

Preparing the Western Alliance for the Next Out-of-Area Campaign

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THE CURRENT PHASE IN EAST-WEST DÉTENTE has had a fundamental effect on the Western alliance. Nato's institutional structure, basic strategy, and doctrinal concepts have been or are currently under review, and for good reason. After all, it is clear that future security challenges to the Western alliance, even in the form of a future hypothetical Soviet/Russian threat, will be faced under completely different political circumstances and geopolitical conditions.¹ While Nato military structures and national defense and diplomatic bureaucracies have produced a large number of proposals to bring Nato into line with the evolving political realities in Europe (i.e., Nato's "New Strategic Concept" released at the Rome Summit in November 1991), one issue has complicated alliance efforts to reach agreement on these needed reforms. The 1991 Gulf War forced the alliance to confront once again the perennial and almost insoluble problem of "out-of-area" conflicts at a time when the alliance was in the midst of review and restructuring. While the subsequent coalition victory over Iraq has removed the immediate need to resolve the issue, the problem of the alliance meeting common threats outside of the Nato-defined area remains unsolved.²

A problem that has continued to plague Nato since its inception is that it is limited to geographical boundaries stated in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Whereas there is no limitation on what individual member states or any

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The author would like to express his gratitude to Monsieur François Heisbourg, Colonels Robert Ulin, Dennis Coupe, and John Hickey, and Lieutenant Colonels Douglas Johnson and Joseph Englehardt for their constructive comments made on an earlier draft. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

collective body of them can do outside of the alliance area, there is no legal, let alone political, basis for joint responses out-of-area under the rubric of the alliance. The existence of this problem has long been known to Europeans, but in recent years it has resulted in reviving the hitherto "sleepy" Western European Union (W.E.U.).³ As defined by its charter (the 1948 Brussels Treaty modified by the 1954 Protocol), the W.E.U. is the sole Western European organization that is both concerned with collective self-defense and has no geographical limitations to its applicability.⁴ Under the leadership of its current secretary general, former Dutch defense minister Dr. Willem van Eekelen, the W.E.U. has attempted to fulfill two new roles: response to threats to collective security outside the geographic area covered by Nato, and serving as the basis for strengthening the European defense pillar.⁵ The W.E.U. has been successful in this regard since the European Community's (E.C.) Maastricht Summit, when it was decided that the W.E.C. would become an integral part of the Community's effort to achieve Political Union by acting as an instrument to implement its defense policy goals.⁶

By making the W.E.U. the vehicle by which the E.C. might ultimately achieve a defense identity, the U.S. goal of attaching the emerging European defense pillar to Nato, no matter how tenuous, was accomplished. Article IV of the Brussels Treaty, as amended by the 1954 Protocol, enjoins the W.E.U. to work in close cooperation with Nato.⁷ Yet, to date, resolution of the issue of whether and how Nato could respond to another out-of-area contingency continues to elude the Western alliance. One might think it unlikely, given the extremely sensitive nature of this issue, that now is the proper time to bring up this divisive matter in Western alliance councils. Nonetheless, there are a number of reasons why the alliance would be well advised to address at this point the problems associated with out-of-area deployments.

First, in view of the overwhelming support that exists in Europe for the United States remaining diplomatically engaged in the affairs of the Continent, if a forward military presence is also to continue European officials would be wise to ensure that Washington does not reach the conclusion that Nato has become anachronistic and no longer accommodates U.S. security requirements.⁸ If there is insufficient political consensus in the alliance to enable it to alter effectively the threat-risk orientation away from the disintegrating Soviet Union to emerging trouble spots, both in and outside of Europe, Nato will simply lose its attractions to Washington. At the very least, such an eventuality could encourage Washington to review closely the option of initiating bilateral defense arrangements, which could be at the expense of Nato collective activities and programs, with Nato members that share Washington's security objectives.⁹

Second, despite the views of some in Europe that such contingencies will not elicit a response from Western Europe, there are strong rationales to suggest that instability in the south will increase in frequency and intensity in the near

future.¹⁰ Population growth that far outstrips industrial expansion has sent a surge of Arabs to Europe in search of jobs now being taken by equally desperate, but more welcome (read: Christian) East Europeans who are willing to integrate themselves into European society. At the same time, West European investment and aid are being redirected eastward, leaving North African countries as an increasingly destitute playground for radical anti-Western fundamentalists and pan-Arab nationalists with increasing access to long-range weapons of mass destruction.¹¹ This situation is fraught with risk for Europe, as well as for the U.S. interests in the region, and should be addressed in common.

If, then, one assumes that there is a need to make Nato (or whatever metamorphic organization replaces it) relevant to its principal members while at the same time addressing European political sensitivities regarding relations with its neighbors, there would appear to be limited political room within which to maneuver. Moreover, there is no doubt that whatever a Nato-E.C.-

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W.E.U. effort may produce concerning the out-of-area issue, the principle of noncommitment prior to the recognition of a specific threat will continue to prevail in Nato. In consequence, it can be assumed with a high degree of certainty that alliance members will continue to address these scenarios in their traditional ad hoc way.¹²

In spite of these seemingly severe limitations, this essay will argue that a basis may exist for an important area of alliance defense cooperation that would facilitate Nato member states' out-of-area deployments. Moreover, the command and control (C²) controversy that plagued the deployment of allied forces prior to the Persian Gulf War will be offered as evidence that the consequences of not initiating such cooperation between Western countries would outweigh potential political costs.

Two points need to be understood concerning cooperation for out-of-area contingencies. First, the cooperation envisaged in this essay would not imply any a priori political commitment or agreement to supply forces to any given contingency. Rather, it would ensure that where any number of alliance members formed a political consensus to act, a military basis for *all* members of the Western alliance to participate would exist. Second, such cooperation, comprising basic staff planning, could occur within whatever organizational structure was comfortable for the participating members: under the auspices of either Nato, the W.E.U., or—conceivably the best solution—*jointly* between these two organizations. What must be recognized by the alliance as a whole is that given the growing sophistication of some Third World military establishments, it would be exceedingly imprudent to assume that the preparation

time the coalition against Iraq enjoyed will be available in future contingencies. Moreover, as seen by the ongoing civil war in what used to be Yugoslavia, the Balkans have the potential for explosive conflict, with little warning time, to which the alliance may feel compelled to react. Indeed, it will be argued that the Western alliance should interpret the Iraqi case as highlighting the clear need to establish a foundation for allied force projection, since current circumstances suggest that without such a basis potentially devastating results could occur in future campaigns.

National Command and Operational Control Defined

At the outset of this discussion, a distinction needs to be made between "national command" and "operational control" in coalition warfare. In essence, national command concerns the internal administration, unit training, logistic support, management, and discipline of armed forces by national authorities. Operational control, on the other hand, relates solely to the actual employment of armed forces for designated objectives either by national or allied commanders. Wartime C² structures that allow for "chopping" (changing operational control of) national units to Nato military commands for employment have long existed in Nato. For instance, under previous Nato arrangements the German army's 12th Panzer Division was to assume wartime operational control over a brigade from the U.S. VII Corps.¹³ At the same time it needs to be stressed that no government surrenders national command of its armed forces to any other country or organization.¹⁴ This important distinction is well accepted in the Western alliance since it allows, in principle, for the most efficient use of allied forces.¹⁵ As a general rule, in a crisis situation national units of an allied formation will operate in a loose association with the central command authority. As conflict becomes more likely, the command association becomes incrementally more firm, to the point where operational control is exercised by an allied headquarters once conflict actually commences.¹⁶

However, to be effective both militarily and politically, clear high-level arrangements among allies need to exist beforehand. "Unity of command," after all, is a widely accepted Principle of War. In the best of circumstances, wartime C² arrangements should be established and tested in peacetime in both field and command post exercises to ensure that they do indeed function. John Collins argues that these arrangements serve four essential purposes: "they establish mutually acceptable lines of responsibility and authority"; "they reduce the likelihood of serious misunderstandings in emergency"; "they increase the likelihood that collaboration will be close and continuous"; and "they affirm the sovereignty of individual states."¹⁷

At the same time, coalition participants are not disposed to allow the use of their forces in situations that could jeopardize their immediate security or their

own specific national interests and objectives. Consequently, both national and coalition rules of engagement (ROE), as well as national guidelines, are issued to commanders to "delineate the circumstances and limitations under which force is initiated and/or continued with other forces encountered."¹⁸ According to Ashley Roach, ROE "ensure armed force is used to achieve and not to defeat the desired political goal."¹⁹ In a coalition setting, allied commanders and associated formations must understand the ROE of foreign units which have been "chopped" to them or risk potentially disastrous consequences. National commanders have the right, and indeed the responsibility, to ensure that the specific operational tasks assigned to them by their coalition commanders conform to their own national roles and missions.²⁰ A contemporary example of the employment of national guidelines within a coalition involved the use of Italian aircraft in the Persian Gulf War. Italian defense minister Virginio Rognoni stated in the press that it would be only after a particular mission had been determined for Italian forces that operational control would be transferred to "American" command. He continued, "It is up to the Italian command to decide which target is suitable for our forces. And since the targets are to be attacked by integrated forces, the coordination can only be American."²¹

It is standard practice among Western allies to refer any disagreements that arise between allied command and national units to the alliance and to respective national governments for resolution.²² While this may appear at first glance a major impediment to the judicious and efficient employment of force, it needs to be recognized that combined operations necessitate consensus among the members if they are to aspire to success. Fortunately the Western alliance has forty years of experience dealing with this nettlesome issue, albeit problems remain.

Command and Control in the Persian Gulf Crisis

While the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis and war offers an excellent example of the difficulties faced by any coalition of states against a common enemy, in one sense it did present the Western alliance with an unusual situation and raised issues that ought to be of immediate concern. The anti-Iraq coalition had the unusual, if not extraordinary, ability to deploy forces against Iraq, indeed right up to the border of Kuwait, with a complete absence of enemy interference. In other words, it would be exceedingly imprudent to assume that future contingencies will enjoy an unhindered ability to deploy and mass forces complemented by modern and extensive port and transshipment facilities. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the time delay between the initial deployment of forces and the United Nations' 15 January 1991 deadline for Iraq to evacuate Kuwait enabled the coalition to sort out C² and coordination of ROE. Without a doubt, had Baghdad chosen to launch a preemptive strike against the coalition's

forces in November or December (at which time command issues were apparently still being resolved),²³ the lack of clear and comprehensive C² and standardized ROE would have resulted in an uncoordinated, and possibly unsuccessful, defense.²⁴

Admittedly, the politically sensitive character of C² and ROE does not always allow a priori resolution of difficulties. The reason of course is that each contingency warranting a collective military response is different. In the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there was assembled what must be considered a *sui generis* coalition of forces, literally from around the world. Therefore, the establishment of an acceptable C² structure was no simple task.²⁵

While many details of the anti-Iraq coalition's command and control scheme have not been released publicly, it is possible to glean from press reports a sense of the general difficulties faced during the pre-conflict deployment period.²⁶ The coalition's forces were commanded by the Strategic National Committee,

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chaired by the Saudi defense minister, Prince Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan, and the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Central Command, General Norman Schwarzkopf. Under this body were two component command committees: one was composed of senior commanders from the Western forces and was chaired by General Schwarzkopf; the other, made up of representatives of the Joint Arab Islamic Force (JAIF), was commanded by Lieutenant General Sultan.²⁷ France, for its part, exercised national control over its own forces up to the outbreak of hostilities, in close cooperation with the JAIF.²⁸ (It was only on 16 January, just hours prior to the outbreak of hostilities, that the French government announced that its forces in the theater would come under U.S. operational control "for a specific period and [for] predetermined missions.")²⁹ The Coalition Coordination, Communication, and Integration Center was established to provide liaison between the two components. According to one source, it was not clear whether this center was indeed to have a command function in war, although subsequent events suggest this was indeed the case.³⁰

Despite predictable command problems with the French and minor difficulties experienced by British forces under U.S. operational control, the primary challenges to unified C² were apparently those associated with the coordination of Western and Islamic forces.³¹ Parenthetically, according to press reports these difficulties were aggravated by the nonexistence of a national Saudi command and control structure. Reportedly there had previously been no effective C²

above the brigade level, and even basic command procedures were inadequate.³² The solution to this conundrum was to allow national ground forces to fight independently at the operational level—in effect, to implement Nato's "layer-cake" concept of dividing the battlefield and assigning each nation its own territory of responsibility.³³

One special case in the alliance has long been the close relationship between the British and American armed services—so close that the British 1st Armoured Division was given tactical operational control over a U.S. brigade during the campaign.³⁴ One would expect this sort of arrangement between two countries with a long association of peacetime cooperation both within Nato and bilaterally.³⁵ Can such cooperation be institutionalized for other future contingencies where other Western forces are involved? To be sure, it is unlikely that Western armies could attain the high degree of interoperability now existing among Western and Western-equipped air forces.³⁶ The anti-Iraqi coalition air forces (under U.S. operational control, using Saudi Awacs aircraft and common tasking orders, and flying approximately 2,000 sorties a day during the first days of conflict) demonstrated the incalculable value of equipment and doctrinal standardization—a condition Nato ground forces are far from achieving.³⁷

The experience of the Western naval forces in the Persian Gulf suggests, however, that it is not operational doctrine but rather the *political* basis for cooperation that requires reform. That the navies of the Western alliance had operational control difficulties is remarkable since their deployment and equipment, like that of their air force counterparts, is international in orientation. For instance, when circumstances require the coordinated activity of two allied ships, it is standard procedure that the senior officer present, irrespective of nationality, assume operational command.³⁸ In the Persian Gulf War, however, operations between Western naval forces were hindered by ineffectual political coordination at the highest European levels.

Some European naval forces were deployed to the Persian Gulf to augment British and French forces there following a meeting of W.E.U. foreign and defense ministers in Paris on 21 August 1990, almost three weeks after the invasion of Kuwait.³⁹ Their purpose was to help enforce the naval blockade of Iraq in accordance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions; they were to join and coordinate with the U.S., British, Canadian, and Australian forces already or soon to be operating in the Gulf. A full week later, a meeting of the W.E.U. chiefs of staff and several chiefs of naval staff was held in Paris to set up procedures for cooperation.⁴⁰ This resulted in adoption of a three-tiered mechanism similar to that used in the W.E.U. deployment of 1987; it created an ad hoc group of experts from foreign and defense ministries and provided for naval points of contact in respective capitals, as well as permanent coordination in Paris (each navy being represented by a senior officer) and coordination between operational commanders.⁴¹ French naval headquarters in Paris was

evidently to provide coordination and intelligence-sharing for W.E.U. warships operating in the Gulf.⁴²

According to press reports, W.E.U. operational coordination was not resolved until 10-14 September, when a conference was held on board the French destroyer *Dupleix* near the Hormuz Straits.⁴³ Five zones of operation were subsequently established.⁴⁴ It is interesting from the perspective of this study, however, that this arrangement was agreed to only on 18 September, after the French Navy and the Royal Navy had failed on 13 September to agree on geographical sharing of patrol zones.⁴⁵ Apparently the W.E.U., under French pressure,⁴⁶ wanted to create its own regional C² and leave the U.S. Navy, the Royal Australian Navy,⁴⁷ and the Canadian Maritime Command to coordinate activities among themselves. A structure embracing all allied navies had reportedly been created in Bahrain during a meeting aboard the French frigate *Montcalm* on 9 and 10 September. Here it was decided that the French would coordinate French and W.E.U. activity and the United States all the others.⁴⁸ This apparently did not sit well with one W.E.U. member, the British, who joined forces early on with their Anglo-Saxon naval colleagues, accepting U.S. Navy command.⁴⁹

Notwithstanding these arrangements, coordination among Western naval forces remained insufficient,⁵⁰ at least from the perspective of one Congressional Research Service study published on 21 September. Even as late as the end of December, according to another Congressional Research Service report, Western naval forces enforcing trade sanctions against Iraq were doing so under national command, and there was still "no formal command arrangement; a situation that would not suffice in the event of armed conflict." The same report also claimed that the W.E.U. played only a limited role in deployment of its members' naval forces and had not established an operational command arrangement.⁵¹ This criticism of the much-touted W.E.U. deployment supports a remarkably frank assessment found in a 7 November W.E.U. Assembly report. This document noted that W.E.U. forces did not possess an accepted tactical command structure and were therefore unable to effect coordinated and directed responses, and that coordination of national ROE and logistic support had still not been achieved. The report also made a startling claim that it had only been during actual operations that U.S. forces in the area were discovered (much to the surprise of W.E.U. forces) to be using unique Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) procedures.⁵² The W.E.U.'s ultimate failure to create an effective naval C² structure can be seen in the Dutch decision of 9 January to place its deployed frigates under American command (with the task of helping protect U.S. aircraft carriers) in the event of war.⁵³ This left French naval authorities exercising operational control upon the commencement of hostilities over only Belgian, Spanish, and its own ships in the war zone.⁵⁴

The W.E.U.'s inability to meet its members' security objectives ought accordingly to be obvious; it has proved unable to coordinate effectively a modest naval deployment,⁵⁵ something recognized by its own secretary general as easier to organize than air and ground forces coordination.⁵⁶

It seems inexplicable that the navies of the Western alliance should have experienced these C² and interoperability difficulties. After all, Western navies had had forty years of experience in peacetime cooperation, not to mention the benefit of the Allied Tactical and Communication Publications series. They had also regularly conducted a wide range of exercises, participated in standing naval formations since the 1960s, and deployed to the Persian Gulf together in 1987 and 1988. Clearly the problem rests at the political level and not with the military forces sent to the Gulf. Such disorganization could in a conflict cause needless loss of lives and equipment, both by enemy action and quite likely by fratricide. The case of the navies clearly indicates an even more serious problem that could have faced Western ground forces in Kuwait and Iraq. One can easily contemplate some future contingency with a larger Western ground presence where poor planning and coordination could have the terrible result of destroying the fragile political consensus among our allies for subsequent out-of-area deployments. Notwithstanding the W.E.U.'s value as a framework for ad hoc cooperation between its members and North America, the Gulf crisis demonstrates that a structure more formal than the current two-pillar arrangement is required.⁵⁷

Imperatives for Reform

The Western alliance, therefore, needs to ascertain whether political support exists for resolving these operational impediments. One would think, given Nato's vast success in improving interoperability, creating wartime C² structures, and harmonizing national ROE that it should be a relatively simple exercise to facilitate future out-of-area deployments, drawing on this body of expertise, doctrine, and procedure. What is needed, therefore, is a politically acceptable method by which Nato assets can, as Nato secretary Manfred Woerner argues, be made available to alliance members engaged in out-of-area contingencies. After all, observes Woerner, the North Atlantic Treaty "does not limit the scope of our security planning or coordination; nor does it exclude joint action."⁵⁸

The impediment to this seemingly obvious requirement is, of course, European sensitivity about becoming an unwilling participant in "adventures" critical to some alliance members but of little concern to others. Nonetheless, a strong case can be made that Western European countries are becoming increasingly anxious about potential threats to their common security on their southern and southeastern flanks.⁵⁹ The North Atlantic Assembly's condemnation of Iraq's conquest of Kuwait, and Nato's formal ministerial meetings and

daily crisis sessions, were unprecedented and indicate a sufficient basis for a more formal common approach to this issue.⁶⁰

Several Western European countries are far advanced in developing forces for such contingencies. The French created the Force d'Action Rapide in 1983 for the purpose of providing a hard-hitting mobile force for both European and Third World operations.⁶¹ The Italian Army created the Forza di Intervento Rapido in 1985,⁶² and the Spanish in 1988 tested for the first time its Fuerza de Acción Rápida, a joint formation modeled on the French and Italian examples.⁶³ Albeit lacking sufficient indigenous air lift, the British have designated their 24th Airmobile Brigade and the 5th Airborne Brigade⁶⁴ as their mobile force for these types of operations. There is no logical reason why these efforts should not be coordinated and exercised on a regular basis.

Despite the fact that Nato is reforming its military structures and is in search of new missions in the post-Cold War world, it would be fruitless for the United States, or any other member for that matter, to press for the formal inclusion of out-of-area operations within the alliance's specific purview. There is too much emotional baggage, particularly in Europe, to allow such an eventuality; also, a Nato framework could exclude the European country most interested and militarily prepared to contribute to such operations, i.e., France. The sequel to the Cold War has yet to be written and the events in the former Soviet republics in 1991 point toward the possibility that Nato will continue to have urgent relevance for its members for some time to come. Thus, given the importance of maintaining consensus for the continuation of Nato with its traditional in-area focus, to introduce such a divisive issue as out-of-area planning when the alliance is undergoing fundamental structural reform could well be counterproductive.

At the same time, it is evident that other options are limited. During Italy's presidency of the E.C., Italian foreign minister Gianni de Michelis proposed that the role of the W.E.U. be shifted to the proposed European Political System itself in order to give the E.C. a foreign and security purview.⁶⁵ Interestingly, Michelis's proposal was subsequently rejected by the W.E.U. Assembly out of fear that such a move might weaken Nato.⁶⁶ In this vein, the E.C. Summit held in Maastricht in December 1991 agreed that efforts by the E.C. to achieve political union could eventually include a common defense policy, to be achieved via the W.E.U. In this respect, the Community has agreed to examine and identify military units which could be assigned to the W.E.U. Also, since the Community does not include all the European members of Nato, and not all European Nato states are members of the W.E.U., the E.C. has agreed in principle to offer W.E.U. membership or observer status to Community members. European Nato states not currently members of the W.E.U. will be offered observer status in that body.⁶⁷ Albeit moving at almost glacial speed, efforts at creating closer political union, to be complemented by an emerging defense identity, are moving ahead.⁶⁸

Linking Nato and the W.E.U.

Short of creating some new security organization that will deal with the issue of extra-regional security, it is apparent that from the perspective of Western Europe the W.E.U. is the appropriate forum in which these states will discuss these issues. As the sole Western European organization that concerns itself with its members' security and whose writ has no geographic limitations, the W.E.U. is well situated to play a leading role in addressing its members' security concerns. While it is problematic whether the W.E.U. can claim to have served its members well in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991, the fact remains that this organization is the only one potentially capable of providing the essential political support for such endeavors, and that *wants* to do so.⁶⁹ The W.E.U. deserves credit for having been largely responsible for garnering Western European support in 1987 for sending a joint naval force to the Persian Gulf to clear mines during the Iran-Iraq war. Thus, though admittedly the subsequent W.E.U. naval deployment to the Kuwait theater was far from the grand operational success some (like Dr. van Eekelen) have claimed, at least this organization, however ill-prepared it may now be, has at least once successfully coordinated its members' response to out-of-area contingencies.

If one acknowledges that the W.E.U. will be the organization to direct Western European engagement in out-of-area operations, a major problem becomes apparent in regard to the roles the United States and Nato are to play. It is also necessary to define types of cooperation and planning that are politically acceptable and militarily sufficient. These are two different if closely related issues, and are best dealt with separately.

Institutions and Roles. At a very minimum, establishing a formal liaison entity and a joint military body connecting Nato (including the U.S.) and the W.E.U. would be both reasonable and possible. There are a number of reasons for joining the two bodies and doing so in this way. First, it would enable the Western alliance to benefit from the enormous military expertise that exists in Nato, without necessitating replication. To be sure, power projection and sustainment over potentially vast distances is not something with which Nato has overly concerned itself; substantial doctrinal and conceptual assistance would be required from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Nonetheless, a basis for cooperation and coordination between defense forces does exist within Nato and should be utilized. Second, a joint arrangement would not constrain either of these two major bodies from internal reorganization and reform. Both organizations play important roles in their respective areas of responsibility and should not be hindered in any way from reforming themselves to meet changing security and political conditions. Thus, should the E.C. eventually subsume the

responsibilities of the W.E.U., the W.E.U.'s relationship with Nato under this proposal should not impede that European political and security integration.⁷⁰

Nonetheless, there are potential problems that can be identified at the outset. For instance, some in Europe, particularly the French, see an enlarged W.E.U. independent of the United States and Nato as a supplement to Nato and particularly to Washington's leadership position. A number of rather ambitious proposals have been put forward by the Assembly of the W.E.U. for that organization to take a leadership role in Europe in a number of specific areas, e.g., developing a satellite verification capability to monitor compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty and to track potential out-of-area threats.⁷¹ However, as noted, the W.E.U.'s track record has been less than satisfactory; it does not make sense in this era of finite defense resources to replicate what already exists in Nato. In any case, the physical contrast between Nato's enormous command, control, communications, and intelligence center

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and the W.E.U. secretariat in London (which does not even possess secure communications to Nato headquarters)⁷² should demonstrate that each organization should limit itself to what it is best equipped to do.

As regards institutional issues, the membership of the W.E.U. does not include a number of European Nato countries. Interestingly, in view of the W.E.U.'s strong interest in out-of-area security, it does not include the Nato members outside the Central Front area (Norway, Denmark, Greece, and Turkey). Moreover, it is problematic whether the Maastricht Summit proposals for associate membership for these countries in the W.E.U. will find acceptance by them. In any event, this should not present any major legal or political impediments, since one of the purposes of creating a joint liaison body would be to permit participation by Nato members who are not part of the W.E.U. Presumably the mere existence of coordination between those countries wishing to develop the capability to pursue out-of-area contingencies could serve as a catalyst for further Western defense integration. To be sure, it can be predicted that French sensitivities would have to be assuaged. Since specific C² plans and hierarchies would have to be determined prior to ad hoc agreements to deploy forces, this Nato-W.E.U. structure would not have the same political “baggage” that has alienated France from some Nato military activities in the past. Finally, in view of Paris's interests in out-of-area threats to its security, a strong case could be made to encourage France to take a leading role in the establishment and development of the proposed liaison body.

Indeed, to ensure a definite W.E.U. flavor (which may be essential for its acceptance) for this combined structure, it would be wise to limit the planning headquarters staff to field-grade officers seconded from W.E.U. members. In time of crisis, the staff would be complemented by personnel from participating states, who would take the lead in planning and in operations specific to the contingency. Nations involved in a given situation could greatly facilitate matters by commencing solely out-of-area contingency planning on a national basis.⁷³ When released by national political authorities, these plans would form a basis for action by the combined planning staff. The small permanent staff would act routinely as an overseer of alliance interoperability, maintaining and testing it through periodic exercises, and providing a nucleus for expansion in crisis. This cadre staff could also prepare tailored packages for various operational conditions, e.g., desert, jungle, over-the-beach, airmobile, airborne, etc. It may also be wise to make this body the headquarters of a standing combined rapid reaction corps such as that suggested by Dr. van Eekelen.⁷⁴ Such efforts could provide important impetus to achieving E.C. efforts to create a European defense identity within the framework of common E.C. and W.E.U. security and defense policies.⁷⁵

Planning and Cooperation. The military planning necessary to facilitate future combined responses to out-of-area contingencies (presumably avoiding the problems of the Western contingent in the anti-Iraq coalition) would be very modest as long as the Nato military structures continue to exist and its forces conduct regular field, command post, and logistics exercises. Maneuvers for air-lifted, airmobile, and amphibious forces would be required, as well as logistics projection and sustainment exercises among countries possessing these capabilities; these could be carried out easily within existing Nato structures and programs.

Given the uncertainty of world events and the political sensitivity of certain scenario-specific issues, prior staff activity should be limited primarily to establishing standardized planning methodology. Such an approach has long existed within the context of the Anzus Security Treaty between the United States, Australia, and (until 1985) New Zealand. It would be prudent for the proposed Nato-W.E.U. body to draw from the Anzus experience, for instance, an agreed-upon planning manual with explicit provisions for C² and ROE specifically for out-of-area conditions. Wherever possible, existing Nato procedures, standards, and methods should be employed.

Actual contingency planning for specific scenarios would take place only when political consensus to respond to a specific threat existed among alliance members. It needs to be clearly understood, and would have to be carefully explained to the publics of alliance members, that helping to develop a generalized planning methodology would by no means imply a nation's pre-commitment to support any specific out-of-area operation, but would merely simplify

joint out-of-area action in instances where the respective political leaderships felt national interests so dictated. The actual organization that would do this planning would be very modest and could conceivably be housed in a former Nato facility closed as part of the alliance's streamlining of its common structure.

The military capabilities necessary for a specific operation would remain a national concern, and therefore the composition of the planning staff would be left to the participants. One would think that the capabilities involved could draw upon current thinking in Nato, which is attempting to direct more attention to the security requirements of the flank countries, who have seen little diminution in risks to their security.⁷⁶ With few exceptions, if any, out-of-area requirements would be very similar to those of campaigns on the flanks.

A Nato-W.E.U. linkage would be, without a doubt, a controversial proposal in some European countries where the mere suggestion that Nato ought to address threats to security beyond the geographic boundaries of the alliance treaty produces Pavlovian responses just short of hysteria. However, if the Persian Gulf War has demonstrated nothing else, it has made two points clear. First, the basic elements of preparing to fight in coalition, sometimes taken for granted in Nato military structures, are absolutely essential if military operations are to be successful and casualties minimized. Second, Third World military establishments are becoming more sophisticated and therefore will increasingly require a proportionately sophisticated, joint, and combined-arms response by Western nations.

In view of the likely distances involved and the accompanying logistical challenges, it is also increasingly clear that the W.E.U. alone would find it very difficult to meet the dual challenges of power projection and sustainment. For example, according to van Eekelen, the logistical challenges of deploying ground forces to Saudi Arabia were such that European nations were advised to dispatch only self-supporting forces.⁷⁷ Whether Europeans appreciate it or not, the involvement of the U.S. military could be crucial in worst-case scenarios, and would be very welcome indeed even in less challenging contingencies.

That the world is not entering into a new phase of universal peace and tranquility becomes increasingly evident with the passing days. The conflict in the Persian Gulf, the possibility of instability in the former Soviet Union, and seemingly never-ending conflicts throughout the Third World demonstrate that there is no shortage of potential trouble spots that could seriously threaten common Western security interests. At best, the adoption of a Nato-W.E.U. institutional arrangement to deal with out-of-area scenarios would manifest a new and mature approach to an issue long divisive in the Western alliance. From the perspective of the United States, such cooperation would be in line with long-standing policy, since it would encourage greater European defense

cooperation but not at the expense of existing trans-Atlantic security arrangements.⁷⁸ At worst, the creation of such an organization would be seen by those in Europe fundamentally opposed to this type of cooperation as a symbolically important concession in the perennially acrimonious trans-Atlantic burden-sharing debate. Those in that camp would be well advised to consider that nations who have interests everywhere but responsibilities nowhere run the serious risk of relying on others for their protection, with little or no influence upon the manner in which this protection is afforded. Thus, until such time as the "state of nature" as defined by Thomas Hobbes becomes more like that envisaged by John Locke prior to man's creation of property, the Western alliance would be best advised to adopt a unified approach and a strategy of deterrence, and not to continue to hope that its traditional ad hoc approach to crisis will meet its security needs in the uncertain future.

Notes

1. For a review of operational considerations in a future Nato operation in the Central Region, see William T. Johnson and Thomas-Durell Young, "Planning Considerations for a Future Operational Campaign in Nato's Central Region" (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992).

2. "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," Press Communiqué S-1(91)85, (Brussels: NATO Press Service, 7 November 1991).

3. For background on the renaissance of the W.E.U. see Daniel Colard, "L'UEO et la Sécurité Européenne," *Défense nationale*, March 1988, pp. 75-89 and Alfred Jean Cahen, "The WEU and the European Dimension of Common Security," Royal United Services Institute of Defence Studies, *Defence Yearbook, 1989* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1989), pp. 25-37.

The Western European Union has nine members: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, by contrast, has sixteen: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

4. Interview with the W.E.U. Assembly's president, Robert Pontillon, *Le Monde*, 11 July 1990 and *The New York Times*, 21 August 1990.

5. Willem van Eekelen, "Building a New European Security Order: WEU's Contribution," *NATO Review*, August 1990, pp. 18-23.

6. *The Washington Post*, 12 December 1991.

7. "Brussels Treaty, as amended by the Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty, Paris, 23 October 1954" (London: W.E.U. Secretariat, 1969), p. 5.

8. See, for example, Assembly of Western European Union, *Communiqué issued after the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers*, Document 1224 (Brussels: 23 April 1990).

9. I argue this point in my monograph, *The Changing European Security Calculus: Implications for the U.S. Army* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1991).

10. *The Washington Post*, 15 November 1990.

11. For background see Martin Navias, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 252 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990).

12. For an excellent history of Nato's response to out-of-area contingencies see Elizabeth D. Sherwood, *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1990).

13. Frederick Franks and Alan Carver, "Building a NATO Corps," *Military Review*, July 1991, pp. 30-31.

14. See, for example, former French defense minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement's comments on this topic in *Antenne 2 Television* (Paris), 20 September 1990 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS-WEU-90-184), 22 September 1990, p. 7 (hereafter cited by FBIS short title).

15. For example, following the announcement by the British defence minister Tom King that British forces in Saudi Arabia would operate under American operational control, the Labour Party's defence spokesman, Martin O'Neill, responded, "It is what we expected. It means that we will be one of the people the Americans consult before any action is taken." See *Press Association* (London), 21 September 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-184, 21 September 1990, p. 5.

16. For details of this particular aspect of C^2 relating to the Australian contribution to the Gulf see the *Telegraph Mirror* (Sydney), 14 January 1991.

17. John M. Collins, "High Command Arrangements Early in the Persian Gulf Crisis," *Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress No. 90-453F*, 21 September 1990, p. 1.

18. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Publication 1, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1 July 1987), p. 317.

19. Ashley Roach, "Rules of Engagement," *Naval War College Review*, January-February 1983, p. 54.

20. *The Daily Telegraph* (London), 12 December 1990.

21. *Corriere della Sera* (Milano), 19 January 1991.

22. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 December 1990.

23. *The Washington Post*, 2 November 1990.

24. Regarding the importance of early establishment of clear C^2 structures, W.E.U. secretary general van Eekelen writes that this could be achieved once a conflict occurred. Air Chief Marshall Sir Paddy Hine, R.A.F., head of the joint command of Operation Granby in the United Kingdom, strongly disagrees. Cf., Willem van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," *Survival*, November-December 1990, p. 529 and *Press Association* (London), 31 October 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-212, 1 November 1990, p.3.

25. *The Washington Post*, 3 December 1990.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Press Association* (London), 12 October 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-199, 15 October 1990, pp. 7-8 and *The Washington Post*, 6 November 1990.

28. *Antenne 2 Television* (Paris), 20 September 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-184, 21 September 1990, p. 7.

29. *The New York Times*, 17 January 1990.

30. Steve R. Bowman, "Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: Summary of U.S. and Non-U.S. Forces," *CRS Report for Congress No. 90-639 F*, 27 December 1990, p. 19.

31. Note that most of these reported "problems" were apparently resolved following the decision by the British government to deploy a division-size force, which enabled British troops to conduct independent operational missions. See *Press Association* (London), 23 November 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-227, 26 November 1990.

32. *The Washington Post*, 2 and 5 November 1990.

33. *The Washington Post*, 3 December 1990.

34. For background on this issue see British Information Services, British Consulate General (New York), *Policy Background 1/91*, 10 January 1990; *Melbourne Herald*, 2 October 1990; *The Washington Post*, 10 January 1991; and *The Observer* (London), 30 September 1990.

35. For background on this subject see my "Whither Future U.S. Alliance Strategy? The ABCA Clue," *Armed Forces and Society*, Winter 1991, pp. 277-297.

36. As argued by François Heisbourg in *The New York Times*, 12 January 1991. Note that as early as October France provided liaison officers to U.S. and Saudi Awacs aircraft. See *Agence France-Presse* (Paris), 10 October 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-196, 10 October 1990, p. 29.

37. *The Washington Post*, 18 January 1990.

38. Note that the Royal Australian and Royal New Zealand Navies also follow this procedure. See testimony by Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot, R.A.N., in Australia Parliament, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Subcommittee on Defence Matters, *Official Hansard Transcript of Evidence*, vol. I, April 1980-March 1981 (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1981), p. 1783; and Norman Dodd, "New Zealand's Defence Problems," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, June 1978, p. 54.

39. *The Washington Post*, 22 August 1990.

40. *Il Sole-24 Ore* (Milano), 24 August 1990.

41. Van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," p. 525.

42. *ANSA* (Roma), 28 August 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-168, 29 August 1990, pp. 1-2.

43. *Agence France-Presse* (Paris), 18 September 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-181, 18 September 1990, p. 4.

44. Van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," p. 528.

45. *Agence France-Presse* (Paris), 18 September 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-181, 18 September 1990, p. 4.

46. *Agence France-Presse* (Paris), 20 September 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-184, 21 September 1990, p. 1.

47. Statement to the Australian Parliament by the Prime Minister, Mr. Bob Hawke, Canberra, 4 December 1990 in Australian Overseas Information Service, *Australia Background* (Washington), pp. 7-8; and *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 December 1990.

48. Interview with French foreign minister, Roland Dumas, in *Antenne 2 Television* (Paris), 3 September 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-172, 5 September 1990, p. 9 and Assembly of Western European Union, *Consequences of the Invasion of Kuwait: Operations in the Gulf*, Report, Document 1243 (Paris: 20 September 1990), pp. 7-8.

49. As evidenced by the December boarding of the "peace ship" *Ibn Khalloon*, cooperation among the British, American, and Australian navies was excellent. See *Press Association* (London), 26 December 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-248, 26 December 1990, p. 1.
50. Collins, "High Command Arrangements," p. 5.
51. Bowman, "Iraq-Kuwait Crisis," p. 19.
52. Assembly of the Western European Union, *Consequences of the Invasion of Kuwait: Continuing Operations in the Gulf Region*, Report, Document 1248 (Paris: 7 November 1990), p. 14.
53. *Hilversum International Service*, 9 January 1991 in FBIS-WEU-91-007, 10 January 1991, p. 12.
54. Note that French press sources claim Italian warships fell under French control. See *Domestic Service* (Paris), 23 January 1991 in FBIS-WEU-91-016, 24 January 1991, p. 8. Italian sources, however, claim that all Italian forces were under U.S. operational control, *ANSA* (Roma), 18 January 1991 in FBIS-WEU-91-013, 18 January 1991, p. 45. According to press reports, the W.E.U. was eventually able to solve its coordination problems by creating more detailed guidelines. See *NRC Handelsblad* (Rotterdam), 9 January 1991 in FBIS-WEU-91-011, 16 January 1991, pp. 4-5.
55. *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 September 1990.
56. Van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," p. 529.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 523.
58. *The Guardian* (London), 30 November 1990.
59. *The Washington Post*, 29 January 1991.
60. *The Washington Post*, 16 September 1990.
61. Dominique David, *La Force d'action rapide en Europe: Le dire des armes* (Paris: Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense nationale, 1984).
62. Carlo Jean, *Studi strategici* (Milano: Franco Angeli Libri, 1990), pp. 171-172.
63. Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "Spain's Security Policy and Army in the 1990s," *Parameters*, June 1990, pp. 95-97.
64. Philip A. G. Sabiu, "British Strategic Priorities in the 1990s," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 254 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990), pp. 49-51.
65. *Le Monde* (Paris), 22 September 1990.
66. *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 5 December 1990.
67. See German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's speech to the Bundestag in *ARD Television Network* (Hamburg), 13 December 1991 in FBIS-WEU-91-241, 16 December 1991, pp. 8-9. The twelve European Community members are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
68. *The Washington Post*, 12 December 1991.
69. Van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," pp. 521-522.
70. As suggested by British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd, the W.E.U. could well serve as a bridge between the E.C. and the United States. See *The New York Times*, 26 December 1990.
71. Assembly of the Western European Union, *Observation Satellites—A European Means of Verifying Disarmament: Guidelines Drawn from the Symposium*, Report, Document 1230 (Paris: 25 May 1990).
72. *The New York Times*, 26 December 1990. It should be noted as well that there is far from being a consensus within the W.E.U. to standing military formations. For instance, a proposal to create multinational formations was defeated at the April 1990 council of foreign and defense ministers. See *Agence France-Presse* (Paris), 23 April 1990 in FBIS-WEU-90-079, 24 April 1990, p. 1.
73. As argued in *Consequences of the Invasion of Kuwait*, 7 November 1990, p. 25.
74. *The New York Times*, 26 December 1990.
75. *The Washington Post*, 12 December 1991.
76. See comments made by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General John Galvin, to the Times Journal Co., 17 September 1990 in *ACE Output*, November 1990, p. 2.
77. Van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," p. 522.
78. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The European Pillar: The American View," in "The Changing Strategic Landscape," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 235 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), pp. 95, 103 and David Yost, "France and West European Defence Identity," *Survival*, July-August 1991, pp. 327-351.