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## Future British Surface Fleet: Options for Medium Sized Navies

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not fit. Writing before publication of the new maritime concept "... From the Sea," which focuses on littoral warfare, George suggests that no new ground has been broken with the proposals for restructuring the Navy. He postulates, with insightful analysis, an entire nuclear deterrent force at sea, the Navy as the primary U.S. force in Nato with SacLant emerging as the senior U.S. officer in the alliance, and the U.S. Navy as the primary force to deal with trouble in the Third World. It is clear that he views the Navy as the only logical force of choice in many situations.

The second alternative to the current and programmed naval force structure is lengthy and detailed, and it is the meat of the book. Much of his argument is controversial, but all of it is thoughtful, well reasoned, clear, and concise. The author discusses mission analysis as a crucial first step, but eventually the issue becomes the forces: type, quantity, and building plans—including research and development, new deployment concepts, the role of the reserves, and reconstitution should the interwar period end. In each area George offers alternatives to prevalent naval thought, some of which have already been adopted, some certainly under consideration, and others that are guaranteed to raise the hackles of some segment of the Navy.

Now that he has raised the communal blood pressure, George slices a vein of Navy blue with his rapid-fire conclusion that lists the perils of the "less of the same" course: decreasing

numbers, erosion of the industrial-reconstitution base, a focus on yesterday's mission requirements, a squeeze on future programs, the tendency to try to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear (attempting to push the wrong program for the wrong mission), increased deployment requirements, morale problems, Goldwater-Nichols, parochialism, shooting the messenger, congressional interference, arms control, and personnel problems.

*The U.S. Navy in the 1990s* is a *tour de force*, written by a man who has spent much of his life thinking about the Navy and its role in national security. No matter what one thinks of his proposals, James George cannot be ignored. This book will make waves. It should be required reading for everyone in Washington.

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Brown, David K. *Future British Surface Fleet: Options for Medium Sized Navies*. London: Conway Maritime Press and Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 190pp. \$34.95

The title of this work is rather misleading, until the book is read. Thereafter, one would find it difficult to compose ten more suitable words as a precis of its contents. David Brown's slim book, which runs well under two hundred pages, satisfies not one but three schools of interest. Firstly, for those expecting grand strategy, the book both devotes a chapter to the

subject and draws on this discipline frequently. Secondly, for those wishing to draw on succinct engineering statements, or learn of the technology of warship construction and armament, nearly half of the contents will assuage their thirst for knowledge. Lastly, for those whose source of enjoyment is crystal-ball gazing, there is much on which to speculate.

The diversity of this short and well illustrated work is both its strength and its weakness. The specialist in either strategy, technology, or long-term planning will rue the lack of detail. However, the naval enthusiast, with a wider brief, will applaud the author for both satisfying his curiosity and educating him about all the disciplines that go into the art of building and operating a modern warship. But do not expect a bland "party line" exposition. Far from it. Be prepared to disagree with any number of the author's theories, and in the fast-changing world in which we live, who is to say he is wrong?

David Brown has all the right qualifications to offer as an authority in his field. He spent his whole career in the design of warships and in associated research, retiring in 1988 as the Deputy Chief Naval Architect. He brings his wide experience to his public in both a digestible and informative style—never blinding the reader with technology, yet never insulting the intelligence of those with some knowledge of the subject.

However, the book is not without its faults. Largely conceived in 1988, it was first published in Great Britain

in 1991, so much of the strategic thought centers on the Soviet Union as the major threat. Although the author recognises that times have changed, the frequent references to the West's old adversary, and how tomorrow's navy should be designed to counter it, are somewhat annoying. His words are, no doubt, music to the ears of those who say that antisubmarine warfare and the convoy system are not dead, and he draws on the thoughts of Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Chernavin (until recently commander-in-chief of the Russian, and before that the Soviet, navy) to support his premise that little has changed.

One of David Brown's main themes is the need to maximise the number of organic aircraft at sea. Whether he really believes in a strategic necessity for this capability is not clear, but he succeeds in satisfying another strong naval lobby, although his projections suffer from undue adherence to this strategy. There is also a tendency in his writing to extol the virtues of one philosophy or design, only to contradict later his own arguments. Again, this is both a strength and a weakness. A wide range of propositions are made and left open-ended, leaving one to make up one's own mind.

The book does arrive at a number of conclusions, all drawn under the umbrella of the problems of the "conflicts between resources and commitments and between quality and quantity." Brown has written a valuable work, and, on

his own admission, has "stirred the pot with vigour." The reader can be forgiven for feeling rather punch-drunk when finished reading the book. Controversy, innovative thought, and not a little bias drip from every page. Tomorrow's Royal Navy would benefit enormously if this book were made required reading for the operational requirements fraternity and for those who hold the purse strings. For the remainder of us, one needs look no further to be educated, exasperated, and stimulated. All for much less than the cost of a theatre ticket.

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Tower, John G.; Brown, James; and Cheek, William K., eds. *Verification: The Key to Arms Control in the 1990s*. McLean, Va.: Brassey's (US), 1992. 243pp. \$32

Blechman, Barry M., et al. *Naval Arms Control: A Strategic Assessment*. New York: St. Martin's, 1991. 268pp. \$45

These two books complement each other. Unfortunately, both were written before the extent of the collapse of the Soviet Union was appreciated. Therefore, each book has a distinctly "Cold War" flavor. One could almost draw the inference that the subject of arms control needs the dominating presence of the Soviet Union to be of interest. However, a moment's reflection puts that idea to rest. This review,

then, concentrates on the aspects of both books that offer an illumination of the arms control environment in a multipolar world marked by regional interest to the United States and by intractable disputes among the indigenous populations.

The authors of each book are distinguished in the arms control field. James Brown is the principal editor of *Verification*, which contains a number of essays by individuals at universities and national security "think tanks." Barry Blechman is the senior author of *Naval Arms Control*, in which each of the four authors contributed major sections. This reviewer found the two articles written by Cathleen S. Fisher, "Controlling High-Risk U.S. and Soviet Naval Operations" and "Limiting Nuclear Weapons at Sea," to be particularly valuable, as was William J. Durch's compilation of U.S.-Soviet maritime incidents in his article, "Things That Go Bump in the Bight: Assessing Maritime Incidents, 1972-1989." *Naval Arms Control* does not address regional security explicitly, and it only indirectly notes that other countries had at-sea nuclear capabilities that presumably had to be figured into the calculus of arms limitations. In the lead article, "Geopolitics, U.S. Interests, and Naval Arms Control," Barry Blechman has detailed the asymmetric roles of the U.S. Navy and that of the former Soviet Union. Without the Soviet Union there is only the (disquieting) existence of a residual naval nuclear arsenal in parts of that region, and potential naval nuclear