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Werner Rahn

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# Japan and Germany, 1941–1943

## No Common Objective, No Common Plans, No Basis of Trust

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Captain Werner Rahn, German Navy

**S**INCE THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, the Japanese empire had been competing with the other world powers to achieve equal rights, recognition, and security. Her ultimate aim was to expand her power in East Asia and thereby reduce the influence of the Western powers by obtaining a position of regional hegemony. Since the end of World War I the United States had met this policy with growing opposition. America was committed to a liberal world economic order and was not prepared to accept a market area in Asia that was self-sufficient and shut off from the rest of the world. It was possible, for a time, to incorporate Japan into a world system of armament limitation and to restrict her territorial ambitions. However, the Manchurian crisis in the fall of 1931 and the resulting Japanese imperialist policy toward China made it clear that the Land of the Rising Sun was not, in the long run, going to accept the existing power structures in Asia. Washington gradually began to intensify economic pressure on Japan.

### From Neutrality to Wartime Alliance

In the spring and summer of 1940, the Japanese leadership saw the collapse of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, along with the British debacle at Dunkirk, as a “golden opportunity.” There seemed to be no doubt that Germany

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Captain Rahn is head of the Second World War Research Department, Military History Research Office of the German Armed Forces, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Hamburg University. From September 1991 until February 1992 he was a Secretary of the Navy Research Fellow at the Naval War College.

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would defeat Great Britain in the end. Therefore, the Imperial Army and Navy Staffs looked forward to the defeat of the Western powers and made plans to inherit their rich colonies in Southeast Asia. Signing the Tripartite Pact on 27 September 1940, "Japan bound herself to the future of Germany and Italy, but retained the freedom to choose the timing and objectives of her war effort." However, in the fall and winter of 1940 it was obvious to Japan that its policy of hegemony in the Far East was at a dead end. The Tripartite Pact had failed in its goal of deterring the United States from increasing its economic pressure against Tokyo. The protracted war in China "was draining the industrial and financial resources of Japan without adequate compensation"; The Japanese army had involved the country "in a war that could not be won and had secured gains that could not be dominated or consolidated."<sup>1</sup>

From 1939 onward, the United States sought to bring about a revision of Japanese power politics. In addition, America began in 1940 to intensify efforts to build up the U.S. Navy. Regarding this rearmament increasingly as a threat, the Japanese had calculated, on the basis of the construction plans and shipyard capacities of the two sides, that their own fleet would probably approach seventy percent of the American fleet's strength by the end of 1941 but thereafter would drop steadily, reaching thirty percent by 1944. For Japan, this amounted to a clear degradation of its status as a naval power.<sup>2</sup>

The Japanese Naval Staff did not, however, expect a sizeable reinforcement of the American fleet before 1942. It had also assumed, wrongly estimating German potential, that Great Britain would soon be defeated. The Naval Staff saw, accordingly, the emergence of a "window of vulnerability" in terms of Japan's own armaments and those of its adversaries.<sup>3</sup> Specifically, the Japanese predicted an opening in the fall of 1941 with respect to their potential adversary, the United States, that could be exploited for offensive action in Southeast Asia. It was, however, strategically imperative from the outset that Japan limit the conflict to one or two years and quickly consolidate the conquered territories, in order to achieve an acceptable compromise peace.

In the spring and summer of 1941 the Japanese leadership had to accept that their most powerful ally in Europe was going its own way in policy and strategy. In March 1941 Adolf Hitler ordered, in his "Directive No. 24 Regarding Cooperation with Japan," that the aim of German policy "must be to bring Japan into active operations in the Far East as soon as possible. This will tie down strong English forces and the focal point of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific."<sup>4</sup> But the same directive prohibited giving any information to the Japanese about the planning of Operation Barbarossa. The attack on the Soviet Union had been a long-term German war objective since summer 1940 and was scheduled to begin in June 1941.<sup>5</sup> During his visit to Berlin in March-April 1941, therefore, the Japanese foreign minister, **Yosuke Matsuoka**, noticed only a cooling-off in German-Soviet relations.<sup>6</sup>

Hitler was anxious to keep the United States out of the war in the Atlantic until he achieved victory over the Soviets, but his attitude toward Japan was changing. In July, after the first impressive results of the campaign in Russia, he wanted joint action with Japan against Russia aimed at an annihilating victory that would create a lasting deterrent effect upon the United States. On 14 July 1941, in a record of a meeting with General Hiroshi Oshima, the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Hitler's view of the global war situation was explained: "From our point of view, Russia is the threat in the east, America in the west; from that of Japan, Russia in the west, America in the east. He [Hitler] is therefore of the opinion that we must annihilate them together. In the lives of

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*"... The German Naval Staff stated with regret that 'generous strategic and operational cooperation with the Japanese armed forces command does not exist. . . .' This was undoubtedly the heart of the matter."*

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nations there are hard tasks that one could not solve by shutting oneself off from their existence or by putting them off to a later time."<sup>7</sup> In August 1941 Hitler was still expecting a Japanese surprise attack on Vladivostok.<sup>8</sup> By the end of October, however, he seemed to have abandoned his expectations, even of the militarily oriented Japanese government of General Hideki Tojo. He considered Japan "still too lukewarm and not very willing to take action."<sup>9</sup>

Remembering its bad war experiences with the Red Army at Nomonhan in the summer of 1939 (where a battle on the Khalkin-Gol River on the Manchurian frontier had cost the Japanese 11,000 of the 15,000 men engaged), Tokyo was very cautious and saw great danger of commitment to a second war in Asia. Furthermore, in August 1941 the Japanese perceived a similarity between the situation of the German army in Russia and its own in China: that Russia and China both were countries without a "heart." That is, neither could be annihilated by one deadly blow at its strategic center.<sup>10</sup> With that in mind, the Japanese government now tried to avoid any clash or incident with the Soviet Union, orienting instead its strategic objectives toward the south.

The decision of the Japanese leadership in July 1941 to send troops to southern Indochina (then still under French rule) deliberately ran the risk of starting a war with the United States and Great Britain and resulted in further time pressure on Japan. Japan was virtually cut off from supplies of major raw materials by the economic countermeasures taken in response by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. The oil embargo, in particular, struck the Japanese at the heart of their strategic capabilities. Since supplies only covered requirements for a maximum of two years, it was possible to foresee the time at which the war in China, or any operations by naval and air forces, would become impossible.<sup>11</sup>

If Japan wanted to free itself from the grip of the Allied embargo and, at the

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same time, assert its position in China and Indochina, the only way left open was to secure by force the oil fields on Borneo, Java, and Sumatra. These fields produced and processed sufficient oil to satisfy Japan's long-term requirements.

Japan's decision at this point to take immediate action against the United States was ultimately the result of strategic considerations. In expanding the Japanese sphere of influence to the south, the Japanese navy believed that it could not risk exposing its eastern flank to the threat posed by the American Pacific Fleet and by American forces in the Philippines.<sup>12</sup>

Early in November 1941, when the Japanese leaders decided to go to war against the Western powers, their main concern was to secure their partners in the Tripartite Pact, Germany and Italy, as firm allies in Japan's war against the United States and Great Britain.<sup>13</sup> Japan sought both to see these common adversaries tied down to the greatest extent possible in the European-Atlantic arena and to use the potential capacity of the German armament technology and industry in support of its own operations. Tokyo was acutely aware of the weakness of its war economy and saw the danger of an Anglo-German compromise peace, which would have placed Japan in a militarily hopeless position and forced it to come to a disadvantageous arrangement with the United States.<sup>14</sup>

On the other hand, Japan attempted to mediate a settlement of the German-Soviet conflict as quickly as possible in order to regain use of the Trans-Siberian Railroad as a direct link with Europe. At the same time, Japan tried to get Germany to agree "not to conclude a special peace with the USA as long as one of the two parties was still at war with this power."<sup>15</sup> These ideas were not initially approved in Berlin. A negotiated peace with the Soviet Union was totally alien to Hitler's mind.

Early in November 1941, when the signals from Tokyo indicated a confrontation with the United States, German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop endeavored to induce Japan to enter the war against the Soviet Union and to pursue a common strategy against Great Britain, ignoring the United States.<sup>16</sup> When von Ribbentrop's endeavors were unsuccessful, however, and the Japanese-American negotiations failed, Berlin went along with Japan's course of confrontation with the United States. Germany now repeated the assurance it had already given in the spring to foreign minister Yosuke Matsuoka that it would not leave Japan alone in a war with the United States. In addition, Hitler assured Japan that he would not conclude a separate peace with their common adversaries.<sup>17</sup>

Although Tokyo made it clear that Japan wished to remain neutral toward the Soviet Union, Hitler obviously regarded tying down the United States in the Pacific as his last chance to win the war. Because of the setbacks of his army before Moscow in early December 1941 and the increasingly apparent American commitment in the Atlantic during the previous several months, Hitler planned to defeat the Soviet Union definitely in 1942. He hoped to do this before the

American war potential could influence the European theater effectively.<sup>18</sup> The ally in the Far East had now finally assumed the role which the German dictator had from the start wanted it to have: with all its military potential, Japan was only a useful "junior partner," not able to exercise any direct influence on the politico-strategic decisions of the German leadership.<sup>19</sup>

In contrast, when the Germans and Italians declared war on the United States on 11 December 1941, the Japanese saw its regional war of conquest in Asia secured by the resulting worldwide dispersal of its enemy's potential. Japan had not given its European allies any insight into the long-term strategic objectives of its own war effort. With the attack on Pearl Harbor, the war took on a global dimension that soon had an impact on the way in which both Germany and Japan would conduct the war.

### Global Strategic Perspectives and Correlations

At the outset in December 1941, Japan's strategic intention was to confine the offensive phase of the war to conquest of the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, and Burma and to eliminating the British and American spheres of influence in Asia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Japan would then try to consolidate this large, maritime sphere of influence, exploit it for economic purposes, and defend it against the retaliatory attacks of the Western powers. Japan hoped that its alliance partners, Germany and Italy, would accelerate their operations towards Suez in order to establish a link across the Indian Ocean. The German-Soviet war was a serious impediment to Japan's strategic concept; it hampered a combined conduct of the war and, above all, made armaments cooperation impossible. Thus, Tokyo continued to try to negotiate a peace for this conflict. Unlike Hitler, whose war policy aimed at annihilating his adversaries, the Japanese leaders were aware from the beginning of Japan's limited military capabilities. In fact, they ruled out altogether a traditional "victory"—conquering the United States or destroying its war-making potential—knowing that Japan would never be in a position to achieve that.<sup>20</sup>

In Japan's strategic planning for its southward expansion there was no coordination whatsoever with its Tripartite Pact partners. They were given only a rough outline of the "probable" first operational objectives and received no information at all about schedules, employment of forces, or desired cooperation. When the Japanese ambassador, General Oshima, reported to Hitler about the first Japanese operations a few days after the war began, he also pointed out the opportunities that presented themselves to Germany and Japan if they were to coordinate their operations. Oshima suggested "a kind of leverage or interplay" that would "inevitably be the ruin of the Anglo-Saxon powers."<sup>21</sup>

This proposal could have provided a useful starting point for global-strategic cooperation between the two geographically distant Axis partners. Not only did

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Hitler expressly approve this train of thought, but a short time later he actively took it up again when he explained his strategic concept to Oshima on 3 January 1942. If military operations were closely coordinated, Hitler said, it would be possible to produce a "leverage which would be bound to have tremendous repercussions on the enemy, as he would be compelled to shift his points of main effort time and again, thereby hopelessly dissipating his strength."

Although Hitler was optimistic that he would in this way be able to wrench India from the British Empire and defeat Britain, he had no idea how he was going to bring about a military decision in the war against the United States.<sup>22</sup> In any case, the strategic concept scarcely got off the ground. The elementary conditions were lacking on both sides to formulate a common strategy and then to implement it operationally. Neither Berlin nor Tokyo was prepared to reveal its actual war objectives to the other. The two supreme headquarters had no direct link with each other for the constant exchange of opinions and information. Selective information policies, characterized by suspicion and deliberate obscurity, and limited radio capability did not help either side to get a realistic picture of its partner's situation. Ultimately, inadequate military capabilities made very risky, and therefore unlikely, any large-area operations to establish a direct geographical link that would have mitigated such difficulties.

For Hitler, the continuation and successful conclusion of the war of annihilation against the Soviet Union formed the linchpin of his strategic deliberations. Alternatives involving different objectives, such as those oriented to the Near East and the Indian Ocean formulated by the German Naval Staff, stood no chance of being accepted.<sup>23</sup> The German potential for waging war would, for the foreseeable future, remain largely tied to the Eastern front and thus to the continent of Europe. There were only a few forces available for an offensive strategy in the eastern Mediterranean, even if Italian forces were taken into account. This meant that from the outset, prospects for an advance toward Suez were limited. However, German leaders did not—as was necessary to create mutual trust—admit this with any candor to their partner in Asia.

The German campaign in the East suffered its first setback just as Japan entered the war, but Tokyo was thoroughly mesmerized by its own great initial successes against the "White Powers," and its feeling of superiority was strengthened.<sup>24</sup> It appeared that Japan would be able to expand her sphere of influence in Southeast Asia without difficulty. Now that closer cooperation with Germany and Italy was imperative, the Japanese leadership was anxious to draw precise boundaries to define not only zones of operations but also future spheres of influence. Indeed, in the military agreement between the Axis powers of 18 January 1942, which set longitude 70° east as Japan's western limit, it was largely successful in doing so.<sup>25</sup> Delimitation rather than cooperation was the basic idea of this agreement. Its general plan of operations was so vague that it could not serve as a practical basis for combined operations. It focused on the elimination

of enemy positions and forces and consolidation of the Axis powers' own spheres of influence. In the meaningless words of the agreement, not until they were able to identify a concentration of the enemy fleets in the Atlantic or Pacific were the partners to provide any reciprocal support with their respective naval forces. In practice, however, when the German Naval Staff requested support from Japan for operations against Allied merchant shipping, the latter refrained from giving concrete promises. In fact, the Japanese proposed not to intensify tonnage warfare until they had secured naval supremacy in the western Pacific and the enemy had concentrated its naval forces in the Atlantic.<sup>26</sup>

In contrast, the German Naval Staff had always held the view that operations against Allied shipping had global dimensions. Any offensive by the Allies, either in the Pacific or in Europe, and indeed the very ability of Great Britain to survive were dependent on adequate merchant shipping. Since the enemy's entire merchant shipping formed a centrally controlled unit, it did not matter where a merchant ship was sunk—every ship sunk had to be replaced by a new one.<sup>27</sup> Under this concept, eliminating the enemy's strategic positions was of particular importance. Removing the cornerstones of the enemy's naval communications would make it more difficult for him to protect merchant marine movements and easier to employ one's own naval resources. With Japan's entry into the war as an alliance partner possessing good starting positions in Asia and, most importantly, the strong battle fleet and powerful naval air forces which the German navy lacked, the German Naval Staff hoped to be able now to achieve its own strategic naval objectives.

However, it soon became apparent that the two naval staffs had different interests and, thus, very different ideas and desires for the employment of the other's naval forces. As one historian has described the situation, "Japan was primarily interested in the Axis conducting powerful warfare in the Mediterranean against the heavy British units, which Japan would then not have to fear in the Far East. Germany, on the other hand, was interested in considerably intensifying the tonnage war, which could make all detours via Suez superfluous and would not make the German Navy too dependent on Japanese naval warfare successes."<sup>28</sup> The deeper cause of these differences lay in different concepts of naval strategy. Because of its materiel weakness, the German navy never had a chance to eliminate the Royal Navy—the "strength element" of British sea power—although it had been in an excellent geographical position to do so from the summer of 1940 onward. With its limited capabilities, therefore, the German navy concentrated instead on reducing the enemy's "transport element," in order to paralyze his potential to wage war.

The Japanese navy, itself a strength element befitting a seafaring nation, considered the elimination of the enemy's corresponding strength element to be the primary objective of its naval strategy. Because of this focus, Japanese leaders failed to see in the transport element both their own weakness and that



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of their enemy. Thus, protecting their own maritime lines of communication and operating against the enemy for this purpose played only minor roles in Japan's employment of her naval resources.<sup>29</sup>

**Strategic Alternatives.** After its initial successes, which had seen the rapid expansion of the Japanese sphere of influence and the removal of any immediate threat from enemy forces, the Japanese leadership was in a dilemma about how to continue the war. Washington and London were evidently determined to fight to the finish; the hoped-for compromise peace appeared to be unattainable. This dilemma was aggravated by the fact that the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy could not agree on a joint strategy for continuing the war. Given its own early advances and the enemy's continuing weakness, the Japanese naval command wanted to retain the strategic initiative and prevent the enemy from consolidating and reconstructing its offensive potential. The Japanese sphere had so grown that maritime offensives were now required that could be lastingly effective only if ground objectives could be seized and held. This required land forces, but the Japanese army showed little inclination to support the navy as long as the war in China was still in progress and the option of attacking the Soviet Union was still retained.

Theoretically, there were four options open to the Japanese for continuing their offensive strategy:<sup>30</sup>

- A thrust southward with the objective of directly attacking Australia.
- A thrust into the southwestern Pacific to occupy island positions, thereby neutralizing Australia by cutting maritime communications between it and the United States.
- A thrust eastward into the central Pacific in order to eliminate the remainder of the American fleet, especially the undamaged aircraft carriers, possibly moving on to occupy Hawaii to prevent its further use as a base.
- A thrust westward into the Indian Ocean to establish a link with the European Axis partners, Germany and Italy.

Any sober analysis realistically estimating Japan's potential should have come to the conclusion that only some single option had a chance of success—if indeed any did—but not a combination of two or three. The Japanese naval command, unable to get the army to give it the troops required for an offensive, was also unable to arrive at any alternative using a rational concentration of the forces it had. Instead, it dissipated its strength attempting to carry out, at least in part, three options at once.

Japan lacked the land forces and transportation capacity required for the first option (attack on Australia). However, the second option, expansion of the defensive belt into the southwestern Pacific, was a possibility. The attempt to pursue it led to the naval air battle in the Coral Sea in early May 1942 and to the battles of attrition for and on Guadalcanal, lasting from August 1942 until

February 1943. As for the third option, a thrust eastward, Japan could not expect to achieve surprise again as at Pearl Harbor. However, the idea of removing, in one battle, the latent threat that American naval and naval air forces posed to its sphere of influence was deeply rooted, especially in the mind of the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. Colonel James Doolittle's surprise raid on the homeland on 18 April 1942 sufficed to push eventually all other strategic alternatives into the background.

The final option, a thrust westward into the Indian Ocean, presented itself, contingent upon Japan's willingness to coordinate her war effort closely with those of her European alliance partners. There were not only military benefits but, above all, economic reasons in favor of establishing a direct link with the German-Italian sphere of influence via Suez and the Near East. For one thing, these regions offered further reserves of crude oil, which was extremely scarce in Japan, Germany, and Italy. Additionally, this link would make possible the use of German industrial capacity for Japanese armaments.

There are some indications that the Japanese naval command seriously considered the Indian Ocean idea at a very early stage. In February 1942, reports received in Berlin from Tokyo indicating that the Japanese were interested in occupying the strategic position of Madagascar became more frequent. That island, although located in the German zone of operations, represented an excellent base for paralyzing Allied maritime communications in the northern part of the Indian Ocean.<sup>31</sup> With remarkable realism, the Japanese naval command indicated to Vice Admiral Paul Wenneker, the German naval attaché

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in Tokyo, that the war had by no means been decided and that its outcome was still "in the balance." It was therefore important to forestall the impact of the United States' "enormous armament effort," which would start to make itself felt in 1943. Admiral Wenneker reported the opinion of the Japanese navy to Berlin: "If the Axis powers succeed in establishing a link across the Indian Ocean this year, the war will be decided in their favor. For this reason, all forces should be employed to this end and the attack should be conducted with dynamic force simultaneously from the north by Germany and Italy and from the south by Japan."<sup>32</sup>

At the same time, the German naval command was formulating similar ideas. Notwithstanding this undeniably bold and risky strategic approach stood no

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serious chance of being accepted by the national leadership in either Berlin or Tokyo. The Soviet factor acted as the decisive hindrance for both sides. As long as the priority for the overall German war effort lay on the Eastern front, there were simply no forces available for a thrust into the Near East. In Tokyo, the army command pointed to the Soviet threat to the Far East and rejected the proposed approach. The Japanese army was not prepared to make available for the offensive the two divisions required for the occupation of Ceylon.<sup>33</sup> The Japanese naval command itself, recognizing the inhibiting effect of the German-Soviet war, doubted that Germany would be able to establish a link with Japan across the Indian Ocean if it were at the same time to occupy Russia up to the Urals. In late February 1942, therefore, the Japanese naval command, taking up an idea discussed time and again within the Japanese leadership since the fall of 1941, attempted to gain German support for a negotiated peace with Moscow.<sup>34</sup> When Berlin flatly rejected the proposal, it also indirectly weakened the elements in Tokyo that advocated closer coordination and a common overall strategy for the Axis partners.<sup>35</sup>

It became apparent in Tokyo that Berlin was not in the foreseeable future going to launch an offensive in the Middle East, and the Japanese army command was able to gain acceptance on 7 March 1942 for its intention to postpone an offensive westward to India.<sup>36</sup> While the navy remained prepared to employ all forces in order to retain the initiative and to force a decision, the army saw the danger of dissipating its forces in an expanding sphere of influence with long and vulnerable supply routes. In appraising the risks in this way, however, the army command was ignoring its own mistakes: no decision had been achieved in the Chinese war, where great effort and considerable forces had been dissipated over an enormous area.

***Attempts and "Disappointments."*** Since the army and navy were on opposing sides in the Imperial Headquarters, rather than working together to formulate an effective strategic concept, the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, was able to take offensive action only with the naval resources at his disposal. In order to exploit the continuing period of weakness of the Allies, he launched an attack on the British Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean. To this end he had at his disposal the aircraft carrier formation under Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, representing an offensive potential that had several times demonstrated its striking power.<sup>37</sup> In view of other operational plans that had already been made for the carriers in the Pacific, Yamamoto decided to mount a short raid in which he expected to destroy only enemy naval forces; it seemed unnecessary to inform Japan's alliance partners in Europe. His carrier formation advanced into the Indian Ocean in April 1942, but the German Naval Staff did not learn about it until they received reports that the Japanese had been successful. The German Naval Staff had on 27 March expressed to the

representative of the Japanese navy in Berlin, Vice Admiral Naokuni Nomura, its "keen desire" that the Japanese navy commence operations against the Allied lines of maritime communication in the northern Indian Ocean as soon as possible and asked to be informed of Japanese intentions, for the purpose of coordinating plans.<sup>38</sup> Because it was not so informed, and also of course because of the material weakness of the German navy, Germany was not able to take any action whatsoever to assist or support the Japanese naval campaign.

Although the Japanese advance into the Indian Ocean was nothing more than an incident as far as its design and scope were concerned, the Allies viewed it as a dangerous development that, although it was unlikely to ruin their global strategy, could create many difficulties for them. Therefore, in April 1942 the British Chiefs of Staff urgently requested American support, making clear the consequences an expansion of Japanese naval supremacy to the western part of the Indian Ocean would have. They pointed out that supply to British forces in the Middle East would collapse, that the Germans would gain access to Arab oil, that Germany and Japan would thereby establish a geographical link, that the most important supply route to the Soviet Union would be severed, and that Turkey would move into the German sphere of influence, with serious consequences for the Soviet Caucasus front.<sup>39</sup>

However, in April 1942 Berlin and Tokyo were in fact a long way from such strategic solidarity. They did not have the means, nor were they thinking along those lines. However, if there ever was a feasible opportunity for global-strategic cooperation between the Axis powers in World War II, it was presented by the vulnerability of the Allies in the Indian Ocean during the first half of 1942. At that time the Japanese still had the potential to gain a footing on Ceylon and Madagascar. Following the devastating British defeats in Singapore, Malaya, and Burma, a successful Japanese landing on Ceylon would probably have shaken the entire British position in India. A Japanese naval campaign making use of Ceylon and Madagascar and coordinating with long-range German and Italian submarine missions was certainly possible in terms of both technology and materiel.<sup>40</sup> Its threat to the Allies' supply routes in the Indian Ocean would have amounted to a major setback to the Allied campaign. The strategic "leverage and interplay" which Oshima and Hitler had hinted at in late 1941 and early 1942 was, thus, very much a latent danger for the Allies. However, this chance slipped out of the hands of the Axis powers in the spring of 1942 and never came back. The Axis powers' potential constantly diminished thereafter in comparison with that of their adversaries, and they continued to fail to coordinate their overall war effort.<sup>41</sup>

After the withdrawal of their aircraft carriers from the Indian Ocean, the strategic interest of the Japanese was concentrated on the southwestern Pacific, where they soon suffered setbacks. Fearing a Japanese threat to Madagascar, the Allies landed on that French colony on 5 May. A few days later, Vice Admiral



must always be based on healthy optimism. Otherwise, the impression will be created that Japan is of no use to us any more as an ally and is to be written off, whereas in actual fact she is one of the most important factors for a successful continuation of the war."<sup>47</sup>

These sentences prove once again that the top-level German commanders were already living in a world of illusion where any reference to reality was bound to be regarded as a depressing nuisance, and make clear just how hopeless the war was. In Tokyo, Wenneker could "not quite understand why frankness was not desired." In fact, all the phrases in his estimate of the situation had come from Japanese officers, including the Chief of the Imperial Naval Staff. According to the latter, the Japanese potential was indeed limited, "and it is better to realize this in all clarity than to be disappointed later."<sup>48</sup>

Berlin, in contrast, believed that the Axis still had a strategic trump card in the strong and largely unused Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria, a card which Germany had desperately desired to play against the Soviet Union following the Stalingrad disaster. In January 1943, therefore, Hitler officially called upon Japan to participate in the war against the Soviet Union, and even offered to transfer two U-boats for this purpose. In material terms, this represented only an extremely modest reinforcement for the Japanese navy and was probably meant largely as a good-will gesture.<sup>49</sup> Tokyo stuck to its refusal to get involved in the German-Soviet war. Instead, in the spring of 1943 it attempted once again to probe the prospects for a negotiated Soviet peace in order finally to gain access to the German armaments potential by way of a direct land route. The Japanese leadership was increasingly coming to realize that they were standing with their backs to the wall in a defensive war against the constantly growing strength of the Allies.<sup>50</sup>

When the Japanese evacuated Guadalcanal in early February 1943, they surrendered for the first time a position in their defense perimeter that could no longer be held. American submarines constantly increased their sinkings of merchant ships, with the result that the economic exploitation of the conquered territories fell far short of expectations. These enemy successes within the Japanese sphere of influence, along with the Japanese failures in the battles of attrition on the defense perimeter, were probably the reason why the German Naval Staff now received an assurance from Tokyo that the Japanese navy would devote more attention to operations against Allied shipping.<sup>51</sup>

However, strategic cooperation had come too late for this sphere of naval warfare. By the fall of 1942, a tonnage war could no longer force a decision but could only delay defeat. The Japanese leaders' desire for a favorable situation that would enable a settlement with Japan's adversaries was never fulfilled. Only a few Japanese officers, such as General Kanji Ishiwara and Admirals Yamamoto and Osami Nagano, had given proper thought to the full risks of the war.<sup>52</sup> In their view, the majority of the Japanese military, because of its own historical

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experience, had concentrated on a short, limited war ending in a compromise peace. In doing so they had failed to realize that in a struggle with the two Anglo-Saxon maritime powers there could be no alternative to total war, and no negotiated peace. Total defeat was a foregone conclusion.<sup>53</sup>

### Problems of German-Japanese Coalition Warfare

Coalition warfare, if it is to be effective and successful, requires close cooperation between the alliance partners at all levels, from the start of the war to the conclusion of peace. Ideally, it involves common strategic objectives, a frank exchange of information and opinions, and tactical-operational cooperation between the armed forces of the allies. A direct geographical link between the partners is an essential prerequisite for cooperation, as it facilitates reciprocal support by forces and armament production. This link does not, *a priori*, have to be a land connection; it can also develop through maritime lines of communication, as is shown by the successful example of the United States and Great Britain.

The three Axis partners, Germany, Japan, and Italy, came nowhere near fulfilling the requirements of the ideal situation. Their only common enemies were the Western powers, inasmuch as Japan remained neutral toward the Soviet Union. As is manifest in the discussion above, their strategic objectives differed to a considerable degree. In addition, their exchanges of opinions and information remained rudimentary and selective; no side disclosed to an ally its objectives and its own situation in a frank and unreserved manner. The greatest impediment, however, proved to be geographic separation. Secret communications were dependent on couriers, who had to travel long distances, and on unreliable telecommunications. It was possible to bridge this separation only sporadically with a few blockade runners and submarines, resulting in an exceedingly modest exchange of raw materials, armaments, and other industrial products.

***“Frank Exchanges of Information.”*** In the fall of 1940, following the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, Japan dispatched a sizeable naval mission headed by Vice Admiral Naokuni Nomura to Germany in order to obtain as much benefit as possible from German war experience and developments in the field of arms technology. The mission submitted a comprehensive list of questions and desired visits, including seventy-seven queries on German war experience, 115 technological questions, and eighty-nine proposed visits to munitions factories mentioned by name. When the German Naval Staff analyzed the list, it got the impression that Japan believed “she could demand from Germany an intellectual clearance sale.” Such a transfer of data, however, could not be justified by the Tripartite Pact alone. Since the OKW had not yet issued a policy directive for cooperation with the Japanese, the Naval Staff now took the initiative. On 14

February 1941 it issued guidelines that emphasized the principle of mutuality and advocated only those assistance measures that were effective for short periods. All wishes "amounting to industrial espionage or industrial theft" were to be turned down.<sup>54</sup> This restrictive course appeared to be justified by the way in which Tokyo had behaved thus far. The Japanese had supported the German naval campaign in only a very cautious manner, and when in spring 1941 the German naval attaché, Admiral Wenneker, had requested information, they had granted him only a very superficial glimpse of the Japanese armaments industry. Even after Japanese naval officers in Germany were allowed to inspect the new battleship *Tirpitz* and had many details explained to them, it took considerable pressure from Germany before Admiral Wenneker in Japan was allowed in return to inspect the battleship *Yamato*. Even then he did not get to see much, as the guided tour lasted only one hour and was limited to uninteresting areas of the ship.<sup>55</sup>

Despite this experience, Hitler fiercely criticized the naval command's directive limiting cooperation with Japan. He accused the navy of unauthorized meddling in the realm of politics.<sup>56</sup> Countermanding the navy, he ordered that "for the preparation of cooperation it is necessary to strengthen Japanese military power by every means. To that end, the commanders in chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht will extensively and liberally comply with Japanese requests for the communication of German war and battle experience, and for aid in the field of war economy and of technical nature. Reciprocity is desirable, but must not impede the negotiations."<sup>57</sup> Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, commander in chief of the German navy, then decreed that the Japanese were to be shown and given an explanation of everything "that is no longer in a state of development or trial."<sup>58</sup>

Nevertheless, having in view how little Japan did in return, the German Naval Staff was sparing in providing direct support. This was true particularly in the fields of radio reconnaissance and radar. The information given about radio intelligence was limited to organization and basic principles; no data on its capabilities, or concrete intelligence, was provided at first to the Japanese. Later, in October 1941, the Japanese naval attaché in Berlin requested the delivery at short notice of two sets of a type of air search radar (known as DT) developed by Germany. The Japanese complained that their own developmental equipment was not yet ready for use. However, the German naval command made it clear to the Japanese attaché that German war requirements did not permit such a delivery. What was more, "the threat to Japan [was] not especially great."<sup>59</sup> Even though this reference to a "small threat" probably only referred to the air war, this reaction was still strange, coming from an ally who expected so many advantages for itself from Japanese entry into the war.

It looked at one point, however, as though cooperation through mutual trust was about to materialize. "Bismarck has been averaged, but we must tie our helmet



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strings more tightly. Best wishes to the Grand Admiral." With these words, remembering the loss of the German battleship, the chief of the Japanese Naval Staff, Admiral Osami Nagano, ended a detailed briefing to the German naval attaché on 11 December 1941 about Japan's sinking of the British battleship *Prince of Wales* and battle cruiser *Repulse* the previous day.<sup>60</sup> However, Wenneker

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***"The elementary conditions were lacking on both sides to formulate a common strategy and then to implement it operationally. Neither Berlin nor Tokyo was prepared to reveal its actual war objectives to the other."***

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and the other attachés in Tokyo were soon to discover that the exchange of information and opinions with the Japanese military staffs continued to be a laborious process. It was by no means marked by any willingness either to discuss strategic plans and operations frankly or to formulate concrete possibilities for cooperation. In most cases, German attachés were informed about Japanese operations only after the fact, when these had been brought to a successful conclusion.

By always emphasizing their successes and deliberately concealing or minimizing their losses, the Japanese displayed an arrogance that threatened seriously to hamper mutual cooperation. On 12 February a relieved Wenneker reported to Berlin that after a phase of self-importance and presumption, Japanese officers had recently become more level-headed and open, restoring the previous trustful relationship.<sup>61</sup> Only four weeks later, however, he protested strongly to the navy ministry about a speech given by its spokesman, Captain Hiraide. As reported in all Japanese newspapers on 13 March, Hiraide had said, "Napoleon once exclaimed: Give me naval supremacy in the English Channel for six hours, and I will rule England. Shortly after the start of the current war in Europe, the German Führer said the following: I would like to achieve naval supremacy in the 23 [nautical mile] wide Strait of Dover, for once I have it the British Empire will be destroyed. Today, the British fleet still rules the waves in this strait, although it is indeed only some 20 nm wide. And what about our Imperial Navy? We are operating over distances of more than 2,000 nm and landing our troops wherever we wish."<sup>62</sup> The British Admiralty could not have put it better in its propaganda war against Germany (although a short time earlier a German battleship formation had challenged the British and passed through the Straits of Dover nearly unscathed).

Wenneker regarded Captain Hiraide's remarks as an attempt "to make Germany the laughing stock of the world" and as a disparagement of the efficiency of the German Wehrmacht so as to give particular emphasis to Japanese successes. Wenneker believed that these successes were due largely to the fact that Allied forces were tied down in the Atlantic, and he saw Hiraide's attack as

"a sign of ingratitude." He demanded satisfaction in the form of a visit and apology by Hiraide's direct superior. Complying the very same day, Rear Admiral Takozumi Oka, chief of the Command Office at the navy ministry, appeared at the German embassy bearing a letter from the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Shigetaro Shimada. In the letter, the minister described Hiraide's remarks as "inappropriate," expressed his "profound regret," and promised that Hiraide would be punished. By emphatically requesting that "nothing about this incident and its settlement should be made public, in the interests of the close cooperation between the two countries" the Japanese navy showed that it found the whole affair highly embarrassing and hoped it would be quickly forgotten.<sup>63</sup> Nevertheless, Hiraide's conduct was symptomatic of the triumphant ecstasy that had seized the Japanese armed forces and public during the first few months of 1942. After the war, Japanese writers described it self-critically as a "victory disease" which obscured people's level-headed view of military realities and confused their minds.<sup>64</sup>

In April, Wenneker had the opportunity to visit the Japanese conquests in Southeast Asia during a four-week journey to the front. Once again he discovered, as an "unpleasant concomitant," a Japanese arrogance "which made the British and Americans out to be an extremely mediocre adversary, considerably inferior to the Chinese." The Japanese officers constantly asked Wenneker when the Germans were going to launch their large-scale offensive against the British fleet in the Mediterranean, "the destruction of which would permit the establishment of a link with Japan and would virtually decide the outcome of the war in favor of the Axis." In answer to these questions, the German naval attaché time and again emphatically reminded the Japanese officers of "the enormous achievements of the German Wehrmacht which enabled these Japanese military successes."<sup>65</sup>

There were contrasts between the naval and the military links between the two countries. Vice Admiral Wenneker and the military attaché, Major General Alfred Kretschmer, were the conduits in Tokyo between the respective German military commanders and the Japanese navy and army. In Berlin, the sizeable Japanese military mission headed by Vice Admiral Nomura had been in Germany since the spring of 1941. This group, in which Lieutenant General Ichiro Banzai as military attaché represented the interests of the Japanese army, remained the most important Japanese military mission in Germany after Tokyo's entry into the war. However, because of the heterogeneous Japanese command structure, the mission did not always have close links with its own embassy in Berlin, which, operating independently, it frequently bypassed.

Within the German command, the Naval Staff remained in permanent contact with Nomura and informed him in general terms about its own naval operations. In contrast, contacts between the OKW and the Army High Command (OKH), on the one side, and the Japanese on the other remained

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sporadic and superficial. The chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, General Alfred Jodl, did not receive the military representatives of Germany's most powerful ally until two months after Japanese entry into the war. During these talks, Jodl showed little inclination to do more than outline how Germany intended to pursue the war. He only hinted vaguely at the operational objective of the army in its second attack against the Soviet Union in the Caucasus.<sup>66</sup> A short time later, the German Naval Staff stated with regret that "generous strategic and operational cooperation with the Japanese armed forces command does not exist. The initiative for this cooperation should be taken by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. However, the OKW does not seem to attach any importance to combined strategic and operational planning with the Japanese."<sup>67</sup>

This was undoubtedly the heart of the matter. German commanders were neither prepared nor able to probe the strategic opportunities for coalition warfare. In the summer of 1942, at the peak of the German successes against the Soviet Union, they requested vigorous support in the Indian Ocean from their Asian partner. By this time, however, Japan was already past its peak of military capability—though Tokyo concealed this fact from its ally in Berlin.

**"Tactical-Operational Cooperation."** Concrete opportunities for military cooperation ultimately arose only in limited naval operations in the Indian Ocean. In 1942 the German navy employed there (in addition to the blockade runners that shuttled between bases on the French Atlantic coast and the Japanese sphere of influence) only two auxiliary cruisers, supply vessels, and from the fall onward, some larger U-boats. Here too, operational cooperation was laborious and protracted, especially if one side intended to cross the established operational boundary, 70° east longitude.

Not until ten months after Japan entered the war did the German and Japanese navies issue an "Agreement on Message Handling" regulating radio procedures, call signs, and encryption.<sup>68</sup> As late as 1943 the Japanese naval command refused to grant the German naval attaché in Tokyo his own radio station for handling communications with German units, including the blockade runners. In January 1943, Wenneker gained the impression that erection of transmitters was "still a very uncanny business" for the Japanese. "They are afraid it will interfere with their own communications, which in fact do not work very well, and perhaps they also regard it as a matter of prestige that they are expected to grant us direct radio communications which they cannot oversee and control in detail."<sup>69</sup> In contrast, the exchange of radio intelligence eventually proved a positive factor in German-Japanese cooperation. In the spring of 1942, the Japanese Admiralty told Wenneker that about one-third of the German reports had been of

operational use.<sup>70</sup>

**“A Direct Geographical Link.”** The only transport connection between Europe and Japan was represented by the blockade runners, which could boast a considerable record of success, at least until mid-1942. From January 1941 to March 1942, fifteen vessels with a total cargo of 101,775 tons (including 44,450 tons of raw rubber) set sail from the Far East. Twelve of the ships, with 75,000 tons (including 32,650 tons of raw rubber), reached German bases in France. In the opposite direction, all six ships that set sail from Europe reached their ports of destination in East Asia. From the fall of 1942 onward, however, there was a marked increase in the number of blockade runners lost.<sup>71</sup> Moreover, the conduct and protection of this limited cargo traffic repeatedly ran into problems with Japanese authorities, who from the start were not prepared to promote this exchange of goods and frequently erected bureaucratic obstacles removed only after Wenneker’s emphatic complaints. At the same time, Japanese attempts to use the few German blockade runners for travel between Southeast Asia and the homeland reflected the strains within the Japanese sphere of influence, with its long maritime lines of communication.<sup>72</sup>

Of all the German military staffs, the Naval Staff was probably the only one to grasp fully the crucial importance of coalition warfare. This was apparent from the remarks made by Admiral Kurt Fricke, Chief of the Naval Staff, to Vice Admiral Nomura on 7 September 1942. It was Fricke’s “firm conviction” that the belligerent party would benefit most “which manages to wage the coalition war following uniform principles, constantly establishing mutual contact and engaging in discussions conducted in an atmosphere of absolute trust.” Fricke was describing an ideal situation. In fact, it was more nearly a description of the cooperation between Germany’s enemies, the United States and Great Britain, even though the German admiral expressed doubt on this very point. However, admitting that Germany and Japan had not succeeded “in conducting very close coalition warfare,” and hoping for an improvement, he showed where, after ten months of combined warfare, the shortcomings of the Axis coalition lay: no common enemy on the Eurasian continent, no common war objective, no common plans, and no frankness or basis of trust.<sup>73</sup> These deficiencies were an important contribution to the defeat of the Axis powers.

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### Notes

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11. Jerome Bernard Cohen, *Japanese Economy in War and Reconstruction* (Westport, Conn.: 1973), pp. 134–135 and Willmott, *Empires*, pp. 67–68.

12. Willmott, *Empires*, pp. 115–117.

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46. War Dairy Naval Staff, Part A, 18 and 28 December, BA-MA, RM 7/43, pp. 386 and 521.
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65. Report German Naval Attaché Tokyo, 5 May 1942, BA-MA, RM 12 II/251 fol. 183–184. See also 1. Skl, War Diary, Part A, 7 May 1942, BA-MA, RM 7/36, pp. 136–137.
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