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The Limitations of Military Power: Essays Presented to Professor Norman Gibbs on his Eightieth Birthday

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century Europe, be it history, political science, or economics. It will open vistas previously unavailable to civilian scholars.

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Hattendorf, John B. and Murfett, Malcolm H., eds. *The Limitations of Military Power: Essays Presented to Professor Norman Gibbs on his Eightieth Birthday*. London: Macmillan, and New York: St. Martins, 1990. 242pp. (No price given)

Professor Norman Gibbs was the Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford University from 1953 to 1977. Well known as a visiting lecturer at the Naval War College in the 1960s and 1970s and as a contributor to this journal, Gibbs was also visiting professor at several other American institutions, including Princeton, The Mershon Center at Ohio State, New Brunswick, and West Point. In addition, at Oxford he taught and served as *doctor vater* to a number of past and present War College faculty members.

Gibbs received the page proofs of the *festschrift* on his eightieth birthday but died before the book appeared in print. In it, a number of his friends and former students have combined an interesting collection of essays, using the theme of Gibbs's own interest in the Clausewitzian ideas of friction and the inherent limitations of military power.

In his foreword to the volume, General Andrew Goodpaster relates Gibbs's success as a teacher at West Point, while British diplomat Sir Michael Pike tells of his own experience as an undergraduate in Gibbs's classes, and military historian Piers Mackesy discusses his close association with Gibbs as a colleague. The remainder of the book is divided into three sections. The first essay outlines the way in which war studies developed over the past century at Oxford University, showing Gibbs's role along with those of his predecessors, Spencer Wilkinson and Cyril Falls, and his successors, Sir Michael Howard and Robert O'Neill.

In the second part of the book, four authors suggest some themes, beyond Clausewitz's view of moral and psychological factors, that limit military power. Robert O'Neill illustrates the limitations of alliances and international order. George Tanham discusses the military problems involved in dealing with an elusive enemy in unconventional warfare, and Robert Jordan discusses the ways in which international organizations restrain military power. Concluding the section is Colin Gray's important article, which draws attention to the way in which geography limits grand strategy.

In the third part, five authors illuminate, in terms of historical case studies, the restraints on military power. Charles Townshend considers the role of a commander's personality in dealing with civil disturbances. George Peden discusses financial and

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industrial restraints, and Jehuda Wal-lach examines the use as a ruse of military plans for "Operation Sea Lion." Malcolm Murfett shows the restraints on a naval power employing force in the confined waters of a river, while William Duiker considers the American experience in Vietnam and demonstrates the need for policy makers to have a broad and lucid understanding of national security affairs.

In this collection of essays the editors and authors have worked together to produce a scholarly contribution that expresses the scholarly approach Norman Gibbs instilled in them, along with some suggestions for extending and elaborating on Clausewitz's understanding of the limits of war as an instrument of policy.

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Ismael, Tariq Y. and Ismael, Jacqueline S. *Politics and Government in the Middle East and North Africa*. Miami: Florida International Univ. Press, 1991. 535pp. \$39.95

This study is a regional survey of how states were formed, how they are governed, and how they interact with each other and the rest of the world.

Written as an introductory text, it includes a general overview and fifteen case studies dealing with the subject states in their subregional contexts: the Northern Belt, Fertile Crescent, Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa.

As a reference these case studies can

stand alone, but it is recommended that the work be read as a whole. To read an analysis of a particular country without first understanding the larger historical, political, and social context is to chance an incomplete or erroneous picture of reality. Fortunately, the authors have devoted the first sixty pages to a framework placing all that follows in proper context.

The authors believe that to gain an understanding of the Middle East and North Africa, one should study patterns of activity over time rather than focus on specific events. For example, although the Gulf War looms large throughout the work, it is not the focus of attention but rather an important reflection of the past and a guidepost for future trends.

The bulk of the book focuses on twenty states stretching from Morocco to Iran, from Turkey to Sudan, and on the Arabian Peninsula. Each state is analyzed in terms of its modern historical development, nationalist credentials, the role of the religious, military, and other elites, as well as of its economy and foreign relations. The Palestinian question is discussed as both a separate area of study and as an all-pervasive problem, one that clouds virtually every regional issue.

The fallout of the bitter contest for leadership of the Arab nationalist movement is also evident throughout. Arab leaders are either reviled as Western toadies (Sadat and Mubarak), praised as bold and right thinkers (Nasser and King Hussein), or treated with mild, almost apologetic criticism for excesses in pursuit of laudable goals