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## "Global Crossroads and the American Seas," and "History and the Sea: Essays on Maritime Strategies"

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posture. True to its original design, it remained bottled up in the southern North Sea without ever threatening British control of the Atlantic sea-lanes. What was lacking, Wegener concluded, was not just a strong battlefleet, but access to the Atlantic that could only be provided by "geography," i.e. by the possession of Denmark and Norway. Only then, would the German navy pose a serious strategic threat to the British.

Wegener experienced bitter hostility to his ideas on the part of Tirpitz and his coterie. As Tirpitz continued to dominate the German navy, even after defeat, this hostility ultimately put an end to the critic's naval career. Wegener was unceremoniously forced into early retirement. In the end, it was not Admiral Raeder, but a civilian who began to show an interest in Wegener's ideas: Adolf Hitler.

It was Hitler who, in 1940, ordered the occupation of Denmark and Norway in an attempt to conquer "geography" and to gain access to the open Atlantic. But for reasons that will no doubt be studied in strategy courses at naval colleges around the world, Hitler did not win either.

Of course, since Wegener's critique of Tirpitz was formulated, many other factors have, in various ways, further modified modern strategic thinking. Nevertheless, this volume will prove invaluable to all students of naval history and strategy. It contains a careful translation of Wegener's once famous book,

first published in 1929. There are also three shorter essays produced as internal memoranda in 1915, in which the author first developed his ideas.

Dr. Holger Herwig is well qualified, through his own work at the University of Calgary, to edit and supervise this translation. Through a long, well researched essay, Dr. Herwig introduces the reader to the contemporary political context. The introduction highlights the feuds within the naval officer corps that were rooted in the differences of opinion over strategic matters. It alone, make this volume a worthwhile and rewarding read.

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Reynolds, Clark G., ed. *Global Crossroads and the American Seas*. Missoula, Montana: Pictorial Histories Pub., Co., 1988. 220pp.  
Reynolds, Clark G. *History and the Sea: Essays on Maritime Strategies*. Charleston, South Carolina: Univ. of South Carolina, 1989. 232pp. \$24.95

Both books are by Clark G. Reynolds, the well-known naval historian who is presently chairman of the history department at the College of Charleston. *Global Crossroads*, is the proceedings of the 1987 conference which the International Commission for Maritime History (ICMH) held at Charleston. It reveals Reynolds' work as both program chairman for the confer-

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ence as well as the editor of the proceedings. The second volume, *History and the Sea*, is a selection of Reynolds' own essays which have appeared in various journals over the past quarter century.

Reynolds has selected 18 of the 30 papers delivered at the ICMH conference for publication in *Global Crossroads*. All represent new research into the central role which America has played as a maritime crossroads between the Atlantic and the Pacific, from the late 17th century to 1945. Under this broad rubric, scholars have explored a wide range of topics and approaches dealing with both the commercial and naval uses of the sea. Reynolds has grouped the papers under four headings: (1) Maritime Trade of the Americas, 18th century; (2) Maritime Trade of the Americas, 19th century; (3) Defense of Shipping in the Americas 1674-1815; and (4) Naval and Maritime Strategies in the Pacific, 1780-1945. All four groups are clearly part of one intellectual view that unites both the commercial and military uses of the sea, although readers of this journal may tend to be more interested in the essays in section three, dealing with the defense of trade.

Reynolds' volume *History and the Sea* is an important retrospective collection of essays that have appeared in a variety of journals over the years. Not only are they nice to have in one volume, they also represent a valuable summary of one man's intellectual journey and thought. The first chapter is in fact

a reprint of chapter one from his book, *Command of the Sea*. In that work, Reynolds made the important observation that "since no one type of nation has existed throughout history, . . . there has been no one type of navy or naval strategy." From this starting point, he examines some of the differences in varying naval strategies, but naturally enough concentrating on the nature of American naval strategic thinking. In the course of this, we can see his growth in thinking about Mahan's contributions to naval strategy as well as the development of Reynolds' own ideas about thalassocracy as an appropriate concept for understanding and using American naval power.

The final essay in the book, "Eight Centuries of Continental Strategy: Imperial and Soviet Russia," is published here for the first time. While obviously written in the context of the public debate over the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy of the Reagan years, it still retains great value despite the vast changes which have made much of that debate irrelevant to current issues. His consideration of Russian naval history in the light of geopolitical, economic, cultural, and military factors is a valuable pattern and raises the essential issue for a modern strategist as to whether or not the Soviet Union has broken from its historical roots and patterns of behavior.

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