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The Canadian-American Alliance, 1955–1988

Some Maritime Considerations

Greg C. Kennedy

Any sound coalition strategy must not only influence enemy perceptions but reassure our allies.

Sir Michael Howard
in Robert W. Komer,
Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defence, 1984

AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II, North America contained the first and third-largest navies in the world: the United States Navy (USN) and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). The necessity for the United States to maintain large naval forces in the face of the Soviet Cold War threat was readily accepted, given the Western superpower's growing global obligations and dependencies.¹ Canada, however, lost little time in demobilizing a substantial part of her fleet, which consisted almost totally of small antisubmarine warfare (ASW) vessels.² Canada's major maritime contribution to the coalition's war effort had been in the area of convoy defence, ensuring that vital war materials reached Great Britain and Europe from the North American arsenal.³ With the formation of Nato in 1949, Canada naturally continued that task within the new North Atlantic alliance structure.

While a sense of close cooperation and common missions has characterized the relationship between the USN and the RCN, there have been differences in mission priorities, national support for the services, technological and equipment demands, and levels of international responsibility.⁴

For the United States as a democratic superpower, international support, both diplomatic and military, were crucial factors in Cold War naval planning. The

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continued acquisition and maintenance of international allies was one of the most critical tasks facing U.S. foreign relations.

This article investigates the naval requirements of the United States from 1955 to 1988 and discusses how Canada and the RCN fit into those missions as a Nato and North American ally. Also, this investigation attempts to ascertain what level of cooperation has existed between the USN and RCN by analyzing the roles, missions, strategies, and equipment of each service throughout that period. The article highlights the substantial divergences in strategy, missions, and equipment that existed between the two maritime forces.

In the immediate post-World War II era, Canada and the United States were linked by a number of joint command and planning organizations. The close cooperation achieved during the battle for the sea lanes of the Atlantic was voluntarily continued and was embodied in such organizations as the Canadian-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), the Canada-U.S. Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), and a Nato planning body, the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG).⁵ In addition, Canadian and American maritime forces consulted and operated together under a number of Nato commands and groups: the Allied Command Atlantic (whose head, the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, or SacLant, was always an American admiral and also the commander in chief of American naval forces in the Atlantic); the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group (NAORPG); and the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (StaNavForLant, established in 1967). In direct contrast to the bitter struggle that had occurred between the RCN and the USN over areas of operation in the early years of the war, Canada sought NAOPRG membership only in its sub-group B, on "The Atlantic Ocean Lines of Communication," obtaining it in October 1949. This sub-group was responsible for planning against submarine and aerial attacks on transatlantic shipping in central ocean areas.⁶ Such limited maritime involvement with Nato revealed Canada's desire to remain committed to naval roles that its ASW-oriented navy could perform with minimum change to doctrine or command organization and with no expensive modifications to existing naval weapons or vessels.

This desire for economy in conjunction with closer defence ties with the United States was acknowledged by Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent in an address to the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York, on 14 October 1949. The prime minister stated that "We cannot undertake to manufacture all the many and complicated and costly items of arms and equipment for modern military forces: many of these things we must obtain from your manufacturers. But, in order to pay for them, we must be in a position to provide you with certain other items for your forces which we can provide efficiently in Canada."⁷ The Joint Industrial Mobilization Committee had been set up to that end in April of 1949. The net result of all of Canada's involvement

in these joint organizations, with regard to its strategic position generally, was that Canada acknowledged its dependence on the United States for security, even in maritime matters. The USN had assumed the role once held by the Royal Navy—protecting Canada, through a coalition defence, from European aggression.

This dependence was revealed by the RCN's numerical strength. In 1955 its combat strength was one aircraft carrier, three destroyers, and seven frigates on operational status; two cruisers, three submarines (on loan from the United Kingdom), seven destroyers, and five frigates were involved with training.⁸ This small force was tasked primarily with the defence of the Nato sea lanes, or lines of communication, running across the Atlantic to Europe. It was envisioned that, in a repeat of the World War II strategy, RCN forces would assist other Nato units (primarily USN and Royal Navy (RN) units, at that time) in escorting convoys to Europe.⁹

Nato naval war planning in the 1950s envisaged a Soviet repeat of Hitler's attempt to strangle Great Britain into submission through the use of submarines.¹⁰ Nato analysts assumed that upon the outbreak of European hostilities, large numbers of Soviet submarines would enter the Atlantic in an attempt to interdict shipping between North America and Europe.¹¹ The speed required for reinforcing Nato ground forces, given fears that a large-scale Soviet ground offensive would quickly overwhelm the weakened European nations, dictated that Canadian and U.S. naval strategy allow no delay.¹² Ensuring the timely arrival of those reinforcements required the neutralization of the large Soviet submarine fleet, which made ASW a top priority in Nato maritime planning.¹³

The Canadian rationale for this type of commitment to Nato was that Canada's equipment and operational experience lent itself to such a continuance of its World War II contribution. In 1955, faced with a seemingly enormous Soviet submarine threat that could seriously impede Nato reinforcements needed in a European conflict, the fact that the RCN undertook an ASW role as Canada's maritime contribution to Nato solved two problems simultaneously for the Canadian navy.

The first problem was the need to provide a credible reason for maintaining a large peacetime maritime force. Membership in Nato provided Canada with a serious threat that required substantial forces to counter.¹⁴ Due to the high speed required in responding to any Soviet aggression, adequate forces had to be in place at all times; World War II mobilization schedules would not be sufficient to save Europe from the Soviet advance. Thus, the RCN was seen as a necessary force-in-being, one that could not be reduced to its dismal pre-war levels. Secondly, the specialisation resulting from such a clear, one-dimensional tasking allowed slim Canadian defence funds to be used most efficiently, without any diversion of monies having to be made toward attempting to construct and maintain a general-purpose fleet, complete with carriers and carrier aviation,

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submarines, cruisers, destroyers, amphibious warfare craft, and accompanying logistical support.¹⁵

However, the validity of the decision to continue Canada's Cold War contribution to collective defence along the same lines as those of World War II is questionable. Given Soviet geography and certain technological weaknesses, which were obvious even in the 1950s, there were reasons for Canada to question the naval role it had decided to play within Nato. But such challenges in Canadian defence issues did not find an authoritative voice within either Parliament or the Department of National Defence.

"The independent actions of the RCN during the Cuban missile crisis and the manner in which the USN today shares information indicate a close and long-standing inter-service connection that may even extend beyond official channels."

Geographically, the Soviet Union of 1956 faced a situation similar to that of Nazi Germany in 1939: a lack of ports that opened directly upon major oceans, and a lack of U-boats in sufficient numbers and of adequate size to be able to implement an immediate blockade of Britain. Hitler's admirals had been able to deploy their short-range U-boats into the Atlantic effectively only because the fall of France made available French ports on the Atlantic.¹⁶ The Soviet Union in the 1950s possessed one port, Vladivostok on the Pacific coast, that had something like ready access to an ocean and, most importantly, was free of ice for most of the year. Murmansk had access to the Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea as well, but it suffered from not only severe climatic conditions but a serious geographic disadvantage as well, especially for surface ships and any conventionally powered vessels. In general, Soviet naval forces, surface or subsurface, had to pass through strategic choke points at the entrances to the Norwegian, North, Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean seas, making their detection by Nato surveillance forces quite likely.

Also, the need to counter the powerful maritime threat posed by strong Nato naval forces, particularly the U.S. Navy's fast attack carrier groups, forced the Soviets to devote a large part of their strength to their own coastal areas, leaving little free to pursue large-scale offensive operations in the Atlantic sea lanes or in the Pacific. The Soviet asset that would be most effective in ambushing Nato forces approaching the coast of the USSR was its large submarine fleet. Such strategic demands could, and did, create a large strain on Soviet submarine forces, limiting the number available to be sent into the Atlantic on interdiction missions.¹⁷ The United States Navy, in a report compiled by Admiral Low for the Chief of Naval Operations in April 1950, estimated that of the 225 Soviet submarines under fourteen years old, only seventy-eight were capable of ocean

patrols (with a range of from 7,400 to 15,000 miles).¹⁸ The Soviet navy, while a moderately strong force, was not as serious a threat to the well-being of the two Western navies as was the interservice rivalry that was building in North America.

The RCN's development was affected by larger strategic issues, in particular the policies of the United States. Both the RCN and the USN in the 1950s were under severe pressure to justify their existence. Given the growing belief that the nuclear bomb and the rising predominance of air power had made limited war, and therefore conventional weapons, irrelevant, many questioned why navies were needed at all. In 1956, the Canadian minister of defence, Ralph Campney, thought that "at the present time the retaliatory force of the free world is provided by bombers of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) with nuclear weapons produced by the United States." His feelings towards the Canadian contribution to Nato and the role of the RCN were that:

1. Canada's primary role in NATO's collective security is the contribution to early warning and air defence.
2. Canada's naval role is the defence of our coastal areas, as always, and co-operation with our NATO allies in defence of vital sea lines of communication, particularly in view of Soviet concentration on building up a modern submarine fleet. . . . The RCN has 40 warships currently earmarked as this country's contribution for the defence of coastal waters in the Canada-U.S. region and for the NATO naval forces under control of SACLANT.¹⁹

Such attitudes towards the defence of the North American continent, and toward the predominant role air power played, also directly affected the missions of the USN and the development of certain weapons.²⁰ The operational, strategic, and tactical choices made by the USN during its own battle to justify its existence had an important influence on the RCN of the 1950s and 1960s.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the United States Navy was primarily concerned with developing effective nuclear-powered submarines, both SSN (attack) and SSBN (ballistic missile) types, and with expanding its carrier forces into a nuclear role. The well documented struggles of Admiral Hyman Rickover and the battle between the U.S. Air Force and the Navy (as well as the struggle within the Navy itself, between submarine and carrier proponents) over which service or arm was to provide the bulk of America's strategic forces, do not require elaboration here.²¹ What is important is that the USN became financially committed to two very expensive weapons programs: the nuclear submarine and a new generation of attack aircraft carrier (CV). The RCN, on purely economic grounds, could not hope to emulate such programs, nor was it clear that the USN wanted it to. The USN saw the RCN as having a complementary role. The USN itself neglected general-purpose units to some extent in this period, particularly surface ASW forces, because of the antisubmarine capabilities

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of the new SSNs;²² Canada's concentration on surface ASW helped the U.S. Navy fill a gap in its own force structure.²³ Even more important was Canada's desire to operate, in any meaningful way, only in the Atlantic. Such limitation assured the United States of an ASW-capable ally in that ocean, leaving U.S. naval forces free to maneuver in response to global requirements.

This mutually beneficial adoption of roles by the RCN and the USN did not last. By 1965, the beginning of America's formal involvement in Vietnam, the submarine and CV programs, as well as the nuclear-powered carrier (CVN) project, were well into production. Funding had been approved and appropriated for the construction of forty-one SSBNs and five submarine tenders, a project that would not be completed until the late 1960s.²⁴ Twenty-nine SSBNs were operational by 1965, as were twenty-one SSNs. The USS *Enterprise*, commissioned in 1961 as the world's first CVN, was now fully operational. The RCN, on the other hand, was struggling in the early 1960s with a mission definition problem, as well as with a need to update obsolete equipment with new technology. Both factors appeared to involve costly, long-term expenditures.

The question of what mission a navy is to perform is most often asked when major equipment purchases are to be made. This is due to the extremely high costs and very long lead times involved in producing naval vessels; a clear and precise definition of what roles they are to perform is mandatory before such an important commitment is made.²⁵ The RCN's struggle became manifest in 1961. In that year an inquiry, which would produce a document known as the Brock Report, was held to determine Canada's naval needs.²⁶

In the Brock Report, the RCN considered all of these issues in preparation for acquiring new technology and new vessels to bolster its now aging fleet. The main focus of the report was to define what the primary roles and operational missions of the RCN were, and what equipment and structure the RCN would require to fulfil them. The report defined the role of the RCN as:

- (a) defending Canada's interests against attack from the sea;
- (b) meeting our commitments to collective security arrangements;
- (c) contributing to other external undertakings;
- (d) supporting the Canadian Army in actions arising out of (b) and (c); and
- (e) establishing and maintaining Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic.²⁷

The operational tasks of the RCN were determined to be:

- (a) to defend sea lanes of communication through control, escort and convoy of shipping;
- (b) to detect, locate and destroy enemy submarines;
- (c) to contribute to early warning of missile attack by submarines;
- (d) to patrol the coastal areas and approaches to Canadian waters;
- (e) to keep our ports, anchorages and approaches free of mines;

- (f) to provide logistic support afloat for the fleet;
- (g) to transport, land and support Canadian Army contingents as required;
- (h) to provide mobile command and base facilities for external undertakings;
- (i) to carry out and support Arctic surface and under-ice operations.²⁸

The report also indicated how advances in technology would influence the strategy and tactics of the RCN, and what Canada and its navy could do in the face of such rapid changes.²⁹

The report pointed out that the RCN was expected to operate under two very different conditions of war: nuclear and limited (i.e., conventional). The committee emphasized that in the aftermath of a nuclear war, the United States and Canada might be rebuilt through the use of the undamaged portion of the Western merchant fleet. Surviving vessels could carry material, personnel, and supplies from the undamaged South American, African, Australian, or other areas, which would then be used to reconstruct the devastated North American continent. Under such circumstances it was vital that the ability of these convoys to carry out their mission be assured. The RCN would be responsible, along with any other surviving North American naval units, for safeguarding these valuable vessels from any Soviet naval forces that existed in the post-nuclear war period.³⁰

Such a series of events, however, was considered less likely than the second war-fighting scenario: limited, or conventional war. In the conventional war scenario, a balanced fleet, at least to the extent that the World War II fleet had been balanced, was thought the most desirable.³¹ The report advised, however, that in order to make conventional forces as realistic a deterrent as possible, tactical nuclear weapons should be given to the RCN.³² Also, close ties with the United States and its navy were considered a prerequisite if the RCN were to attain an effective level of operational capability. Collective security in conjunction with the USN was a must, not only geographically and politically but also technologically. Only by sharing in the weapons technology development carried out by the United States (and to a lesser degree by the United Kingdom) could Canada maintain a modern naval force at an acceptable price.³³ One clear example of the desire of the RCN to share in U.S. naval technology was the question of purchasing SSNs.

The RCN faced a dilemma over whether or not it should obtain SSNs for its fleet. The most important issues revolved around the increasing costliness of sophisticated sonar-equipped surface ships, the growing concern that land and sea-based fixed-wing aircraft were no longer effective in countering the new Soviet nuclear submarines, and the rising belief that only SSNs could perform effective ASW against other SSNs, or SSBNs.³⁴ The Brock Report acknowledged the high ASW performance of the SSNs but rejected them as too expensive for Canada's navy.³⁵ The 1964 White Paper on Defence echoed this assessment, stating that the "question is to determine as precisely as is possible

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the proportion of weapons systems which will provide the maximum intensity of surveillance and maximum defence potential for the least cost."³⁶ In a pattern very characteristic of Canadian defence procurements in the twentieth century, a cheaper solution was sought and found. Canada's ASW forces of the future would be centered around a relatively new concept, the helicopter-carrying destroyer.

Both helicopters and fixed-wing ASW aircraft operated from Canada's aircraft carrier, the HMCS *Bonaventure*, but as early as 1960 it was acknowledged that flying them from the carrier was vastly more expensive in both manpower and money than from destroyers.³⁷ Experiments with helicopter-carrying destroyers had been carried out between 1955 and 1958. These trials resulted in the conversion of the *St. Laurent* and *Annapolis*-class destroyers to helicopter carriers and signaled the beginning of a new orientation in RCN ship construction.³⁸ To extend the combatants' time on station, the HMCS *Provider*, an underway replenishment vessel, joined the fleet in 1963.³⁹ These innovations—the helicopter-carrying destroyers and the *Provider*—constituted an operational response to the perceived threat of the growing number of Soviet submarines, especially the missile-firing ones.⁴⁰ The helicopter-carrying destroyers' most dangerous challenge came not from prospective enemy action, however, but from the Canadian government itself.

The helicopter-carrying destroyer programme had to survive a change in government in 1963, when the Liberal party defeated Prime Minister Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservatives in a federal election. The new Liberal minister of defence, Paul T. Hellyer, initially cancelled the Conservative's new destroyer program but announced in 1965 that a revised naval building program would be carried out under the 1964 White Paper. It would consist of "four new helicopter-equipped destroyers and two operational support ships for our Maritime forces, new anti-submarine helicopters and a conversion program of seven destroyer escorts involving the installation of improved detection devices and other equipment which will significantly improve their submarine protection capability. In addition, these destroyer escorts will also be equipped with a rocket-assisted homing torpedo delivery system, known as ASROC, which has a much greater range than the present anti-submarine weapons in these ships."⁴¹ While the Liberal government appeared at that point to be offering hope for a bright future in defence spending, the RCN would soon find that the Liberal government, and particularly its leader (after 1968), Pierre Elliot Trudeau, were not staunch supporters of a strong defence policy.

The effects of the Trudeau administration on the Canadian armed forces have been discussed at length in many other works. However, the single most important point concerning the Trudeau government and defence policy, and therefore the Canadian navy, was Trudeau's perception concerning any wartime scenario. The prime minister saw the emergence of the Third World and the

reemergence of Europe as challenges to Canada's ability to compete in the world economy; he believed that more emphasis should be put upon meeting that challenge than on preparing defence measures.⁴² Further, Canada needed a stable and prosperous world to ensure a wide pattern of foreign trade.⁴³ It was in Canada's self-interest to contribute to world peace, but in a collective security arrangement such as the United Nations.⁴⁴ All of these issues were directly linked to Trudeau's belief that any major war would be a nuclear disaster that no one would survive. In his view, there was no reason to spend enormous amounts of money on defence, because there was to be no winning the next war.⁴⁵ Trudeau hoped that improving the economic and commercial aspects of the country would help stabilize the world order and thereby provide some measure of security. A strong Canadian economy could help provide food, education, security, and stability to the Third World, which was, in the prime minister's view, the most destabilizing area.

Thus, Canada's defence agencies began a period of decline as the Liberal government oriented its foreign policy towards creating a stable international world environment in order to protect Canadian national interests.⁴⁶ Such a peaceful approach to Western security promised a small role for the Canadian navy. This was in distinct contrast to the struggle in which the United States and the USN found themselves during the 1960s and early 1970s.

America's containment policy had been faced with one of its greatest challenges, the Cuban missile crisis of 1961.⁴⁷ The loss of face suffered by the Soviet Union when the United States and its powerful navy forced the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba inspired a new era of naval awareness in the USSR. The lessons the USSR learned in Cuba about sea power and the need for a superpower to wield it would come back to haunt the USN in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when an intensive Soviet naval building program would challenge American predominance. But in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the greatest challenge for America and its navy was the Vietnam conflict.

Although the Vietnam war was never a contest between two rival naval powers, the USN played a large role. More importantly, advances in technology and weapons development, spurred by combat operations, received a high priority. This search for technologically advanced weapons had a direct influence on the U.S. Navy, in that the Navy became the recipient of enormous increases in funding. In total, the Vietnam war cost the United States \$331 billion (in 1984 U.S. dollars);⁴⁸ while the majority of this sum was spent on war-related items, the renewed vigor and interest in technology and defence resulted in many new naval programs being started and other older projects being greatly enhanced, especially in the anti-air warfare (AAW) and ASW areas.⁴⁹ As well, the American development of a "flexible response" policy for Europe in the early 1960s and the adoption of that policy by Nato in 1967 emphasized the

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new demand for effective conventional weapons and ships to counter growing Soviet naval capability.⁵⁰

“When the U.S. Navy went into harm’s way in the new naval environment, America’s Nato partners were expected to follow; for the technologically inferior RCN warships . . . the chances of survival were becoming very low.”

In 1965, one-third of the entire U.S. naval appropriation was spent on ASW-related programs.⁵¹ The high-power AN/SQS-26 sonar was developed; the lower-power but highly capable AN/SQS-23 sonar program was completed and installed in older destroyers and frigates.⁵² The underwater Sound Surveillance System (Sosus) was completed. Improvements to and procurement of large numbers of the antisubmarine rocket (Asroc) and Drone Antisubmarine Helicopter (Dash) systems occurred, and the Mark 46 antisubmarine torpedo was introduced into the fleet. Advances in sensor equipment for the SSNs, exhaustive testing of new SSN classes (especially the *Permit* class), and introduction of the P-3A Orion land-based antisubmarine aircraft and of SH-3A Sea King helicopters with improved sonar all gave added detection capability and firepower. The establishment of the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center and other test facilities indicates the vast importance placed upon ASW at that time by the United States Navy.⁵³ These programs, vessels, and weapons were a response to the growing fear of the increasing ability of Soviet submarines to use missiles against not only the mainland but also the core units of the American fleet, the carrier battle groups.

Such devotion to creating new and improved antisubmarine weapons resulted in a quantum leap by the USN in the technology and equipment necessary to perform effective ASW, both tactical and strategic (that is, against Soviet SSBNs), an advance that left the RCN far behind. But this emphasis on ASW changed in the 1970s, as American naval planners reacted to the improved Soviet capability to saturate American carrier group defences with “stand-off” missiles delivered by submarine, aircraft, and surface vessels. In fact, the introduction throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s of a new generation of Soviet aircraft, surface vessels, submarines, and missile systems evoked yet another major technological reaction from the USN, one broadly conceived both to defend against missiles and attack the “platforms” that carried them.⁵⁴ Even in the post-Vietnam period, when withdrawal of monies for defence purposes was common, programs already initiated survived. The Harpoon and Tomahawk cruise missiles, the F-14 carrier-based air-superiority fighter, airborne early warning aircraft such as the E-2 Hawkeye, the *Sturgeon*, *Los Angeles*, and improved *Los Angeles*-class submarines, the battleship revitalization program,

Aegis air-defence cruisers, DDG 51-class destroyers, general-purpose *Oliver Hazard Perry*-class frigates, improved amphibious and sea-lift capability, and a host of new sonar, radar, satellite, and electronic warfare advances all appeared between 1973 and 1988—an awesome display of economic, technological, and industrial strength.⁵⁵ Those weapons and platforms provided the foundation upon which an American perception of command of the seas through a high-intensity, high-technology, offensive doctrine, the “Maritime Strategy,” was based.⁵⁶

The Maritime Strategy was developed under the guidance of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, and thereafter of his successor, Admiral James D. Watkins, with major input by the Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. It emphasized the U.S. Navy and Nato allies engaging Soviet forces, both maritime and continental, on a global scale. Soviet attempts to concentrate in the Western European theatre would be distracted by flanking attacks that made the maximum use of Western naval mobility and striking power. In particular, ensuring Norwegian sovereignty and that nation’s ability to contribute to the Nato war effort was a central concern of this strategy of peripheral operations.⁵⁷

The naval force required to realize the total command of the sea demanded by the Maritime Strategy was termed the “600-Ship Navy” by many supporters and detractors alike. The estimate of the numbers and types of vessels specifically required was: fifteen aircraft carriers and four battleships (with both carrier and battleship battle groups requiring highly advanced Aegis-capable or Aegis-interactive escorts); one hundred nuclear attack submarines; thirty-seven maritime patrol aviation squadrons; 100–110 frigates (with significant quantities of cruise missiles and “smart” weapons); a Marine expeditionary force and lift (shipping) for a Marine expeditionary brigade; thirty minesweepers; support ships to match all the above; and strategic sea lift to support overall U.S. military capabilities.⁵⁸ No other nation in the world could build, or indeed even consider building, such a naval force, one based on such expensive and sophisticated weapon systems and incorporating such advanced technologies at all tactical and command levels.⁵⁹

The strategy had many opponents, not the least of whom were some Nato countries. The European nations feared that such a strategy did not fully guarantee the protection of German, Belgian, or even Norwegian soil, the traditional land-oriented Nato goals.⁶⁰ As well, adoption of the new maritime strategy required new equipment purchases or development on the part of the other Nato countries to permit their navies to be able to participate (and survive) in joint operations with the USN.⁶¹ When U.S. Navy ships went into harm’s way in the new naval combat environment, America’s Nato partners were expected to follow; for the technologically inferior RCN warships forward-

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deployed with American naval units under the Maritime Strategy, the chances of survival were becoming very low.⁶²

Still, in the face of accusations by the United States that European nations (and Canada) did not contribute to Nato defence to the same extent that the U.S. did, such objections and protests were put aside; the other Nato governments and their navies entered into the Maritime Strategy force planning process in the early 1980s.⁶³ As with Flexible Response, the U.S. had brought the Maritime Strategy into the Nato environment, where it was accepted as the basis for policy because of the dominant position of the USN and the United States within Nato planning groups.⁶⁴ If the largest naval force on earth maintained such a policy, what options were open to coalition allies who desired maritime protection at a low cost to themselves? This rapid and expensive series of developments, combined with over a decade of neglect, left the RCN in a very awkward position at the beginning of the 1980s in terms of supplying a credible force for Nato and North American maritime operations.

The naval procurement program outlined by Paul Hellyer in 1965 did indeed become reality, but it also signaled the last significant contribution that Canadian government would make to the Canadian navy. Most of the recommendations made by the Brock Report for a general-purpose fleet never came to pass.⁶⁵ The completion of the DDH-280, or Tribal-class, destroyers, was the navy's last sizable acquisition until the Tribal Update and Modernization Program (Trump) in 1983 and the White Paper on Defence of 1987.⁶⁶ This neglect was due to Prime Minister Trudeau's government's having little time for the traditional Nato defence policy.⁶⁷ What arose in its stead in the 1970s was a concentration by the Canadian government on defence planning centering around the idea of sovereignty protection.⁶⁸ The Canadian navy's existence within this new sovereignty-oriented policy was largely justified (and would continue to be right up to 1988) by two implausible assertions: that Canada was a maritime nation, with maritime commerce and trade that required protecting; and that there was a need to guard Canadian sovereignty interests in the Arctic.⁶⁹

Canada had never in the twentieth century been a major ocean trading power, with the exception of the anomalies that were the First and Second World Wars.⁷⁰ Without government aid, private vessels were unable to operate. By 1950 it had been determined that Canadian deep-sea ships were unable to compete against low-cost, foreign-flag rivals. At that point, a policy of *laissez faire* was adopted, and thereafter more reliance was placed on foreign vessels for Canada's oceanic transportation needs.⁷¹ In 1967, on a value basis, selected deep-sea trade represented twenty-eight percent of total Canadian exports and only two percent of total imports, with less than seven percent of the entire trade being carried by Canadian ships.⁷² By 1969 Canada possessed only 895,900 gross

tons of ocean shipping, twenty-sixth in the world; oceangoing cargo vessels represented less than 70,000 gross tons of that figure.⁷³

The majority of Canada's trade was directed towards and received from the United States. Two-thirds of Canada's exports in 1985 went to the U.S., a market that did not require deep-sea transport or a navy to protect the flow of goods to it.⁷⁴ Also, while Canada benefited from overseas trade in both the Pacific and Atlantic, the bulk of the responsibility for protecting that trade in time of war (even under terms of a collective defence) should have logically fallen upon the nations that relied upon the strategic raw materials that Canada supplied to them, much as Great Britain had in the interwar period and the early years of World War II. This view was recognized by the United States. Much of the American criticism of the lack of foreign naval defence spending in the 1970s and early 1980s focused on urging nations to take a greater role in protecting their own sea lanes. Such a hard line by the Americans concerning naval forces was indirectly beneficial to the Canadian government and to the RCN, both of which were unable to meet alliance commitments regarding maritime Nato operations.⁷⁵

In Canada, the government focused attention upon the fact that defence monies were being spent to protect Canadian sovereignty.⁷⁶ Such an emphasis was one of the few reliable ways by which money for the modernization of the RCN, as demanded by Canada's Nato allies, could be obtained in the face of the needs of the expanding Canadian social support system. Protection of fisheries, offshore oil, waterways, Canada's undefended Pacific coast, and of future ocean-bed resources were all goals that could command some widely based public support. For these reasons, the most important issue was seen to be the protection of Canada's sovereign waters. Thus, the Arctic sovereignty issue provided the most nationalistic and "safe" rationale for the continuance and perhaps improvement of the Canadian navy.⁷⁷

The 1987 White Paper proposed the purchase of between eight and twelve SSNs for the Canadian navy, along with a number of new Canadian Patrol Frigates (CPFs).⁷⁸ The rationale used to justify the eight-billion-dollar, fifteen-year total commitment was, predominantly, that Canada required nuclear submarines to patrol beneath the Arctic ice in order to protect its sovereignty from both Soviet and American vessels. The new surface forces, for their part, would carry modern countermeasures, surface-to-surface missiles and AAW weapons, and sensor systems that would allow them to escort convoys that traveled near the prospectively very dangerous "GIUK" (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) "gap." While operations around the GIUK gap were not the preferred scenario for USN or Canadian planners, the planned RCN technological advances were necessary if RCN vessels were to play any role in the American Maritime Strategy, even that of simply conveying material across the Atlantic.

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Both the SSN and CPF designs were technologically advanced by USN standards and well able to perform the missions set out by the strategy for their classes. Given the high cost of the two types, it is a safe assumption that such a contribution to the Maritime Strategy was indeed their hidden rationale. If simple Canadian sovereignty had in fact been the main driving force behind the 1987 naval program, then a smaller number of SSNs (perhaps two or three) and less sophisticated, more generalized weapons for the CPF (no anti-air or surface-to-surface system, but rather continued concentration on ASW) would have sufficed.⁷⁹

It is most likely that Nato (specifically American) pressure upon Canada to upgrade its navy to levels that would allow it to perform its naval duties within the alliance caused Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's Progressive-Conservative government to investigate the possibility of constructing such a radically new navy.⁸⁰ However, divided Canadian opinion, lack of a solid defence policy establishing the need for SSNs, anti-American feelings in some quarters, and the huge price tag associated with the submarine program eventually conspired to assure that the latter did not progress much beyond the speculative stage.⁸¹ On the other hand, the CPF part of the White Paper did survive, due mainly to the extremely antiquated state of Canada's surface fleet and the pressing need to upgrade it.

Clearly, Canadian and American naval policies have arisen from two extremely different national points of view. Drawn together by connections forged in World War II and continued in Nato, the maritime needs of a superpower and those of a smaller power have diverged over the years. The shared experience and struggle during the war created some common ground and beliefs for their two navies to draw upon. The USN regarded the RCN as a trusted and valued ally during and immediately after the war. That respect was based on Canada's actual naval strength and its geographic and political importance for America's international operations. The independent actions of the RCN during the Cuban missile crisis and the manner in which the USN today shares information indicate a close and long-standing interservice connection that may even extend beyond official channels.⁸²

This relationship suffered from the late 1960s until the early 1980s, during the rule of Liberal governments in Canada. Perhaps partially in an effort to distance itself from the Vietnam-tainted and "imperialistic" United States, Canada under Trudeau seemed determined to find its own maritime defence strategy. During this period, the costs resulting from rapid technological changes and innovations in naval warfare caused Canada to lose the national will and ability to continue to develop its navy to the USN pattern. However, no viable

or reliable alternative policy was established. Finding an alternative role was made more difficult by the increasingly limited capabilities and questionable alliance value of the RCN. The growing American perception in that period that Canada was getting a "free ride" on defence at the expense of the United States was even more evident once the Maritime Strategy came into play. All this conspired by the early 1980s to diminish the material value of the RCN for any Atlantic Nato-Warsaw Pact conflict.

Although Canada had not been a consistent material supporter of American naval policy, neither did it have to be in order to maintain its position as a valued maritime ally of the United States. The maritime defence of the United States from Soviet actions required, by simple geography, the defence of Canada. Even when U.S. naval planning became more offensive and global in nature, the Canadian contribution to the defence of North America—through land-based aircraft, airfields, and naval bases—was a valued addition. As a source of ASW vessels for North American and Atlantic waters (with the potential to increase operations fairly rapidly during an emergency, due to a relatively highly industrialized economy), as a dependable political ally (as demonstrated during the 1991 Gulf War), and as a strong trading partner, Canada and her antiquated navy could afford to bask in the benevolent glow of the powerful neighbor to the south and contribute what they could to collective defence.

After the Vietnam war, fielding a sophisticated and fully capable ASW fleet and acquiring the technology to fight the Cold War meant spending enormous amounts of money, money the Canadian Liberal governments were unwilling to spend.⁸³ The Progressive-Conservative government of Brian Mulroney adopted a similar attitude towards the overall strategic rationale for the RCN, failing to deviate substantially from the Liberals' approach of contributing the minimum required for the upkeep of Canadian maritime forces. In terms of naval strength, Canada dropped below even the level of a middle power when the RCN's Second World War technology could no longer fulfill the tasks demanded of it.⁸⁴ For U.S. naval planners, this meant that Canada had become a potential, not an actual, maritime ally. Just as before the First World War and in the interwar period, Canada after 1964 relied on the mantle of a larger power for protection of its foreign policy and of the state itself. After a brief and artificial period of autonomous Canadian naval strength, the United States, in coalition with other Nato nations, had replaced Great Britain as the Canadian maritime protector.

Several rationales put forth by various interest groups, including academics, naval officers, politicians, industrialists, and ecologists, have been used to justify the existence of the Canadian navy. Still, the reality has remained that without the USN and collective defence, the Canadian maritime commitments over the years make no sense.⁸⁵ From 1955 to 1988, the RCN was a valued, if not always a materially valuable, part of the Nato maritime alliance, particularly the

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American-Canadian effort to protect western Atlantic ocean areas. However, as the global picture realigns in the post-Cold War period, one may muse about what the price for such protection will be in the future, or even whether the United States and the U.S. Navy will be willing again to offer such services in the name of alliance building. The questions of what Canada's maritime strategy is (not only for itself but in terms of alliances with the U.S. and other nations), and of what the role of the RCN is to be, are therefore yet to be answered.

Notes

1. See John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, eds., *American Defense Policy*, 4th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1977), chap. 2. Even so, the American navy was reduced a great deal, along with the other armed services, in the immediate post-war demobilization.

2. Sharon Hobson, *The Composition of Canada's Naval Fleet, 1946-1985* (Halifax, N.S.: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie Univ., 1986), p. 57.

3. See Marc Milner, *North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle for the Convoys* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1985); Marc Milner, "Royal Canadian Navy Participation in the Battle of the Atlantic Crisis of 1943," James A. Boutillier, ed., *The RCN in Retrospect* (Vancouver: Univ. of British Columbia Press, 1982), pp. 158-75; W.G.D. Lund, "The Royal Canadian Navy's Quest for Autonomy in the North West Atlantic," *The RCN in Retrospect*, pp. 138-58; and W.A.B. Douglas and Jurgen Rohwer, "The Most Thankless Task Revisited: Convoys, Escorts and Radio Intelligence in the Western Atlantic, 1941-1943," *The RCN in Retrospect*, pp. 176-87.

4. While unification of the Army, Royal Canadian Air Force, and Royal Canadian Navy in 1968 created new commands and titles for each of the services, for clarity this paper will refer to the Canadian navy as the "RCN" throughout.

5. Jerome D. Davis, "To the NATO Review: Constancy and Change in Canadian NATO Policy, 1949-1969," doctoral thesis, Johns Hopkins Univ., Baltimore: 1973, pp. 125-26.

6. Lund. See also Joel J. Sokolsky, "Canada and the Cold War at Sea, 1945-1968," a paper presented to the Conference on the Canadian Navy in the Modern World, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1985, pp. 47-48.

7. Danford W. Middlemiss, "Economic Defence Co-operation with the United States, 1940-63," Kim R. Nossal, ed., *An Acceptance of Paradox, Essays in Canadian Diplomacy in Honour of John W. Holmes* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982), pp. 89-90.

8. Hobson, pp. 71-72.

9. In 1953 the United States Navy contributed eighty percent of the naval forces in the Atlantic that were under Nato control. USN, RCN, and Royal Navy forces, combined, constituted ninety percent of the Nato commitment in the Atlantic. Sokolsky, "Canada and the Cold War at Sea," p. 35.

10. This planning was strongly influenced by American, British, and Canadian opinion within Nato. See D.W. Middlemiss and J.J. Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada, 1989), pp. 16-25; Sir Peter Hill-Norton, *No Soft Options: The Politico-Military Realities of NATO* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 16-27; William T.R. Fox and Annette B. Fox, *NATO and the Range of American Choice* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1967), pp. 59-76; Roger Hilsman, "NATO: The Developing Strategic Context," Klaus Knorr, ed., *NATO and American Security* (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1959), pp. 11-36; and Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), pp. 49-51.

11. Planning for such a scenario took the form of such joint Nato exercises as "New Broom V," in which Canadian, U.K., and U.S. vessels participated in antisubmarine exercises with a convoy passing from Norfolk to Gibraltar. *NATO Letter*, June 1956, p. 20.

12. Nato's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) in 1956, Admiral Jerauld Wright, estimated that there were four hundred Russian submarines, with eighty to eighty-five being completed every year. He believed that the three tasks of Nato—the defence of Western Europe, the defence of North America, and the defence of the Atlantic—were interdependent and that if Nato failed in one it would fail in all. The sea lanes were the life-lines of Nato. *NATO Letter*, v. 4, June 1956, p. 21. These lifelines were clearly emphasized to Nato early on by Canadian Lt. Gen. Charles Foulkes in the "Foulkes Plan," which proposed the United States and Canada as a strategic reserve for Nato. See Douglas L. Bland, *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of Structure and Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. 118-19.

13. While Brain Cuthbertson's work correctly acknowledges the primacy of the ASW role during this period, he does not make the critical connection of the dedication to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SacEur) and the primacy of the land element to continental defence that Sokolsky and others make in connection with collective defence and maritime planning. Cuthbertson tries, unconvincingly, to persuade the reader that if there had been a different strategic threat, the RCN would have created the proper force to counter it. Cuthbertson, *Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers* (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1977), pp. 132-43. This is an interesting but flawed analysis, given the lack of nuclear weapons development in the RCN, although various reports and projects, such as the Brock Report, advocated that the RCN acquire such weapons to make the navy a more viable deterrent force.

14. Joel J. Sokolsky, "Seapower in the Nuclear Age: NATO as a Maritime Alliance," doctoral thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.: 1984, pp. 118-19.

15. *Ibid.* On the death of Canadian naval aviation and the events leading up to the scrapping of the *Bonaventure*, see Stuart Soward, "Canadian Naval Aviation, 1915-1969," *The RCN in Retrospect*, pp. 271-85.

16. Marc Milner, "The Battle of the Atlantic," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, March 1990, pp. 45-66.

17. Some of the most insightful and controversial work on the Soviet navy is by Michael McCWire. His studies show quite clearly the limited geographic and strategic options that the Soviet submarine forces had during this period. Although the situation would change to some extent with the advent of nuclear-powered SSNs and SSBNs (equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or SLBMs), Soviet submarines in the 1950s were tasked primarily with coastal defence. They were to prevent carrier task forces or amphibious formations from successfully operating along the shores of the Soviet Union proper. See K.J. Moore, Mark Flanigan, and Robert D. Helsel, "Developments in Submarine Systems," Michael McCWire and John McDonnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions* (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 151-84; Michael McCWire, Ken Booth, and John McDonnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints* (New York: Praeger, 1975); and Michael McCWire, ed., *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context* (New York: Praeger, 1973).

18. Sokolsky, *Canada and the Cold War at Sea*, p. 28. While seventy-eight submarines is more than were possessed by Nazi Germany at the beginning of the Second World War, the technical ability of these vessels remained largely unchanged from those employed by the Germans at the end of the war. Range, number of torpedoes carried, and the snorkel had all added to the capabilities of the Nazi U-boats by 1945. The Allies had countered with changes in tactics, weapons, radar, and sonar. The success enjoyed by Allied land-based aircraft, escort vessels, and hunter-killer ASW groups, all using a high level of technology against the numerous U-boats in the later stages of the war, leads one to believe that such ASW responses available to Nato in the early 1950s would have served well against the conventional Soviet submarine threat of the late 1950s, except of course for nuclear-powered submarines. For discussions on the type XXI and Type XXII U-boat and Allied abilities to counter them, see Marc Milner, "The Dawn of Modern ASW: Allied Responses to the U-Boat, 1943-1945," *Royal United Services Institute Journal*, Spring 1980, pp. 14-29. However, the importance of Ultra (decryption of high-level German codes) to Allied ASW operations and also continuing U-boat improvement by the desperate German navy make any firm judgment on immediate post-war USN ASW capabilities against Soviet submarines very problematical. See Brian McCue, *U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay: An Essay in Operations Analysis* (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1990); and David K. Zimmerman, "The Royal Canadian Navy and the National Research Council, 1939-45," *Canadian Historical Review*, v. 69, no. 2, 1988, pp. 203-221. For a recent argument to the contrary, which assumes that Soviet SSNs would act in the same manner as those commanded by American or Nazi naval officers (both groups sharing a traditional set of tactics and beliefs that represented each group's unique wartime submarine experience and that did not necessarily reflect any Soviet tactical or strategic preference), see Richard Hegmann, "Reconsidering the Evolution of the US Maritime Strategy, 1955-1965," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, September 1991, pp. 299-336.

19. *NATO Letter*, August 1956, p. 16.

20. Campney has obviously confused, or deliberately combined, Nato and North American defence roles in a manner in which most analysts would not. The two missions are usually considered to have been independent of one another, North American defense requiring early warning and air defence, Nato commitments requiring assigning forces to the defence of Europe. Still, his statement indicates that the RCN most likely suffered in its relative ranking within the Department of National Defence when budgets and funds were considered. The construction of the North American Air Defense (Norad) early warning radar lines and the acquisition of interceptors for the air force was no doubt at the expense of the navy and the army.

21. The American admirals were afraid that the increasing capabilities of new bomber types, mated to the destructive power of the nuclear bomb, would cause a reduction in operational roles of, and therefore funding for, new aircraft carriers and carrier wings. See Kenneth J. Hagan, *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power*, chap. 12 (New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 333-61; Clay Blair, *The Atomic Submarine and Admiral Rickover* (New York: Holt, 1954); Francis Duncan, *Rickover and the Nuclear Navy* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990); and Harvey M. Sapolsky, *The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1972), pp. 14-61.

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22. Komer, *Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense?* pp. 27–37; Carl H. Amme, “Seapower and the Superpowers,” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* (hereafter USNIP), October 1968, pp. 26–35.

23. Budget figures for the USN at this time tend to support this assumption. See U.S. Department of Defense, “United States Navy, Programs and Expenditure,” *Annual Reports for 1958–1964* (hereafter DoD *Annual Report*) (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.).

24. DoD *Annual Report*, 1964, p. 243. Nine SSBNs were commissioned in 1964, bringing the total to twenty-one. Construction was begun in that year on the final six SSBNs.

25. For an example of such discussion, see Reuven Leopold, “Surface Warships for the Twenty-First Century,” James L. George, ed., *Problems of Sea Power As We Approach the Twenty-First Century* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), pp. 269–92.

26. Canadian Department of National Defence, Directorate of History (DHist), *The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Naval Objectives* (hereafter the Brock Report), July 1961. The purpose of the RCN, according to the report, was to “ensure that Canada, in concert with allied and friendly nations, will be able to use the seas for our own purposes in peace and war.” (p. 69)

27. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

29. *Ibid.*, “Letter to the Chief of the Naval Staff from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Naval Objectives.”

30. Brock Report, p. 56.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 56–57. See also, Hobson, p. 30.

32. Brock Report, pp. 36–37.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 49–50. It was noted, however, that the Canadian sovereignty question might have led to conflicts with other nations, even close allies. This created many interesting problems concerning an American-armed Canadian navy being used to stop American violations of Canadian sovereignty.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 93–94, 64–66; and “The RCN in 1963,” Statement by Vice Admiral H.S. Rayner, *The Canadian Military Journal*, v. 29, nos. 7–8–9, 1963, pp. 37–38.

35. Brock Report, pp. 63–64. At \$30 million (Canadian) per unit (for surface vessels), the committee recommended that Canada no longer send sonar equipment to sea (i.e., no new surface units with outdated sonar would be built) until research and development found a cheaper method. Such reasoning was characteristic of the report, which stressed the “small, cheap, and many” concept in vessel and weapon acquisition for the RCN.

36. Larry R. Stewart, ed., *Canadian Defence Policy, Selected Documents, 1964–1981* (Kinston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations, 1982), p. 5.

37. Hobson, p. 26. See also Soward, pp. 282–85.

38. Hobson, pp. 26–27.

39. The importance placed on Canada’s acquiring its own tactical support ships was a departure from World War II practices. Then, supplies were obtained from U.K. or U.S. logistical systems. Such a development can be seen as a step toward some level of autonomy. *Canadian Military Journal*, v. 30, nos. 7–9, Summer 1964, p. 11.

40. Rayner, “The RCN in 1963.” In this article, Vice Admiral Rayner estimates that the Soviet submarine threat consisted of 515 vessels, but he recognizes that only twelve were nuclear-powered, and that of the remaining 503 conventionally powered submarines, only a handful were more advanced than the WWII-type craft. See also Hobson, pp. 30–31.

41. Address of the Minister of National Defence, Paul T. Hellyer, to the Empire Club, Toronto, 18 February 1965, reprinted in *The Canadian Military Journal*, v. 13, nos. 4–5–6, Spring 1965, p. 5.

42. *Canadian Defence Policy, Selected Documents, 1964–81*, a policy statement issued 29 May 1968, pp. 10–12.

43. Margaret V. Royal, “Canadian American Relations: The Last Option. A Study of the Third Option in Canadian Foreign Policy,” doctoral thesis, Queen’s University: Ontario, 1985, p. 2.

44. Statement by Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, 1 March 1969, *Canadian Defence Policy, Selected Documents, 1964–1981*, pp. 13–15.

45. *Canadian Defence Policy*, policy statement of 29 May 1968, pp. 10–12.

46. *Ibid.*, excerpts from an address by Prime Minister Trudeau to the Alberta Liberal Association, 12 April 1969, pp. 18–21.

47. Interestingly, the RCN was put on a higher alert level during the Cuban missile crisis by high-ranking RCN officers *without* instructions from the appropriate civilian authorities. Long-range Royal Canadian Air Force ASW aircraft were directed to cover areas left vacant in the Atlantic due to American quarantine operations. Surface vessels conducted exercises and patrols in important areas of the Atlantic. Such close ties between the USN and the RCN were without equal in the Norad command and demonstrated the depth to which the informal ties between the two services had reached. Sokolsky, “Canada and the Cold War at Sea,” pp. 55–56.

48. Komer, *Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense?*, p. 13.

49. Navy programs for fiscal year 1965 totaled \$15.1 billion in direct obligational authority. Of that amount, \$13.7 billion, or 90.6 percent, was concentrated on general-purpose forces, general support, and research and development.

50. Komer, p. 6. See also Sokolsky, "Seapower in the Nuclear Age," pp. 188-90.

51. DoD *Annual Report*, 1965, p. 24. It must be pointed out that the lead-time for any class of naval vessel (that is, the time required to design, develop, and construct the first ship) is approximately ten years.

52. In 1964, two new ASW destroyers were added to the fleet, with another sixteen building or contracted for. DoD *Annual Report*, 1964, p. 246.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 20; DoD *Annual Report*, 1965, pp. 23-25, 258-80; DoD *Annual Report*, 1966, pp. 23-27, 228-311; and DoD *Annual Report*, 1968, pp. 29-33, 315-43.

54. The appearance of the Tu-16 Badger, Bear-H, and Tu-22M Backfire bombers; the Charlie, Echo II, Victor, and Alfa-class SSNs and SSGNs (nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarines); the Kiev-class carriers; the Kara, Kresta I and II, and improved Kynda guided missile cruisers; and, in the 1980s, the Kirov-class nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser—many of these platforms carrying improved cruise and guided missiles such as the AS-4 and SS-N-19—created the fear within naval circles that the USN had not only lost the quantitative edge but the qualitative as well. See Norman Polmar, ed., *Soviet Naval Developments* (Annapolis Md.: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1979); and Lawrence Korb and Linda P. Brady, "Rearming America: The Reagan Administration Defense Program," Steven E. Miller, ed., *Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy* (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 3-7.

55. Between fiscal years 1981 and 1986, the budget for research, development, testing, and evaluation increased eighty-six percent. Joseph Kruzell and George E. Hudson, eds., *American Defense Annual, 1985-1986* (Lexington Va.: D.C. Heath, 1985), pp. 55-56. It should also be pointed out that the growing concern over America's ability to project military force successfully into the Middle East, quickly and in sufficient strength, prompted many programs and developments in the areas of not only advanced weapon systems but also in sea and airborne heavy-lift systems, such as improved Galaxy C-5A and Hercules C-130 models, and SL-7 fast containerhips. See Brad Meslin, "Superpower Intervention in the Gulf: The Capabilities Equation," David Leyton-Brown and R.B. Byers, eds., *Superpower Intervention in the Persian Gulf* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1982), pp. 48-78. These systems would be vital to the Maritime Strategy as well. See also U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1983* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1984), pp. III-18 to III-123; *Ibid.* for fiscal year 1985, "Naval Forces"; *Ibid.* for fiscal year 1987, "Naval Forces" and pp. 175-94. Also see Michael McGwire's *Soviet Naval Influence, Soviet Naval Policy, Soviet Naval Developments*, and also "A New Trend in Soviet Naval Development," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Autumn 1980, pp. 8-14. As well, see C.G. Jacobsen, "Strategic Considerations Underlying the Development of Soviet Naval Power," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Spring 1980, pp. 25-29; Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Emphasizing the Assets: A Proposal for the Restructuring of Canada's Military Contribution to NATO," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Autumn 1979, pp. 17-20; Thomas B. Grasse, "Selling Sea Power," USNIP, July 1989, pp. 30-35; Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, "The Maritime Strategy," General P.X. Kelley, USMC, "The Amphibious Warfare Strategy," and Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr., "The 600-Ship Navy," all in USNIP, January Supplement, 1986; John Allen Williams, "The US and Soviet Navies: Missions and Forces," *Armed Forces and Society*, Summer 1984, pp. 507-528; and Matthew Allen, "Forward Maritime Strategy," *The Naval Review*, April 1988, pp. 128-33.

56. There was an equivalent high-technology, high-intensity strategy for the land battle in Europe, known as "Air/Land Battle 2000." It has been suggested that the economic show of force required by these two strategies bankrupted the Soviets, because the USSR was unable to compete at such a high and intense technological and financial level, and that therefore this "buying out the pot" poker analogue assisted directly in bringing about the end of the Cold War.

57. Joseph Kruzell, ed., *American Defense Annual, 1987-1988*, (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1987), pp. 32-25.

58. Keith A. Dunn and William D. Staudenmaier, *The Washington Papers/107: Strategic Implications of the Continental-Maritime Debate*, v. 12 (New York: Praeger Special Studies, and Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Center for Strategic and International Studies), 1988, pp. 7-11. See also Kruzell, *American Defense Annual, 1986-1987*, pp. 121-36.

59. While earlier years saw a greater number of ships deployed by the USN (653 in 1950, and roughly 1,000 on average for ten to fifteen years after the Korean War), the cost of the technology that the Maritime Strategy relied upon was the real expense. The costs of new aircraft types, missiles, assault craft, helicopters, and other equipment were at levels never before seen. It was that cost, and not merely the number of hulls in the water, that caused a great deal of questioning of the strategy. See Paul Denarie, "A Political and Strategic Strike Force: The Aircraft Carrier, a Mobile Air Base," *International Defense Armament*, April 1988, pp. 48-53; and John D. Alden, "Tomorrow's Fleet," USNIP, May 1986, pp. 201-08.

60. Komer, pp. 67-70. Articles that tend to support Komer's argument about allied support for the strategy, and not only in the European theatre, are: Stanley J. Heginbotham, "The Forward Maritime Strategy and

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Nordic Europe," *Naval War College Review*, November-December 1985, pp. 19-27; Matthew Allen, "Forward Maritime Strategy," *The Naval Review*, April 1988, pp. 128-33; and James A. Nathan, "How's the Strategy Playing with the Allies?", *USNIP*, August 1988, pp. 57-62.

61. A survey of *Jane's Fighting Ships* for the years 1985 to 1989 will show that a modernization of the West German, Belgian, Dutch, Danish, and Norwegian fleets took place at that time. Such building was perhaps in order to allow their vessels to take a more active part in the Maritime Strategy, but more likely came about because of U.S. pressure on these countries to contribute more to the overall defence of Europe within the Nato framework.

62. Nathan, pp. 57-62; and Martin Shadwick, "National Defence: The Protection of Canada/NATO/North American Defence/Peacekeeping/Equipment Programs," R.B. Byers and Michael Slack, eds., *The Canadian Strategic Review, 1985-1986* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1988), pp. 125-87.

63. Dan Smith, *Pressure: How America Runs NATO* (London: Bloomsbury, 1989), p. 39; Barry R. Posen and Stephen Van Evera, "Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment," Miller, ed., *Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy*, pp. 51-55. See also Komer, pp. 23-25, 51-76.

64. The Nato document of most importance to these discussions is the "ConMarOps" (Concept of Maritime Operations).

65. In fact, the navy had its very existence again called into question between 1964 and 1967, due to the debate over the effectiveness of anti-ballistic missile systems and whether such a system would make ASW operations against Soviet SSBNs redundant. *Canadian Defence Policy, Selected Documents, 1964-1981*, "White Paper on Defence, 1964," pp. 89-90.

66. The major units of the Canadian navy in 1985 were three submarines, four Tribal-class destroyers, thirteen frigates (average age twenty-three years), and four replenishment ships. Hobson, *The Composition of Canada's Naval Fleet*, pp. 44-45, 118.

67. Trudeau supported Nato in the spirit of collective defence, but only insofar as it related to the defence of North America. Margaret Royal, p. 60. See note 42 of this article.

68. The 1971 White Paper on Defence listed the new defence priorities as: "(a) surveillance of our own territory and coast-line, i.e., the protection of our sovereignty"; "(b) the Defence of North America in co-operation with U.S. forces"; "(c) fulfillment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon"; and "(d) performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may from time to time assume." Colin S. Gray, *Wellesley Paper 1/ January 1973: Canada's Maritime Forces* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973), pp. 8-12.

69. For a striking example, see R.B. Byers, "Canadian Maritime Policy and Force Structure Requirements," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Spring 1983. Byers assesses the five major naval roles of the navy as being strategic deterrence, strategic antisubmarine warfare, sea control and denial, projection of power ashore, and naval presence. The Canadian navy of the 1970s and 1980s was singularly incapable of performing any of these roles, even in limited joint operations with the United States. See also Martin Shadwick, "National Defence," R.B. Byers and Michael Slack, eds., *The Canadian Strategic Review, 1985-86* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1988), pp. 125-86; R.B. Byers, "What Roles for Canada," Brian MacDonald, ed., *High Tech and the High Seas* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1985), pp. 27-39; and D.B. Bindernagel, "Planning for Future Ship Requirements," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Autumn 1984, pp. 22-27. A firsthand look at the navy's point of view is J.A. Fulton, "What Model Fleet for Canada," in MacDonald, ed., *High Tech and the High Seas*, pp. 152-61; this argument also follows this traditional line of rationalization. Such approaches echo the ruminations of Admiral R.H. Falls, Admiral Timbrell, and Vice Admiral John Allan, who all cited the Soviet threat as the main concern of the Canadian navy in 1978-1980 (*Canadian Defence Policy, Selected Documents, 1964-1981*, pp. 115-38), but paid homage to the politically expedient Arctic sovereignty question.

70. *Report to the Minister of Transport, Task Force on Deep-Sea Shipping, April, 1985* (Ottawa: Government Publications, 1985), pp. 14-16.

71. *Ibid.*, p. v.

72. Canadian Transport Commission, *Summary of Canadian Merchant Marine Analysis of Economic Potential* (Ottawa: Government Publications, December 1970), pp. 1-2.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 1. Tables and figures in Ernest G. Frankel's *Management and Operations of American Shipping* (Boston: Auburn House, 1982), p. 63, do not list Canada as even having a major merchant fleet in 1977.

74. *Task Force on Deep-Sea Shipping*, p. 2; see also Frankel, pp. 70-71.

75. In the post-Falkland War period, it became painfully clear that Canadian DDH-280s and other RCN combat vessels were sorely lacking in surface-to-surface missile systems, antinuclear and electronic countermeasures, and AAW capability. Such technological weakness rendered them almost defenseless against any serious threat and prime targets even in an alliance force such as an American carrier battle group. Valuable for the long range and endurance of their Sea King helicopters, Canadian vessels figured to fare poorly if used in the Maritime Strategy purposed by they USN.

76. Colin S. Gray, *Canada's Maritime Forces*, pp. 30-48.

77. F.W. Crickard, "An Anti-Submarine Warfare Capability in the Arctic a National Requirement," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Spring 1987, pp. 24-30; Jean-Jacques Blais, Minister of National Defence, "The 1984 Defence Budget," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Summer 1984, pp. 8-12; Joel J. Sokolsky, "Canada's Maritime Forces," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Winter 1985, pp. 24-30; and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Parting of the Waves? The Strategy and Politics of the SSN Decision," David G. Haglund and Joel J. Sokolsky, eds., *The U.S.-Canada Security Relationship* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 267-295. Speaking against the Canadian SSN procurement program, see S. Mathwin David, "Nuclear Submarines for Canada: A Technical Critique," Haglund and Sokolsky, eds., *U.S.-Canada Security Relationship*, pp. 215-38.

78. R.F. Archer, "The Canadian Patrol Frigate," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Autumn 1984, pp. 13-20, and see note 69.

79. If simple sovereignty protection had been the main mission for RCN submarines, a diesel-electric combination would have sufficed, even though it would not have fit the Arctic sovereignty "red-herring." However, a diesel-electric submarine has limitations when operated offensively that an SSN does not, mainly in the areas of speed and endurance. The standard use of such diesel-electric submarines is ambush-style area-protection missions (for which the largest operator of diesel-electric submarines, the Soviet navy, used them).

80. This debate pitted those who wanted the SSNs for hunting Soviet SSBNs and SSGNs thought to be lurking under the ice cap (Sokolsky, Byers, and Crickard) against those who believed such an offensive strategy to be unnecessary (Michael McGwire). Both camps agreed that Soviet SSBNs and SSGNs, along with the bulk of the Soviet navy and its supporting land-based aircraft, would be found in and around Soviet SSBN "bastions" (protected operating havens) and not off the coasts of North America or in other seas far from the Soviet coast. The Soviets' concerns over protecting their strategic nuclear capability caused them to draw their SSBN forces closer to home as the range of their SLBMs increased. The main mission of the remainder of the Soviet fleet was to protect these bastions from American SSN, ASW, and carrier forces. See Sokolsky, "Parting of the Waves?" pp. 279-81. For other perspectives on the use of the SSN and Soviet capabilities, see the various works of James M. McConnell, Milan Vego, and J.S. Breemer, whose works have appeared frequently in USNIP and the *Naval War College Review* over the last ten years.

81. There is much debate over whether or not the U.S. was particularly interested in seeing Canada acquire nuclear technology, and under-ice capability particularly. See Suzanne M. Holroyd, *A RAND Note: U.S. and Canadian Cooperative Approaches to Arctic Security*, N-3111-RC, June 1990; and Joseph T. Jockel, "The U.S. Navy, Maritime Command and the Arctic," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, December 1989, pp. 23-33.

82. Sokolsky, "Canada's Maritime Forces," p. 26.

83. One of the best works on the impact of technology on warfare, coalitions, and nations is still William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000* (Illinois: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982).

84. The Netherlands, with a coastline of several hundred kilometers, had forty-three ships and 17,000 personnel, while Canada, with a coast line of 7,300 kilometers, had thirty-eight ships (generally older models) and 10,000 personnel in 1985. J.A. Fulton, *What Model Fleet for Canada?*

85. Sokolsky, "Parting of the Waves?" pp. 275-77.

Ψ

[The author] represents, perhaps, the abstraction with which the fashionable intelligentsia of the capitalist West can contemplate warfare, towards what may be the end of almost half a century of unprecedented peace in their part of the world.

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