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The United States Navy and United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations

Captain George Allison, U.S. Navy

In the Gulf, we saw the United Nations playing the role dreamed of by its founders, with the world's leading nations orchestrating and sanctioning collective action against aggression.

President George Bush,
National Security Strategy of the United States, 1991

ALMOST AS SIGNIFICANT AS THE DEFEAT of Iraq in the recent Gulf war was the United Nations' role in authorizing and coordinating international military efforts. The potency of the UN mandate for the use of force enabled rapid mobilization of the world's armed forces and greatly strengthened the bonding of the alliance against Iraq. No longer just a debating society, the UN has attained considerable influence in formulating and directing global policy, and the world now sees the UN as a legitimate participant in the conduct of international events. Indeed, U. S. national policy explicitly supports the UN, and the *National Security Strategy* states that the United States seeks to "strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, economic and social progress. . . ." ¹

Authorizing a great war, however, is an unusual event for the UN, for, by far, its more customary (and less sensational) operations are peace-keeping and the maintenance of international peace and security. Since its first operation in Indonesia in 1947, the UN has supervised over fifteen major peace-keeping undertakings on three continents.² Here too, the UN has become much more visible and dynamic; the scope and intensity of peace-keeping have increased,

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and the 1992 efforts in Cambodia and Yugoslavia, for instance, involved very large, multinational forces in complex and difficult operations requiring substantial financing and logistics. As its founders intended, the UN is becoming the world's primary agent for active enforcement of global peace and security.

If, however, there is a surprising attribute of these peace-keeping operations in the forty-six years since Indonesia, it is the minimal contribution of maritime forces. Although every country that the UN has entered for peace-keeping purposes has had a seacoast, the number of times that navies have participated can be counted on the fingers of one hand, and most of those few were over twenty-five year ago. Whether because of member nations' reluctance to part with their ships or simply an absence of need, the UN has seldom called upon maritime forces.

Recent events, however, show that the United Nations is becoming aware of the versatility and mobility of seagoing forces; it has begun to incorporate them into its operations, under its control and flying the UN flag. Indeed, with the extension of economic exclusion zones out to two hundred miles, and with the increase in global drug smuggling, international maritime missions are increasing in visibility and importance, and it is likely that the UN will soon acknowledge a greater need for ships and navies—not just for peace-keeping, but peace-enforcing as well. The U.S. Navy must now consider whether it intends to participate in these operations, and if so, how it will do so.

Should the U.S. Navy contribute forces to UN operations? Would American ships flying the UN flag contribute to the success of missions and promote world peace? Or would they, instead, lose their freedom of action and possibly their sovereignty, becoming subject, to paraphrase Jefferson, to "an entangling alliance"? And, if the ships are used by the UN, how should command and control be organized? The purposes of this paper are to investigate these questions, determine the prospective benefits and liabilities of assigning the U.S. Navy to UN missions, and recommend a course of action.

To examine properly the possibilities of these operations, the history and organization of UN peace-keeping forces on land are examined and the results extrapolated to seagoing forces. The article then assesses the historical contributions of naval forces to the UN and describes possible future missions, with justification for conducting them under the United Nations flag. The next section describes how UN peace-keeping operations, in general, work, summarizing each aspect of the missions: the authorization to assemble forces; how forces are raised, controlled, and supplied; and legal matters, including the law of armed conflict as it applies to international bodies. This discussion is followed by an examination of how the foregoing approaches would apply to seagoing forces on United Nations missions.

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Former and Future Missions

The U.S. Navy's early association with United Nations operations was extensive. America's first participation in UN peacekeeping was in 1947, when the attack transport *Renville* served as the headquarters ship for the UN team mediating between the Dutch and the Indonesians over sovereignty of what was then known as the Netherlands East Indies. A peace agreement fashioned aboard that ship came to be known as the Renville Truce.

In June 1948 three U.S. destroyers and a French minesweeper provided patrol and transport services for Count Folke Bernadotte, the UN officer mediating between the Arabs and Israelis struggling in Palestine. When a truce between the opponents broke down in July, the escort carrier *Palau* and an attack cargo ship evacuated the endangered truce observers and their equipment from Haifa and brought them to safety until the truce could be renegotiated.³

During the Korean war, the American navy was one of ten serving in Task Force 95, the "United Nations Blockading and Escort Force." The ships of this formation flew the UN flag, and command of its various task groups rotated among officers of all the nations. Task Group 95.1 in particular, which patrolled the west coast of Korea, was commanded throughout the war by a British rear admiral. Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, USN, who commanded the task force, was later adamant that the ten navies had been able to work together effectively.⁴

In 1961 the civilian-manned U.S. Navy transport USNS *General R.M. Blatchford* began a tour that lasted two and one-half years during which she carried over 36,000 troops, doctors, and nurses to and from the Congo for a large UN operation being carried on in that African state.⁵

Since 1964, however, the United Nations has not asked for a U.S. warship to participate in a peace-keeping force, and none has flown the UN flag since the Korean War. The UN has not been without concerns at sea, however, and it has recently experimented with maritime forces. From November 1989 until December 1991, Argentina provided four patrol boats with crews to the UN observer group in Central America to help monitor cross-border traffic in the Gulf of Fonseca between Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. The boats had UN observers onboard, flew the UN flag, and reported to the senior UN observer ashore.⁶ It is also to be recalled that after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the first military action authorized by the UN was boarding and search at sea.⁷

Today the UN is coming to realize the value of naval assets for forward presence and crisis response, just as the United States has acknowledged that value in its national military strategy. If the Argentine operation was a harbinger, the UN will in the future want to use American warships as part of a force under its own command.

There are several missions that might properly be conducted under the UN aegis in the areas of conflict resolution, peacetime contingencies, and peace-keeping.⁸ Some of the ideas most frequently discussed in contemporary writings are:

- *Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) patrols.* Since EEZs were expanded out to two hundred miles from the boundaries of territorial seas, the formerly international waters therein have assumed new value for their new parent states. Ninety-five percent of the world's fish catch is taken in EEZs, and disputes over fishing and other economic rights in these waters may call for international supervision.

- *Drug interdiction.* Drug smuggling on the high seas is now a global problem, not one that is just between Latin America and the United States. European cities as well are ports of entry for narcotics, and traffickers are using all the traditional maritime trade routes. For uniform international enforcement, control of interdiction patrols might be best managed under UN coordination.

- *Disaster and humanitarian relief.* The fall of the Soviet Union, famine, and a series of natural and man-made disasters have combined to make humanitarian relief a growing world concern. Ships are valuable for this purpose because of their transport capacity and mobility, those with large, helicopter-capable decks especially so. Only a few nations have such ships, and if there were to be a large operation, international control might be desirable to bring them together rapidly.

- *Non-combatant evacuation operations.* The United States has frequently used its naval forces in evacuations in Third-World countries undergoing political upheavals, rescuing civilians of other nations also. A small nation without such naval capability needing to evacuate its people from an unfriendly area would probably appeal to the UN for help.

- *Mine clearance.* Navies of a number of nations have developed expertise in particular types of mine clearance—shallow water, deep water, close to shore, far from land, etc. In a complex clearance operation, with mines spread over large, dissimilar areas, the capabilities of several different navies would be required; a means of assembling such a multinational force would be required as well.

- *Assistance to peace-keeping forces ashore.* Naval forces can contribute to UN operations on land in numerous ways, including offshore command and control, logistics, surveillance, and boarding and search of vessels bound for the countries of interest.

As the international community develops additional common purposes, the justification for international control of some types of naval operations may become more apparent than at present. If this control is to be exercised at all, however, the maritime forces must adapt to the framework of UN rules and procedures.

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The Basis and Conduct of Peace-Keeping Operations

When the United Nations Charter was written in 1945, the member nations desired an organization that would not only promote international peace and security but have the means to enforce it as well. The ability to take military action against a state was codified in Chapter VII, which gives the UN the authority to use force, obligates member nations to provide troops, and puts the military forces involved under the control of a Military Staff Committee composed of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members of the Security Council.

Because of internal disagreements preventing the required unanimity among the Security Council members, however, the UN has never used the enforcement powers of Chapter VII to raise a force or lead military actions. Except for a single formal meeting in 1947, the Military Staff Committee has ceased to function; it is called to order twice every month for the sole purpose of adjournment.⁹ UN forces in the Korean conflict, although sanctioned by the organization and flying its flag, were commanded by the United States, which functioned as a combined commander as it would in the war against Iraq.¹⁰

Realizing that a United Nations-directed force for controlling breaches of peace would be useful, however, the members have developed a number of protocols, based on voluntary cooperation, to provide peace-keeping forces. Article 24 of the Charter gives the Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security"; this authority has been reinforced by the "Uniting for Peace Resolution," which affirms that the General Assembly may "act promptly and recommend actions, including collective measures, to restore or preserve international peace and security."¹¹ The peace-keeping mission has overtaken enforcement in priority.

What are peace-keeping operations, and how do they differ from the conventional use of military force? Paul Martin, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, has outlined the best characterization of peace-keeping operations:

1. Peace-keeping involves the interposition of an international presence in one form or another.
2. The object of peace-keeping is, essentially, to prevent violence from breaking out or to contain or curtail it where it already has broken out. UN forces are strictly debarred from taking the initiative in the use of armed force, and, indeed, may use it only as a last resort.
3. Peace-keeping is designed to create or restore, as the case may be, an environment in which a peaceful solution to the problems at issue can at least be contemplated.¹²

In addition to the essential elements—the control of violence and the use of force only in self-defense—UN-sanctioned peace-keeping operations have historically required the approval of the parties to the conflict: host governments

where possible, or factional representatives where there was no host. Peace-keeping is built on a foundation of fairness in which the UN strives to avoid taking sides. Consent for entry into the country is negotiated with those entities and becomes part of the peace-keeping resolution, which states the intent of the operation, the rights and responsibilities of UN-provided forces in the country, and the duties of the host government. Peace-keepers are not just policemen; they must be capable of carrying out military operations, and they are bound by the conventional rules of war, including the Geneva conventions. They act with the authority of the Security Council and with the explicit permission of the interested parties.

Raising Forces. Once a decision has been made to undertake an operation, the UN can ask member states to furnish forces under Charter Article 25, which states that "the members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."¹³ Forces are offered by the respective ambassadors, and the Secretary General selects contingents in consultation with the host government and other interested parties.¹⁴ In the past, to avoid superpower confrontations the five permanent members of the Security Council were not included in armed operations; this restriction is no longer applicable. In fact, a battalion of Russian paratroopers is now on duty with the UN force in the former Yugoslavia.¹⁵ Should U.S. forces be considered for participation in armed peace-keeping operations, the president can provide them to the UN under the "United Nations Participation Act of 1945," which authorizes the president to make available to the UN "armed forces, facilities, or assistance."

Because the Military Staff Committee is inoperative, creation and organization of the peace-keeping force is arranged by the UN Under-Secretary for Peace-Keeping affairs, assisted by the Military Advisor to the Secretary General. The Military Advisor, who is typically a general officer from a nation other than the permanent members of the Security Council, has no executive authority but is simply a coordinator who can only recommend action. To underscore the civilian character of the missions, the Military Staff Committee has been purposely omitted from responsibility for peace-keeping operations.¹⁶

The forces that are voluntarily supplied can be arbitrarily withdrawn as well, which has been a notable weakness of these operations. Withdrawal of forces is considered a right, and the mechanism for it has been written into the agreements that raise the forces, with the proviso that a "national contingent . . . will not be withdrawn without adequate prior notification, to the Secretary-General, so as to avoid the impairment of the ability of the force to discharge its functions."¹⁷ States have withdrawn their forces not only for their own national emergencies and self-defense, but also because they no longer supported the mandate of the


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commitment.¹⁸ The length of an operation has also caused states to consider withdrawal, as in the Cyprus mission, which has lasted for twenty-eight years.¹⁹

Command and Control. The UN uses two command structures in its operations. In the first, command is delegated to a state or group of states, and they control their own forces. This was the arrangement used in the major enforcement operations in Korea and the Gulf war. The forces are bound by the conventional laws of armed conflict and act as agents of the UN, but under their own flags.

Under the second structure, which is used for peace-keeping operations, command is entrusted to an individual who is appointed by and responsible to the UN but is without disciplinary authority over the multi-national troops under his command. Individual countries maintain the right to compel compliance with orders and punish infractions (see figure 1).²⁰ With the consent of the Security Council, the Secretary General appoints the commander, who then reports to the Secretary General through the Under-Secretary for Peace-Keeping Affairs. The commander may be a military officer, as in the current Balkans operation, or a civilian, as is presently the situation in Cambodia; if he is military, however, he generally has a political advisor, or "Special Representative," to assist. The political advisor is not, as was the case in the Soviet navy, a "watchdog" over the commander but serves instead as a liaison with the host government to handle delicate political matters.

Figure 1
Chain of Command for UN Peace-Keeping Operations



When multinational forces are present, the host country is divided into geographic areas, and each national force is given charge of a zone. The national contingents maintain representatives on the headquarters staff and are subject to the operational authority of the commander. As was noted above, however, the commander has no disciplinary authority over the forces under his command; this authority is retained by the national governments.

The UN finances the on-scene forces, meeting the accumulated costs from its peace-keeping budget, to which all members contribute. The participating nations are expected to cover the normal pay and routine administration of their forces, but the UN reimburses governments for extraordinary costs associated with their units' deployments. Furthermore, the UN is responsible for logistical support associated with the mission, although in cases where large amounts are required, the participating states are requested to furnish them.²¹ The growing UN budget for peace-keeping is indicative of the organization's rising commitment to these operations; the peace-keeping bill quadrupled in 1992, to almost \$3 billion.²²

Communications from the field to UN headquarters in New York are primarily conducted via commercial satellite links, such as INMARSAT. A civilian version of the STU-III secure telephone is used for encrypted traffic; it is backed up by commercial telephone lines and cablegrams.

Status of Forces Agreements. As agents of the United Nations, peace-keeping forces enjoy many privileges of the diplomatic corps, including immunity from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the host government. Before an operation commences, a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is negotiated with the host country to secure these immunities and to guarantee freedom of movement within the country. The typical SOFA requires the forces to respect the laws of the host country, including border customs and foreign exchange, but to be subject only to the civil and criminal laws of their own government.

Under the SOFA, a commission established by the Secretary General arbitrates claims among the various parties.²³ Although claims may be submitted by a state to the UN for expenses, they may also be submitted by the UN against a state for damages. These could include costs of the early withdrawal of a state's forces, or property damage committed by its soldiers.²⁴

Rules of Engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict. UN forces have but one rule of engagement: to use force only in self-defense. To quote from a typical peace-keeping resolution, "The force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character. It will not use force except in self-defense. Self-defense would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. The force will

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proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict will take all the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Council.”²⁵

UN forces are, of course, subject to the Geneva Convention and the accepted laws of armed conflict; in the matter of prisoners of war, however, there is an exception. Since the UN has no courts, it cannot take disciplinary action against prisoners. For this reason, the participating forces become individually responsible for disciplining prisoners, and handle them under their national laws.²⁶

Naval Forces in United Nations Operations

Thus we have seen that there can be substantial peace-keeping missions for naval forces operating under a UN flag, and that ground forces engaged in such missions are governed by an evolved set of command-and-control procedures and negotiated rules. These procedures and rules are not sufficient for integration and control of naval forces, however; the complexities of both naval operations and established maritime law raise new issues that must be resolved before ships can be assigned to UN control. Four of the most important issues are:

- *Operational control.* The UN naval commander must have sufficient authority to direct the ships assigned, but he must direct them in ways compatible with United Nations guidelines—many years of negotiation and experience have made them practical and widely acceptable.
- *Sovereignty.* The historical principle that ships are sovereign territory has made nations reluctant to transfer them to international control. Sovereignty of the ships must be maintained.
- *The Law of the Sea.* International maritime law is concerned with ships that fly a state’s flag and does not address those operated by an international organization. The Law of the Sea must be interpreted as to its application to UN-flagged vessels.
- *Financing and logistics.* The costs of naval operations are prohibitive, which is why only the wealthiest countries can afford oceangoing fleets. For the UN to fund a naval force as it does a ground force would overwhelm its peace-keeping budget. The financial burden on the UN should be minimized.

Operational Control. The type of operational control (OpCon) used in peace-keeping operations, that of entrusting command to an individual appointed by and responsible to the UN but without disciplinary authority, is readily adaptable to forces at sea and would not interfere with the sovereignty of ships. The authority of the force commander would extend only to the each ship’s commanding officer, who would retain full disciplinary authority over his crew. Conceivably, the force commander could request replacement for a commanding officer, or even the entire ship if its performance were below expectations,

but matters of training and readiness onboard the ship would continue to be under the cognizance of the commanding officer and his national government.

The commanding officer would report to two authorities: the force commander for operations, and his national government for everything else. If there is a conundrum here, it is that the force commander may order the ship to do something detrimental to the interests of its own flag. Presumably, the mission would be well enough defined to prevent this contingency, but if it did occur, the commanding officer would be able to consult with his government through national communications channels. Agreements that transfer ships to the operational command of the UN must be explicit and clearly describe the bounds of the operation, as well as grievance procedures if either party—the force commander or the ship—is dissatisfied with the performance of the other.

The presence on board of a force commander who is not of the same nationality as the ship may present a security problem to the flagship, but not an insurmountable one. The UN has been very amenable to appointing commanders acceptable to all parties; the countries that supply the forces have a voice in their selection. Forces for peacekeeping operations are offered to the UN voluntarily, and a government always has the option to withdraw its offer if the commander is unacceptable. Furthermore, it is not strictly necessary to have the force commander at sea with his ships at all, as long as they are responsive to his direction.²⁷

A ship on board which the force commander is embarked would be regarded as being under his continuous operational control, but other ships would enjoy a flexibility not available to land forces, the option of temporary OpCon. Land forces need continuous OpCon to remain in the host country legally, but a ship can patrol in international waters without special authority. Therefore, ships can come and go from the mission as required, and need hoist the UN flag only when actively involved in the operation. This type of OpCon could apply to drug interdiction and EEZ patrols, to which ships can contribute while engaged in routine, non-UN-related transits.

Very little effort is necessary to bring ships into the UN communications system. The commercial INMARSAT system that, as noted, provides to land-based forces direct links to UN headquarters in New York City was in fact designed for shipboard service, and it is accessible worldwide. Capable of secure voice and data (via fax) transmission, the equipment is portable and could be supplied by the UN to each unit; connection to the ship's satellite antennas is helpful but not necessary. A commercial system has the advantages of separating UN traffic from national communications systems, which alleviates overloading of the latter and helps prevent security compromises; it also permits expeditious transmission of mission-related intelligence, all of which should go through UN headquarters. National systems could, of course, be available for backup.

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Sovereignty. The sovereignty issue is perhaps the greatest impediment to assignment of U.S. naval forces to the UN for peace-keeping; it is widely believed that once transferred to UN control, they would no longer be answerable to the president or Congress, and that as "international" vessels they might also be subject to boarding and inspection. These concerns are unfounded, for, as will be seen, the sovereignty of ships is protected even in international operations.

Ships in UN operations remain immune from boarding and inspection. By international law, warships have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any state other than the "flag state," that whose flag they fly. Some may argue that when the ship is under UN OpCon and flying the UN flag in addition to its own, the UN is the flag state, but this a very tenuous interpretation of the law, one which could not be accepted by any U.S. warship commanding officer, at least. Furthermore, Article 105 of the UN Charter provides that the organization "shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes." Many precedents establish that UN-controlled buildings are inviolate and immune from search; I believe the same standard should apply to UN-controlled ships, as well.²⁸

The right of withdrawal is an inherent feature of agreements that assemble peace-keeping forces, and it remains the ultimate expression of sovereignty. There has been no precedent for a country surrendering its forces to unlimited UN control, and it is unlikely that such a condition would ever be required for peace-keeping.

The Law of the Sea. Consent of host entities is a prerequisite for land-based UN peace-keeping operations, but under the authority of Article 105, quoted above, a UN-flagged vessel should, it would seem, be able to enter the territorial waters of member states without consent. The vessel would be operating in the territorial waters of the member nation "for the fulfillment of its purposes," and would therefore be entitled to "such privileges and immunities as are necessary," including, presumably, the privilege of presence itself.

Ships have the ability, which land forces do not, of rapidly shifting between noninvolvement and presence—and herein lies a fundamental value of maritime forces for UN peace-keeping. Consent has never been necessary for ships in international waters, and it apparently need not hinder UN-flagged ships in littoral waters either. International law, and mobility, would give UN-flagged ships flexibility unknown to the ground forces.

Financing and Logistics. Naval forces are very expensive, and if the UN intends to use them in maritime operations, it should expect to reimburse participating governments for part of their costs, just as it does for ground operations. As is the case for ground-based peace-keeping, the organization should offset "extraordinary costs" over and above those of normal operating. These costs would

include additional fuel consumed while on station, transportation of supplies to the deployed forces, and personnel transfers to and from the ships. Using its international offices, the UN can arrange port calls to resupply the ships, absorbing the administrative costs involved, including tugs, pilots, and pier space.

Considering the strained UN budget, financing will no doubt be the biggest obstacle to overcome if naval forces of any nation are to participate in peace-keeping; paradoxically, however, it could also be the biggest inducement. Rather than turn ships over to continuous UN control, countries could submit to intermittent, or "token," control (i.e., fly the UN flag) in return for token reimbursement. Countries could experiment with UN control at a low level of initial commitment, performing missions that they would do anyway, while the UN determines the probable costs and benefits. Everyone gains: the UN sees its mission done, the participating countries enjoy a UN sanction and a little money back, and each can evaluate the potential for further operations.

As the influence of the United Nations increases and the organization assumes a more commanding role in world affairs, maritime peace-keeping and enforcement operations will inevitably come under its jurisdiction. The mobility and flexibility of naval forces can enhance the ability of the UN to act quickly in a world crisis, and because of the U.S. Navy's experience in global operations, it is there that the UN will look for them. The U.S. Navy now has the opportunity, by actively participating in these operations, to write UN doctrine and guide the priorities of peace-keeping and enforcement into the next century.

But why should the U.S. Navy subordinate its units to UN control, especially for missions that it has always done by itself? Humanitarian assistance and maritime patrol are traditional naval missions that the U.S. Navy has performed quite well on its own; UN OpCon may mean loss of exclusive authority over the ships involved and perhaps the addition of several layers of administration.

There is only one reason why the United States would in fact turn over its military forces to UN control—and it is not necessarily out of concern for international order. Instead it would be, to paraphrase the U.S. Army's manual FM 100-5, *Operations*, to assist in producing a condition in the theater of operations that will achieve the strategic goal. In several past maritime operations in which the United States was involved, American strategic goals were best achieved when its ships operated in an international task force or directly under UN guidance; in the new world environment, UN OpCon may again serve our purposes.

The benefits of operating under the UN flag are appreciable and timely. UN global responsibilities and its growing mandate to promote stability and control

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crises neatly dovetail with the similar concerns of the national security strategy and can provide a structure within which the Navy can continue worldwide presence in combined operations with fleets other than those of Nato and our Pacific allies. Centralized direction from the Security Council can add legitimacy to naval deployments and enhance the concept of collective security, itself an underlying goal of the national security strategy.

The foremost justification for UN involvement, though, is that even as the size of the Navy contracts due to budget cuts, the number of its potential responsibilities is greatly expanding. The single transcendent threat of the Soviet Union has disappeared, and in its place a multitude of lesser threats have emerged all over the world. Very soon, the U.S. Navy will no longer be large enough to be present simultaneously in all regions; a globally cooperative, multinational force will be necessary.

The advantages of involvement are thus apparent, and the way ahead is equally straightforward. To integrate itself effectively into UN missions, the U.S. Navy should:

- *First*, build confidence by initially proposing missions for which its (the Navy's) experience level and consequent probability of success are high. Humanitarian relief or evacuations are likely candidates. We should offer to fly the UN flag in return for Security Council resolutions endorsing the missions and should accept (token) reimbursement to avoid setting a precedent of "working for free." The length of the missions should be bounded in the enabling resolutions so as to preclude open-ended commitments. A UN representative need not be onboard but could be present as an observer.

- *Second*, use the lessons learned from early missions to formulate standard doctrine. Several areas for which UN naval doctrine will need formalization are: incorporation of UN political guidance into operational procedures; the applicability of international law to international naval forces; rules of engagement; the UN chain of command from New York headquarters to the ships at sea, and attendant communications procedures; the flow of intelligence from international sources through the UN organization; and allied participation in combined task force.

- *Third*, support the activation of the Military Staff Committee for peace-keeping and contingency operations. Now that the five permanent Security Council members are on relatively good terms, the Military Staff Committee can assume its proper role in coordination and leadership of military forces under UN control and, more importantly, can provide guidance for resolution of many of the doctrinal and procedural issues listed above.

There is no doubt that United States naval forces can assist in United Nations peace-keeping, and it should be clear that the association would be mutually beneficial. Simply put, the United Nations has the missions, and the United States has the ships. The two should get together.

Notes

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4. Malcom W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, *The Sea War in Korea* (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1957), p. 295.
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9. Prins, p. 137.
10. Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro, and Anne P. Simons, *Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1969), p. 333.
11. Boyd, p. 58. Article 24 reads: "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf."
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24. Bowett, p. 383.
25. Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 425, 1978 (UN Doc. S/12611 of 19 March 1978), as quoted in Siekmann, p. 208.
26. Bowett, p. 490.
27. Telephone conversation with Derek Boothby, 10 April 1992.
28. Goodrich et al., pp. 617-619.