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Small Wars, Big Defense: Paying for the Military after the Cold War

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mere technicalities, nor does he say that certain capabilities will never be achieved; he simply says that the capabilities are not now available. In plain English, Arnett calls attention to the limitations of the missile guidance systems and to the mismatch between the potential agility and mobility of targets (Scud launchers, for example) and missile targeting capabilities.

It is interesting to follow the perceptions about sea-launched cruise missiles that appear to exist among the arms control negotiators. Apparently the Soviet negotiators so strongly believed the claims of stealth, relative invulnerability, warhead effectiveness, and "pin-point" accuracy put forward in the slick publications that they desired to have such weapons nullified. On our side, if development of cruise missile technology was ever intended only as an arms control "bargaining chip," our system of weapons advocacy nonetheless developed staunch converts, particularly among national security ideologues. Perhaps the historical record will show that the expenditures to develop the sea-launched cruise missile were productive in winning the Cold War with economic, as well as technological, weapons. The trouble is that we do not yet have an accounting of the opportunity costs that the United States incurred in its pursuit of cruise missile programs.

One could wish for a sequel that would address the opportunity costs to both antagonists associated with this type of weapon. It is not fair to criticize Dr. Arnett for this omission,

since it lies beyond the scope of what he wanted to do. But the economic questions surrounding weaponry were of vital interest then, are now, and most assuredly will be in the future.

In summary, this book is a solid contribution to the literature of the interrelationship of technology and national strategy. It lays out most, if not all, of the concepts concerned with the military use of sea-launched cruise missiles. It touches discreetly upon some of the issues of truth and credibility surrounding weapons programs that are cloaked in secrecy for national security reasons. When security embargoes lapse, will there be a torrent of revisionist exposés of various weapons programs? Maybe there should be. As with certain aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative, hints of possible fraud as well as of waste and abuse raise far more serious questions about the overall integrity of our developmental processes. Dr. Arnett mentions these matters only briefly, and in passing. Can integrity and credibility be separated, either by military planners or arms control policy negotiators?

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Weidenbaum, Murray L. *Small Wars, Big Defense: Paying for the Military after the Cold War*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992. 228pp. \$22.95

Dr. Murray L. Weidenbaum, Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. Louis, is concerned not only about shifts in defense priorities and expenditures but also about general precepts. His views are those of a thoughtful, articulate conservative.

Popular debate about the configuration, mission, and expense of the defense establishment can be tedious and superficial. Defense, in brief, is in need of what George Bush termed "the vision thing."

Professor Weidenbaum organizes the ten chapters of his book into three parts: "meeting today's challenges," "running the military at lower cost," and "defense policy for the future." He views much of our military behavior since 1945 as operating in "start and stop cycles." He prefers "fundamental, slower-acting reforms" to "quick fixes in defense policy." "Use of the military budget as the premiere political gravy train," he argues, "is a luxury that this nation should abandon quickly." However, one of the more vexing matters is how to retain elasticity and flexibility in the defense industry so as to prevent a feast-or-famine condition. Weidenbaum advocates "a strong defense industrial base" along with "alert and well motivated reserve components."

The essence of Weidenbaum's case can be stated in five linked theses. First, the armed forces should be retrenched, because of the disappearance of the Soviet and East European military threat. Second,

although the military establishment needs to be reduced, the quality of the military force should not be diminished. He adds that the military should keep what equipment it has in good repair and should not add all of the intended new weaponry. Third, in the reduction scheme, the core elements should receive careful attention so that future enlargement of the force, if circumstances dictate, would be possible. Fourth, he argues in favor of keeping a basic defense industrial and research base, again with an eye to enlargement in case of need. Fifth and finally, he warns about the dangers of nuclear proliferation among Third World states and about easy access to advanced weaponry by international terrorist organizations. He would like to see contingency plans that deal with this menace.

This is a well crafted, meticulously documented study in the field of political economy. It is a welcome supplement to texts in American government and American civil-military relations. Surely, some readers will take issue with the author's willingness to criticize both military and civilian managers and elites. Yet Weidenbaum has produced a provocative agenda for the political and economic leadership.

Although the author has pointed the way ahead, it would have been instructive had he, first, shown his readers how other nations have dealt with comparable defense problems at various times, and second, considered the economic implications of possible peacekeeping and peacemaking roles

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Nixon, Richard. *Seize the Moment: America's Challenge in a One-Superpower World*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. 322pp. \$25

For most of us growing up in the Vietnam-Watergate era, Richard Nixon was a highly unpopular figure. Many have strongly mixed feelings about his gradual move into the role of elder statesman, which occurred primarily with the publication of his several well-received books on foreign affairs. Nonetheless, regardless of one's opinion of the former president, *Seize the Moment* is an impressive *tour d'horizon* of the problems and opportunities facing U.S. foreign policy at a time when vision is conspicuous by its absence.

Nixon sets out his framework for thinking about American foreign policy in a strong introductory chapter. His central thesis is that it is not enough that communism has been defeated in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and aggression in the Persian Gulf stopped. Rather, "we must seize the moment to win victory for peace and freedom in the world." A second major theme is the primacy of morality in foreign policy. Nixon cites an exchange with Mao wherein the Chairman asked, "Is peace America's only goal?" To which

Nixon replied, "Our goal is peace but a peace that is more than the absence of war—a peace with justice." Nixon notes the persistent conflict between idealism and realism in American foreign policy and argues that one extreme is impotent, the other immoral. "We should remain dedicated to the ideals of freedom and justice that have served as the beacons of our foreign policy, but be realistic and practical about what it takes to move the world in their direction."

He goes on to discuss three popular myths concerning U.S. foreign policy. First is the myth of the "End of History," that "the march of technology, not armies, and battles of markets, not ideas, would become the central dynamics of history." Nixon has only to counter with the tribal, ethnic, national, and religious violence splattered across the daily headlines, as well as with the continuing vigor of various ideologies such as "socialism with a human face" and radical fundamentalism in the Middle East. He aptly quotes Paul Johnson: "One of the lessons of history is that no civilization can be taken for granted. Its permanency can never be assured. There is always a dark age waiting for you around the corner, if you play your cards badly and you make sufficient mistakes."

The second myth is the irrelevance of military power. Disputing trendy arguments that "military power no longer serves as the key instrument of statecraft or represents the bedrock of foreign policy," that interdependence among large powers makes war