop, Robert. *Aye Aye, Minister: Australian Naval Administration, 1939–1959*. Canberra: Australian Government Pub. Service, 1990. 262pp. \$29.95

This is a continuation of the author's earlier work, *Australian Naval Administration, 1900–1939*, published in 1973. Some readers might be put off by the title, but in spite of some forays into administrative minutiae, this book is not without its value to those with an interest in the history of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).

The author covers a large number of topics related to the history of the RAN during this crucial period. These include internal naval administration, naval aviation, supply, naval operations, and relations with other navies. The chapter on naval supply is especially revealing as to how the RAN has merged the Royal Navy's practice of employing largely civilians to provide shore support and the modern U.S. Navy logistics system needed to support its guided missile destroyers and guided missile frigates.

If a criticism is to be found, it is on the subject of the RAN's relations with some of the navies discussed, particularly in an operational sense.

To be sure, much information related

to this subject remains classified; however, one would have hoped for a more detailed assessment of the character of these service relationships, particularly in the case with the U.S. Navy. Fortunately, the author's treatment of the influential role played by the Royal Navy over the years is solid indeed and reveals many aspects of this complex relationship.

Despite these minor criticisms, the work provides a detailed study of the RAN through the use of a wide array of primary source material. Any student of the RAN, both in the historical and contemporary senses, would be well served to read carefully Robert Hyslop's work.

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Hellyer, Paul. *Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada's Armed Forces*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990. 306pp. \$29.95

The decision by the government of prime minister Lester B. Pearson (1963–1968) to unify the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) into one service was one of the most contentious issues that ever faced Canada's Parliament. Now, more than twenty years after the enactment of the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act, the minister of national defence at the time, Paul Theodore Hellyer, adds his perspective to the debate in this work.

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Paul Hellyer, who served in Parliament until 1957, was its youngest member when elected in 1949. Reelected in a by-election victory in 1958, he was appointed minister of national defense by Lester Pearson in 1963 when the Liberals came to power. Hellyer served in the RCAF during World War II, and his experiences as a junior noncommissioned officer still weighed on his mind when he was appointed to the cabinet.

Previous efforts to integrate the disparate elements of Canada's defence forces had been unsuccessful. In 1963, the Glassco Commission on Government Organization criticized their inefficient and redundant administration, which seemed to explain the rapid decline of capital spending as a proportion of the defence budget (from 42.4 percent in 1954 to 18.9 percent in 1962).

There was room for improvement. (For example, in the realm of personnel administration, when a sailor was posted to one of HMC Ships, a new personnel file was opened. The same procedure occurred each time he was transferred from ship to ship or shore establishment; therefore, after a long career there were a number of different personnel files for the same individual.) Thus, many senior officers embraced the concept of integration, hoping that the ensuing savings postulated in the 1964 White Paper on Defense would be transferred to capital programs.

Damn the Torpedoes is arranged in chronological order, and is peppered with interesting and occasionally

humorous anecdotes. What rapidly becomes evident is Hellyer's unceasingly ambitious character and desire for action at apparently all costs, even if only to appear decisive.

Chapters five through nine are the crux of the book. Hellyer describes the mounting opposition to unification and how he dealt with it. One result of integration was an excess of officers at flag or general officer rank as positions became redundant. In a blunt fashion, Hellyer writes that "the first casualty [of this redundancy] was Rear Admiral [Jeffrey] Brock, Flag Officer Atlantic Coast." Chapter ten describes "The [Rear Admiral William] Landymore Affair" and its impact on the unification debate. It must have been a bitter pill indeed for a distinguished flag officer such as Admiral Landymore to be told by his minister that he had been fired for "eighteen months of consistent disloyalty to the people he was paid to serve." Even though Hellyer eventually softened his remarks, by then the damage had been done.

Hellyer's memoirs occasionally suffer from a politician's vice: the apparently irresistible urge to embellish a narrative. The most glaring example is his statement that "I decided, in the words of FDR to 'Damn the Torpedoes; full speed ahead' [toward unification of the Armed Forces]." Of course, "damn the torpedoes" were the words of Commodore David G. Farragut at Mobile Bay during the American Civil War, and not Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The conclusion of the chapter describing Canada's centennial effectively closes out Paul Hellyer's tumultuous period as minister of national defence. The remainder of the book is devoted to his attempt in 1968 to win the leadership of the Liberal Party. While it cannot be denied that *integration*—as opposed to *unification*—has resulted in some economies and increased efficiency, can it be considered successful, since the ensuing savings originally pegged for capital programs did not occur?

Damn the Torpedoes is an interesting, although superficial, memoir of Paul Hellyer's tenure as defence minister during one of the most chaotic periods in Canada's history. It is a timely book, appearing in an era where the armed forces are being subjected to increasing scrutiny and challenge as to its relevance in the society of the 1990s. Whatever comes to pass, Hellyer purports that unification "established Canada as a world leader in military organization"; perhaps, but so singular a leader that none has chosen to follow.

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fulfillment of desire) was driven by man's struggle for recognition juxtaposed with the logic of modern science. The subsequent collapse of world communism has now provided the backdrop for an expanded analysis of human history and predictions of the future of world conflict.

Fukuyama's thesis builds on Plato's famous tripartite division of the soul: desire, reason, and *thymos*—*thymos* being loosely defined as an individual's self-esteem and desire for recognition. With this in mind, he examines each of the world's major political regimes to determine which ones can best satisfy all parts of the soul. Fukuyama states that authoritarian regimes, either of the communist left or the totalitarian right, might satisfy needs and desires, but ultimately fail to fuel man's *thymos*. Authoritarian regimes of the left fail because of their attempt to defy nature by making all men equal in every respect, not just in the eyes of law. Rightist regimes with a master-slave orientation are failures as well. The recognition given to the master by the slave, who is of no value, does not satisfy the master's *thymos*. Fukuyama concludes that only liberal democracy—in the style of John Locke and Thomas Jefferson—has the capacity to satisfy all three parts of Plato's definition of soul in a stable, balanced way.

The author's examination of history, particularly modern history, demonstrates that liberal democracy is steadily gaining acceptance in our world. He provides excellent empirical data to support his conclusion,

Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press, 1992. 418pp. \$24.95

In his 1989 National Interest essay "The End of History," Francis Fukuyama argued that the "motor of history" (a continually inflating