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## In My View

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## In My View

### **Authors**

Robert Previdi, Curtis A. Munson, James Goldrick, Adam B. Siegel, John F. Jones, and John E. Tashjean

# IN MY VIEW. . .

## The Joint Chiefs: "Admiral King Would Shudder"

Sir,

I could not agree more with Mr. Anthony Harrigan's letter "The Myth of Service Integration," which appeared in your Spring 1993 edition. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation and the whole idea of "Jointness" must be looked at again.

Goldwater-Nichols makes the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) the single dominant leader of all our military services. This is a tricky concept because no military man can know enough about ground, sea and air operations to run all our forces effectively.

It is dangerous to effective decision-making, when it comes to military recommendations, when any president or secretary of defense receives only one opinion. To avoid situations like the Bay of Pigs, what any president needs is alternative viewpoints coming from all the chiefs.

One problem with Vietnam was that President Johnson dealt primarily with one military man, Earle G. Wheeler, then chairman of the JCS. What we did with Goldwater-Nichols is to make the mistake of Vietnam—freezing out the chiefs as a body—"the law of the land."

In his thoughtful June 1984 *New York Times* article, former JCS chairman Lyman Lemnitzer wrote, "The best way to give civilian leaders balanced military advice is by using the talents and broad experience of the military Chiefs of all the services. Each knows his own service; each is an expert in his field. Our present organization provides the checks and balances that moderate extreme views."

In his 1946 testimony before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, the brilliant leader of the United States Navy during World War II, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, said, "The strength of the JCS lies in the combined knowledge possessed by the individual members and in the checks and balances that tend to prevent domination by only one person." King went on further to say, "The proponents, in my view, have confused the application of the principles of centralization versus decentralization. I state again my belief that the most effective use of our fighting forces can be attained by the intelligent integration of various agencies for the common defense. I do not concur that we must have an overall centralization to accomplish essential integration."

This is precisely what John Lehman refers to as the bloated bureaucracy in Washington. Consider King's small staff in Washington during World War II versus what exists now in the Department of Defense.

Because of Goldwater-Nichols, for the first time in our history, one military officer, the JCS chairman, can control events. He alone is the principal adviser to the president, the secretary of defense and the National Security Council (NSC). He alone attends NSC meetings. And the commanders-in-chief report to Washington through the chairman, who also controls the budget.

In my book *Civilian Control versus Military Rule*, which analyzes the Goldwater-Nichols Act, I made seven recommendations:

*One:* Have the chairman designated as the military chief of staff to the secretary of defense in addition to his role as JCS chairman.

As chief of staff to the secretary, the JCS chairman would now be in a perfect position to directly support the secretary, particularly on issues involving joint military operations. He becomes a source of ideas over and above both the chiefs and the service secretaries. The chairman's and the secretary's focus must always be the same. This system would ensure civilian control, and improve overall integration and effectiveness by making the points of responsibility crystal clear.

*Two:* Put the individual service chiefs back in the military chain of command as was the case during World War II. Can you imagine what would have happened in the second World War if Admiral King had been an adviser and not head of the Navy? All of our problems with the Joint Chiefs of Staff started when we took the chiefs out of the chain of command.

The war-fighting capability of the United States lies in the individual services. It does not lie in the Joint Staff, which under Goldwater-Nichols reports exclusively to the JCS chairman.

Everything will be more effective if it is clearly understood that political policy formation is the exclusive responsibility of our civilian leaders, while they must also be involved in approving and supervising military strategy and even implementation, to varying degrees, depending on the situation.

The chiefs, because of their position relative to the president and the secretary of defense, would, as Admiral King and General Marshall did during World War

II, be the key players in translating political policy into military implementation for the ten combatant commanders around the world. Getting the ten area commanders totally involved in budgets and the translation of policy into implementation is illogical and dangerous, as we found out with MacArthur in Korea and even in Desert Storm, where authority was sometimes confused between General Powell and General Schwarzkopf.

*Three:* Have the service chiefs and their individual staffs become the military staff of the secretary of defense. On the civilian side, I would have the individual service secretaries and their staffs become the civilian staff of the secretary.

This is the most efficient and effective way to manage the Department of Defense. Why? Because the secretary of defense would have both the military and civilian parts of the military establishment reporting directly to him with the chairman also assisting the secretary. This change would increase overall effectiveness while reducing duplication of staffs between the secretary, the chairman, the chiefs and the service secretaries.

*Four:* Pass a law forcing the president to meet regularly with all the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*Five:* I recommend that congressional leaders attend NSC meetings that specifically involve decisions concerning the possible use of American military forces. This arrangement would involve Congress early in the process and hopefully get rid of the illogical War Powers Act.

*Six:* When a military subject is being discussed, have all the chiefs meet with the NSC, not just the chairman and the vice chairman.

*Seven:* Have the vice chairman report directly to the JCS chairman as his assistant. The vice chairman absolutely should not be the number-two man in the military and surely should not outrank the service chiefs. This consistent downgrading of the chiefs is not the solution—it's time to rethink what we have done.

Robert Previdi  
Manhasset, N.Y.

*Editor's note:*

Mr. Previdi is the author of *Civilian Control versus Military Rule*, Hippocrene Books (New York, 1988).

### Robert Massie's *Dreadnought*

Sir,

Commander James Goldrick's review of Robert Massie's book *Dreadnought* (*Naval War College Review*, Winter 1993) highlights shortcomings both real and perceived that discredit the book out of proportion to its failings. In a book of

1,000 pages, errors of fact and usage are not only likely but almost inevitable. The examples the commander listed are unfortunate, of course, but not significantly damning and could be easily repaired in future editions. Indicating that these minor inconsistencies warrant ignoring this worthwhile book would cheat students of our profession of valuable insights into one element of the pre-war situation and a valuable allegory to the Soviet/American arms race just ending in our own time.

More to the heart of Goldrick's misgivings are his comments about the scope and content of the book. *Dreadnought* is about the naval arms race between Germany and Great Britain prior to World War I. Massie proved to my satisfaction that the naval build-up was a significant factor in the deterioration of the relationship between England and Germany and in part made the alliance with France *possible* even if not inevitable. He never indicated that the Great War was the inescapable result and, in fact, made exactly the same point that Goldrick did, that the war was not inevitable until Germany invaded Belgium. Finding fault with the book because it is not an exhaustive treatment of the political environment in Europe prior to the war is meaningless.

Goldrick also takes very pointed exception to source materials, both those Massie used and those he did not. Massie's work is heavily dependent upon the letters and papers of Admiral Jackie Fisher and others who played significant roles in the events chronicled. Goldrick finds fault with the objectivity of these players as well as the books Massie used as source materials, choosing instead more recent volumes such as Jon Sumida's *In Defense of Naval Supremacy*. These works would doubtlessly have added to the value of the book as a scholarly work, but finding fault with the use of primary source materials of the principals involved is specious. Returning to the theme of the book, the references used may have been more to the point of the political decisionmaking that led Europe to the charnel house in 1914, and that after all was Massie's intent.

Curtis A. Munson  
Major, U.S. Marine Corps

*The reviewer replies:*

I read Major Munson's comments with interest. His analysis of Massie's thesis in *Dreadnought* and mine have clearly reached different conclusions. That Massie did—in the end—allow some space to discounting the importance of the naval arms race in the outbreak of the First World War is true. My problem is that this was in the way of a short "add-on" to a lengthy narrative which did little but emphasise the importance of the naval question, to the exclusion of much else.

Good history is about balance—and that only comes from a determined effort to discover and analyze every significant source. Munson defends Massie's selection of primary sources. Well enough, but let me turn his allegory of the Soviet/American arms race into an analogy. If a historian were to write a history of the U.S. Navy's attempts to counter the Soviets by relying (for his primary naval material) almost wholly upon Admiral Hyman Rickover's correspondence and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt's memoir *On Watch*, would the result be a fair representation of reality? Equally important, in view of Major Munson's determination to draw insights, would it be sound guidance for others facing like strategic problems? On their own, both admirals have things of great importance to say. But a historian who transmits the views of contemporary actors within his thesis must accompany that transmission with criticism and analysis made from a basis of deep understanding of his subject. I do not see this in *Dreadnought*.

James Goldrick  
Commander, Royal Australian Navy  
HMAS *Watson*

### Carrier Aviation and the Historical Record

Sir,

I am uncomfortable with the tenor and tone of Cdr. Thomas W. Trotter's article "The Future of Carrier Aviation" in the Winter 1993 *Naval War College Review*. I must state at the outset that I hold far different views on the issue of carrier forward deployments than Cdr. Trotter. I do believe them important for U.S. foreign policy purposes and for the possibility of rapid response to a crisis situation. With this in mind, I must take exception to two points: his dismissal of carrier importance in averting crises; and, his commentary on the Royal Navy in the nineteenth century.

Cdr. Trotter questions "the hackneyed expression, 'When a crisis occurs the President always asks, "Where are the carriers?"'" (pp. 33–34). Cdr. Trotter, in his rebuttal of this point, asserts that "more often than not, the presence of either one or two carriers has neither averted, nor significantly aggravated, a potential crisis." This comment suffers from a simple problem—the difficulty, if not impossibility, of proving or disproving it.

In studying the issue of forward deployments, the most difficult question is of efficacy—just how useful is it, anyway, to have forces forward? Simply asserting that carriers are not important in crisis situations, as Cdr. Trotter has, does not make the comment true. For every case of the inadequacy of the carrier (CV) response as a political tool (such as Cdr. Trotter's comments on the carriers in the vicinity of Iran in 1979–1980), I can point to a case where the CV might have been a crucial element (such as in February 1977 when Idi Amin held

several hundred Americans hostage, or in the 1967 Six Day War when a highly visible USN carrier movement helped get Syria to agree to a ceasefire). (For a list of 207 U.S. naval crisis responses, 140 involving carriers, see CNA Research Memorandum 90-246, *The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era: U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946-1990*, by this writer, February 1991.) In addition, Cdr. Trotter's comments on the carriers off Iran ignore a very real element of their presence—if, at any point, President Carter had decided to use force against the Iranians, carrier aviation could have responded at very short notice.

In addition to not really knowing the true value of carriers in crisis situations, we do not know how many crises U.S. military forward deployments prevented by their simple presence. We simply cannot prove a negative, nor can we replay history. What might have happened without the U.S. carrier presence near Saudi Arabia in mid-August 1990? Would the absence of USN air cover have led Saddam Hussein to decide to invade Saudi Arabia before adequate forces arrived on scene? We are unlikely to ever know the answers to these questions, but we do know that two forward-deployed aircraft carriers provided the first significant U.S. air presence during Desert Shield.

I also must question the comments about the Royal Navy in the nineteenth century. For example, it is simply not true that “the British maintained a fleet that was vastly superior in design to any of its adversaries” (p. 40). For example, the French Navy introduced both steam (*Napoleon* in 1847) and ironclads (*Gloire*, 1859) before the British. The Royal Navy in the 1880s was the last navy of a major power to abandon muzzle-loading guns. (For a brief discussion of this, see William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power*, Chicago, 1982, pp. 263-5.) The British often let others innovate and then used Britain's vast shipbuilding industry to out-produce a threat such as those the French infrequently caused. In other words, the British policy was reactive—“they saw no reason to plunge headlong into adopting untested weapons . . . without compelling reasons for doing so. Ordinarily, the compelling reasons were furnished by foreign warships.” (John F. Beeler, “Defense Spending and Technological Change,” *Swords and Ploughshares*, Fall-Winter 1991, p. 4.) The British sometimes even attempted to discourage rather than foster technological developments (such as torpedoes) and thus sometimes found themselves on the trailing, rather than leading, edge of naval technology. World War I exposed the effects of the century-long decay in the Royal Navy when, ship for ship and man for man, the German Navy was a far superior force. (For a good discussion of this point, see the section on Jellicoe and Jutland in Cornelli Barnett, *The Swordbearers*, New York, 1964.)

The comment on the same page that “the British maintained a strong defense industrial base in order to increase their naval power if necessary, capably, and rapidly” also seems to skew the historical record. This implies a conscious governmental direction of the nation's industrial power to conform with



potential defense requirements and to be ready for mobilization when required. Paul Kennedy, in *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (the cited source for the comments), states something different: "Britain's growing industrial muscle was not organized in the post-1815 decades to give the state swift access to military hardware and manpower. [p. 152] Like that of the United States in, say, the early 1920s, therefore, the size of the British economy in the world was not reflected in the country's fighting power; nor could its laissez-faire institutional structures, with a minuscule bureaucracy increasingly divorced from trade and industry, have been able to mobilize British resources for an all-out war without a great upheaval" (p. 153).

Over the past several years, the world has seen amazing changes. In our attempt to ease comprehension of these changes and their implications, we seek historical analogies to provide some guidance. While often a fruitful path, it is a dangerous one as well since history can mislead as well as guide. Those who seek to use history to illuminate the present or future owe their audience the obligation to accurately reflect that past. While I could discuss this issue much further, I believe this article did not accurately reflect the historical record in support of its arguments.

Adam B. Siegel  
Center for Naval Analyses

### Douhet, Air Power, and Jointness

Sir,

The reactions to my article, "Giulio Douhet Vindicated—Desert Storm 1991," from Lt. Colonels Hammes, Sabata and Spies and Commander Howard were classic. They have summarily dismissed yet another in a long line of air power advocates who, they believe, overstate the facts in an inherently invalid position. And now the latest, the *charge du jour*: why can't airmen be joint and worry less about their own service and more about fighting as a team? That is what makes this whole argument ironic, in my view: until "they" understand (and accept) how airmen look at warfighting, "they" are the ones who are barriers to jointness.

No one argues that the ground and the sea are different environments, different mediums. The conduct of war in each is also different—control of sea lines of communication is not the same thing as securing and holding a section of ground. Consequently, and not so surprisingly, practitioners of the ground medium think differently than those on the sea. It's more than doctrine, it's more than training, it's more than weaponry, it's more than field manuals or regulations—and it's not service parochialism. It's fundamental, it's part of the culture

of the service and it's part of how an Army officer or Navy officer or Marine officer views the world.

But the sky does not seem to be viewed as separate—other than by airmen. Airmen do see it as a different medium. It has three dimensions instead of two, the limiting factors are different, the possibilities different. Air Force officers, not surprisingly, think about warfare in different ways than their brothers and sisters in the other services. This is not evil, nor is it anti-joint, it simply is.

Let us say we have an enemy with the classic elements: a fielded army, appropriate logistics support, an infrastructure of roads, bridges, etc., an industry base, a population, C<sup>3</sup>, and leadership to run the show—a range of tactical to operational to strategic objectives, although which is which is not always clear (“fuzzy,” as Air Force Chief of Staff General McPeak has said).

How do the “joint” planners approach this enemy? The ground practitioner sees a flat plane, one which must be broken into sections and secured, and held by a soldier with a weapon. They will advance through the fielded army, take ground, have air support assist with logistics, second echelons, infrastructure, etc., and with sufficient soldiers holding key positions, the war is eventually concluded. I admit to serious overgeneralizing; however, the soldier holding ground is virtually a sacred belief in the ground mentality. The soldier-holding-ground concept, however, drives a lot of planning and requirements. It is why we had over 400,000 soldiers in the desert in 1991. It also drives the conduct of the operation—it tends to make the Army officer think in terms of tactics and operational-level objectives. Again, there is nothing wrong here, it's how the ground practitioner thinks about the problem.

The airman does not see the problem in the same way. The immediate objective is not necessarily the fielded army. The Air Force officer tends to think tactically, operationally and strategically at the same time. Not because he is smarter (or less so), but because the medium allows, actually demands, him to do so. This outlook leads to different assumptions about the conflict and different planning factors. None of which have anything to do with service parochialism.

The problem with the “air power can win wars, no it can't” argument is that, in my opinion, it's interpreted as asking the ground practitioners to set aside their soldier-on-the-ground concept. To consider that a soldier is not fundamental to war termination strikes at the ground practitioner's way of life. That's why there has been so much fuss about the use of the term “air campaign,” which has to be one of the silliest controversies in service rivalry history.

Can the Air Force win a war alone? Probably not. A nuclear detonation can adjust a number of attitudes, which may result in achieving political objectives, but air power is not omnipotent. It can be decisive, but even that label still receives resistance from ground and naval experts. Can the Army win a war alone? Probably not; well, maybe; but does it really matter?

The point is, Douhet was right. Air power is a separate entity. Air practitioners view the battlefield differently, so they plan differently. Their view of the end game may be dramatically different than that of the ground planner. Yes, most conflicts require a soldier holding ground, even though there may be rare circumstances where the conflict won't. However, there are any number of ways to get that soldier to that position and this is where the service-parochial views do all of us a disservice. Jointness will occur when we all understand, accept, and even value the differences in outlooks and can agree to do what is best.

The problem is, my opinion again, ground officers and Navy surface officers don't believe in air power, at least not past a certain point. The officers reviewing my essay are examples. That's why you have Douhet, Mitchell, Kenney, LeMay, Moynier, Warden and hundreds more writing about air power and its tremendous range of possibilities. Even a non-flying Air Force lieutenant colonel entered the debate.

Perhaps it will always come down to this: those who see the earth as covered with land and water, and those who see it as covered with the sky and space. Everyone may be right, but there must be some advantage to seeing all perspectives.

John F. Jones

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

### "Japan and Germany, 1941–1943"

Sir,

Readers who want to round out Captain Rahn's valuable study of German-Japanese relations in 1941–43 (*Naval War College Review*, Summer 1993) are referred to the writer's *Past in Review, 1941–1991* (University Press of America, 1992), chapter 2 of which brings a new primary source to bear on Japanese foreign policy and its widely unknown major course correction because of the battle of Smolensk in the summer of 1941.

As for the demarcation line of 70 degrees east (Rahn, p. 52), its significance was both political and strategic. Politically, it put India on the Japanese side of the line. Strategically, the line runs north to Omsk, which was the farthest objective selected in a contingency plan drawn up by the Japanese Army general staff (*Past in Review*, p. 37). Chapter 2 of this work is not superseded by Carl Boyd's *Hitler's Japanese Confidant, General Oshima Hiroshi and MAGIC Intelligence, 1941–1945* (University Press of Kansas, 1993), which touches on the ouster of Foreign Minister Matsuoka in July 1941 only very lightly (p. 27).

For these fascinating multi-service and multilateral factors, the most fundamental strategic concept is not coalition warfare but culmination and the culmination point. As these linked Clausewitzian concepts are not included in

the *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia* (Brassey-US, 1993), the writer may be allowed to refer to this article on "The Short-War Antinomy Resolved: or, from Homer to Clausewitz," *Defense Analysis*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 165–171 and the sources cited there.

Dr. John E. Tashjean  
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Arlington, VA 22210

*Editor's note:*

See this issue's "Recent Books" department for a notice on Dr. Tashjean's *Past in Review*.

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### Call for Papers

Siena College is sponsoring its ninth annual international, multidisciplinary conference on the 50th anniversary of the World War II, to be held 2–3 June 1994. The focus for 1994 will be 1944—though papers dealing with broad issues of earlier years will be welcomed. Topics welcomed include, but are not limited to: Fascism and Naziism; Resistance and Collaboration; the Air War; the Italian Campaign (Anzio, Casino, etc.); the North Atlantic and the Naval War in the Pacific; "Island Hopping"; the Russian Front; Normandy and the European Theater thereafter; the Warsaw Rising; the Holocaust; Literature; Art; Film; Diplomatic, Political, and Military History and Biography; Popular Culture; Minority Affairs; Women's Studies; Asian, African, Latin American and Near Eastern topics. Religion, Pacifism, Conscription, events on the Home Front and Post-War Planning as well as Draft Resistance and Dissent will also be of significant interest. All these and other topics of relevance are welcome. Replies and inquiries to Professor Thomas O. Kelly II, Department of History, Siena College, 515 Loudon Rd., Loudonville, New York 12211-1462.

Deadline for submissions: December 1, 1993.