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Bismark and the Development of Germany, Vol. I: The Period of Unification, 1815-1871; Vol. II: The Period of Consolidation, 1871-1880; Vol. III: The Period of Fortification, 1880-1898

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professional activities of crew members. For the uninitiated, the author has described just what the "crew concept" meant to the German navy, and its profound influence upon its members. This is a refreshing and comprehensive study, but it is a microcosm of the German military, *not* German society.

It was the elitist and ultraconservative nature of the armed forces, coupled with their stated goal of political neutrality, that allowed Hitler to remain in power. This work documents something that may be more important than the lack of residual Nazism: that institutional Nazism was more effective in its way than overt Nazism. This system, as it existed in the prewar period, guaranteed that without question the armed forces would support any conservative government. The Kriegsmarine, through its policy of political neutrality, constituted a support to authoritarian, militaristic regimes. What political neutrality actually meant was that the Kriegsmarine was politically obedient to the dictatorial government in power.

Erich Rust is the son of a member of Crew 36, which has provided him with insight into the crew system of the German navy. He argues with considerable effectiveness that the junior officers under Hitler never were Nazis. While accepting his conclusion on the limited effects of Nazism on the junior officers, it is important to remember the speech given by Adolph Hitler after the assassination attempt of 20 July 1944:

"Not a single one of these criminals belongs to the navy. Today it has no Reichpietsch in it." Also, the post-Putsch statement by Grand Admiral Doenitz, "Eating dirt rather than return to Jewry control," is an important indicator of the navy's involvement with the Nazi party.

This is an important work for those who wish to understand the effects of a single political party or system of government on its military. It may just help us to understand the problems we encounter when dealing with countries less friendly to democratic governments.

While reporting a "happy ending," this history depicts a "scary" theme: how honorable men can easily become the instrument of a criminal government.

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Pflanze, Otto. *Bismarck and the Development of Germany, Volume I: The Period of Unification, 1815-1871*. 518pp. \$39.50. Volume II: *The Period of Consolidation, 1871-1880*. 554pp. \$39.50. Volume III: *The Period of Fortification, 1880-1898*. 474pp. \$35. New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990.

This trilogy is the culmination of more than four decades of labor, and it constitutes a welcome issuance after the German "reunification." Indeed, both the debate as to whether to relocate the German capital to Berlin (decided in June 1991) and the Bismarck

exhibition in that city have served to stimulate interest in the Iron Chancellor specifically and in the historical problem of Prussia generally.

Pflanze has mastered not only the well known published documents and literature but gained access to the archives at Merseburg and Potsdam in the former German Democratic Republic, as well as to the Bismarck Family Archive at Friedrichsruh.

The author has chosen to concentrate on Bismarck as the river pilot on "the stream of time." Perhaps the most important segment of the work is the fourth chapter of Volume I, "The Strategy of *Realpolitik*." Therein Pflanze has analyzed Bismarck's political strategy as "the art of the possible." Subtitles such as "the fulcrum of power" and "the chessboard of politics" adumbrate the author's thesis that Bismarck's true genius lay in his ability to make the best of a myriad of bad choices and in his insistence upon a strategy that allowed for alternatives at every juncture (the Clausewitzian notion of reassessment under escalation). It has been suggested that this chapter be required reading "for all contemporary practitioners of foreign policy." It certainly will be welcome reading for students of strategy and policy at the Naval War College.

If the trilogy has a weakness, it is that the last two volumes concentrate almost entirely on domestic affairs. Of the thirty-two chapters of these two volumes not one is dedicated to Bismarck's celebrated conflicts with what he termed the "demi-gods" of

the general staff. Surely, the "war-in-sight" crisis of 1875, the Bad Kissingen *Diktat* of 1877, the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and the great crisis with the military in 1887 deserve at least as much space as the Iron Chancellor's occasional mental depressions and confirmed gourmandism. Current leaders should "suffer" such disabilities!

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Ley, Ronald. *A Whisper of Espionage: Wolfgang Kohler and the Apes of Tenerife*. New York: Avery, 1990. 255pp. (No price given)

"A famous scientist, a tropical isle, and a ring of spies. . . ." This would appear to have all the ingredients of a spy thriller. However, rather than entertaining, this book is merely boring. Ronald Ley, author and psychologist, has attempted to apply "scientific method" to history on the assumption that he could "categorically prove" from data gained by personal interviews and visits to and research in Germany and England that Dr. Wolfgang Kohler had been a German spy.

Ley asserts that the founder of gestalt psychology had during World War I probably operated a clandestine radio that provided intelligence to German naval units operating near the Canary Islands. At that time Kohler was on the Island of Tenerife conducting research on apes that later led to his psychological theories.