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## The Psychology of Conflict and Combat

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paradigms with no obvious utility in the practical world. Rather it is a concise, orderly purposeful work which offers practical advice to the leader on how to achieve his or her goals. Although Sun Tzu intended his work as an instruction to monarchs and their generals, much of it is equally useful to leaders in other fields—commercial, financial, industrial, etc. In sum, *The Art of War* teaches the leader how to order one's thoughts and remember the objectives; how to measure, train, and lead subordinate leaders; how to earn and maintain the respect of subordinates of all rank; and how to seize and maintain the initiative against one's opponents.

Clavell's version of this work is especially worthwhile. It incorporates his exceptional insight into the Chinese mind and character. After decades in the Far East, and following a long association with the Middle Kingdom and its inhabitants, James Clavell is far better equipped than a mere translator to accurately describe to the Western mind the thoughts of Sun Tzu.

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Shalit, Ben. *The Psychology of Conflict and Combat*. New York: Praeger Pub., 1989. 224pp. \$39.95

This is one of those exciting offbeat books like Robert Ardrey's *Territorial Imperative*, where truths jump off the page. It contains a

whole pod of new and old verities learned from soldiers in combat. There is also a psychologically well-defined theory that Lebanon may be Israel's Vietnam.

Shalit reaches this conclusion through eleven comparison points:

- Unconventional ideological reasons and target population.

- Blurring the identity of the enemy, causing breakdown of structure and causing higher combat stress reaction than any prior Israeli experience.

- The mistreatment of civilian population, (in Shalit's term) the dirty war.

- The breakdown of cohesion caused by rotation. (Although tours of duty in Vietnam were based on individual rotation, the Israeli problem is alleviated only in part by using unit rotation.)

- The ratio of combat to support troops.

- The use of drugs.

- The level of psychiatric treatment. The Israeli treatment model is to place the psychologist in the field to treat "disorders as a coping problem, rather than as a clinical issue."

- Divisive antiwar protests. Soldiers are going to prison, rather than serving in Lebanon. A brigade commander sought to resign rather than follow the order to attack Beirut.

- The transition from military to civilian life.

- The media bias in covering antiwar protests.

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● The conspiracy of silence in discussing the war.

The text is illustrated with excellent and unexpected diagrams, such as the "Flow Chart of Aggressive Strategies" by which to apply Shalit's "Laws of Escalation of Aggression." Tables appear, such as "Attitudes Toward the Enemy Shown by Israeli Combat and Support Troops on Three Fronts" to demonstrate Shalit's conclusion that there does exist a consistent order of fear and hate of the enemy ranks: support troops in all cases have significantly greater hate and lower fear and respect of the enemy, than do combat troops!

The book has a complete index, an even better bibliography. Ben Shalit is now affiliated with the Karoliska Institute and the National Defense Research Institute in Karlstad, Sweden.

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Kam, Ephraim. *Surprise Attack: A Victim's Perspective*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1988. 266pp. \$25

Many books have been written attempting to analyze the success of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and the American failure to prevent it. (Such an event had been predicted since the 1920s. Moreover, heightened tensions between the United States and Japan had even resulted in alerts at Pearl Harbor in July and October 1941.) The current

American nuclear deterrence strategy is affected by a concern for a possible surprise attack, and the Israeli experience has also been conditioned by a concern for surprise attack, that was realized in the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

Ephraim Kam, an instructor at the Israeli National Defense College and the author of *Surprise Attack*, has combined a sense of immediacy with a cogent blend of managerial psychology, military history, and human nature to analyze victim behaviors that permit a nation, a government, or a military force to fall victim to surprise attack.

The structure of this book bespeaks a systematic approach to the problem of surprise attack. While it may seem obvious that a researcher would do this, my experience with other books indicates that they all too often get lost in the emotionalism connected with a particular event. However, Kam begins at a reasonable starting point and defines the problem as one of perception and reaction by an organization. He has divided it into three parts: the components of the phenomenon itself as borne out by historical examples of surprise attack victims; the operations of the individual (victim) analyst who misperceives indicators of the attack to come; and the dysfunctional operations of groups of analysts who collectively misinterpret warning indicators. Kam does not address a particular surprise attack per se rather, he uses material from eleven representative