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The Baltic Sea in the Post – Cold War World

Commander Kurt B. Jensen, Royal Danish Navy

ALTHOUGH A RATHER CONSTRAINED AREA geographically, the Baltic region is one in which the impact of a number of profound changes, concentrated with unique intensity, is being felt.

Throughout the Cold War period, the Baltic area was regarded as, in a sense, a continuation of the Central European “Iron Curtain”; accordingly, its strategic significance was always in focus. Today, however, so precipitous are the changes in the Baltic environment that an effort to understand their implications is demanded. In general, these developments are positive and offer historic opportunities that the region’s states must consider carefully. These opportunities are in various dimensions, especially the political and economic, but they will also affect security considerations for the whole zone. In time this environment of change will itself become the basis upon which each of the regional states approaches force planning issues.

This article addresses the strategic significance, in this regime of change, of the Baltic Sea.¹ It first sets out the Baltic’s historical context in the traditional terms of shifting power balances. The implications of current changes on three levels—political, economic, and military—are then identified, leading to general conclusions as to regional strategic significance, prospects, and tendencies.²

Historical Context

As would be expected in an area with such a geographical configuration, the history of the Baltic Sea is marked by conflicts in which access has been a key factor. Up to the present century, these struggles have been driven by the opposing economic interests not only of the littoral states but also external powers who sought to exploit both the economic and military possibilities of the Baltic.

Denmark and Sweden, by virtue of their locations and trade policies, assumed active roles early on. From the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries, these two states,

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30 Naval War College Review

along with the towns of the Hanseatic League, dominated traffic within, into, and out of the Baltic.³ In this period, the Hanseatic towns sought to make the Baltic a *mare clausum*, or closed sea, and Denmark, exploiting its strategic position, introduced the Oeresund Dues in 1429.

However, the importance of the region's markets also attracted the Netherlands, and the interest of that state in preserving free trade—i.e., a *mare liberum*—influenced the situation in the Baltic through the seventeenth century. The Dutch role as a major outside power affecting the internal Baltic strategic situation was later supplanted by England, which became the dominant regional naval power until the middle of the nineteenth century. The British interest was centered in a *mare liberum*, from both the economic and military perspectives.

A number of factors in the mid-nineteenth century caused a major shift in the Baltic strategic situation. First, the Industrial Revolution reduced the traditional economic importance of the Baltic itself; emblematic of the diminished importance of trade was the Sound Treaty of 1857, by which Denmark gave up the collection of dues. Secondly, the British withdrew from the arena as two littoral states, Russia and Germany, emerged as regional naval powers. Germany, with the achievement of a Baltic *mare clausum* regime as a distinct objective, now became the leading power in the area. It remained so to the end of the First World War, after which in the interwar years competing German and Russian spheres of influence gradually began to emerge.

The post-world war period was characterized by the dominance of the USSR in the Baltic; Soviet interest was in a closed-sea policy, with a resulting focus on the Straits. The new *mare clausum* regime was clearly challenged by the United States, the new external power—this time a superpower—having strategic interests in the region. The Baltic came to be viewed as an important part of the northern European power balance, and it functioned well as a buffer zone between the opposing interests of the two superpowers.⁴


What conclusions can be drawn from this historical context? Not surprisingly, observers differ as to strategic implications. However, there seems to be general acceptance of the following theses:

- First, the strategic significance of the Baltic Sea has been closely linked to the overall “rise and fall” of European great powers.⁵

- Second, while early in this millennium the area was dominated by economic factors, the military aspect has been central in the last century, reaching a peak in the Cold War.

- Third, sea power has clearly played a major role, specifically in the efforts of a dominant Baltic power to establish a *mare clausum* and those of an outside great power to assert a *mare liberum*.

- Fourth, Denmark's unique geographic position controlling the Straits (long exercised by the imposition of dues) has often led to involvement in regional



conflicts—without, however, serious challenge to its ability to exert controlling influence.

- Finally, the Cold War was a special case wherein the Baltic Sea was an important element in the balance between two superpowers, one of which, for the first time in history, was also the dominating regional power.

The Changing Political Environment

In the post-Cold War resettlement of European affairs we have witnessed changes both unprecedented and coming at a pace that none would have believed possible only three years ago. Moreover, it would seem that the process is not yet coming to a halt; rather it is likely to be a continuing one with which we will have to live for some time. It is true that an outside observer might feel that the Cold War also presented Europe with a series of significant political events, but that at length a resolution was reached and stability achieved. For the foreseeable future, however, a renewed status quo is not probable. We will have to continue to adjust to a changing environment, one in which force planning for the future will require flexibility.

Fragmentation. The predominant political development in Europe for the past three years has been fragmentation. The breakup of what could be called the

32 Naval War College Review

“Eastern Power Hemisphere” implies an arithmetic formula: 1→21. This expression describes the dissolution in December 1991 of the Soviet Union and both the formal emergence of fifteen new independent states (most of them loosely joined in a new Commonwealth of Independent States, or CIS) and the release of six Eastern European countries from the political, economic, and military dominance of the former USSR. For the Baltic region there are several major implications.

The most important is the achievement of independence by the Baltic States—Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. The arrival of three new littoral states, each with sovereign rights, will inevitably influence security issues in a powerful way. So far, however, their emergence has had only a minor impact, due to the fact that they have so far given priority to the complete and expeditious withdrawal of all CIS military forces based on their territories as a prerequisite to restoration of full state sovereignty.⁶

Second, and a consequence of the foregoing, Russian sovereign territory on the eastern Baltic has been reduced to two small bridgeheads, around Kaliningrad (the former Königsberg) and St. Petersburg. In addition, the former is located in a rather confined area (the Kaliningrad *oblast'*) surrounded by Poland, Belarus, and Lithuania, with which there are no agreements as to the use of corridors, etc., for military purposes.

Finally, the collapse of the Soviet bloc has brought the inauguration of new eras in the national existences of two major Baltic states. The disbandment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1991 marked the passing of the last obstacle to the transformation of Poland into a democratic and free market-based society. The disintegration of the Soviet Union fundamentally affected Finland as well. The renegotiation of the Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, completed in January 1992, led to the final disengagement of Finland from the overwhelming influence, formal and informal, of its eastern neighbor.⁷

Integration. Remarkably, however, if fragmentation has been the dominating characteristic of recent European developments, another important factor in the same period has been integration. First of all, the twelve member countries of the European Community (EC) proceeded along the path toward further and deeper integration with the removal of trade barriers at the end of 1992. The way ahead to political union had been laid down in the Maastricht Treaty of December 1991, after which the process continued without interruption until 2 June 1992, when the Danes voted by a very narrow margin against ratification. This outcome, and the very mixed French approval of the treaty in the referendum of 20 September, would suggest that prospects are weak for continuation of the process as scheduled. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that integration will proceed—and in fact the Danes reversed their vote in May

1993—albeit more slowly than had been anticipated. Similarly, there is little doubt that the EC will continue to be the core of European political development, a fact that Sweden and Finland seem to have acknowledged in their application for full EC membership, on the premises of the Maastricht agreement. Poland has clearly expressed its desire to obtain membership, and it seems likely that the Baltic States, when their domestic situation allows, will seek membership as well.

A second evidence of a tendency toward integration is the astonishing sequence of events that led to the reunification of Germany on 1 October 1990. On that date a littoral state disappeared from the Baltic map; the same date marked the reemergence of a former great Baltic power. Long recognized as the economic locomotive of Europe, Germany has now reached the end of the road to full sovereignty upon which it began after the Second World War. Clearly, renovation of the former German Democratic Republic will retain priority in the coming years, but there is little doubt that Germany will work toward a more significant political role.⁸

Cooperation. Yet a third general trend in post-Cold War Europe has been the establishment of new fora for regional cooperation. In relation to the Baltic region, the prime forum, the Nordic Council, dates back to 1953. Member states include Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark—that is, three Nato members, one neutral state, and one with a special relationship with the former USSR. This diversity of membership is commonly considered to provide the basis for the so-called “Nordic Balance.”⁹

Poland has been actively involved in the establishment of two regional cooperation bodies in the aftermath of the Cold War. One is the Visegrad Group, founded by Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia for the pursuit of common goals of economic reform and economic integration with the Western European countries. Another forum is what was originally known as the Pentagonale, established in 1990 by Italy, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia; the body was later joined by Poland, forming the Hexagonale.¹⁰

The newest and most remarkable cooperative body for the Baltic, however, is the Baltic Cooperation Council (BCC), founded in Copenhagen on 5 and 6 March 1992 by the foreign ministers of all the regional countries: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Russia, Poland, Germany, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. It is especially notable that Norway, not normally associated with the Baltic region, is a member. This initiative is seen by some observers as in effect a revival of the old Hanseatic League, but it is probable that its objective in fact will be to ease the transitions of Poland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into democratic and free market-based societies.¹¹

To summarize, the political environment of the Baltic Sea has changed dramatically, with geopolitical impacts that are fundamental in many respects.

34 Naval War College Review

We are witnessing the disappearance of the European superpower; specifically, it is being deprived—in a process with important regional implications—of most of the assets that would allow it to reimpose Baltic supremacy. At the same time, a former great power has reemerged, one with long-term potential for greatly influencing the Baltic situation. In geopolitical terms we see a tendency toward a shifting of the European center of gravity away from Moscow and to Berlin. The continuation of the integrating process in Europe and extension of regional cooperative fora constitute a positive trend in political developments around the Baltic Sea.

Economic Prospects

The economic interests of the Baltic can be related to four factors: shipping, fisheries, exploitation of sea bottom resources, and recreation.¹² Each of these elements is likely to gain in influence in the aftermath of the Cold War. The sovereignty of all the littoral states will eventually lead to major emphasis on the sea as a transportation medium; intensified regional trade on the Baltic must be expected. A contributing factor is that the infrastructure of the former republics and satellites of the Soviet Union is now in a very bad state. Establishment there of a more developed industrial base will require increased use of the Baltic Sea for export and import.¹³ This strong interest in a more rapid and rational development of maritime transport in the Baltic has already led to the establishment of a practical forum, the Baltic Port Organization, representing twenty-seven regional ports as of January 1992.¹⁴

Exploitation of natural resources is inevitably linked with the delimitation of maritime borders on the continental shelf. The shelf holds commercially valuable deposits of oil, phosphorite, glauconite, ferromanganese nodules, amber, sand, and till (the latter being a clay substratum containing sand and gravel).¹⁵ The reunification of Germany and the independence of the Baltic States has added another level of complexity to what was already a sophisticated system of national maritime border declarations and agreements. Sovereignty of the Baltic States has not yet led to resolution of maritime boundaries with respect to territorial seas, exclusive economic and fisheries zones, or the continental shelf. The necessary bilateral and multilateral talks are yet to be held, and the Baltic States have not yet formally bound themselves to the 1982 Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (known as UNCLOS III).¹⁶

Exploitation of natural resources and recreational potential will be a major economic interest of all littoral states; associated with it, however, is the very demanding issue of environmental problems. It has recently become obvious to the outside world that development in the USSR grew out of a "growth at any cost" mentality, obsession with gigantism, and willingness to twist science to political ends. The price today is enormous—it can only be described as an

environmental nightmare ravaging the former Soviet republics. Similar problems also face Poland and the former East Germany.¹⁷ Countering this enormous transnational threat effectively will inevitably require substantial and prolonged effort, which will in turn require extensive cooperation and the generation of vast amounts of funds within the Baltic region.

As the foregoing suggests, economic interests in the Baltic Sea are very likely to gain in importance. On one shore of the sea we find a region marked by economic underdevelopment, a cheap work force, and dramatic need for investment. On the other we find a highly sophisticated zone with a very expensive work force and a saturated market. Between these two most unequal economic regimes there is the Baltic itself, offering a safe and economical transportation medium. The basis for prosperity in the region is obvious; what is more important, however, is that both shores of the Baltic seem to show a positive will to take advantage of their remarkable opportunity.

Prospects for the future economic significance of the region have been described by a number of observers and officials, but the vision expressed by Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, the former Danish foreign secretary, in a statement of 23 January 1992 is probably typical of that of many: "The Baltic Sea is no longer a blind alley on the outskirts of Europe, but will once more become a centre of activity and prosperity. Become what some people refer to as the Baltic Growth Zone."¹⁸

It is in this prospect that we find the rationale for the establishment of the Baltic Cooperation Council. Undoubtedly the vision of the Baltic as a strong economic region in the future is the driving force behind present political interest in joining this forum. In a short-term, practical way, however, this body will form an initial framework for cooperation and coordination between the littoral states and will eventually lead the way to membership in the European Community for those states not presently members.

Security Implications

Security prospects for Europe in general arise from two recent significant changes. The first was the announcement in December 1988 by then-President Mikhail Gorbachev that the Soviets would unilaterally reduce their troops in Eastern Europe. This decision eventually led to the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and then to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and along with it the threat of a conventional Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe. The second change began with the attempted Moscow coup of 19 August 1991, which led rapidly to the demise of the Communist Party and then of the USSR itself.¹⁹

The resulting framework confronts the Baltic area with a series of regional security issues. First and foremost is the problem of the withdrawal of all CIS

36 Naval War College Review

(formerly Soviet) military forces stationed in the Baltic States. For now, Russia's justification for keeping some 120,000 troops in the new nations is mainly economic; the argument is that the withdrawal cannot be carried out before housing and jobs at home can be guaranteed. The CIS military also insists that withdrawal is linked to a prior commitment to remove troops from Germany and Poland, and it is attempting to negotiate a target date of 1994 at the earliest for commencing the Baltic withdrawal.²⁰ The possibility of an unstated additional linkage to the large Russian minorities in all the Baltic States cannot be excluded, however. The fact that 34 percent of Latvia's population, 30.3 percent of Estonia's, and 9.4 percent of Lithuania's is ethnically Russian could be an important factor in any negotiated settlement of the troop-withdrawal issue.²¹

A second challenge is the Russian Baltic Fleet; its status is of particular relevance to the evolving regional security situation. A consequence of the independence of the Baltic States will be a gradual withdrawal of formerly Soviet naval units; so far, however, it is not clear where they will relocate. Recent statements seem to indicate that Russia is committed to keeping a large naval force in the Baltic Sea.²² That all units will withdraw to St. Petersburg and Königsberg seems unrealistic, which could mean the transfer of many ships to the Northern or Pacific Fleets. The eventual reduction of Russian sea frontage to two relatively constrained strongholds—St. Petersburg is obstructed by ice for some part of each winter—would eventually degrade the capability of the Baltic Fleet and perhaps even challenge its stature as the dominant naval force in the area. Also, in a symbolic gesture befitting the new realities, the Baltic Military District has been renamed the Northwest Group of Forces, with headquarters presently in Latvia.²³

Yet another effect of the changing security environment is that the geography of the potential battlefield has been altered. When the forces of the two alliances faced each other across the inter-German border, those of the Warsaw Pact were only 250 miles from Nato's English Channel ports. With the agreed withdrawal of its troops from the former East Germany by the end of 1994, the starting line for any future Russian offensive will move at least back to the German-Polish frontier, four hundred miles from the Channel. With the final removal from Poland, it will drop back another 250 miles. Possibilities for confrontation in the Baltic have changed likewise.²⁴

Fourthly, it should be stressed that whereas the above-mentioned issues have to do with potential changes in the future, the actual situation in the Baltic with respect to hardware remains unaltered. In other words, though it may be argued that while recent developments may have deprived CIS forces of much of their "will," it is still difficult to find any change in their "capacity." A central factor here is the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Agreement. CFE was meant to break down the military infrastructure of the Cold War order; in essence, it

became part of the self-destruction of the system designing it. In that context, the August coup can be seen as a last, desperate attempt by conservative elements in Russia to prevent what it saw as a selling-out of the ability to project power into Europe. Today, the fate of CFE is very much in doubt; a series of problems in implementation have arisen. Treaty equipment limitations were tied to the former Soviet military districts, some of which have now become separate states—which have, for a number of reasons, not ratified the agreement. This in turn means that for many years to come, force planning is bound to be based on the continued existence, as listed in such publications as *The Military Balance*, of large amounts of weaponry. To be realistic, force planning should assume complete implementation of the CFE treaty no earlier than 1995.

Finally, regional security considerations cannot exclude the factor of uncertainty. Uncertainty, first of all, attaches to future developments in Russia. We may hope that the most likely outcome is continued positive evolution toward democracy and a market-based economy. However, the possibility of a reversion to dictatorship or, in the worst case, chaos and civil war, cannot be excluded. The U.S. National Security Adviser during the Carter administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski, has recently expressed his pessimistic perspectives on the domestic developments in Russia. Mr. Brzezinski's concern is that the pains of transition to capitalism may well undermine the appeal of the democratic ethic. In that setting, there may be great proclivity to take refuge in more organic and more tightly binding beliefs such as ethnicity, xenophobia, or religion. The current difficulties Russia is experiencing could provide dangerously fertile ground for "a new form of fascism, that would fill the void of the black hole, that Bolshevism created in Russia, creating the conditions of coercive order—even if no longer of coercive utopia—that democracy and the free market may not have been able to insure." Should such fascism take root in Russia, he adds, it would "almost certainly spread to some of the non-Russian former Soviet republics" and also "infect the politically more unstable portions of Central Europe," even possibly spreading "to some portions of Western Europe."²⁵

On the basis of these security factors, some general conclusions can be drawn. First, the Baltic Sea is no longer an arena of superpower confrontation; opposing military blocs no longer face each other across it; it is no longer the flank of a European front line. Second, military capacity is still present, notwithstanding the overall political changes. Third, while the risk of large-scale conventional aggression in the form of amphibious attack is now very much reduced, the danger of regional or low-level conflicts is very much alive. Finally, the current positive, downward trend in the overall potential for military conflict in the Baltic is very much dependent on events in Russia. A renewed dictatorship would have serious security implications.

38 Naval War College Review

Prospects and Tendencies

The purpose of this discussion has been to present the various factors relating to the three main dimensions of the Baltic environment in the post-Cold War period. How do these dimensions interact, and what are the overall strategic implications for the region?

To use any simple model to describe the strategic significance of the post-Cold War Baltic region is difficult; in fact, it requires a detailed analysis beyond the scope of this article.²⁶ The very term “post-Cold War” connotes a certain degree of resolution, of stability; the facts, as the foregoing makes plain, are more ambiguous. On the whole, however, it would seem that the economic element is rapidly gaining in influence, and the political as well, though somewhat less so, whereas the military component is somewhat reduced.

Any attempt to estimate future prospects and tendencies for the strategic importance of the Baltic Sea requires a resort to two scenarios, the difference between them being the role of Russia. In the better case, its economic reform process will succeed and democracy will continue to evolve, conservative elements and the military-industrial complex will be neutralized, and Russia will be gradually integrated in ever more binding international cooperative fora. In this case the likelihood that the Baltic will become a prosperous region is plain. In such a case, regional cooperation would advance, and, in a broad European context, economic cooperation, based most likely on the EC, would make the Baltic littoral an important growth zone. Economic considerations would be foremost in this scenario, followed by political ones, and military the least.

In the other, worse, case, Russian economic reforms fail and the evolution of democracy is upset by new authoritative, nationalistic leadership, perhaps bent on restoring the old Soviet empire by means of military power. The planned withdrawal of forces from the Baltic States would halt, and a real threat to the Baltic would result. A threat of military aggression against Western Europe would not necessarily result, but a restoration of something like the former power balance in the Baltic, with renewed emphasis on the military element, would be likely. Economic opportunities would be thrown away for a long period of time. This falling back to a “cold war” situation would put the military element ahead, followed by the political, with the economic last.

The Baltic has for centuries played an important role in the balance of power in Europe. During the Cold War this region even had a kind of frontline status as part of the superpower confrontation. The end of the Cold War has dramatically changed the situation; the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of Germany—referred to by many as the winner of the Cold War in Europe—are

the dominant factors. Regionally, the present situation offers unique opportunities for the littoral states, some of them newly independent, to take advantage of economic opportunities. However, the demise of communism has raised the danger of regional and low-level conflicts in the area; the outlook is linked to internal and political developments in Russia.

The current situation offers positive trends in many respects. However, it seems realistic to join a Swedish admiral in the following statement: "For me it is quite clear, that the Baltic Sea is not yet a 'sea of peace.'"²⁷

Notes

1. "Strategy" is typically used in compound terms like "national strategy" or "grand strategy," connoting the development and use of a government's entire range of resources to achieve objectives against the opposition of another government or grouping. See, among others, Henry C. Bartlett and Timothy E. Simes, "Long-Range Planning in a Changing World," *Fundamentals of Force Planning: Vol. III, Strategy and Resources* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1992), pp. 2–3.

However, the term has traditionally applied to four areas—political, economic, military, and diplomatic. This usage derives from General Beaufre, as cited, among other places, in Julian Lider, *Military Theory*, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Gower, 1983), p. 196.

In this article, "Strategic" is taken as relating to one geographic area, the importance of which is evaluated along not four but three dimensions, diplomatic and political elements being combined.

2. It is recognized that a careful and thorough contemporary analysis of the strategic significance of a given region requires a three-level examination: first, the internal situations of the countries involved must be clarified; second, relationships with and between superpowers and regional powers must be investigated; and third, factors affecting the region as a whole must be traced, since they form the basis for strategic conclusions ultimately drawn. The emphasis of this article, however, is upon the latter, i.e., pan-regional elements. The other two levels of examination are addressed only in passing.

For a full-scale example of the three-level analytical model see the author's "NATO's Southeastern Flank," *Tidsskrift for Søveesen*, nos. 5–6, 1988, pp. 193–312.

3. The Hanseatic League was an association of merchants and cities along the north German and Baltic coasts in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries. It operated in a trading area based around the Baltic Sea. See Ole Waever, "Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War," *International Affairs*, January 1992, p. 77.

4. H. Smidt, "Oestersjøens strategiske betydning," *Tidsskrift for Søveesen*, no. 3, 1992, pp. 134–37. Several sources offer in-depth analyses of the historical development of the Baltic. *The Baltic: Balance and Security*, by Mogens Espersen (Copenhagen: Information and Welfare Service of the Danish Defense Ministry, 1987), pp. 9–60, is an overview of different historical eras and an excellent source. His "The Security Policy History of the Baltic" in *The Baltic: Yesterday—Today—Tomorrow* (1981, by the same publisher) is a briefer alternative.

5. The term alludes to Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1990). This work is a major study, providing an excellent analysis of the rise and fall of the European powers, among others, within the relevant time frame.

6. Jeffrey L. Canfield, "The Independent Baltic States: Maritime Security Implications," *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 1992, pp. 55–81. Canfield's article offers a comprehensive analysis of this issue, with emphasis on the withdrawal factor.

7. The term "finlandization" is well known and describes a policy of a state's restricting itself politically in order not to offend a neighboring great power. See Det Sikkerheds—og nedrustningspolitiske udvalg, *Fred og Konflikt*, 1991, p. 355.

The new agreement on "Good Neighborliness and Cooperation" has no clauses about consultation or military assistance. Article 4 establishes a commitment for Finland to maintain a defensive capability to prevent its territory from being used for armed attack against the other party. See "The Military Balance in Northern Europe, 1991–1992" (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1992), pp. 27–28.

8. The impact of a unified Germany has caught the attention of several scholars. Among them is Peter Duignan, director of Western European Studies at the Hoover Institution and the co-author of a 1992 booklet entitled *Germany: Key to a Continent*. Duignan expresses the importance of a unified Germany in this way: "In demographic, political, military and economic terms, Germany is the most powerful country in Europe. It Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1993

40 Naval War College Review

not only plays a crucial role within the European Community, but it dominates the market. The Germans have got relationships and plants in all the European countries." Cited from *World Traveller*, March 1993, pp. 28–38.

See also "Germany Demands Seat in UN Security Council," *The New York Times*, 24 September 1992, p. A1.

9. Waever, pp. 77–102. Waever gives a good presentation of the possibilities for survival of Nordic cooperation in post–Cold War Europe. An introduction to the concept of "Nordic Balance" appears on p. 79. For a complete discussion of the Nordic Council, see *Fred og Konflikt*, pp. 326–27.

10. Unal Cevikoz, "European Integration and New Regional Cooperation Initiatives," *NATO NYT* [NATO news], June 1992, pp. 23–24. The effect of the replacement of Czechoslovakia by two states is difficult to determine at this point. In the case of Yugoslavia, the Belgrade government was not able to fulfill its 1992 Hexagonale presidency, which subsequently reverted to Austria.

11. Cevikoz, p. 25.

12. See Klaus Carsten Pedersen, "The Economic Exploitation of the Baltic," in *The Baltic: Yesterday—Today—Tomorrow*, pp. 24–29.

13. Canfield, pp. 64–68, gives a solid and up-to-date review of the maritime transportation industry in the Baltic States.

14. *Jyllandsposten* (Aarhus, Denmark), 3 March 1992. The organization was founded in Copenhagen on 10 October 1991 by representatives of the ports of Copenhagen, Rostock, and Tallinn. The twenty-seven ports that were participating by January 1992 were in Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Sweden. The first General Assembly took place in Tallinn on 26–27 March 1992. The organization's objectives and the key issues it faces are:

- Rapid and rational development of maritime transport in the Baltic region. This development is to have the dual purpose of boosting economic development in the states of the region while creating efficient pathways for transfer of cargo and passengers from port to port.

- Coordination of cooperative measures agreed upon by member ports with regard to such matters as development, investment, specialization, etc.

- Exchange of information, technology transfer, port management services and other skills, rehabilitation of ports, etc.

- Education and training of personnel.

- Establishment and maintenance of a network of international contacts.

- Marketing the Baltic region as a strategic logistics center.

- Negotiation and decision-making with regard to the Organization's affiliation with other international bodies (such as the International Association of Ports and Harbors), whether on the basis of collective associate membership or individual membership for ports.

15. Canfield, p. 69.

16. See Canfield, pp. 68–71, especially the table of territorial sea claims on p. 70.

17. For a gloomy survey of the environmental disaster facing the former Soviet republics, see *U.S. News & World Report*, 13 April 1992, pp. 40–51.

18. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, "The Rebirth of a Dynamic Region," Address to the Conference on Reintegration of the Baltic States in the World Community, London Chamber of Commerce, Chatham House, 23 January 1992. Quoted in Smidt, p. 155.

19. These changes were described by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, when he was the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee of the U.S. Congress, as the two modern Soviet Revolutions. See Les Aspin, "From Deterrence to Denuking: Dealing with Proliferation in the 1990s," Compendium, National Security Decision Making Department, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 18 February 1992.

20. Canfield, pp. 56–58, provides a detailed review of the withdrawal issue.

21. For the implications of these Russian minorities, see *U.S. News & World Report*, 22 June 1992, p. S3. As an example suggesting the importance of this issue, the Russian minority in Estonia was not allowed to participate in the presidential elections of 20 September 1992. The Russian government's reaction implied the likelihood of sanctions, perhaps affecting oil deliveries, and the possibility of delays in the troop withdrawal negotiations. On the presidential election, see Peter Marslew, "Weekendavisen," 25 September–1 October 1992, p. 8.

22. In a recent statement, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev claimed that a *raison d'être* for the Baltic Fleet was "to deter any future territorial claims on Kaliningrad from extremist groups in Germany and elsewhere." *Reuter News Highlights*, 16 March 1993.

23. Canfield, p. 61.

24. Strategic options in the Baltic have been investigated in historical perspective by Lt. Col. M.H. Clunnesen, "Change and Strategy in the Baltic," *Enjeux Atlantique*, no. 2, 1992.

25. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century* (Scribner, 1993).

26. For a useful model, the "strategic tripod," see Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, "Grand Strategy and the Structure of US Military Forces," *Fundamentals of Force Planning: Vol. III: Strategy and Resources* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1992), pp. 57-68.

27. Claes E. Tornberg, "Swedish Future Surface Ships and Submarines," *Naval War College Review*, Winter 1992, p. 55.

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