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John H. Maurer
Arthur J. Marder
Mark Jacobsen
John Horsfield
Edwyn Gray

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The author tempers his criticism in his explanation of how the assault on Guadalcanal by the American navy and marines achieved local tactical surprise as well as strategic surprise of the first magnitude. However, this plan, pushed by Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet, launched a strategic offensive with the Allies in an inferior material position, which left a potentially fatal imbalance in one leg of the tripod of forces. The U.S. Navy, outnumbered and outgunned, fought bravely as always.

In addition the author pays his respect to the suffering, starving, and defeated enemy survivors: “We cannot leave the subject of the Japanese soldiers on Guadalcanal without honoring them for their one supreme virtue—a determination and a courage—far above that of any of the other combatants in World War II.”

This work confirms this reviewer’s long held opinion that the United States Navy—the Naval War College in particular—should devote time to the study of this important campaign. Though our weapons are more sophisticated and require tactical changes, the fundamental decisions of leadership are the same. The author offers a work that will provide gain for the gristmill. Every military professional is encouraged to read it.

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Britain’s collapse as a world power is a topic that continues to fascinate. One element responsible for the breakdown of British power was the inability of Britain’s Royal Navy to offer effective naval protection to the empire east of Suez when faced with the outbreak of war with Japan in December 1941. During the opening campaigns of the war against Japan, Britain’s Royal Navy was hunted down, forced to run, and dispatched in short order when it stood to fight.

The litany of early disasters that overtook the Royal Navy in the Pacific War is familiar. On 10 December 1941, Japanese land-based aircraft destroyed the capital ships Prince of Wales and Repulse that made up Force Z, based at Singapore. In April of 1942, when Japan’s force of fast carriers raided into the Indian Ocean, Britain’s battle fleet of aging battleships under Admiral Sir James Somerville had to avoid harm’s way lest it be annihilated. The Royal Navy, which had once served as tutor and model to the Japanese navy, was now having its ears boxed by its former pupil. It was indeed fortunate for Britain that while Japan carried out its advance toward Southeast Asia it also attacked the
United States, thereby helping to forge the coalition that ultimately overwhelmed the Japanese Empire. Since Japan became strategically overextended in fighting a multi-front war, the British Empire survived without losing India or Australia despite the weakness of the Royal Navy.

As the Japanese Empire crumbled, the Royal Navy staged a comeback and participated in the Pacific advance toward Japan. The British battleship *King George V* bombarded Japanese industrial plants on Honshu by the summer of 1945.

Arthur J. Marder’s first volume of this history was completed before he died in 1980. It examined the British and Japanese naval planning and preparations for a war during the late 1930s and the opening naval campaign off the coast of Malaya that witnessed the destruction of Force Z. The present second volume discusses operations of the British and Japanese navies during the Pacific War.

At the time of his death, only Part One of this study had been completed. It comprises the six opening chapters, which deal with the period of December 1941 to April 1942.

Two students of Marder’s, Mark Jacobsen and John Horsfield, ably took up the task of completing the second volume at the behest of Marder’s widow. We are fortunate that they did. The result is a detailed narrative of British naval operations against Japan.

Part One displays Marder’s skill as a naval historian, particularly in his account of Somerville’s desperate attempt to fend off the raid by Admiral Nagumo’s carriers into the Indian Ocean in April 1942. It provides a close-up picture of the strategic and operational dilemmas confronting admirals in command of fighting fleets.

Jacobsen and Horsfield have continued Mader’s narration, providing a historical account of the Royal Navy’s operations throughout the remainder of the war. They have done an exceptionally fine job of disentangling both the complicated story of British decisionmaking in crafting a strategy for the closing campaigns of the war against Japan, and also the personality conflicts that afflicted Britain’s top leadership.

One drawback to this history, however, is the lack of exploration into the larger, more searching analytical hypotheses. Jacobsen and Horsfield have provided a solid narrative, but did not take the opportunity to analyze their conclusions about naval operations.

Despite this criticism, the now completed two-volume study of the Royal Navy in the Pacific War is a fitting conclusion to Arthur J. Marder’s long and productive career as a naval historian.

*Operation Pacific*, by Edwin Gray, discusses the same topic in less than half the length, and at less than half the cost. His writing style flows easily, and as a consequence he has produced an accessible single-volume history of British naval operations against Japan.
during the Second World War. This, however, is the book's only virtue.

Gray has provided nothing new from his research or strategic analysis, nor does the author have much to say about the struggle of the Japanese. Indeed, strategic analysis is clearly subordinated to his stories about naval operations.

Of the two books reviewed, *Old Friends New Enemies* is a scholarly work, while *Operation Pacific* was apparently written to reach the general audience.

JOHN H. MAURER
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The dust jacket of this work says that the book argues "that the vast majority of junior naval officers under Hitler, while well trained and prepared to defend 'Volk and Vaterland' as good patriots, felt no profound or lasting attachment to Nazi ideology. Instead, their ideological preferences remained with patriotic, conservative groups such as the German National People's Party and its successor organizations after World War II."

This prepared me to suffer the defense of the Kriegsmarine's passivity in, if not outright support of, the Nazi administration. This reviewer has felt insulted by defenses of institutions that aided and abetted Adolph Hitler in his immoral activities by apologies that claim that "we were never Nazi's" and assert that "We fought the good fight—never mind what we fought for!"

It was a pleasant surprise, then, to find that this work contained instead a rich documentation of the construction, selection, and training of the Kriegsmarine's officer corps. It is a collective biography of 318 men who joined the Kriegsmarine in 1934 to become naval officers. Rust has provided a professional, political, and psychological group portrait.

Selection was made from a pool of about 7,300 petitioners; thus the Kriegsmarine had the luxury of selecting one out of every twenty-five or thirty applicants. The recruits came from the middle and upper classes of Christian background (the navy never admitted either Jews or atheists into its officer corps), with the majority coming from north Germany. All were from conservative backgrounds, known for a strong distrust of democratic government and a longing for the return to the pre-World War I autocratic conditions. The three-and-one-half-year indoctrination isolated the trainees from their family and friends, creating the desired effect of loyalty to the navy and to their crew class that outweighed any previous ties to the outside world. Their training was guaranteed to inculcate and reinforce their conservative-obedient tendencies. There were no closet liberals in this society.

Rust has reconstructed the activities of the members of Crew 34 during and after World War II. Emphasis is placed on the political as well as the