

1993

## Book Reviews

The U.S Naval War College

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### Recommended Citation

War College, The U.S Naval (1993) "Book Reviews," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 46 : No. 3 , Article 10.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol46/iss3/10>

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# BOOK REVIEWS

*A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.*

*Admiral H.G. Rickover*

## “A Masterful Job”

Fuller, William C., Jr. *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914*. New York: The Free Press, 1992. 557pp. \$35

**I**N WHAT SHOULD PROVE TO BE A SEMINAL WORK, Professor William Fuller of the U.S. Naval War College has probed the interrelationship between political objectives, strategy, and military potential in tsarist Russia. He insists that his book is *not* a comprehensive military history or a treatise on Russian military theory. Nor is it concerned with “strategic culture,” a concept that Fuller finds particularly distasteful. His objection to partisans of this latter approach is that they treat culture as if it were unitary and believe that the definition of a strategic culture will allow prediction. Despite all these disclaimers, however, Fuller not only elucidates key moments in Russian military history but finds a pattern of choice and development that suggests both theoretical and cultural predispositions in Russian history.

Whatever patterns one may discern in Fuller’s study, however, the key to his understanding is that the development of strategies to meet political objectives and the assessment of military potential are matters of judgment and choice, not the predetermined outcomes of culture, geopolitics, or theoretical dogmas. Neither Russia’s strategic past nor its future are foreordained. But an appreciation of the roads taken and eschewed in that past may clarify both the necessity for and the potential consequences of choices in the future. Not only, then, does this book lay the groundwork for his next study on strategy and power in Soviet Russia, but it offers insights into the fundamental dilemmas facing post-Soviet Russia.

A key issue in Fuller’s study is why Russia’s eighteenth-century strategies were so successful in the expansion of Russian power, and its nineteenth-century strategies so deficient. As he notes, in many respects the successes of the eighteenth century magnified the political and strategic problems of the next

century. The enormous expansion of Russia's territories proliferated enemies without and restive populations within. When this geopolitical circumstance is joined with the relative technological and material inferiority of Russia after mid-century, the dimensions of the strategic problem are clear.

Although the security problems of the nineteenth century may have been more severe, the real concern was the adequacy of the Russian regime's response. Fuller argues that earlier there had been a congruence among policy objectives, strategies, and the military systems—a harmony that disappeared as the nineteenth century unfolded. Russia's imperial ambitions throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were enormous, but the nation managed to sustain these ambitions, with a sufficient material base of population and resources and by a shrewd combination of strategy and diplomacy that isolated enemies and reassured other states. Managing the triad of objectives, strategies, and military potential was a remarkably successful conciliar system of decision making initiated by Peter the Great and refined by his successors.

Ironically, Russia's very "backwardness" became a source of strength to the rulers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Serfdom allowed the regime to organize a command system of long-term conscription and to establish within Russian culture a virtually independent military society. At the same time, the poll tax on the peasantry generated the financial basis of the infantry armies. The ultimate victory in the Napoleonic wars confirmed, in the mind of the leadership, the clear superiority of this autocratic system.

Although Russia had a clear interest in playing the role of a satisfied power after the Napoleonic wars, the technological revolution that was moving its putative rivals toward ever greater wealth and military potential drove the Russian leadership toward external adventures to cover its inherent weakness. The defeat in the Crimean War only exacerbated the urgent desire to hide those weaknesses. Fuller views Russian expansion in Central Asia and in Manchuria in the latter part of the nineteenth century as quite unlike the earlier imperialism. In the eighteenth century, expansion was the result of careful planning and preparation, whereas the later expansions in Asia were both reactive and generative of bitter rivalry with Great Britain and Japan. The almost accidental character of Russian strategy in this latter period was exacerbated by the policy apparatus and military organization that developed throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The earlier conciliar system that provided centralized decision making and coordination gave way to a fragmented ministerial system and nearly autonomous military districts. It is little wonder, therefore, that the political objectives of the regime became increasingly contradictory. The ultimate consequence was an inability to discriminate among threats and a mind-set that saw all future conflict as general, rather than local, in character. Under those circumstances, the late imperial regime was gripped by what Fuller calls "strategic pessimism."

## 134 Naval War College Review

Ironically, even the abolition of serfdom worsened the military weakness of the state. A servile and virtually lifelong draft had created a large and cohesive force, but one that was clearly a separate society. The emancipation of the serfs and the development of a system of universal military service tended both toward the integration of the military with society at large and the development of reserve cadres, but at the cost of introducing into the military all the tensions and divisions of the larger civic culture. At key moments in 1905–1906 and in 1917 this meant that the army was not the unwavering support of the autocracy but itself a fulcrum of social discontent. As Fuller notes, “as was so often the case in Russian history, reform undertaken to strengthen the regime would eventually imperil its continued survival.”

Finally, although the late imperial regime saw steady economic growth, the gap, both economically and technologically, between itself and the other major European states, Japan, and the United States yawned ever wider. Its communications and transportation infrastructure, as well as its technocratic culture, were simply insufficient to undertake any major external adventure. Because of this, one would have thought that the tsarist regime would have moderated its ambitions, perhaps engaged in some strategic withdrawal, and sought peace above all else. That it did not opened the way to the tragedy of general war and revolution.

It is always dangerous to draw exact parallels between an earlier historical evolution and present events in Russia. But it is equally clear that Russia’s past presents cautionary messages for its current leadership. William Fuller has done a masterful job in elucidating what these messages might be.

Robert S. Wood  
Naval War College

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

*The Soviet Union after Perestroika:  
Change and Continuity.* New York:  
Brassey’s (US), 1991. \$9.95

Presently, it is a common observation among specialists on the former Soviet Union that those who venture to write anything more ambitious than an Op-Ed piece risk seeing their thoughts hopelessly out of date before they appear in print. At first glance the present volume might appear to

confirm that view, especially since the failed coup of August 1991, with all that event portended, occurred just as it was being published.

Such are the uncertainties still surrounding the ruins of Europe’s last great empire that many of the questions and answers offered by these authors are as important today as they were when it still appeared that Gorbachev (or his conservative challengers) might yet, through a

combination of maneuvering and repression, hold the Union together and halt, or at least slow down, the processes corroding its cohesiveness and vitality.

One strength of this volume is the diversity of perspectives among its contributors: Paul Holman, Paul Craig Roberts, Karen LaFollette, John J. Dziak, Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., Fred F. Littlepage, Sergei Fedorenko, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.. It enables them to address the diverse aspects of the Soviet disintegration and its implications for the future. Holman, who has studied the Soviet Union for many years as an intelligence officer and academic, offers a useful analytical model that attributes its unraveling to three simultaneous upheavals: political, economic, and ethnic. He notes that the interaction among the three precludes any attempt to predict the future "by simple extrapolation of current trends."

Roberts is a conservative economist who gained policymaking experience in the Reagan administration. He and co-author Karen LaFollette argue in a thoughtful essay that the failure thus far of efforts made at economic reform is attributable to delay in privatizing, and that until private property is firmly institutionalized there can be no meaningful economic reform. Describing the de facto privatization now underway as former apparatchiks seize control of state assets, both authors see a parallel to the process of enclosures in Western Europe, whereby feudal use

rights were converted into private property.

Dziak writes of the revolutionary implications arising from the loss of popular fear of the security organs in what had become a "counterintelligence state," and he speculates on the potential for mischief among communist holdovers in the security apparatuses of the Eastern European countries.

Krepinevich and Littlepage present a farsighted analysis of how the collapse of the Soviet Union is changing Europe's security structure. They note that any future U.S. role will have to be played among a constellation of newly influential institutions, including the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Community, the Western European Union, and "designer" subregional groupings such as the "Pentagonal," the Nordic Council, and the Council on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean.

Fedorenko has perhaps the most unique perspective. He operated for years within the Soviet apparatus and, more recently, has studied its failings from the vantage point of Western academia. He warns that political and economic reform face an uphill struggle in an environment that lacks the American "heritage of democratic traditions and sophisticated political culture," but he also notes a "solid consensus" across Soviet society that national survival depends upon joining the democratic mainstream. Fedorenko chides the United States for failing (six years after the onset of

## 136 Naval War College Review

perestroika) to develop a strategic "master plan," although he does acknowledge that doing so would require solving a long list of complex problems.

Pfaltzgraff, in a prescriptive essay that unfortunately focuses almost exclusively on the failings of Gorbachev, nonetheless offers some still-cogent reasons not to assume that a strategic threat to the U. S. can never again emanate from the territory of our former adversary.

Indeed, if there is a common theme among these essays, it is the need for the United States not to underestimate the potential challenges to Western security interests that may emerge from the current turmoil, whether in the form of: a resurgent, expansionist Russia; out-of-area threats to Nato interests; or of millions of refugees fleeing civil and economic chaos, straining, perhaps fatally, the fragile democratic infrastructures of Eastern Europe. For those charged with devising policies to meet these potential challenges, or simply with advancing public understanding of how they have arisen, this book is a useful tool.

LAWRENCE E. MODISSETT  
Naval War College

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Bullock, Allan. *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives*. New York: Knopf, 1992. 1,082pp. \$35

Notwithstanding the measured optimism to be found in the conclusion to this work, Bullock's weighty study

of the butchery unleashed by these two tyrants constitutes a *fin de siecle* examination of its main event—the battle between millenarian Nazi racism and chiliastic Soviet socialism. Bullock, long familiar with German sources (his *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* received critical acclaim in the early 1960s), appears current and well acquainted also with the secondary literature pertaining to Stalin. Consequently, what the reader finds in this book is a lengthy, sometimes pedestrian, but often engaging examination of "one of the blackest periods in Europe's history."

Both dictators were narcissists suffering from paranoia. Stalin trusted no one and was determined to avenge every wrong done to him, however minor. Hitler believed that the Jews and Bolsheviks were behind every problem. It was only later that his paranoia spread to include his fellow Nazis, and he attributed Germany's military reversals to internal enemies of the Third Reich. Nevertheless, each despot possessed a unique gift that permitted him to achieve great power over a dazed and dislocated people.

Stalin used his position as General Secretary and his organizational talents to place officials beholden to him into important positions, thereby assuring the necessary "votes" before he challenged other luminaries in the Party. He then utilized the support of the Right to destroy the "Left Opposition," then co-opted the policies of the Left and turned on his former allies. As Stalin's power increased, he

collectivized agriculture, accelerated the growth of heavy industry, and exterminated not only his opponents but those who appeared capable of spontaneous behavior—all in his quest to forge revolutionary credentials equal to those of Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin.

Hitler directed his oratorical gift at the increasingly large and enthusiastic crowds and ultimately captured a following that could not be ignored. Not only did he blame the Weimar Republic for the suffering of the German people, but he promised to restore German glory with the Thousand Year Reich, once the Nazis were in power. The Nazi party garnered only 800,000 votes in 1928, but the Depression of 1929 raised their total count to 6.4 million in 1930, and in 1932 their total rose to 13.75 million. In January 1933, Hitler was co-opted into the government as chancellor, and by July the Nazis held a monopoly on political power.

It was power that permitted Hitler to accelerate Germany's capability to bear arms again (*Wiederwehrhaftmachung*), which was a necessary precondition for the pursuit of his racial millennium. The latter could be achieved only after the Jewish question was solved and the *Untermenschen* (Slavs) in Eastern Europe were made slaves of the newly settled Germans.

On 22 June 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. On 31 July Hermann Göring ordered SS General Reinhard Heydrich to make the necessary preparations for the "total solution of the Jewish question."

Bullock insists that "there was only one man among the Nazi leaders who could have conceived of so grandiose and bizarre a plan."

The Soviet Union's victory over Hitler's Germany ended one dreadful regime, only to allow Stalin's USSR to survive for almost forty years.

Bullock concludes that twentieth-century European history has been the story of Hitler and Stalin: the redefinition of boundaries in Europe; the massive scale of inhumanity; and the conflict of ideologies. Bullock states that when "war, revolution, or some other form of violent upheaval disrupts normality and continuity . . . it is possible for an individual to exert powerful, even a decisive influence on the way events develop." He is quite correct to conclude that, notwithstanding the social and economic dislocations that enabled these two tyrants to win power, "only later did it become clear how much difference it made who won."

WALTER C. UHLER  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

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Keegan, John, ed. *Churchill's Generals*.  
New York: William Morrow,  
1992. 368pp. \$13

Distinguished historian Martin Blumenson once described the U.S. commanders of World War II as the most formidable array of warriors in our history. The same can be said of Great Britain's military commanders. Ably edited by John Keegan, *Churchill's Generals* includes seventeen

## 138 Naval War College Review

essays on twenty general officers who served Churchill "at the supreme crisis in the nation's life." Contributors include such notable historians as Barrie Pitt, Kenneth Macksey, Sir Douglas Fraser, and Brian Bond. The result is a superb collection of essays that examine the successes and failures of Britain's senior army commanders. A complete bibliography and detailed chronology follow each essay.

At the core of this work is Winston Churchill, the prime minister and minister of defense, whom the editor describes as a "frustrated Marlborough yearning to be a general in the field of battle and the presiding genius of the Grand Alliance." Churchill was still minister of defense in 1945, the longest-surviving of all Hitler's Western opponents and perhaps the most implacable and successful of his foes. Keegan views Churchill as a brilliant leader who perceived his country's war-making power as essentially amphibian but recognized that war in modern society was basically attritional in nature. The tension between these two forces dominated Churchill's direction of operations and his appointment of military commanders.

A review of each biographical essay reveals a common thread in Churchill's commanders. All were similar in age, background, education, training, and experience. Most were born in the 1880s, and, almost without exception, they were either products of the Royal Military College in Sandhurst or the Royal Military Academy in Woolwich. All

but Field Marshal William Slim attended public schools; none had been to university. Most were either infantrymen or artillerymen, a notable change from World War I, when cavalrymen tended to dominate the senior ranks. Many had served as staff officers, and the majority had fought in the trenches during the Great War. Few had any experience in joint operations.

What makes this anthology so valuable is the balanced assessment of each of the commanders. For example, Montgomery emerges as the general who gave Churchill the victories that he and the nation sorely needed, but Monty was also a commander who made serious errors, such as the decision to launch Operation Market Garden. Alan Brooke is the most influential chief of the Imperial General Staff ever produced by the British army, but he was also ever resentful of Churchill's constant interference in operational matters.

Other commanders, including Field Marshals Earl Alexander and Sir Claude Auchinleck, receive their criticisms and praises for their failures and successes. Still others, like Generals Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart and Sir Louis Spears, enjoyed the fullest confidence of Churchill but were unable to fulfill the high expectations of senior positions to which they were appointed but were not entirely suited. Two commanders, Orde Wingate and Sir John Dill, failed to survive the war. One, Arthur Percival, spent the majority of the war as a Japanese prisoner of war.



In summary, *Churchill's Generals* is the most comprehensive examination of the army commanders who helped Churchill win World War II. Written predominantly from a British perspective and reflecting a strong national bias, the book provides an intimate portrait of Britain's senior military commanders during the most devastating war of the twentieth century.

COLE C. KINGSEED  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army  
West Point, New York

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Townsend, Peter. *Duel of Eagles*.  
Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press,  
1991. 455pp. \$24.95

This is one of the best histories written about the Battle of Britain. It was crafted from the experiences of Peter Townsend, commander of Britain's 85 Fighter Squadron and a participant in that battle. Despite his emphasis on air power, the author has provided a remarkable blend of history, technology, ideology, and personality. Townsend's love of flying emerges throughout the work, which is punctuated with humor, horror, determination, despair, professionalism, and pragmatism. He has managed to capture the spirit of both the war and the warrior.

Townsend believes that though the war was fought by brave and courageous men, it was an unnecessary continuation of World War I, brought on by the debacle at Versailles.

One of the unique things about this book is the German viewpoint provided through interviews of former German pilots, war documents, and letters. The author leaves no doubt about why the Germans lost the Battle of Britain. First and foremost, he blames poor leadership. He contrasts the visionaries in the German air force with their incompetent leaders and the leadership's failure to match doctrine to technology. As an example he refers to the German order for Me 109s to escort bombers, despite the fact that they did not have the combat range to be effective in that role. A combination of poor intelligence and competing wartime priorities led to inconsistent guidance and the failure to identify the Royal Air Force fighter squadrons and their ground control network. Ultimately, it was incongruent strategy and uncoordinated efforts that led to the downfall of the Germans.

Townsend excels in his discussion of the Royal Air Force. His fascinating narratives about men like Trenchard and Churchill provide the reader with clues about what the author believes to be the key to victory in the Battle of Britain. Included are discussions about the morality of bombing, the efficacy of air power, and interservice cooperation, which are dynamic excursions along the road to the battle. Indeed, reading about the buildup phase is so compelling that the battle itself is a bit anticlimactic.

Readers who enjoy firsthand accounts of dogfights (sadly, without the accompanying hand gestures) will

## 140 Naval War College Review

revel in the taut depiction of man and machine engaged in a contest of wills, but the most richly rewarded will be those looking for insights and analysis.

Every military professional should read this book. It includes issues such as joint operations, doctrine, fog of war, women in combat, and the importance of leadership. This reader found it difficult to remember that the author was referring to the 1940s. For example, the similarities between Hitler's strategic objectives for the Battle of Britain and General Schwartzkopf's strategic objectives in the Gulf are uncanny.

Finally, should there be any lingering doubt about this book's applicability, consider the following Trenchard quote: "How much easier our task . . . would be if the older services had always said, 'How can we help you?' instead of . . . 'How can we destroy you?'"

Townsend has provided us with lessons as timeless as they are timely.

KEVIN CURRY  
Major, U.S. Air Force

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Miller, Nathan. *The Naval Air War, 1939-1945*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 175pp. \$24.95

Despite the title, this is primarily an overview of the employment of aircraft carriers, rather than of naval aviation as a whole, during the Second World War. Miller offers a readable account of the carrier operations in all theaters, but makes only occasional

references to shore-based naval aviation, and there is little background information about why the major powers entered the war with the types of naval aviation they had.

Miller makes clear that during World War II the aircraft carrier reached a degree of maturity that surprised all but its most ardent supporters. Unfortunately, he does not fully discuss the development of carriers during the inter-war years. Although carriers were the subject of intense development in the United States and Japan, that was not the case in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy. The varying degrees of interest and support in these countries had a dramatic and direct impact on the naval campaigns of the Second World War.

Despite a few annoying errors—for example, the biplanes were *not* canvas-covered—his coverage of British fleet carrier operations is extensive and generally good. The 1945 operations of British escort carriers in the Atlantic and the British Pacific Fleet carriers are also mentioned, but in both cases one might have hoped for more detail.

The United States and Japan entered the war with large, well trained carrier forces, which became their primary striking arms—particularly for the United States after the loss of the majority of its battleships to Japanese carrier aircraft at Pearl Harbor. Miller offers a thorough account of the operations of the Japanese and American carrier forces, with an emphasis on fast carriers and only a brief discussion of the escort carriers, which,

served well in tasks ranging from anti-submarine warfare and ferrying aircraft to support of amphibious operations. His documentation of the operations of Japanese carriers is extensive, beginning with the attack on Pearl Harbor (which is described out of chronological sequence in the first chapter), through their successes in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, their setbacks at the Coral Sea and Midway, to their final destruction.

The author's account of the American carrier forces' risky and costly operations of 1942, and their dominance over Japanese sea and land-based air power, is similarly well told. But Miller's title warrants greater coverage of shore-based naval aviation: the Japanese navy's powerful 11th Air Fleet; the Luftwaffe's *Fliegerkorps X*; the Royal Air Force Coastal Command; the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Army Air Force patrol and bomber squadrons; and shore-based navy and Marine fighter, bomber, and torpedo squadrons. All made significant contributions to the naval air war.

Furthermore, a history should provide photographs and text that are mutually supportive. In this book, they are too often at cross-purposes, which is a significant distraction. Photographs are often separated from the related text, and in several cases they raise expectations that the text does not address. For example, there are no less than four photographs of the U.S. Navy's PB4Y-1 Liberators in the Pacific, but their activities there

receive little mention. The four photographs of the last moments of the *Lexington* are disproportionate to the two paragraphs that describe her demise. Additionally, there are several annoying errors in the labeling of plates. The photographs of the Hurricanes aboard *Illustrious* shown on pages 28 and 29 are actually Fulmars; the picture of the *Victorious* on page 31 is reversed (only the Japanese built an aircraft carrier with the island on the port side); and one of the Spitfires shown at the bottom of the same page is an F4F Wildcat.

This book is suitable for the first-time student of aircraft carrier operations in World War II, but for readers familiar with the naval history of the Second World War it will offer nothing new. For those requiring more complete coverage of naval aviation in that war, Norman Polmar's *Aircraft Carriers*, published by Doubleday in 1969, covers this period in greater depth.

ROBERT B. PINNELL  
Commander, U.S. Navy, Ret.  
Kingston, Rhode Island

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Stillwell, Paul. *Battleship Arizona*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 480pp. \$48.95

This is an illustrated history of the life and times of the battleship that was sunk at her berth in Pearl Harbor by the Japanese on 7 December 1941 and lies still in the mud beneath the Arizona Memorial.

## 142 Naval War College Review

Paul Stillwell traces the history of the old ship from her building and commissioning in March 1916 to her death in 1941. The narrative describes life aboard *Arizona* through the eyes of the officers and enlisted men who served in her. It is amply supported by numerous photographs in her various periods between alterations. The changes in her appearance and armament illustrate the changes made in all the battleships during the period from 1916 to 1941.

The book includes several interesting appendices. One describes the ship's employment and twenty-six-year life. Others list the names of her commanding officers, the over 1,500 men who were serving in her on 7 December, and those who died in her. Still another consists of drawings and technical data on the ship, and a last one presents a series of touching letters to the girl friend of an enlisted man who served in her.

Stillwell is not only an author of many books on naval history, but he also serves as director of oral history and editor-in-chief of the quarterly *Naval History* at the Naval Institute Press. He is a skilled and competent writer and an excellent interviewer, drawing on the memories of over a hundred interviewees for this study. The hundreds of photographs he chose are excellent. As a result, the *Arizona* comes alive with the words of the men who served in her. A bonus is that the book accurately describes life as it was on any of the other battleships of that era. Change the

name and the account could fit any ship and any battleship sailor.

This book will be attractive to any student of naval history or to anyone who likes the Navy or the sea. But it may be of special interest to the thousands of officers and enlisted men who served in battleships prior to World War II. From its pages their families and friends will come to know the life they led and the hardships they endured.

WILLIAM P. MACK  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, Ret.  
Annapolis, Maryland

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Twichell, Heath. *Northwest Epic: The Building of the Alaska Highway*. New York: St. Martin's, 1992. 368pp. \$24.95

Heath Twichell has done more than write a fascinating story chronicling a truly herculean task; he has produced a case history for decision makers and strategic planners.

World War II triggered the plan to build a road linking Alaska with the forty-eight states to provide communication and logistical and strategic access that could not be interrupted by the Japanese navy. It also included bending the route to serve airfields in the Canadian Northwest and Alaska, as well as constructing a pipeline along the MacKenzie River and over the Rocky Mountains to provide fuel from the oil fields to White Horse, Skagway, and Fairbanks.

The decision to pit man and machine against space, nature, and

time hinged on the assumption of a threat to sea communications by the Japanese, which was proven wrong. This was foreseen at the time by the ranking Canadian on the USA-Canadian Permanent Joint Board of Defense (PJBD). On 3 March 1942, after the PJBD had approved the U.S. Army plan to build a road through Canada to Alaska, Dr. Keenlyside told the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs that while Canada, for political reasons, could not bar the United States from land access to Alaska, "the strategic justifications . . . for the road are of questionable validity." He said also that while the major justification of a threat to sea communications by the Japanese navy might have been true at the time the decision was made, "if the United States programme of plane and ship construction is even approximately achieved, it will not be true in 1944. If the road could be built in two weeks instead of two years the argument would be valid."

In less than two years, the road (but not the pipeline) was usable for military traffic, but even when the first trucks made the tortuous journey in November 1942, less than a year after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese threat to sea communications with Alaska was minimal and fading.

Twichell covers this story from every angle and in detail. The author demonstrates commendable restraint in avoiding accusations. He applies his personal interest and compassion to areas that demand honesty and

understanding. The arrogance of racial prejudice, chauvinistic attitudes, military and civilian rivalries, and American insensitivity to Canadian sovereignty were factors then as they are today. But though the cost exceeded its wartime worth, the execution of that road by unprepared engineers, both military and civilian, was truly an epic accomplishment.

This work has a structure like that of a musical piece. There are themes and movements woven into a single opus that combine the influence of military and political leaders on events and the reciprocal impact of events on the great and the small.

Big people were involved. Senator Truman's handling of the CANOL pipeline investigation raised his presidential stock and lowered that of General Brehon Somervell, the Army's logistic czar, who relieved General Hoge from command of the Alaskan construction, probably for personal reasons (and thereby paved the way for Hoge to become a four-star combat leader in the European theater). Lesser leaders failed on the spot. Yet, it is the many unsung heroes (black and white, military and civilian, men and women) that fill these pages who warm the heart of the reader.

As a bonus, Twichell offers students of strategy an interesting comparison of how civilian entrepreneurs and military leaders treat large projects that are overtaken by events. For example, after the American Civil War, the Collins overland cable (planned to connect Europe and America through Canada and Russia, via the Bering

## 144 Naval War College Review

Strait) was almost completed at a cost to Western Union of over \$3,000,000. In the summer of 1866 Cyrus Field's fifth try at an Atlantic cable succeeded, and the Collins project was stopped. During World War II, however, when it was clear that a Japanese threat to communications to Alaska no longer existed, the road and oil line continued. Professional pride plus access to the public treasury proved to be a hindrance to making hard and timely decisions.

Twichell is a former professor at the Naval War College. He is linked to Alaska through his father's role as an engineer officer in this epic and also through the drama of discovery in his first book, which covered the Alaskan feats of General Allen, for which the author won the Allan Nevins Prize in American History.

Students of strategy, logisticians, sociologists, and adventurers who are interested in Alaska, or anyone who loves drama will benefit from reading this book. Building the Alaska highway was not strategically critical, but it was a heroic accomplishment.

WILLIAM FRED LONG  
Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.  
Newport, Rhode Island

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Compton-Hall, Richard. *Submarines and the War at Sea, 1914-1918*. New York: Macmillan, 1991. 314pp. \$19.95

Most readers are familiar with the exploits of the German submarine arm in the two world wars, but few are

aware of the tactical and technical innovations that all the major navies had to develop to make the submarine a viable weapon system. Richard Compton-Hall has provided us with that information. *Submarines* is a book about the people, equipment, and tactics of a naval arm that most senior naval leaders initially considered at best a technical curiosity with some possible use in coastal defense.

Compton-Hall's narrative takes the reader aboard those early British, German, and Russian submarines and provides a feel for the primitive and dangerous conditions in which submariners then served. It was a perilous profession with little promise of career rewards. It is a view that strips away the romantic myths about the early days in submarine service. Compton-Hall explains why the naval leaders of the pre-World War I era expected so little of their submarine; yet, those early pioneers persevered and provided results that shocked the world and changed naval operations forever.

The author is a former career submariner in the Royal Navy, and from his past experiences he has an insight that few can match into submarine operations. Unfortunately, he periodically laces his narrative with chauvinistic pronouncements (such as that Royal Navy sailors had more spirit, were more chivalrous, did more with less, were more innovative, than anyone else, etc.). Such statements detract from an otherwise outstanding account. Still, that is only a minor

distraction in a story written with rare credibility and enthusiasm.

This is a thorough and passionate look at the people, tactics, and equipment that shaped the world's first submarine campaigns and influenced submarine designs and operations well into the 1950s. It is a book for the serious naval historian or enthusiast.

CARL O. SCHUSTER  
Commander, U.S. Navy

short introductions that place each selection within the literature.

Inasmuch as in such a work the choice, truncation, arrangement, and introduction of the documents precondition what a reader can hope to take from them, the qualifications of the editor are crucial. Professor Stamp's, of course, are of the finest: the classic study of slavery, *The Peculiar Institution*, is only one of his many books, awards, and distinctions. Stamp as historian is represented here by a passage from that book, one that presents his own conviction of the centrality of slavery in the war's causes.

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Stamp, Kenneth M., ed. *The Causes of the Civil War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991. 255pp. \$10

"The Civil War," says Bernard de Voto in one of the selections in this collection, "is the crux of our history." Evidence of that fact is the number and variety of sources in this new third edition of Kenneth M. Stamp's *The Causes of the Civil War*, which first appeared in 1959. The book pulls together, in a way accessible to general readers, selections representing what appears to be the whole spectrum of opinion on the subject held by persons writing at the time or ever since. The present edition adds five new documents to the last (1974) version, for a new total of eighty-seven: primary and secondary, contemporary and subsequent. Stamp, as editor, provides a background summary (1787-1861), pithy comments on the study of historical causation in general, a list of recommended readings, an index, and perhaps most usefully,

The editor sorts his documents among seven interpretive "prisms," or broad groupings of opinion as to those causes: that they lay in a conflict between a "Slave Power" and the "Black Republicans"; or, between states' rights and nationalism; or, between attackers and defenders of slavery; or, that this was fundamentally an economic matter; or, one of gross failure of leadership; or, a systematic failure of democracy to adjudicate internal contradictions.

Documents in all these sections are selected so as to address simultaneously, as if in a matrix, three related and overarching questions: Why had the sections been so mutually hostile before the war, and for so long? Why was secession the immediate response of the Deep South to Lincoln's election? Why were most Northerners unwilling simply to let the Southern states go? Professor Stamp offers no concluding assessment of these issues,

## 146 Naval War College Review

but the readings, arranged chronologically within sections and reflecting nuances of opinion on each side of each issue, provide plenty of evidence as to what it might be.

One rewarding kind of analysis the editor leaves for the reader is the collecting of common threads. Such threads might be the importance of party politics (see Silbey, Boucher, and Benton); the Civil War—vice, presumably, the War of 1812—as the “second American Revolution” (the Beards, and others); and the fragility (Allan Nevens, cf. David Donald) of “an atmosphere in which every episode became a crisis.” There are curiosities in this entertaining book (like Hamilton J. Eckenrode’s view of Southerners as “Tropic Nordics”), and some memorable grotesqueries (Richard H. Shryock, in 1933, dismissing “Platonic abstractions like Union and Freedom” as matters for “sentimentalists”).

*The Causes of the Civil War* remains in this third edition an indispensable tool. It is a must-read for students of the period and a must-use for its teachers. The book is itself evidence of the urgency of the need, unabated for over 130 years, to revisit continually the sources and attempt to illuminate this crisis that could be resolved, in John Quincy Adams’s words, “only at the cannon’s mouth.”

PELHAM G. BOYER  
Naval War College

Dudley, William S. *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History*, Vol. II. Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1992. 770pp. (No price given)

This second volume of William S. Dudley’s *The Naval War of 1812* continues his project of reviving an area of history long neglected by American scholars: the compilation of a reliable and comprehensive documentary naval history of that conflict. The standard collection of materials pertaining to the American side of the conflict was assembled less than a decade after the Treaty of Ghent by John Brannan, who edited *Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States, during the War with Great Britain in the Years 1812, 13, 14, & 15*, published in 1823. Unfortunately, little has emerged since in this genre. On the other hand, British and Canadian historians have literally blown the Americans out of the water with the publication of significant documentary collections. Earnest Cruikshank, and later William Wood, set the standard with their multi-volumed collection of material relating to British and Canadian activities during the war, which may someday be utilized for a similar effort focusing on American documents.

Fortunately, American scholarship has begun to catch up, at least regarding the naval aspects of the war. Dudley and his colleagues at the Naval Historical Center have engaged in the long-needed project to produce a three-volume set of material relating



to the naval war in 1812. The first volume of *The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History* was published in 1985 and contained a selection of documents relating to the causes of the war and its naval aspects during the first six months. In this second volume, published in 1992, Dudley continues by earmarking over five hundred documents pertaining to the naval campaign of 1813, both at sea and on the inland waters. As he explains in the preface, he wished to provide a more comprehensive look at the fledgling U.S. Navy than would be possible with a mere "recounting of battles from eyewitness reports." Additionally, he has included documents that reflect the "concerns of policy makers as well as commanding officers, of ordinary sailors and marines, and of common citizens who had opinions about the course of the war." The result is a rich mixture of material that goes beyond a dreary listing of official state documents and reports. Through it all, Dudley provides a terse but informative narrative that weaves together the contents of each section. This narrative "resin" offers the necessary background perspective to a work that should be of great value to the interested layman as well as to the practicing scholar, who may already be familiar with much of the material.

Dudley approached this formidable task by organizing the documents into chapters that correspond to the five theaters of operation: the Atlantic, the Chesapeake Bay, the Northern Lakes, the Gulf Coast, and the Pacific. He

initiates each chapter with a short introductory essay that examines the area of operations in 1813 and establishes the context of the documents that follow. Within each chapter, the documents are arranged chronologically by topics, each topic introduced with an explanatory heading. This mix of narrative and documents is properly balanced so that the former does not intrude into the main purpose of the work yet is sufficient to give meaning and perspective to the materials.

This is a richly illustrated and well indexed study and contains a useful though far from complete list of short titles. It is not, nor was it intended to be, a complete documentary record of the naval war of 1812. It is important for its representation of significant and (what might appear at first blush) not-so-significant topics and issues regarding the naval establishment in this country. It serves as a manageable overview of a rich variety of topics.

Dudley's work is certainly not without fault, however. One in particular lies in the arrangement of topics within the chapters. There seems to be an unresolved conflict in the editor's mind about whether the material should be arranged topically or chronologically. The result is a mix of the two. For example, in the third chapter, dealing with the Northern Lakes theater, a more logical flow of material would have resulted had Dudley organized his documents around each of the areas of operations within that theater rather than mixing them together in a rough chronological

## 148 Naval War College Review

flow. If the reader is primarily interested in the activities on Lake Erie, for example, he or she must scan the table of contents carefully to mark out the material relating to that subject. This is inconvenient at best and downright annoying at worst.

However, Dudley must be complimented for assembling a collection of sources that provide a valuable look at the early years of our naval establishment as it faced its first real test. He has certainly made a significant contribution to the historical record of this period, and it is hoped that the project will continue with the timely publication of the third and final volume in this series.

In conclusion, documentary histories are often difficult to assemble and even more difficult to read, but Dudley has succeeded in overcoming these barriers so well that his work deserves a place in every university and public library.

ALLAN D. BELOVARAC  
Mercyhurst College  
Erie, Pennsylvania

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Whipple, A.B.C. *To the Shores of Tripoli: The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines*. New York: William Morrow, 1991. 357pp. \$23

Whipple is a former editor and writer of Time-Life Books and the author of numerous maritime titles. He has produced a history that is fast-paced and well written.

Whipple's narrative does not disappoint. The images of newly inde-

pendent Americans clashing on the seas with the corsairs of the Barbary coast, engaging in hand-to-hand combat in the approaches to Tripoli harbor, bombarding the city itself, or leading a hodgepodge army of mercenaries across the Western Desert to Derna are the stuff of Hollywood. (Although I would not advise anyone to waste their time watching *Tripoli*, with John Wayne.)

Unfortunately, while the author may be a master of the sea tale, he clearly is not an expert on the history of the early U.S. Navy. He suggests that the navalist-antinavalist debate in the United States was purely sectional. It was not. He terms the British 4th-rate *Leopard* a frigate. He incorrectly writes that "fleet maneuvers and coordinated support of army troops" characterized the American naval experience during the Revolution. He writes of broadsides being fired Hollywood style, *en masse*, whereas in the American service the guns were fired in rotation as they bore. He has even misspelled the name of one of the U.S. Navy's early heroes—Captain Thomas "Truxton" (Truxtun).

Whipple's major failing is his determination to portray the Tripolitan War as the conflict that shaped the American sea services. Such a claim is both unoriginal and inaccurate. Glenn Tucker made the same argument in his similarly titled *Dawn Like Thunder: The Barbary Wars and the Birth of the U.S. Navy* (1963). Statements such as that the Tripolitan War was the United States' "first foreign war," and one that witnessed the operation of

the nation's "largest naval fleet," are inaccurate.

The United States' first foreign war was the undeclared naval war with France, the Quasi-War, fought between 1798 and 1801. While it is true that trouble with the Barbary pirates prompted Americans to begin the construction of six frigates in March 1794, it was the crisis with France, which began three years later, that caused Congress to refine a program that had stalled, to reestablish the Marine Corps, and man the service's ships. Virtually all of the officers and warships that appear in the pages of Whipple's narrative first entered service and made their marks during the war with France. During the Quasi-War the U.S. Navy deployed as many as four squadrons to the Caribbean, and over twenty men-of-war—a force larger than that deployed to the Mediterranean. The Americans also developed the logistical know-how to conduct sustained operations far from American ports. Even the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps activities ashore (political intrigue and involvement in the affairs of Hispaniola (Haiti) in 1799 and 1800, and a small amphibious landing on Curacao in 1800) foreshadowed the dramatic cross-desert trek of William Eaton and Presley O'Bannon.

While Whipple is guilty of trying to oversell the extent to which the Tripolitan War served as the catalyst for the "birth" of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, the author is to be applauded for stressing the fact that the conflict was "America's first war with

an Arab tyrant." Too often, Americans and Europeans view the U.S. Navy's presence in the Mediterranean as uniquely an element of the Cold War. In fact, the United States has maintained a naval presence in the Mediterranean for about 150 of the last 200 years! There are, as Whipple points out, similarities between the American effort to face down the Tripolitan bashaw's state-sponsored terrorism and such efforts in the 1980s as the April 1986 El Dorado Canyon strikes against Muammar Qadhafi's Libya. For Americans, hostage-taking, limited military actions, and attempts to undermine Arab states politically are nothing new.

That being the case, there are insights to be gained from the Barbary War experience, and from Whipple's book. I would note especially one of the author's conclusions: that "a hostage situation nearly always requires some sort of negotiation, however unpleasant the prospect," a reality this nation's leaders have recently had to relearn, and ought not again to forget.

MICHAEL A. PALMER  
East Carolina University

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Swanson, Carl E. *Predators and Prizes: American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 1739–1748*. Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1991. 299pp. (No price given)

This is a study of privateering in colonial America during the War of Jenkins' Ear (1739–1748), also known

## 150 Naval War College Review

as King George's War. It is clearly written and well researched from newspapers, manuscripts, secondary sources, and a computer data file of 3,973 entries on "instances of prize actions," drawn mainly from colonial newspapers and the few surviving vice-admiralty court records.

The author's thesis is that privateering was an important and popular form of maritime enterprise in eighteenth-century America and the most significant American contribution—during the War of Jenkins' Ear—to the British Empire's war effort against the French. It fit nicely into the prevailing mercantilist thinking of the time. According to Swanson, privateering not only allowed a nation to mount a major military effort with private capital (at no cost to the government) but also was a way for individuals to profit from the war. The French and Spanish seaborne trade was greatly reduced with the capture of their merchant ships and goods; privateering destroyed their overseas trade while the wealth of the British increased. Moreover, Swanson illustrates that because of the great impact that American privateering had on the Spanish and French, American trade conversely suffered greatly at the hands of the French and Spanish privateers.

Included are well-founded discussions on the law of privateering, the impact of privateering on the American labor market for seamen, and the costs of fitting-out privateers. However, the question of whether or not the owners of privateers made great

profits is less clear, due to the lack of documentation. This is a relatively minor flaw.

Swanson has made a significant contribution to eighteenth-century American maritime history. This study should be read by anyone who wishes to understand the role of privateering in colonial American war-making.

DAVID SYRETT  
Queens College  
The City University of New York

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Weir, Gary E. *Building the Kaiser's Navy: The Imperial Naval Office and German Industry in the von Tirpitz Era, 1890–1919*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992. 289pp. \$36.95

Over the past two decades, historians have analyzed most aspects of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz's creation of the Imperial German Navy. Basically, these works have centered on the political-strategic parameters of the Tirpitz plan, its operational underpinnings, and the men who manned the fleet. However, the development of a German naval-industrial complex under Tirpitz has largely escaped analysis. This gap in the literature has now been filled by both Gary Weir, of the Naval Historical Center in Washington, D.C., and historian Michael Epkenhans in Germany.

Based on archival materials at Freiburg and Essen and on two exploratory articles published in 1984 in *Military Affairs* and the *International*

*History Review*, Weir's work details Tirpitz's untiring efforts to construct the world's second-largest fleet. Closely following the British model, Tirpitz created an intricate system of regulation and protocol designed to uphold contractual product guarantees, pay schedules, patent rights, cost and weight changes, and the like. It was not an easy task. Fritz Krupp maintained a monopoly in naval ordnance and, with Dillinger, in armor plate; additionally, by 1914 the Essen giant had established a stranglehold on U-boat construction. Although Tirpitz sought to use outside competition, from Midvale in the United States and Thyssen in Germany, to drive down armor prices, Krupp's close ties to Kaiser Wilhelm II proved to be a "trump card." Weir concludes that the relationship between Krupp and Tirpitz was one of mere "coexistence."

The Great War brought the navy chronic shortages of time, labor, and raw materials. For industry, it was "costly, hectic, demanding, and full of anxiety, but immensely profitable." Weir argues that the navy's command technology climaxed in the "Scheer Program" of September 1918, whereby Germany planned to build 450 U-boats by late 1919. Weir dismisses the claims of earlier authors that the program was largely a public relations effort, but he does admit that the navy would have been hard pressed to find 40,000 new workers to join its existing force of 6,500 to build the boats.

What lessons emerge? First and foremost, Tirpitz makes the case that since national security depended in part on the navy, and since armament industries formed a major component of national defense, parliament was honor-bound to finance naval building. Second, since tens of thousands of jobs depended on fleet construction, budget cuts in national defense posed not only a security risk but also a danger to the national economy. As Weir points out, all of this has a highly contemporary and disturbing ring to it. Further, Tirpitz's "painfully cautious attitude toward research and development," combined with German industry's preference for profits over patriotism, meant that technological advancement was left largely to the private sector—with the result, among other things, that Germany failed to develop a single effective turbine for her fleet.

Weir has provided a welcome addition to the literature not only of the Imperial German Navy but also of military-industrial relations in general. He details both the extent and the limits of military procurement within the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II, thereby reminding us once more of the feebleness of industry's patriotism as measured against its profit margin. Officers should read this book carefully so they may understand the other side of the table in weapons production.

HOLGER H. HERWIG  
The University of Calgary

## 152 Naval War College Review

Brown, Michael E. *Flying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1992. 398pp. (No price given)

This is an important book. It should be read by both civilian and military decision makers involved in the acquisition of high-technology weaponry. Brown received his doctorate from Cornell University and is currently a senior research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. To illustrate his thesis, he has traced the procurement of U.S. strategic bombers from the Army Air Corps days of the 1930s to the latest U.S. Air Force bomber, the B-2. Rejecting the notion that the profit motive has been the primary impetus for successive bomber designs, Brown argues that the principal factors behind the search for ever greater bomber performance have been strategic (i.e., perceived threats) and bureaucratic (i.e., the desire of Air Force officers to achieve autonomy and ample appropriations to secure a war-winning strategic bombardment capability).

Two different strategies can be followed in developing advanced designs: sequential and concurrent. In the former, decisions on procurement are delayed until one or more experimental models are flight-tested and modifications are introduced to rectify shortfalls. The time required for sequential development depends on how ambitious the established performance criteria are. Obviously, the further one pushes beyond the state of

the art, the more unknowns and uncertainties there are. This strategy is sometimes described as "fly before buy."

Those responsible for national security are under great pressure to obtain weapons of superior performance to replace the existing force structure as it becomes obsolete due to perceived increases of an enemy threat. To hasten the pace at which advanced weaponry can begin production and then deployment to the operational units, decision makers have frequently resorted to a concurrent procurement strategy, which involves compressing the whole acquisition process. The selection of a design (among those of rival firms in competition) is made on the basis of computer simulations and wind tunnel tests. At the same time, work begins on the experimental model for initial flight tests and expenditures are made for production tooling, jigs and fixtures, etc..

With the B-1B, for example, more than 16,000 production drawings and 54,000 tool orders had been released for fabrication *before* the initial flight test model had been completed. The assumption here is that the design will remain fairly stable from paper project to flight test model—which, in reality, has almost never been the case. Necessary modification arising in flight tests has frequently led to massive reworking of production tooling, causing large cost overruns and painful delays in deployment. The principal thesis of this study is that it is possible to build technologically advanced

weapons while minimizing acquisition risks, but only if a sequential policy is followed: delaying production decisions until actual flight tests have been conducted and required modifications worked out. The time compression claimed for concurrency has seldom been achieved in practice.

Why, then, have Air Force and civilian decision makers shown such a strong bias in favor of concurrency? Brown points out that once heavy expenditures are made for production as well as for development, a program gains a momentum that is difficult to stop. Because bomber projects can sometimes run seven or eight years or longer, they can extend beyond the term of an administration or a Congress friendly to defense into an era of lean budgets and reluctant leaders. In such periods, the sunk costs make it extremely difficult politically to cancel a program outright. On the other hand, where programs are only modestly beyond the state of the art, concurrency can hasten the day of deployment in quantity, with no more than minimal risk.

The author urges a greater use of prototyping and a sharply limited resort to concurrency, but he concludes on a doleful note. Keeping in mind the fate of Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard's attempt to reintroduce "fly before buy" in the early 1970s, Brown suggests that we should not be sanguine about the prospect for significant reforms in the weapons acquisition process, inasmuch as the "institutional forces at

work in the Pentagon are both powerful and durable."

In a brief note on sources, the author asserts that he has consulted some three thousand pages of documents in Air Force and industry archives. However, scrutiny of his footnotes suggests that much, if not most, of his source material (other than those documents reproduced by air-arm and industry historians in their own studies) was not the actual working papers of the decision makers but was obtained from monographs and histories. Given the excellence of this monograph, one must conclude that the official historians on whom Brown has relied have turned out many fine studies.

This book is marred by a number of annoying flaws. For example, the B-17 never mounted *five* turrets. More seriously, the author ignores the addition of an electronic warfare crewmember to the B-52, giving the bomber an additional offensive weapon in its electronic countermeasure capability. Also, the inadequate index has no entry whatever for electronics or avionics. Fortunately, neither these nor other nits undermine the central thesis.

I.B. HOLLEY, JR.  
Duke University

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Fozard, John W. *Sydney Camm and the Hurricane: Perspectives on the Master Fighter Designer and His Finest Achievement*. Washington, D.C.:

## 154 Naval War College Review

Smithsonian Institution Press,  
1991. 258pp. (No price given)

This book is a collection of essays by Mr. Fozard, many given as commemorative addresses, in honor of Sydney Camm, one of England's most memorable aircraft designers. Camm is credited with creating the Hawker Hurricane, the aircraft most responsible for winning the Battle of Britain in 1940. Camm began his thirty years as Hawker's chief designer in 1925, at the age of thirty-two. The son of a carpenter, he had little formal education (seven years total) but an extraordinary sense of design, a passion for detail, and an abiding interest in aircraft. One senses that technology ultimately challenged his limited education, particularly after the war, with the arrival of jet aircraft, supersonic flight, and air compressibility. In his senior position as design team leader, Camm insisted on a well-educated engineering staff, which he directed with penetrating insight if not detailed knowledge.

Reading about Camm reminds one of Ed Heinemann of Douglas Aircraft. Both have demonstrated that (at least in the middle of this century) talented nonconformists with very little education could make the grade.

Though the Hurricane was an advanced design for its time (1935), it was built conservatively; initially it was largely fabric covered. Sir Tom Sopwith, head of the Hawker company, gambled the company's resources on the British government's eventual decision to buy the

production, he was able to deliver the first aircraft in 1937. As a result of this bold move, there were over five hundred Hurricanes available for the Battle of Britain. They made the difference, stopping more German aircraft than all other defenses combined, including the vaunted Spitfire. Not until 1944 was the last of some 14,400 Hurricanes produced.

Despite this book's title, Fozard discusses not only Sydney Camm but also his successor, Ralph S. Hooper. The author served as an aircraft designer under both men. As a result, the last chapters cover the development of aircraft concepts that eventually led to the current Harrier series, which, flown by the U.S. Marines, did so well during Desert Storm. The reader is left with the impression that although work on the Harrier started during Camm's reign at Hawker in the 1950s, this was not his kind of aircraft. His favorites, for which he received much acclaim, were the Hart biplane fighter of the late 1920s, the postwar Hunter jet, and, of course, the Hurricane.

This book is about the English aircraft design process as it was developed initially by Camm's Hawker team and thereafter by its organizational successors. Written as it is by a senior English aircraft design engineer, it is meant primarily for the aircraft historian who is not averse to plowing through speeches and fuzzy group photographs of people important (and that only to each other) largely because they



formed a team capable of repeated remarkable achievement.

RICHARD F. CROSS III  
Washington, D.C.

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Arnett, Eric H. *Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles and U.S. Security*. New York: Praeger, 1991. 224pp. \$45

This book is a comprehensive examination of one of the more arcane aspects of strategic warfare and of the maneuvering done to gain the advantage in arms control negotiations. As one digs through the uses proposed for sea-launched cruise missiles—American Tomahawks and their Soviet navy counterparts, the Sampson (nuclear), Styx, Sunburn, and Starbright—one wonders how much influence military considerations had on the political scientists who composed the scenarios. Dr. Arnett sheds light on some of the technological misconceptions that abound in the claims and counterclaims of the “cruise missile lobby.”

Eric Arnett holds a doctorate in engineering and public policy from Carnegie-Mellon University and is an associate at the Program on Science and International Security of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He is therefore well qualified to discuss the issues surrounding the debate on the potential roles of sea-launched cruise missiles in the American and Russian force structures. In his discussions of the intersection of technology, strategy, and public policy, it is refreshing (and

essential) that attention is paid to technological facts and to the limitations technology imposes, as well as the opportunities it confers, on offense and defense.

Despite the use of submarine-launched Tomahawks in the Gulf War, the whole subject of sea-launched cruise missiles has been relegated to an inconspicuous place in the current debates about force structure, build-down, and arms control. Perhaps that relegation is premature. Arnett points out that the sea-launched cruise missile with a conventional explosive warhead represents an attempt by technology to provide conventional weapons for “strategic” missions. Fanciful mission scenarios such as “decapitations,” minimum-warning attacks, and so forth must be viewed in the context of attempts by each side to retain a strategic advantage even as reliance shifts away from the nuclear arsenal. Although Arnett uses a clear, unemotional style to detail mission possibilities, it is easy to imagine the fervor with which the advocates can press their cases.

The author’s technical knowledge comes into play when he convincingly demonstrates that sea-launched cruise missile technology today, and for the foreseeable future, is not equal to the demands of the missions. It is apparent that Arnett has more than a cursory familiarity with the relevant technical details of warheads, guidance systems, and missile countermeasures. He does not dismiss the performance shortcomings as

## 156 Naval War College Review

mere technicalities, nor does he say that certain capabilities will never be achieved; he simply says that the capabilities are not now available. In plain English, Arnett calls attention to the limitations of the missile guidance systems and to the mismatch between the potential agility and mobility of targets (Scud launchers, for example) and missile targeting capabilities.

It is interesting to follow the perceptions about sea-launched cruise missiles that appear to exist among the arms control negotiators. Apparently the Soviet negotiators so strongly believed the claims of stealth, relative invulnerability, warhead effectiveness, and "pin-point" accuracy put forward in the slick publications that they desired to have such weapons nullified. On our side, if development of cruise missile technology was ever intended only as an arms control "bargaining chip," our system of weapons advocacy nonetheless developed staunch converts, particularly among national security ideologues. Perhaps the historical record will show that the expenditures to develop the sea-launched cruise missile were productive in winning the Cold War with economic, as well as technological, weapons. The trouble is that we do not yet have an accounting of the opportunity costs that the United States incurred in its pursuit of cruise missile programs.

One could wish for a sequel that would address the opportunity costs to both antagonists associated with this type of weapon. It is not fair to criticize Dr. Arnett for this omission,

since it lies beyond the scope of what he wanted to do. But the economic questions surrounding weaponry were of vital interest then, are now, and most assuredly will be in the future.

In summary, this book is a solid contribution to the literature of the interrelationship of technology and national strategy. It lays out most, if not all, of the concepts concerned with the military use of sea-launched cruise missiles. It touches discreetly upon some of the issues of truth and credibility surrounding weapons programs that are cloaked in secrecy for national security reasons. When security embargoes lapse, will there be a torrent of revisionist exposés of various weapons programs? Maybe there should be. As with certain aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative, hints of possible fraud as well as of waste and abuse raise far more serious questions about the overall integrity of our developmental processes. Dr. Arnett mentions these matters only briefly, and in passing. Can integrity and credibility be separated, either by military planners or arms control policy negotiators?

ALBERT M. BOTTOMS  
Charlottesville, Virginia

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Weidenbaum, Murray L. *Small Wars, Big Defense: Paying for the Military after the Cold War*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992. 228pp. \$22.95

Dr. Murray L. Weidenbaum, Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. Louis, is concerned not only about shifts in defense priorities and expenditures but also about general precepts. His views are those of a thoughtful, articulate conservative.

Popular debate about the configuration, mission, and expense of the defense establishment can be tedious and superficial. Defense, in brief, is in need of what George Bush termed "the vision thing."

Professor Weidenbaum organizes the ten chapters of his book into three parts: "meeting today's challenges," "running the military at lower cost," and "defense policy for the future." He views much of our military behavior since 1945 as operating in "start and stop cycles." He prefers "fundamental, slower-acting reforms" to "quick fixes in defense policy." "Use of the military budget as the premiere political gravy train," he argues, "is a luxury that this nation should abandon quickly." However, one of the more vexing matters is how to retain elasticity and flexibility in the defense industry so as to prevent a feast-or-famine condition. Weidenbaum advocates "a strong defense industrial base" along with "alert and well motivated reserve components."

The essence of Weidenbaum's case can be stated in five linked theses. First, the armed forces should be retrenched, because of the disappearance of the Soviet and East European military threat. Second,

although the military establishment needs to be reduced, the quality of the military force should not be diminished. He adds that the military should keep what equipment it has in good repair and should not add all of the intended new weaponry. Third, in the reduction scheme, the core elements should receive careful attention so that future enlargement of the force, if circumstances dictate, would be possible. Fourth, he argues in favor of keeping a basic defense industrial and research base, again with an eye to enlargement in case of need. Fifth and finally, he warns about the dangers of nuclear proliferation among Third World states and about easy access to advanced weaponry by international terrorist organizations. He would like to see contingency plans that deal with this menace.

This is a well crafted, meticulously documented study in the field of political economy. It is a welcome supplement to texts in American government and American civil-military relations. Surely, some readers will take issue with the author's willingness to criticize both military and civilian managers and elites. Yet Weidenbaum has produced a provocative agenda for the political and economic leadership.

Although the author has pointed the way ahead, it would have been instructive had he, first, shown his readers how other nations have dealt with comparable defense problems at various times, and second, considered the economic implications of possible peacekeeping and peacemaking roles

## 158 Naval War College Review

for U.S. forces under U.N. sponsorship.

RICHARD DALE  
Southern Illinois University  
at Carbondale

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Nixon, Richard. *Seize the Moment: America's Challenge in a One-Superpower World*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. 322pp. \$25

For most of us growing up in the Vietnam-Watergate era, Richard Nixon was a highly unpopular figure. Many have strongly mixed feelings about his gradual move into the role of elder statesman, which occurred primarily with the publication of his several well-received books on foreign affairs. Nonetheless, regardless of one's opinion of the former president, *Seize the Moment* is an impressive *tour d'horizon* of the problems and opportunities facing U.S. foreign policy at a time when vision is conspicuous by its absence.

Nixon sets out his framework for thinking about American foreign policy in a strong introductory chapter. His central thesis is that it is not enough that communism has been defeated in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and aggression in the Persian Gulf stopped. Rather, "we must seize the moment to win victory for peace and freedom in the world." A second major theme is the primacy of morality in foreign policy. Nixon cites an exchange with Mao wherein the Chairman asked, "Is peace America's only goal?" To which

Nixon replied, "Our goal is peace but a peace that is more than the absence of war—a peace with justice." Nixon notes the persistent conflict between idealism and realism in American foreign policy and argues that one extreme is impotent, the other immoral. "We should remain dedicated to the ideals of freedom and justice that have served as the beacons of our foreign policy, but be realistic and practical about what it takes to move the world in their direction."

He goes on to discuss three popular myths concerning U.S. foreign policy. First is the myth of the "End of History," that "the march of technology, not armies, and battles of markets, not ideas, would become the central dynamics of history." Nixon has only to counter with the tribal, ethnic, national, and religious violence splattered across the daily headlines, as well as with the continuing vigor of various ideologies such as "socialism with a human face" and radical fundamentalism in the Middle East. He aptly quotes Paul Johnson: "One of the lessons of history is that no civilization can be taken for granted. Its permanency can never be assured. There is always a dark age waiting for you around the corner, if you play your cards badly and you make sufficient mistakes."

The second myth is the irrelevance of military power. Disputing trendy arguments that "military power no longer serves as the key instrument of statecraft or represents the bedrock of foreign policy," that interdependence among large powers makes war

irrelevant, and that the costs of war have become prohibitive, Nixon notes that "economic power contributes only indirectly to a nation's security by generating wealth to channel toward that end." It is no small irony that similar ideas about the diminishing utility of armed force and the likelihood of its use were prevalent in the years before 1914.

The last myth is the "decline of America." Nixon points out that America today dominates militarily, has the strongest scientific and technological base, ranks near the top in per capita income, and has the same twenty-five-percent share of the world GNP that it had before the anomalous post-World War II period. "The United States stands at the apex of its geopolitical power. If its status as the world's only superpower erodes, that will result from choice, not necessity."

In succeeding chapters, Nixon offers specific policy recommendations for dealing with the former Soviet Union, Europe, East Asia and the Pacific, the Muslim world, and the Southern Hemisphere. The concluding chapter, "The Renewal of America," discusses problems at home that bear on America in the world, from nascent isolationism to economic and educational weakness, to the decline of values manifested in serious problems of racism, drugs, and crime.

This is a most worthwhile and stimulating book. In contrast to the ephemeral "New World Order," it presents cogent arguments for a coherent world view. Even more

important in a time of excessive pessimism about America's condition, Nixon offers a hopeful assessment of U.S. potential to influence the world for good in the coming years. In the author's words, "Just as the free world turned to America for leadership to confront the post-World War II Soviet threat, the world as a whole will look to America for leadership to grapple with the post-Cold War problems. For most of the world's people, the twentieth century has been a century of war, repression, and poverty. For the first time in history, there is a real chance to make the next century a century of peace, freedom, and progress. Today, only one nation can provide the leadership to achieve those goals. The United States is privileged to be that nation. Our moment of truth has arrived. We must seize the moment."

JAN VAN TOL  
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy  
San Francisco, California

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Simon, Jeffrey, ed. *European Security Policy after the Revolutions of 1989*. Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1991. 640pp. (No price given)

This book is a compendium of essays resulting from a conference on "Force Mobilization, the Revolutions of 1989, and European Security" hosted by the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in June 1990. It is intended as a companion piece to *NATO-Warsaw Pact Force*

## 160 Naval War College Review

*Mobilization*, by the same author and editor, published in 1988.

The essays were written by twenty-two luminaries on Euro-Nato security topics, and though the book is uneven in its coverage, it generally follows a country-by-country format: recent political changes, perceived security threats, and likely force arrays. It is organized into five sections: implications for Nato and Warsaw Pact, German unification and Nato's core nations, Europe's peripheral nations, problems on Europe's flanks, and challenges to Nato's southern (Mediterranean) region.

The book's limitations are twofold—its timeliness and its thematic organization. The events that took place in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in mid-1991 alone render some of this material outdated. Also, the twenty-two "main menu" pieces have that scissors-and-paste look often seen in the first-generation guerrilla warfare books of the late 1960s. This could have been avoided with tighter editing, a few demands upon the contributors for comparable conclusions, inclusion of some maps, and the addition of a complete bibliography. Yet Simon was brave even to attempt this volume, given the problem of perishable material, and it does cover many things not seen in previous unclassified literature.

The essay by U.S. Army Colonel Karl H. Lowe, "U.S. Armed Forces in the New Europe," is a classic that can stand on its own. It belongs on the desks of legislators and executives in Washington. Lowe states that the

"message NATO must convey to the Soviets and their peoples is that the surest guarantee of European stability is to preserve strategic balance and mutual transparency of military activity. . . . It is infinitely wiser to evolve our force (U.S.A.) structures to a security framework supportive of future needs than to simply devolve from what exists without heeding the pitfalls lying in wait." Also, the two essays on the former East and West Germanys, by Joseph S. Gordon and Stephen F. Szabo respectively, are worth whatever the book costs.

This book will not win literary awards for smooth reading, but it is a classic in its time for collateral reasons. During all the years of the Cold War, from 1947 to 1989, did anyone really have a one-volume rationale for all the military forces in the Euro-Nato region? In this book, one can find out what Spain defines as its African security threat, and how that perception influences Nato; the role of the Rumanian army in the 1989 coup d'état, and its probable future behavior; the French order of battle in a mixed-force array; and the Soviet views on war mobilization in a fast-changing political milieu.

Any government or corporate executive who deals with Euro-Nato issues should have this book within easy desk-top reach. For the military professional, the question may well be why such a book did not exist when Nato and Warsaw Pact were clearly defined mortal enemies. This volume should be recommended reading for any college course on twentieth-

century Europe, be it history, political science, or economics. It will open vistas previously unavailable to civilian scholars.

RUSSELL W. RAMSEY  
Air Command and Staff College  
Maxwell Air Force Base

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Hattendorf, John B. and Murfett, Malcolm H., eds. *The Limitations of Military Power: Essays Presented to Professor Norman Gibbs on his Eightieth Birthday*. London: Macmillan, and New York: St. Martins, 1990. 242pp. (No price given)

Professor Norman Gibbs was the Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford University from 1953 to 1977. Well known as a visiting lecturer at the Naval War College in the 1960s and 1970s and as a contributor to this journal, Gibbs was also visiting professor at several other American institutions, including Princeton, The Mershon Center at Ohio State, New Brunswick, and West Point. In addition, at Oxford he taught and served as *doctor vater* to a number of past and present War College faculty members.

Gibbs received the page proofs of the *festschrift* on his eightieth birthday but died before the book appeared in print. In it, a number of his friends and former students have combined an interesting collection of essays, using the theme of Gibbs's own interest in the Clausewitzian ideas of friction and the inherent limitations of military

In his foreword to the volume, General Andrew Goodpaster relates Gibbs's success as a teacher at West Point, while British diplomat Sir Michael Pike tells of his own experience as an undergraduate in Gibbs's classes, and military historian Piers Mackesy discusses his close association with Gibbs as a colleague. The remainder of the book is divided into three sections. The first essay outlines the way in which war studies developed over the past century at Oxford University, showing Gibbs's role along with those of his predecessors, Spencer Wilkinson and Cyril Falls, and his successors, Sir Michael Howard and Robert O'Neill.

In the second part of the book, four authors suggest some themes, beyond Clausewitz's view of moral and psychological factors, that limit military power. Robert O'Neill illustrates the limitations of alliances and international order. George Tanham discusses the military problems involved in dealing with an elusive enemy in unconventional warfare, and Robert Jordan discusses the ways in which international organizations restrain military power. Concluding the section is Colin Gray's important article, which draws attention to the way in which geography limits grand strategy.

In the third part, five authors illuminate, in terms of historical case studies, the restraints on military power. Charles Townshend considers the role of a commander's personality in dealing with civil disturbances. George Peden discusses financial and

## 162 Naval War College Review

industrial restraints, and Jehuda Wal-lach examines the use as a ruse of military plans for "Operation Sea Lion." Malcolm Murfett shows the restraints on a naval power employing force in the confined waters of a river, while William Duiker considers the American experience in Vietnam and demonstrates the need for policy makers to have a broad and lucid understanding of national security affairs.

In this collection of essays the editors and authors have worked together to produce a scholarly contribution that expresses the scholarly approach Norman Gibbs instilled in them, along with some suggestions for extending and elaborating on Clausewitz's understanding of the limits of war as an instrument of policy.

JEREMIAH O'BRIEN  
Newport, Rhode Island

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Ismael, Tariq Y. and Ismael, Jacqueline S. *Politics and Government in the Middle East and North Africa*. Miami: Florida International Univ. Press, 1991. 535pp. \$39.95

This study is a regional survey of how states were formed, how they are governed, and how they interact with each other and the rest of the world.

Written as an introductory text, it includes a general overview and fifteen case studies dealing with the subject states in their subregional contexts: the Northern Belt, Fertile Crescent, Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa.

As a reference these case studies can

stand alone, but it is recommended that the work be read as a whole. To read an analysis of a particular country without first understanding the larger historical, political, and social context is to chance an incomplete or erroneous picture of reality. Fortunately, the authors have devoted the first sixty pages to a framework placing all that follows in proper context.

The authors believe that to gain an understanding of the Middle East and North Africa, one should study patterns of activity over time rather than focus on specific events. For example, although the Gulf War looms large throughout the work, it is not the focus of attention but rather an important reflection of the past and a guidepost for future trends.

The bulk of the book focuses on twenty states stretching from Morocco to Iran, from Turkey to Sudan, and on the Arabian Peninsula. Each state is analyzed in terms of its modern historical development, nationalist credentials, the role of the religious, military, and other elites, as well as of its economy and foreign relations. The Palestinian question is discussed as both a separate area of study and as an all-pervasive problem, one that clouds virtually every regional issue.

The fallout of the bitter contest for leadership of the Arab nationalist movement is also evident throughout. Arab leaders are either reviled as Western toadies (Sadat and Mubarak), praised as bold and right thinkers (Nasser and King Hussein), or treated with mild, almost apologetic criticism for excesses in pursuit of laudable goals



(Saddam Hussein and Qadhafi). Tensions between the rich pro-American states and the poor Islamic states are also explored, often in the context of the late Gulf War.

Anticolonial passions born of European imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries still run strong in the region, and those feelings are reflected here. Great Britain is repeatedly castigated for its past imperial sins, and Israel for its present ones. Religious rivalries figure prominently in both the Arab-Israeli context and in terms of the internal social and political environment of the Islamic states.

There is a definite anti-American thread that runs throughout this study, and though most of the criticism is subtle, implied, or thinly veiled, to find fault with the United States while ignoring or downplaying its positive contributions is a convention in Middle Eastern political writing. So too is the concomitant "explaining" or covering-up for the antics of the likes of Saddam Hussein.

This bias is understandable and, to a degree, supportable, at least from the nationalist's point of view. Still, the work would have been both more palatable and effective had the authors been straightforward and direct in their criticism of the United States.

The authors, professors of political science and social welfare at the University of Calgary, have written widely on the Middle East. In this particular effort they were aided by ten area experts whose contributions account for nearly half the book. The

result is an authoritative, well organized, and readable academic survey. It is also a treatment that opens a window to understanding on the human level, with its display (probably unintended) of the passions and prejudices that are so much a part of that increasingly important region.

THOMAS SEAL  
Major, U.S. Marine Corps  
Stafford, Virginia

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McGibbon, Ian. *The Path to Gallipoli: Defending New Zealand, 1840-1915*. Wellington, New Zealand: GP Books, 1991. 274pp. (No price given)

This work represents yet another excellent New Zealand defense policy study sponsored by the Historical Branch of the New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs. The author has employed a wealth of primary source material to describe the development of that distant country's early defense policy within the British imperial security system. Attention is focused on the dilemma faced by successive governments whether to spend their meager financial resources and manpower on imperial commitments ("out-of-region," in modern parlance) or to develop local defense capabilities. McGibbon explains that the ascendancy of the local-defense school in the 1880s was caused by the fear of rogue cruiser attacks (principally Russian) on New Zealand ports. The government responded by directing enormous attention and

## 164 Naval War College Review

resources to the development of port defenses.

By the turn of the century and following the defeat of the Russian fleet at the Battle of Tsushima in 1904, Wellington's security perceptions had changed considerably in response to the need to protect the ever-precarious imperial interests. New Zealand's naval and military establishments were reformed during this period so that Wellington could deploy trained and relatively well-equipped forces abroad for imperial duty. The move to reform New Zealand's forces just prior to the First World War is well described by focusing on the visionary minister of defence, Colonel Sir James Allen, an important personality that clearly calls out for an extensive biography.

Overall, the scholarship of this work is excellent, as is its clear writing. However, as a government publication, though the book is well endowed with photographs (and even diagrams!), public penury is seen in the ever more common practice of employing endnotes, and incomplete ones at that. This reviewer is pained to make this point, since McGibbon's last work, *Blue-Water Rationale: The Naval Defence of New Zealand, 1914-1942* (1981), which was also published by the Government Printer, was of such quality and completeness as to recall a time when such craftsmanship was the norm in publishing. Alas, the exigencies of finite government finances have reached even the distant antipodes.

Notwithstanding this *cri de coeur*, *The Path to Gallipoli* should be required reading for those with even a cursory interest in New Zealand history, let alone those who wish to understand the basis for modern-day security policy in that country.

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG  
U.S. Army War College

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Wirtz, James J. *The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991. 290pp. \$34.95

The Tet Offensive of 1968 was the decisive battle of the Vietnam War. In Vietnam, the offensive became the dividing line between the periods of U.S. escalation and withdrawal. At home, the surprise of its occurrence discredited the Johnson administration's conduct of the war, which resulted in the president's decision not to run for reelection. For many Americans, Tet '68 also marked the beginning of their disillusionment with overseas military intervention and ever-larger defense budgets justified in the name of anticommunism—a reaction commonly known as “the Vietnam syndrome.”

Yet at the battlefield level, the outcome of the Tet Offensive was a resounding U.S. victory. To compensate for and neutralize our side's superiority in firepower, mobility, communications, and logistics, the communists planned for the offensive's countrywide wave of surprise attacks to be the signal for a

vast popular uprising against the government of South Vietnam. When the general uprising fizzled, it was Hanoi's turn to be surprised. Without this added distraction to contend with, the United States and its allies quickly regained the upper hand, inflicting horrendous losses on the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in the process.

Hanoi's miscalculation was based on the overly optimistic assessment of the war weariness and political disaffection of the South Vietnamese people. That intelligence failure was a costly one. However, time would turn the communists' tactical defeat into a strategic victory. What laid the basis for this stunning reversal was another intelligence failure, of far greater magnitude and consequence: American inability to discern the center of gravity of the enemy's main attack in the impending offensive until it was too late. How and why nearly all of the diverse and sophisticated agencies of our intelligence community so mistook what Hanoi had in mind is the subject of this fascinating book. Combining the disciplines of history and political science with insights from psychological theory, James J. Wirtz has produced both a pathbreaking analysis and a cautionary tale.

Dr. Wirtz researched and wrote most of this book as a pre-doctoral fellow at Harvard's Center for International Affairs, where he made excellent use of its superb staff and resources. Sprinkled with names like Samuel P. Huntington, Walt Rostow, and

George Allen, his acknowledgements read like a "Who's Who" of the political and intellectual establishment. The author now teaches national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School.

*The Tet Offensive* is as thoroughly researched, tautly written, and relentlessly logical as a good intelligence report. Part I (the first third of the book) deals with the protracted debate in Hanoi over an appropriate strategy in response to the introduction of major U.S. ground forces in 1965 and the subsequent deterioration of the communists' battlefield situation. Using both U.S. and North Vietnamese sources, Dr. Wirtz traces the evolution of Hanoi's decision to "go for broke" in the winter of 1968. It was decided not to launch an all-out attack on U.S. bases and combat units but to use a combination of feints, deception, and secondary attacks that would draw our forces away from the population centers, and then to strike and capture those centers by either overwhelming or demoralizing their Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) defenders. In other words, Hanoi had decided to confront its American and South Vietnamese adversaries not at their strongest point, but at their weakest.

In Part II, Wirtz makes effective use of the concepts and terminology of the intelligence analyst to describe how and why we repeatedly "missed the signals" as to the main objective of the coming offensive. In essence, he argues, the majority of U.S. intelligence specialists, both military and

## 166 Naval War College Review

civilian, subscribed to a set of beliefs that hindered their ability to sort, categorize, and interpret objectively the vast quantity of information on enemy activity available to them. Among these beliefs was the certainty that Hanoi was growing desperate, having realized that it could no longer win a purely military victory. Given the firepower and mobility of U.S. ground forces, it was also a certainty that the communists considered American combat units their main, and most dangerous, foe. So far, so good; but in combination with the tendency of many American officials to predict enemy behavior by such historical "analogies" as the Battle of the Bulge (Hitler's desperate last offensive to stave off defeat) and Dien Bien Phu (symbol of France's humiliation at the hands of General Giap), such beliefs could lead to some dangerously blinkered conclusions.

As the evidence mounted that Giap was planning a major effort somewhere in South Vietnam in the early winter of 1968, the general consensus in Saigon and Washington was that something like a combination Battle of the Bulge and Dien Bien Phu was in the making, this time in the demilitarized zone (DMZ), at Khe Sanh—Ho Chi Minh's last desperate attempt to convince the Americans that winning the war was not worth the cost. That the NVA buildup around Khe Sanh (and elsewhere along the Laotian and Cambodian borders) might be a cover for a concurrent buildup near the cities was a possibility too lightly dismissed. It fit

no historical analogy and it challenged comfortable assumptions about who was winning the war.

In all fairness, bits and pieces of raw intelligence data gathered in combat tend to be both ambiguous and contradictory. It is a problem made worse when the bits and pieces become mountainous piles. Still, the evidence of what was to come was there in those piles, to be read by unblinkered eyes. Looking at all the evidence, CIA analyst Joseph Hovey accurately predicted what would happen during Tet. His warnings of the coming attacks on the cities and the attempted general uprising were met with smiles. Our intelligence was too good. We knew the communists did not have the manpower to be everywhere at once and would not be so foolish as to base the success of their plan on the chance of fomenting a simultaneous popular revolt. Yet that is just what they did. That our intelligence was better than theirs regarding the loyalties of the South Vietnamese only adds to the irony of the final outcome.

The flaws in this book are minor. Readers not familiar with the geography of Vietnam will wish for more than one skimpy map, and the author's use of the "four tasks" of the intelligence cycle in conjunction with the "six empirical issues" involved in intelligence processing creates a rather mechanistic and repetitious analytical matrix that only another intelligence wonk could love. However, as an Army veteran of Tet '68 and (briefly) an infantry division staff intelligence

officer (G-2) on the DMZ in 1971, I found this book to be both accurate and scrupulously fair. The only villain here is the weakness of human nature that causes men at war to let preconceived ideas rule their minds. Cen-

turies ago, Sun Tzu said it best: "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."

HEATH TWICHELL  
Oak Bluffs, Massachusetts

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Naval War College Press

—1992—

FOUNDATIONS  
OF  
MORAL OBLIGATION

THE STOCKDALE COURSE

by Joseph Gerard Brennan

Based on the lectures given by Professor Brennan for the Naval War College course, "Foundations of Moral Obligation," established in 1978 by Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale, this survey of moral philosophy manages, as one might expect from the pen of Professor Brennan, to be both erudite and entertaining. Foreword by Admiral Stockdale.

Available from the Naval War College Foundation Gift Shop, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. \$10, plus \$2.50 handling for the first book and \$1 for each book thereafter.