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War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century

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cooperative security option." This proposal assumes that all the nations participating are on the same side, configure their forces for defense not offense, and provide one another with mutual reassurance. The FY 2001 cost of \$147 billion (in 1992 dollars) would be about \$22 billion less than the low option, the savings being obtained through deeper cuts in nuclear forces and in tactical air forces. With this option the authors would hope to engage the (former) "Soviet establishment" and avoid the type of confrontation that led to the Cold War.

This volume offers a lot of ideas in a brief space. Readers may wish that it had been longer and that the authors had addressed more dimensions of the impact of cutting defense spending: for instance, the implications for the defense industrial base are not addressed, whereas these options will probably require a significant reduction in the number of defense contractors and production facilities. How would that affect the ability of the United States to respond to an increased threat even if the change in the international environment developed over a period of several years?

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Gray, Colin S. *War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990. \$24.95

Colin Gray is a very bright man with a well-deserved reputation as a

strategist. While he invariably offers much for his reader to ponder, this book is exceedingly difficult to read.

The obvious problem is that Gray completed this text late in 1989, when most strategists were cowering in intellectual foxholes as the Cold War world exploded into revolution. While we hid, waiting for the dust to settle, or presented the briefest, most general expressions of advice ("Things sure are in flux, a lot of assumptions will have to be reexamined, and it looks like a whole new ballgame!"), Gray was standing tall, marching forward, and arguing strongly for certain views. Inevitably, some of those views have been overtaken by events; Gray's well-known distrust of arms control programs, the motives of Soviet foreign policy, and of the purportedly "defensive" Soviet military strategy now seems irrelevant. Detailed musings on Nato's Central Front battle, the Maritime Strategy, and World War III's all-out nuclear exchanges look as antiquated as a slide rule.

A deeper source of difficulty is Gray's failure to structure a sustained, coherent argument. What we find is a spectacular collection of insights, observations, and ideas that lack organization. In the ten chapters, one may find that sections of each chapter or even the paragraphs within a section are a collection of as yet unassembled pearls.

Another problem for many readers is Gray's erudition (evident in sixty-five pages of excellent notes). The index for "M" lists Manassas, Manzikert, Marie, Midway, and Mons as

battles that Gray cites with a presumption of the reader's knowledge; one could as easily note Gray's references to historical figures, or his fondness for Latin and French phrases—the average reader will be flattered. My students did not enjoy this book.

Consequently, reading *War, Peace, and Victory* is exhausting. One must sort out what looks like outmoded ideas to see if they can safely be discarded ("One can hardly state too plainly that the U.S.S.R., or a successor polity, is *always* going to be a very large military power potentially menacing to its neighbors"). Although the parade of Gray's ideas often seems no better organized than shoppers at a mall, one must think very deeply about his brilliant ideas ("States, particularly democratic states,...are prone to believe that if only that traditional enemy can be overthrown or otherwise strictly contained, a condition of permanent peace can be enjoyed. The fallacy of the last move to peace is a recurring fantasy"). Finally, one must cope with bewildering compound sentences laden with uncommon historical allusions and *bons mots*.

Who, then, should read *War, Peace, and Victory*? Professional strategists. Gray, as always, has much to offer his peers. "Five closely linked themes dominate this book: the unity of strategic phenomena; the influence of geography; the value of historical experience; the power of national culture to help shape expectations, beliefs, and behavior; and the

consequences of technological change for statecraft and strategy." Gray's comments on maritime versus continental strategic choices, the proper respect to be accorded technology (or maneuver warfare), and the strategies pursued by belligerents in both world wars are especially valuable. "If this book has presented a single big idea," Gray urges, "it is that strategy is a unity." "The door to strategic wisdom is opened by the posing of a simple basic question (which is not to say that it is easy to answer)...What is the expected connection between a particular threat or application of force and the desired political outcome to the conflict?" Gray's reflections must be addressed by his fellow strategists, particularly his prediction in the Afterword: "It is not practical, realistic, or even very expedient to assume that anything approximating the current range and weight of military burdens will be required of the U.S. armed forces very far into the twenty-first century."

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Arnett, Eric H., ed. *Science and International Security: Responding to a Changing World*. Washington, D.C.: American Assoc. for the Advancement of Science, 1990. 523pp. \$15

This is an anthology of twenty-eight essays on a variety of topics in international security, with an emphasis on the intersection of these policy issues