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Arctic Leverage: Canadian Sovereignty and Security

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The question of whether conflict is inevitable is thus almost always answered in the affirmative. Although the military-media problem is fraught with mutual (sometimes overt, always latent) hostility, distrust, and misunderstanding of motive and function, the key to its resolution is found in constant examination and education, coupled with intelligent planning, management, and continuing dialogue. Neither side will ever be completely happy with whatever arrangement emerges from such well-intended efforts, but the nation will be best served when, in the crucible of armed conflict, flexible attitudes are maintained by both the military and the media. These are the important statements made by the authors.

This collection is excellent reading and a worthwhile addition to the personal libraries of all officers and working journalists.

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Caldwell, Nathaniel French. *Arctic Leverage: Canadian Sovereignty and Security*. New York: Praeger, 1990. 123pp. \$37.95

Canada's 1987 defence White Paper, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defense Policy for Canada*, announced the plan to bring a better balance to Canadian naval capabilities through the acquisition of a fleet of nuclear attack submarines (SSNs). These submarines were both to allow the resupply of Nato forces in Europe and meet the

threat of the Soviet navy to North America directly. The unique ability of nuclear submarines to patrol the ice-covered waters off Canada's Arctic Ocean coastline also led many in and outside the Canadian government to champion the SSN programme as a means to enhance Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

Nathaniel Caldwell, however, has gone further still. He was prompted to undertake the study of Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security by the possibility that the nuclear attack submarine program was inspired by a desire of the Canadian government to gain leverage in North American defence "out of proportion to its monetary contribution." He asserts that Canada would be able to gain "leverage" in Nato and with the United States if it were to establish effective control over the Northwest Passage. The author poses a number of historical questions on the relationship between Canada and the United States and how the nuclear submarine program related to the issue of Canadian sovereignty.

Caldwell surveys the history of the development of Canadian northern sovereignty, the history of Arctic navigation, the Canada-United States defence relationship, and a geopolitical analysis of Canadian and Soviet strategy in the Arctic. This is far more than the slim ninety-seven page essay (including notes) can bear.

The author provides a useful outline of the Canadian assertion of sovereignty over the Arctic archipelago, but he fails to carry the

argument through to the development of Canadian maritime boundaries. He does not come to grips with the nature of Canadian domestic politics or of the interplay of government departments, which were central factors in the SSN decisions. Neither does he present an effective argument for the pattern of Canadian defence negotiations, other than to confirm the obvious point that Canadians always worry about their sovereignty when dealing with the United States.

Canada clearly has allowed the use of its territory in return for enhanced security. Therefore, the concept that Canada manipulates its geostrategic position for leverage in its defence relationship with the United States is quite credible. This hardly makes Canada unique, however, or even a particularly notable example of this process within Nato, compared to Iceland, or even Germany. What does make Canada unique is that the Canadian public regards the United States as the only conceivable threat to Canadian sovereignty short of Armageddon. This is noted by the author, but not integrated into the explanation.

Caldwell's references to Canadian "primary sources" are actually excerpts printed in secondary sources, rather than the readily available debates of the House of Commons, committee reports, and other Canadian official sources. Also, there is almost no reference to the wide array of Canadian academic works on Arctic sovereignty. The

lack of use of important Canadian sources leads to numerous difficulties throughout the work in interpreting the domestic issues of critical importance to the SSN program and its subsequent cancellation.

The author's interpretation of the changes at the top in the Canadian Department of National Defence are indicative. He portrays then-minister of national defence Perrin Beatty as the "victim" of a shuffle to minister of health; he states that the Commander of the Maritime Command, Admiral Charles Thomas, was "replaced" and that Rear Admiral John Anderson "was removed as Nuclear Program Manager and sent back to operational programs in Ottawa." In fact, virtually any Canadian would regard Beatty's move to minister of health as a considerable promotion; Admiral Thomas moved up to the position of Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff; and Admiral Anderson was first promoted to Chief, Maritime Doctrines and Operations, and is now the Maritime Commander. Such misinterpretations seriously undermine the credibility of the work.

This work also suffers from a simplistic geopolitical approach. Canada's acquisition of Newfoundland is described by Caldwell as "the key to maintaining Arctic sovereignty," *even though*, as the author clearly states, Canada had firmly established her sovereignty over the Arctic lands long before Newfoundland was a part of Canada. The Arctic itself is described as important to national survival because otherwise

Canada would be "surrounded by foreign territory." Since Canada has open access to the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans without the Arctic or Newfoundland, it is difficult to imagine what the author means.

In the end, *Arctic Leverage* fails to provide satisfactory answers to its own questions. There is simply not enough relevant evidence presented to shed new light on Canadian sovereignty and security. The author's numerous errors of interpretation and of the facts, along with his frequent inconsistencies, internal contradictions, and weak analysis, all add up to the conclusion that the reader should look elsewhere for answers on Canadian defence issues.

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Frame, T.R., Goldrick, J.V.P., Jones, P.D. *Reflections on the Royal Australian Navy*. Kenhurst, New South Wales: Kangaroo Press, 1991. 417pp. \$49.95

Royal Australian Navy (RAN) officers Thomas Frame, James Goldrick, and Peter Jones have combined in this work the proceedings of the first Australian Naval History Seminar, conducted under the auspices of the Australian War Memorial in July 1989. This seminar represents the beginning of an effort to "remedy a perceived imbalance in Australia" of military history that has been oriented mainly towards the Australian army.

To that end this volume marshals the insights of current and former RAN officers and noted military analysts from Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.

An introduction is provided by RAN Chief of Staff Vice Admiral M.W. Hudson. The volume's following twenty-five chapters examine: Australia's naval history under British colonial rule; the contributions of specific commanders and politicians; the RAN's relationship with the British Royal Navy, other Commonwealth navies, and the U.S. Navy; and perspectives on the RAN's participation in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.

Of special interest to American readers will be Steven Allen's instructive analysis of the disastrous results of early USN-RAN cooperation in the two-day August 1942 battle off Savo Island. Providing contrast to these painful beginnings is Thomas-Durell Young's chapter on the origins and extent of Australian-American naval cooperation under the aegis of the 1951 Australia-New Zealand-United States alliance (Anzus). The impact of the RAN's turn to the U.S. alliance is further examined in Peter Jones's chapter on the RAN's decision to buy the *Charles F. Adams*-class destroyer.

Those seeking deeper insights into the character of the RAN will benefit from several useful chapters that detail aspects of its relations with the Royal Navy and other Commonwealth navies. The authors also examine the naval cooperation between Australia and New Zealand during New