

1991

The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History 1959-1987

Frank Mahncke

The Office of Air Force History

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Recommended Citation

Mahncke, Frank and Air Force History, The Office of (1991) "The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History 1959-1987," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 44 : No. 2 , Article 19.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol44/iss2/19>

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used as research materials. The types of documents used were action reports from the individual ships involved, verbatim voice radio reports from the office in Tactical Command, and other messages between ships involved.

The text is supplemented by several lists and tables. For example, the "Pacific Chronology" is four individual lists of United States and Japanese cruisers and destroyers lost or damaged, but omits battleships and aircraft carriers. These are longer than necessary because all cruisers and destroyers lost or damaged in the Pacific war are listed, not just ship casualties in the Solomons.

The "Solomons Glossary" explains U.S. Navy terminology used in the text. The index lists ships, battles, and individuals, but the references are to chapter number, not page number.

Each chapter has a crudely drawn "battle vicinity" diagram. These show only the general route of American and Japanese forces in the battle area and are not detailed battle diagrams. Two battle diagrams (Cape Esperance and Tassafaronga) were included, apparently to fill page gaps.

This book adds nothing to the history of the Pacific war that Samuel Eliot Morison has not already described in *The Struggle for Guadalcanal* and *Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier*. There is no doubting the authenticity of research materials used in writing this book. The claim that the log format using messages in

combination with action reports "produces a highly accurate sequence of the events" is also beyond question. However, arranging events in order is only part of the writing process and the author has confused the means with the end. The result is a list of events inadequately described. The log format is unnatural and lacks narrative description; the reader is expected to put a list of events together into a comprehensible story. This deficiency is partially alleviated by explanatory "notes" inserted in appropriate places, but many of these notes confound rather than explain. The summary and critique section of each chapter helps some, but it parrots the dated information from secondary sources listed in the bibliography, which are mostly general histories, personal accounts or propagandistic works written during wartime that have little historical value. Unrelated events are lumped together and headings appear in the text that have nothing to do with what follows. Spelling and grammatical errors and stylistic gaffes add to the confusion. A lot of what passes for information in the text and tables is just plain wrong.

WILLIAM H. CROFT
San Ysidro, California

Office of Air Force History. *The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History 1959-1987*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. 608pp.

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The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, named in memory of the first Superintendent of the Air Force Academy, are given each year at the academy by distinguished historians and military scholars. This compendium of 30 years of lectures is a wonderful browsing source for the military historian. It illustrates the rich scope of military history, that is much broader than usually credited by those unfamiliar with the subject. The subjects range from strategy and tactics, to studies of soldierly thought and biography, and the military and its society.

While most of the lectures naturally focus on dimensions of military history of interest to students of air power, there is much for the naval historian. E. Morison's "The War of Ideas: The United States Navy, 1870-1890," describes the enormous outpouring of naval thought from Fiske, Sims and Mahan that occurred in a period when little seemed to be happening in the United States Navy. Perhaps such interwar periods should not be ignored by historians, for possibly the foundations are being laid for the next visible change in the nature of warfare.

Noel Parrish, whose career in the Air Force included command of the Tuskegee Army Flying School and several postwar positions from which he had a major impact on doctrinal development, lectured on "The Influence of Air Power upon Historians." Not without purpose was his title borrowed from Mahan, for his theme was that the Air Force

and its doctrinal development have been poorly served by the lack of scholarship of Mahan's capability and stature.

T. Harry Williams, the distinguished historian of the Civil War, did a comparison of the military leadership styles in the North and in the South. While all were influenced by Jomini, as taught at West Point by Mahan's father, those ultimately successful—Grant and Sherman—were able to grow in leadership and intellect as the war progressed. Williams also showed the importance of the confluence between the military and political leadership of Grant and Lincoln; a confluence that the relationship between Lee and Davis never achieved.

By way of contrast, D. Clayton James' lecture on the Truman-MacArthur affair explores what may happen when two able men fail to understand each other's perspective. While sympathetic to MacArthur, James makes no apology for Truman's dismissal of him, for MacArthur had utterly failed to grasp that war is too important to be left to generals.

Forest Pogue's lecture on George Marshall, and Frank Vandiver's on John Pershing show the senior military leader and his relationships with the selected leaders at its best. Both generals were superb in their understanding of the wartime and the peacetime role of the military in a democracy. Both are clearly worth study.

Maneuver warfare has received a lot of public attention lately, espe-

cially in the Marine Corps and the Army. Steven Ross's lecture of 1965, "Napoleon and Maneuver Warfare," notes that Napoleon's strategy in the campaigns before 1807 was an exemplary case of maneuver warfare on a large scale. Indeed, Ross does a nice comparison of some of Napoleon's maxims and the 1984 edition of AFM 1-1 and FM 100-5. Perhaps combined arms operations, bold attacks and flexible methods have always been in the armory of good generals. Now and again we may need to rediscover those basics.

Philip Crowl's lecture "The Strategist's Short Catechism: Six Questions Without Answers" could serve as a primer for the strategy and policy curriculum at the Naval War College. His key strategic questions are: What is the war about and what purpose is served by it? Is the strategy tailored to meet the national political objectives? What are the limits of military power in the situation? (Appropriate to this, Sir Bernard Montgomery once said that the first principle of war is "not to try to walk to Moscow.") What are the alternatives to the war and to the strategy should it not prevail? Will the home front support the war? Finally, What have I overlooked in my enthusiasm for the grand plan? Taken all together, this is not a bad list of questions to address before starting a war. One might suggest that they be engraved in the JCS tank.

In publishing these lectures, the Office of Air Force History has done a truly commendable service for

military historians— both professional and avocational—and the military strategists, uniformed and civilian.

FRANK C. MAHNCKE
Naval Surface Warfare Center

Heikal, Mohamed H. *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes*. New York: Arbor House, 1987. 242pp. \$18.95

Egyptian journalist, Mohamed Heikal's personal account of the events leading up to and during the Suez crisis of 1956 has tried, in *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, to "recapture the spirit of the time as we experienced it . . . fill in the background, drawing on evidence not always publicly available." As one of President Nasser's inner circle, he offers an Egyptian appreciation of the crisis which has been largely unavailable to Western commentators.

Cutting the Lion's Tail is certainly subjective. On that basis, it could be dismissed for suffering from too specific biases, as a piece of special pleading. It should not be. It is the nature of memoirs to be subjective, often in the extreme. There are a number of scholars who would, on that account, dismiss all the information contained in it. To do so would be an error, and a repetition of an old-fashioned historical ethos which has long since been discredited. Some of the most valuable evidence available to historians are those memoirs written by the actors in the play, in on daily events, privy to their