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Book Reviews

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BOOK REVIEWS

A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

"War Is a Thing in Itself"

D.E. Showalter

Van Creveld, Martin. *The Transformation of War.* New York: The Free Press, 1991. 254pp. $22.95

MARTIN VAN CREVELD has established an enviable reputation as a military historian and analyst. In this work he assumes a new role as a theorist of war. He offers a challenge both to Carl von Clausewitz and to the scholars and *epigoni* who have elevated Clausewitz's ideas to the status of a universal paradigm. Van Creveld describes Clausewitz as one who viewed war as a balance between governments, armies, and people. The author, however, states that at least one element of this "trinity" has been nonexistent for most of history. In particular, Clausewitz assumes that wars are made by states; van Creveld argues that not only is the state a modern, Western institution, but it is increasingly anachronistic because of its inability to sustain a monopoly of effective violence.

At the high end of war's spectrum, nuclear weapons make it impossible to use armed force for meaningful political ends. Since no one has yet developed a convincing idea of how nuclear war can be fought without devastating the planet, even the risk of such a threat serves to inhibit conventional war as well. At the opposite end of the spectrum, states and their armed forces are eroding due to various forms of low-intenisty conflict. The author argues that such conflict has been by far the most politically effective form of war since 1945—not least because it has highlighted the relative impotence of its opponents. "Counterinsurgency" has established a dismal record of failure. No more than

could the old colonial powers, both the United States and the Soviet Union have been unable to develop combinations of technique and technology consistently effective in a low-intensity environment. In short, the world's most powerful armed forces have become irrelevant to waging war.

This irrelevance reflects Clausewitz's misunderstanding of war's moral element. War is more than the servant of politics, more than the means to an end. The author believes that war is a thing in itself—a form of "play" in the anthropological sense, the only human activity that both permits and demands the commitment of all human abilities from the highest levels to the lowest. Such an elemental force denies any paradigm, much less the rational cost-benefit analysis at the heart of Clausewitz's system.

Van Creveld predicts that the combination of nuclear weapons and low-intensity conflict will do more than render states unable to fight each other. Domestic authority may diminish as the techniques of low-intensity warfare become more widespread. With governments no longer able to safeguard the lives of citizens, van Creveld hypothesizes a global descent into tribalism. Bureaucratic armed forces will be replaced with groups that are constructed on personal and charismatic lines. Wars will be fought for beliefs and existence. "Interest" and "reason of state" as defined by Clausewitz will become relics of a specific historical episode. Van Creveld's dystopian vision of a world transformed brings to mind the clear image of Beirut.

Yet *The Transformation of War*, for all its intellectually stimulating qualities, is vulnerable to the same criticism that the author makes of Clausewitz. It is a straight-line extrapolation that is based on a historically specific set of circumstances. Low-intensity conflict achieved its results in two contexts. One was the Cold War, which pitted thermonuclear superpowers against each other under conditions that not merely favored but fostered war by proxy. When either the United States or the Soviet Union became involved in low-intensity conflict, its rival usually found reasons for aiding the other side. Participants in low-intensity conflict became increasingly sophisticated in soliciting such aid—a behavior pattern that is also common to medium-ranking powers with local interests, such as Israel and Iraq. The end of the Cold War and the eclipse of the Soviet Union offer significant possibilities for an alternate future scenario of "gunboat diplomacy" in a revived form. For example, similar to the Gulf War, states having an interest in stability might temporarily unite to suppress challengers of international order and contain the scope of the conflict.

The successes of low-intensity conflict have also depended significantly on the moral weakness of the contemporary state. Communist and Third World governments have lacked any legitimacy except that conferred by force. The West has been disabled by a creeping utopianism that denies legitimacy to any system falling short of perfection. In each case, the result has been a tendency to paralysis. The insurgent's battle is half won before a shot is fired. Events of the

past five years suggest a new pattern. States of the twenty-first century may be smaller than their predecessors, but they are likely to be more stable and confident. Their firmer moral base will facilitate the deterrence and defeat of the kinds of threat posed by low-intensity conflict.

Of course, these hypotheses are as open to challenge as are van Creveld's. However, they are offered not so much to refute his arguments as to highlight the cunning of history. As van Creveld demonstrates in his critique of Clausewitz, using the past and present to structure the future is at best a risky undertaking. The skills of the historian are not the gifts of a prophet. It would be an intellectual loss if van Creveld, in his efforts to supplant Carl von Clausewitz, should forget how to be Martin van Creveld.

Chernavin, V.N. *Voyenno-morskoy slovar'* (The naval dictionary). Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1991. 511pp. (No price given).

The *Naval Dictionary* is the latest in a series of "encyclopedic dictionaries" offered by the Soviet military over the past decade. This work is part of an overall Soviet general staff effort which took over twenty years to complete. In it the entire core of military knowledge has been organized, defined, systematized, and centralized. As such, each encyclopedic dictionary is an authoritative summation of official military views that have been assembled and promulgated by the general staff with the participation and concurrence of the service most closely associated with the work.

The *Naval Dictionary*'s importance is underscored by its sponsorship by Fleet Admiral V.N. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Soviet navy. By authorizing the use of his name as chief editor, Chernavin placed his imprimatur on its contents. He and his colleagues in the Soviet Ministry of Defense produced a comprehensive reference work for all Soviet military personnel involved in research or publication of naval issues. It contains up-to-date, crisply worded definitions of all terms and concepts related to naval theory. It remains a valuable tool for any officer of the former Soviet navy given the lack of the clear doctrinal boundaries that earlier guided him, whether the service itself evolves into a commonwealth navy or "devolves" into republic forces.

Such high-level patronage was typical of Soviet encyclopedic reference works. For example, the first edition of the *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary* (1983) credited Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov as its editor in chief, while the second edition (1986) cited his successor Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev. Colonel General Pavel Zhilin, chief of the Military Historical Institute, is listed as sponsor of the *Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Civil War* and the *Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Great Patriotic War*. The most important work of all, the magisterial

eight-volume *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, was initiated under the sponsorship of defense minister Andrey Grechko and continued under Marshal Ogarkov after Grechko's death. Its second edition (of which the first volume has just appeared) began under the sponsorship of General Mikhail Moiseyev, then the chief of the general staff.

The purposes of the *Naval Dictionary* were to minimize disruptive policy debates among military officers and to emphasize the heroic past and present importance of the Soviet military. Its introduction impresses on the reader that however far democratization had spread within the Soviet Union, it had yet to touch the top echelons of the Soviet navy. The most important resolutions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regarding questions about the creation and development of the Soviet navy for defense of the socialist fatherland are reflected in this dictionary: illuminating the heroic past of the Russian and Soviet navies, the revolutionary and combat tradition of the latter, the history of military art, the most important principles of Soviet military science, naval geography, and international maritime law and maritime practices.

Yet the impression made by the volume's introduction is not confirmed by its contents. Compared with the earlier Soviet military reference works, its content of ideological rhetoric is surprisingly low. Lenin is given only a half-page mention which replaces the two-page article on him in the *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary* in 1986. Almost all the entries on military theory are suffused with Marxist-Leninist concepts and terminology, but the florid sloganeering that dominated earlier works is absent. The introduction, then, was an assurance to the Soviet naval reader that this volume was indeed an officially approved, authoritative statement of military doctrine and policy, rather than an indication that an ideologically charged approach to military issues was being maintained.

It is difficult to say how much of this was due to the policy of glasnost (which was at its peak at the time of publication), or to the very technical and maritime nature of the work. The *Naval Dictionary* has relatively few entries that deal with the broad, ideology-suffused framework of Soviet military concepts, and these lack the exhortative character of the articles in previous volumes. Even such an entry as "Laws of War" offers no more than a terse, factual summary of the Soviet military position on this concept. One might find such an entry in a U.S.-produced military dictionary that attempted to include Soviet terms and concepts.

The roughly 11,000 entries focus instead on maritime issues. The naval translator or interpreter will find it a gold mine of otherwise unclear and undefinable terminology. For example, the entry "Reference Ellipsoid" carefully explains the minor ways in which this navigational term, as used in the Soviet navy, differs from its usage by the mariners of other

nations. The entries have a nationalist flavor; there are many more entries about the Imperial Russian fleet than one may be used to seeing in Soviet naval works—particularly on that fleet of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The point of their inclusion was, of course, to draw a historic connection between the glorious traditions of the Imperial Russian Navy and its Soviet successor.

The same might be said of the volume's numerous biographies of Soviet and Imperial Russian naval leaders. At the back of the volume are numerous charts and tables, and although some are technical in nature, most deal with subjects such as "Honorary Names Awarded to Formations and Units of the Navy from 1943-1945," or "Memorial Places of Glorious Victories and Heroic Defeats of Ships in the Russian and Soviet Fleet."

The *Naval Dictionary* has a number of entries that indicate the then-current state of Soviet thinking on naval organization and missions. Although its list of missions is essentially consistant with earlier lists, this volume provides more detail and precision on their content and how they were to be achieved. Operationally and organizationally this work defines terms that Western naval analysts encountered in other Soviet naval writings, and it explains to some degree how they relate to each other.

One particularly interesting set of entries is on "Naval Art" and "Naval Science," which indicate new developments in a Soviet military debate that dates back to the mid-1970s: is naval theory independent of general military theory or subordinate to it? The debate was resolved at the time of the disappearance of the term "naval science," with retention only of the term "naval art" to set aside peculiarly maritime issues that could not easily be incorporated into Soviet Military Science or Military Art. This arcane matter was important because it meant that theoretical issues regarding the Soviet navy would be decided by the general staff, not by the navy itself.

The entry on "Naval Art" is short, no more than three sentences, and summarizes the standard Soviet military definition of this concept. It refers the reader to the entry "Principles of Military Art" for more detail, but adds that "naval art" is the "most important part of the Theory of the Navy." The entry "Naval Science" initially qualifies this term as having only historical significance, but nevertheless gives a more detailed definition than that for "Naval Art." It goes on to state that "Naval Science is a constituent part of a unified Soviet military science, into which it was organically integrated in the 1970s. By 1991, issues which had been categorized under Naval Science were examined using "Theory of the Navy," a division of "Soviet Military Science." The entry Theory of the Navy implies—through the comprehensive list of issues this concept covers—that the old debate had been reopened to the distinct advantage of the Soviet navy. The new term

appears to be the exact equivalent of the old "Naval Science," except that formally it was "a division of Soviet Military Science."

In sum, this is an exceptionally well-written and researched reference work. Like its predecessors, it will be of great use for Western analysts in developing insights into the former Soviet navy and its successors. But unlike its predecessors, it is not particularly tendentious. If it were translated into English it would be a helpful reference for any U.S. naval officer.

WILLIAM C. GREEN
Boston University

Tunander, Ola. *Cold Water Politics: The Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the Northern Front.* Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1989. (No price given)

Many studies in progress (including my own) about Soviet security problems have suffered miscarriage before delivery. For decades, we could write at a leisurely pace, confident that nothing would change soon enough to embarrass us. However, the incredible changes that have occurred in all of Eastern Europe have put out of business those of us who made a living with periodic Cassandraesque warnings of the threat to Europe. We cannot write fast enough nor can our publishing houses print fast enough to keep up with the new states and governments of the former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union.

Ola Tunander has managed to avoid that fate. What he has given us contains something new: a method of analysis which strategic writers will understand can save their craft in these perilously peaceful times. It is the application of semiotics (the science of signs) to the strategic competition.

What Dr. Tunander has written is brilliant, and a welcome relief from the stale reprocessing of commonly held information characteristic of the genre writing about the Soviet navy. Using the Maritime Strategy—the U.S. Navy's apparently unilateral operational plan for how to defeat the Soviet Union of 1986—as a kind of metaphor, both a sign and a signal, Tunander demonstrates how the different Nordic nations interpreted it within their own contexts and how they tried to adapt it to their own needs and wants. The result is a fascinating study of cross-cultural interpretations.

This invaluable book will be of interest to Americans for the lesson offered in the subtleties of seapower, complete with illustrations. From across the Atlantic, Americans were inclined to assume that Western Europe perceived its threat in compatible ways. However, Tunander details how differently the Nordic countries established their defensive fronts to the East.

Although the text is filled with convincing insights and research, the reader should first check Appendix II, "Sea and Sign." Here is something new, brilliant, and daring. Tunander applies the method of semiotics to the

strategic debate. The results are stunning. For example, Machiavelli is made current in a study of the strategic process. Tunander writes: "For the nuclear prince, war and interest in war are concerned not with actual war but with possible war, with strategies and counterstrategies, moves and countermoves in the superpower game....The simulation of war has not only distanced the prince from brutal force; in the direct interaction between superpowers, simulated war has largely replaced real war and has even distanced military personnel from brutal force."

Tunander's argument is that the underlying assumption in the arms race was that war was no longer possible, and that therefore what we have been doing all these years is interpreting the credibility of the signals and defining the signs—playing a game like chess with elaborate and dangerous rules. We have spent our lives translating the ambiguities and talking in a code.

As we have clearly entered a period in which the game has shifted, with the European nations and Japan scrambling about looking for new combinations and creating new ambiguities, there will be little work for those who deny the importance of political cultures and their language of signs.

The nations which continue to be culturally self-centered in the new age will be given devastating semiotic lessons such as are being administered in the United States by the Japanese. This work, with its engrossing appendix, splendidly demonstrates the new theory and practice of security studies. As a wonderful bonus, it is written with both clarity and professional scholarship, while avoiding the deadly jargon of the trade, and draws upon the resources of a literate mind for apt illustrations. Here is a man who not only knows his Hegel, but also his Derrida. It is increasingly seldom that we can recommend a book that says something new and useful for these revolutionary times.

ROBERT E. BATHURST
International Peace Research Institute
Oslo, Norway

Friedman, Norman. *Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 435pp. $24.95

No doubt in the next few years publishers will offer numerous selections about Desert Storm, but Norman Friedman has produced the first comprehensive view of the Gulf War. Author of over twenty books on naval subjects, the internationally known military historian has in this work attempted to provide a balanced look into the air, ground, naval, joint, and coalition warfare aspects of the war. The success of his effort is debatable. It is apparant that Friedman is more conversant with naval concepts, and their contribution to the overall war effort, than with the other factors.

The author emphasizes the importance of maritime forces in deterring Saddam Hussein. In particular, Friedman highlights the effect that

amphibious forces had in tying down Iraqi divisions in Kuwait, and he also gives high marks to Central Command (CentCom), especially the army. However, his analysis of the air war brings into question his objectivity. Those who argue that the air war was the decisive part of Desert Storm will disagree with Friedman's analysis, which is critical of the inflexibility of the air-tasking order (ATO). Unfortunately, in the process he loses not only his objectivity but also, I suspect, many readers in the U.S. Air Force. Nevertheless, it is apparent in his analysis that air superiority was of great significance to the overall war effort.

Friedman deserves high marks for his coverage of the background of the war, and the appendices offer solid reference material. In them he lists most of the units involved and provides thorough descriptions of the equipment used by the United States, the coalition, and Iraq, as well as of Scud attacks and the losses suffered by both Iraqi and coalition forces.

Friedman has devoted his final chapter to the lessons we have yet to learn and those from which we have learned. Again his bias toward maritime forces is evident in that he cites as the two great lessons of the war the contributions of its two least-visible elements, sea power and overseas bases. He notes that the only U.S. forces that can be deployed without the consent of current allies are its naval or sea-based forces, and (to his credit, what many believe is the "real" great lesson), that people who are well trained and well led are what win wars. Weapons are not the deciding factor.

Assessments of the Gulf War will continue on for years, and Friedman's perspective of the war was no doubt influenced by the many naval participants that he interviewed. Those interested in the issues leading up to the war, encountered during it, and those that we face in its aftermath will find this book of great interest.

DONALD H. ESTES
Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Allen, Thomas B., Berry, F. Clifton, and Polmar, Norman N. *War in the Gulf: From the Invasion of Kuwait to the Day of Victory and Beyond.* Atlanta: Turner, 1991. 237pp. $19.95

War in the Gulf is, rather than a study of the Gulf War, a celebration of Cable Network News (CNN). The book was commissioned by CNN and is filled with photos, graphics, and anecdotes of that network's excellent reporting of that conflict. Built on the premise that "fleetingness" is the weakness of television news and that images mark its strength, the book offers us images preserved for posterity.

Written by an experienced team with diverse backgrounds in journalism, military affairs, and pictorial histories, this work makes an immediate positive impression. Its strength, as one might expect, is its pictures. Many of them will be familiar to those who watched the war from afar, but

familiarity does not detract from their impact. The images of both the Gulf and the home front are sharp and skillfully edited. They have been woven into a coherent and moving photo essay. However, the book's weaknesses are the inaccuracies (predictable given its purpose, multiple authors, and speed of production), a self-serving focus on the medium of television, and a disjointed writing style which sometimes repeats whole paragraphs verbatim.

The narrative attempts to accomplish three things: present a chronology of events, provide some political and military analysis, and document the role of CNN in both reporting and influencing the war. It falls short. First, the chronicle of events is full of errors, which detract from the work's credibility. It misidentifies Umm Qsar as a Kuwaiti port, credits marines with capturing Faylakah Island in January, confuses the roles of the Saudi army and national guard, and links the PLO to the beginnings of the Intifada. The work betrays a lack of either research, knowledge, or understanding of the region.

There are many examples of superficial and misleading analysis, but two stand out as particularly pernicious. Discussing Iran under Khomeini, it is stated that "Iranians were shoved out of the modern age." It is not at all clear just what this means, though immediate reference to women's rights, religious laws, and human rights suggests that Iran's failure to reflect American values was the cause for that nation's gratuitous expulsion from the modern world. The second example is the full-page photo of Iraqi militiamen brandishing their rifles, with the caption, "Guns are a part of the culture of the Middle East." The photo reflects the popular television image of Moslem hostility toward the West which has prevailed since the Iranian revolution. More importantly, the caption is a disingenuous statement that says nothing yet manages to evoke a negative image. Together they reinforce a stereotype that is both incorrect and interferes with our gaining a better understanding of the Middle East. Recognizing the mischief that such stereotypes can cause, one only hopes that the irony of a gun-and-culture statement made by American authors is not lost on the readers.

Finally, when addressing the role of CNN the book confuses the medium with the message, equating reporting about the war with reporting about television. Evidence of this abounds; self-congratulatory passages appear throughout the text. Next, the authors declare that television coverage "changed the face of war," a rather presumptuous statement that is neither explained nor defended. While television has certainly had an impact, it is doubtful that television plays much in the thoughts and emotions of individual soldiers as they prepare for battle. Still another presumptuous statement is that this work covers the war "without modifying what happened." Given that assurance, we can only hope that this is the case.

Since television reporting is the raison d'etre for *War in the Gulf*, it is unfortunate that the controversy of live coverage is not explored more fully. Acknowledging that live coverage was used to advantage by both sides, this work fails to bring the discussion of television's proper role to a reasoned conclusion. This is particularly unfortunate with regard to the much-debated role played by Peter Arnett. There is much to be said for and against Mr. Arnett's actions, as the authors suggest. Had they pursued the issue beyond the superficial, they might well have contributed something meaningful to the debate over the media's role in modern war. Instead, the readers are left with little more than a weak apologia.

As a picture book, *War in the Gulf* is excellent. Never intended to be definitive or profound, it upholds the authors' assertions that the image is the strength of television news. The book runs into trouble, however, when it distorts these images with shallow and hurried attempts to document, analyze, and explain. Rather than "fleetingness," it is the substitution of images for facts which marks the most serious weakness of this work and, by implication, of television news, which it serves to promote.

THOMAS E. SEAL
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Quantico, Virginia

Barnett, Correlli. *Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War.* New York: Norton, 1991. 1052pp. $35

Barnett has offered a substantial, comprehensive account of the Royal Navy's strategy and operations in the Second World War. Divided into four parts, it discusses the background of the Royal Navy, with a summary of the interwar period and an account of operations up to Dunkirk; the crisis period of 1940–41, from the successful defense against invasion in 1940 to the disasters in the Mediterranean and the Far East; the victory in the convoy battles in the Atlantic, the Arctic, and the Mediterranean; the invasion of northwest Europe; and the return to the Far East.

Barnett argues that through shortsighted policies Britannia had "let the trident slip" in the interwar period and that the Royal Navy had neglected important new forms of naval warfare. Nevertheless, the Royal Navy improved its fighting performance sufficiently to win the vital naval battles required to maintain sea communications so that Anglo-American military power could be reinserted into Europe.

The author argues that much effort was wasted in fruitless Mediterranean diversions. However, the Royal Navy's major achievement was in laying the groundwork for and masterminding Operation Neptune, the naval side of the Normandy landings. Victory against Germany was, however, accompanied by a very subordinate role in the American victory against Japan.

Correlli Barnett is a well-known military historian who has shown some hostility to the Royal Navy. It is notable therefore that he has produced a work that reveals real admiration for the service's fighting qualities and the vital maritime foundations of Allied victory ashore. His military origins also have given him insight into the vital interaction of sea power and events on land. Clearly, Barnett is most comfortable when discussing amphibious operations, and this work probably includes the best available modern account of the major European amphibious operations of 1943-45.

Since Barnett's attack on Montgomery in *The Desert Generals*, he has revelled in controversy. This book is no exception. American readers will perhaps be shocked by the author's stern but just criticism of Churchill, whose relationship with the navy was always an uneasy one. (The famous signal "Winston is Back" had a double meaning that was forgotten subsequently.) He is also right to be highly critical of Churchill's giving in to the Royal Air Force in its doctrinaire opposition to allocating long-range aircraft to an effort to plug the mid-Atlantic gap. Perhaps Barnett's strongest revisionist feature is his critical analysis of the Mediterranean strategy, of which Churchill was the major architect. Here Barnett produces a convincing and brilliant case; his description of Malta as "The Verdun of the Naval War" is especially telling. The huge resources put into a forward naval policy in the Mediterranean might have been used elsewhere to better effect.

It can be argued that it is unrealistic to analyse the Mediterranean campaign in terms of cold profit and loss. History always appears clearer if read after the political and emotional pressures of the time have faded in importance. The author does indeed display a tendency to criticize decision makers in terms of subsequent attitudes and contexts. He argues that Britain should have realized that her empire was a burden, cut her losses, and then concentrated on Europe. At the time however, this was not on the agenda—the British Empire was what the navy and its leaders were employed to defend. What is clear in this work is that less "cigar butt strategy" might have provided sounder imperial defence.

Barnett has produced a well written text that is easy, interesting reading. Its major flaw is the author's treatment of naval technology. There are persistent and significant errors of technical detail throughout that cannot be dismissed as mere annoyances for antiquarians. First, the book may be used as a college text and source of facts—students be warned! Second, naval specialists might be encouraged to dismiss the work because of its unreliability—that would be a tragedy. Finally, the author's historical conclusions about British technological decisions are based on flawed or partial data.

Barnett clearly wanted to add to his well known indictment of British technological deficiencies and

management, but there is another side to the story, to be found in the specialist literature. It is especially surprising and regrettable that Dr. Andrew Gordon's recent work on British naval procurement in the interwar period does not appear in the bibliography. Barnett's first two chapters on interwar policy, and all subsequent sections where technology is discussed, must be treated with considerable care and reserve and should not be regarded as the last word on the subject.

This said, *Engage the Enemy More Closely* is the most significant study of the British war at sea from 1939-45 to appear since Roskill's standard accounts. It is indeed a direct descendant of Roskill's works, since the great man's archive at Churchill College is kept by none other than Correlli Barnett. He has fully exploited the opportunities of his professional situation to add to his predecessor's work and has given the national security community a stimulating and timely reassertion of the fundamental importance of maritime power to a nation's overall war-making capacity. Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin's quote on the dust-jacket says that Barnett's "analysis clearly shows how vital it was for the war at sea to be won before land and air campaigns could bring final victory." That a military historian not regarded as a special friend of the Royal Navy has made this point so clearly is of special significance in today's debates over national strategy on both sides of the Atlantic.

ERIC GROVE
Mountbatten Centre
Southampton University

Kersaudy, Francois. *Norway 1940.* New York: St. Martin's, 1991. 272pp. $19.95

Kersaudy has produced a work that reads fast and is full of lessons, but his interpretations should not always be trusted. For example, he refers to Winston Churchill as physically massive, when in fact Churchill was a diminutive person, and he assails Neville Chamberlain as militarily incompetent and lacking backbone. Yet the former Chancellor of the Exchequer knew more than most government members of Britain's defence establishment and its needs. Moreover, Chamberlain's act of appeasement at Munich in 1938 was absolutely necessary given the totally impotent state of the British air defences at that time. In addition, there is a curious misidentification of "the cruiser *Warspite*" (she was a battleship) beneath a photo of an H-class destroyer in Narvik fjord.

The Norwegian campaign of 1940 was a classic case of British intellectual arrogance—it wanted to run before it could crawl. The British started to organize an expeditionary force, ostensibly to aid the Finns against the Soviets. That concept, however, got muddled with closing the German access to Swedish iron ore, which was shipped during the winter from the

northern Norwegian port of Narvik. The logic of that idea was that Sweden could be persuaded to close its mines to the Germans; to assist them a couple of battalions were to be sent across Norway into Sweden. Naturally, the Scandinavians were not enthusiastic. None of these plans took into account the pacifist nature of the Norwegian government, or, more importantly, the likelihood of a stiff German reaction. So hypnotized were the British by their own planning that they failed to heed the warning signals from Europe regarding German intentions against Norway.

The muddle in London was compounded by the lack of a central direction of the war. Although a Military Coordination Committee was established, chaired by the prime minister, the leadership was usually delegated to Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty. Moreover, London had little knowledge of the army's lack of strength, or the distances over which the navy and the air force would have to operate, or any appreciation of the necessities for a winter campaign in Norway. In addition, the British forces were not yet well acquainted with the Luftwaffe and the consequent need for both large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and to disperse ships and stores in restricted anchorages.

In addition to all this, the story involved not merely Britain but also Norway and France. The Norwegians faced the immediate need to mobilize their forces under German invasion. But the language used by the general staff was not the language heard by the government. To the Norwegian army, partial mobilization meant sending notices by mail for assembly within two days; the government understood it to mean that only those troops in the south would be called to the colors. The pacifist government did not have available the necessary stores of munitions and other supplies for the troops that did assemble. As if that was not enough, the Germans seized some of their ports with "Trojan horses," while others were destroyed by bombs. Since no one spoke the same language, communication was replaced by rampant suspicion, to such an extent British and the French were attacking when in fact they were evacuating.

Politically, the French government badly needed a victory. It sent Chasseurs Alpins to obtain one, and lectured the British government about how to run a war only weeks before France fell ignominiously.

Kersaudy tells his story with great insight, and discusses what was happening in Berlin as well. He tells a tale whose lessons should not be lost. Anything that can go wrong, will, if no one has planned ahead, no one knows the political and physical situation, and direction is from afar.

ROBIN HIGHAM
Kansas State University

D'Este, Carlo. *Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome*. New York: Harper Collins, 1991. 566pp. $35

Carlo d'Este has made, with *Fatal Decision*, another significant contribution to our understanding of the war

in Europe. It is meticulously researched and presents a complete account of one of the war's bloodiest campaigns.

Anzio tested and often exceeded the limits of human endurance. It was, for Ernie Pyle, a place where after a few hours "you wish you were back on the boat...this is a new kind of warfare...the whole beachhead is the front line...it ain't no picnic feeling." Martin Blumenson characterized Anzio as "a gamble conceived in impatience and carried out in haste, the result of a large measure of resentment and conflict between allies."

The author is critical of Sir Harold Alexander (who commanded 15th Army Group), Fifth Army commander Lieutenant General Mark Clark, and is particularly harsh with Churchill, on whose insistence Operation Shingle was launched. All contributed to the execution of a campaign characterized by severe operational and logistical problems, poor coordination between Allied forces, and changing tactical objectives. Churchill dismissed the objections of key military leaders, including Major General John P. Lucas (the designated Shingle force commander), as the usual negative thinking of military planners whom he referred to as "masters of negation." The result was a hastily planned operation that was unsupportable by the remainder of the U.S. Fifth Army, who were battling the Germans along the Gustav Line anchored on Monte Cassino.

The original plan called for Lucas's VI Corps to assault Anzio on 22 January 1944. If successful in establishing a beachhead, Lucas could then advance to the Alban Hills or march to seize Rome, thus severing German communications to the south. According to d'Este, there was nothing wrong with the basic concept of Shingle. If Lucas had had sufficient force he could have coerced Field Marshall Kesselring (German commander in Italy) to abandon the Cassino front. The main flaw of Shingle was its logistical restrictions which kept the size of the landing force too small to achieve its aim.

Unfortunately for the Allies, Kesselring did not react according to their plan. When Lucas hesitated to advance and consolidate the beachhead, Kesselring rapidly deployed elements of thirteen German divisions to Anzio in an effort to eliminate the beachhead. The result was four months of bloody stalemate in which Allied artillery and naval gunfire saved the beachhead from destruction. In the interim Clark replaced Lucas with Lucian Truscott.

Only when substantial reinforcements were received in May were Clark and Alexander able to penetrate the Gustav defenses. They then advanced and eventually joined hands with the beleaguered VI Corps at Anzio. Within a few weeks Rome fell, but only after Clark had allowed the majority of German forces to escape the Allied pincers.

More significant than failed leadership was the operational flaw in the Anzio planning. The distance between the main Allied forces at Cassino and the Anzio beachhead was too great to allow for mutual support. Both the author and Martin Blumenson (in the army's official history) point out that neither sector could influence the other. In short, the operation had been doomed from the beginning.

In the final analysis Anzio was a campaign marked by ineffective leadership at the highest levels. Too few forces allocated to Shingle jeopardized the attainment of even limited objectives. Moreover, the Allied operational and tactical commanders failed to exert the proper supervision and battlefield audacity that was required to ensure military success. The author claims that only the enemy leader possessed the ability to choose instinctively the right course of action on the field of battle.

Perhaps d'Este makes his greatest contribution in assessing the Anzio campaign as part of the overall Allied strategy in the Mediterranean. Was it worth 85,000 Allied battle and nonbattle casualties? The author leaves such judgments to us.

COLE C. KINGSEED
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College

Honan, William H. *Visions of Infamy: The Untold Story of How Journalist Hector C. Bywater Devised the Plan that Led to Pearl Harbor.* New York: St. Martin's, 1991. 346pp. $22.95

Bywater, Hector C. *The Great Pacific War: A History of the American Japanese Campaign of 1931-33.* New York: St. Martin's, 1991. 321pp. $22.95

Hector C. Bywater was a journalist for thirty-six years during which time he contributed to, or was employed by, leading newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic. After writing for James Gordon Bennett's *New York World* on the Russo-Japanese War between 1904-1905, Bywater shifted to Europe where he reported on the rising German navy even as he spied for British naval intelligence. Living mostly in Britain after 1919, Bywater wrote on the naval rivalry between the United States and Japan in the Pacific. His first major volume, *Sea Power in the Pacific,* assessed the situation in the Pacific at the time of the famed Washington conference of 1921-1922 for the limitation of arms. Four years later, when relations between the United States and Japan had passed through an acute crisis over immigration, Bywater produced his fictional account of *The Great Pacific War* of an American-Japanese war between 1931 and 1933.

William M. Honan, a gifted journalist and newsman, has searched in Britain, Japan, and the United States for clues that would indicate that Hector C. Bywater helped to shape Japanese and possibly American war planning before World War II. Honan wishes to convince his readers that Bywater, in *The Great Pacific War*

and elsewhere, predicted the shape of World War II in the Pacific, countered a basic weakness in American war planning, and influenced Japan's great Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku into thinking that Japan should carry out a surprise attack on the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Honan has found no writings by Yamamoto to prove he was moved by Bywater, but it is surely safe to assume, as Honan does, that Yamamoto read *The Great Pacific War* while serving as naval attaché in Washington (1926-1928), if not before. As further evidence of Yamamoto's commitment to Bywater, Honan draws attention to a few other incidents: reports about Bywater by other Japanese officials in the United States; two Japanese army General Staff papers of 1926 (that apparently carry no proof of Yamamoto's authorship); a lecture by Yamamoto given in 1928 as recalled by a member of the audience forty-two years later; a brief encounter between Bywater and Yamamoto at the naval conference in 1930 held in London; and a more extended meeting in 1934 between the two, upon which Honan speculates at some length. Honan concedes that no Japanese naval intelligence reports survive for the period, nor does he cite any Japanese war plans records that prove a Bywater influence.

The author wants his readers to find the source for Yamamoto's plan to attack Pearl Harbor in Bywater's account, written sixteen years earlier. In the tradition of the Japanese attacks on the Russians at Port Arthur in 1904 and on the Germans at Tsingtao in 1914, the Japanese in Bywater's tale planned to capture swiftly and deny to the Americans any naval base facilities in the western Pacific that might serve the United States fleet once it had moved from Hawaii to the Philippines. Yamamoto's attack, of course, was a blow at the main battle forces of the Pacific Fleet, not the crucial support facilities. Only the element of surprise was common to the plans of the two men.

Honan sees in the final battle in *The Great Pacific War* the inspiration for Yamamoto's 1942 plan to attack Midway. Whereas Yamamoto aimed to extend Japan's defense perimeter eastward to Midway and perhaps farther, the Japanese fleet in Bywater's final battle was provoked to fight by a supposed American threat to capture Yap. To this reviewer the circumstances of Bywater's battle were far closer to the desperate sorties by the Japanese against the Americans in the battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf than to Midway.

Among Honan's other claims are: that Bywater revealed the Japanese strategy at the Washington conference in 1921 to force from the United States a renunciation of further building of fortifications or naval bases in the Pacific west of Hawaii; that Bywater was the first to expose German building of "pocket battleships"; that the Japanese demand for a "common-upper-limit" for the American, British, and Japanese navies in the 1930s was really Bywater-inspired; and that Bywater in 1937 uncovered

the Japanese construction of superbattleships. Even Honan concedes that Bywater underestimated these great ships by 30,000 tons. Finally, Honan concludes that Bywater's death in August 1940 may have been arranged by Admiral Yamamoto in order to prevent him from discovering and publishing the admiral's plan to attack Pearl Harbor fifteen months later.

Honan's conjectures make for entertaining reading. But they contain more than a hint at the old and, one would hope, outmoded myth that while the Japanese may be smart, they really cannot think things through for themselves.

The Great Pacific War is a novel that was written by a man generally well grounded in the facts of the situation. Perhaps it is chiefly significant as evidence of Bywater's remarkable ability to bring before the public the strategic problems then being discussed by the professionals behind closed doors. To evaluate Bywater's predictions fairly, it should be kept in mind that he placed his war in 1931, the year of the Manchurian incident, when Herbert Hoover was president. It is safe to conclude, as the American military had estimated since 1906, that Japan would have mounted a massive attack on Guam and the Philippines. American war planners also feared, as Bywater warned, that Japan would somehow block the Panama Canal. In light of the revised estimates upon which the 1929 War Plan Orange was based, Bywater was surely correct in predicting a step-by-step movement by the American fleet across the Pacific. It is difficult to accept Bywater's warning that the administration in Washington might, in panic, approve an inadequately covered attack on the Bonin Islands just south of Tokyo. American war planners were then firmly convinced that the United States fleet required a main advanced base in the Philippines before moving north to blockade Japan.

The Pacific war (1941-1945) departed significantly from Bywater's vision. Naturally Bywater did not anticipate that Japan would fight a coalition of the United States, Britain, China, and the Netherlands. Writing in the day when air power was still considered as useful support for battleships, Bywater did not dream of the role of carrier air in World War II. Moreover, assuming that the United States would remain true to its earlier commitment to freedom of the seas, he wholly failed to anticipate the consequences of the mounting of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Americans against Japan's maritime arteries. In addition, he erroneously expected that gas would be an important factor. Given his obvious respect for both the Americans and the Japanese, he conceived of a civilized war in which each belligerent would be solicitous of the other's defeated and helpless combatants, and he did not forsee that Japan would continue the struggle for nearly a year after the bulk of her fleet had been destroyed. However, none of this detracts from the novel. It is a remarkable estimate

of the situation by one of the distinguished naval writers of his generation.

WILLIAM R. BRAISTED
The University of Texas at Austin

Goldstein, Erik. *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920.* New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991. 307pp. $69

A crafted analysis of bureaucracy and personality, *Winning the Peace* explores how Britain after the Great War emerged from the Paris Peace Conference with its postwar objectives substantially intact. France had obtained neither Luxembourg nor the Rhineland, and Keynes managed to have the reparations sum left blank in the treaty. In Eastern Europe, the New Europe idea had created a relatively stable group of medium-sized powers generally well disposed toward Britain. British interests in the Middle East were protected and consolidated.

How did Britain do it? Goldstein's answer is, preparation. Through the establishment of a Foreign Office Political Intelligence Department (PID) that was staffed by outstanding civilian regional experts, position papers were prepared that addressed the general issues and knotty details that would face the Paris conference participants. These papers served as the informational basis for negotiation.

The book examines the politics surrounding the establishment of the PID in March 1918 by Lord Hardinge of the Foreign Office (a counter to Lloyd George's personal secretariat, the "Garden Suburb"). To begin his operation Hardinge pirated twelve members of the Department of Information's Intelligence Bureau (DIIB) into the Foreign Office, despite the protests of the Department of Information's new minister, Lord Beaverbrook. The twelve included such subsequently well known figures as Robert William Seton Watson, Lewis Namier, and Arnold Toynbee. Brief biographies are given of the principal players in the PID; these provide a rich picture of the personalities who prepared the seventy-one PID memoranda for the conference negotiators. These memoranda were supplemented by 174 Historical Section handbooks and thirty-five military intelligence reports.

Sifting through the mountain of Admiralty, cabinet, foreign office, and personal papers, Goldstein has constructed a coherent thread. His account is not without humor from time to time, as in this discussion of the exultation of the British imperialists in early 1919: "The war was won and the British Empire once again stood victorious. What was more, British armies were in occupation of most of the Middle East. It was not so much a question of what Britain could get, but rather what it would choose to keep. Undoubtedly some dregs would have to be provided for France, preferably in darkest Africa, while some

gristle would be found for the Italians' seemingly curious colonial appetite, and a particularly vile mandate might be graciously offered to the Americans to teach them the arduous nature of an imperial burden."

But as 1919 continued on, the euphoria of the imperialists proved short-lived: Ireland was erupting, Egypt was rumbling, and the Amritsar massacre had ignited India. The tide turned, and imperial reformers became more important in the negotiations.

Allen Leeper, whose credentials included speaking Romanian and holding the position of secretary of the Anglo-Romanian Society, had the difficult job of representing Britain on the conference's Romanian Committee in the face of Italy's support of maximal Romanian claims. Italy, on the basis of checkerboard diplomacy, sought Romania as an ally located to Yugoslavia's rear. Leeper's comment in a Foreign Office minute conveys his despair: "If Mr. Bratianu's Govt. insists on quarreling with the Serbs & putting their trust in Italy, no one can save them from ruin." Allen Leeper's correspondence with his brother Rex, who worked on Russian questions for the PID, is cited on a number of occasions and provides candid background comment on the diplomatic developments. In future, the reader might hope to hear more from Goldstein about the role of the Leeper brothers in postwar diplomacy.

Successful though they were, the PID staff and the British negotiators wanted more from the Paris Peace Conference than they got. They wanted a larger Belgium that included Luxembourg. They wanted a Yugoslavia that included Fiume. They wanted a pro-British Greece. They did not get these or a number of other desired concessions and arrangements. For Britain, winning at Paris meant not losing. As Goldstein puts it, "On paper Britain gained nothing. Its victory was that neither did any other state." Winning the peace meant losing less than anyone else.

This work provides a powerful case for Britain's thoroughness in its preparations and the quality of its PID experts, which made it successful in the diplomatic arena.

GRANT F. RHODE
Brookline, Massachusetts

Pipes, Richard. *The Russian Revolution.* New York: Knopf, 1990. 970pp. $40

The Russian Revolution is an immense and masterful account of the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, the Bolshevik coup of October 1917, and that party's attempt to consolidate its power. It begins where Professor Pipes's earlier study, *Russia under the Old Regime* (1974), left off—both chronologically and, one must lament, ideologically. The work is vintage Pipes. It displays an impressive mastery over evidence which, unfortunately, is forced to serve a narrow and inadequate interpretation of Russian history.

Pipes is probably the foremost proponent of the "patrimonial" interpretation of Russian history, which avers

that because the tsar considered Russia to be his private estate, politics became indistinguishable from the economics of the household. Russians were viewed as mere servitors, not citizens. *Russia under the Old Regime* stated that the modernization of the patrimonial institutions in the 1880s brought on "unmistakable germs of totalitarianism." In *The Russian Revolution*, Pipes asserts that the continued existence of a patrimonial government, impinging as it did upon a recently liberated society and economy, was the primary source of discontent. To a large extent, "revolution was the result not of insufferable conditions but of irreconcilable attitudes." One can "beg to disagree" with Pipes and his patrimonial theory, and one can fault him for paying insufficient attention to the "insufferable conditions," yet still find merit in Pipes's assertion that "nothing in early twentieth-century Russia inexorably pushed the country toward revolution except the presence of an unusually large and fanatical body of professional revolutionaries."

Pipes's interpretation states that the revolutionary period extended for almost a century, from the 1860s to Stalin's death in 1953. The "culminating period," however, was 1899-1924, from the university strike to the death of Lenin. During this period, Pipes argues, the "*Weltanschauung*" and institutions of Soviet totalitarianism were established. Stalinism, consequently, was not an aberration but merely the effective implementation of Leninist ideology—a conclusion which Pipes attempts to support in his last chapter, "The Red Terror." (Unlike the Jacobin Terror of 1793-1794 in France, for "Soviet Russia, the terror never ceased.") However, this interpretation remains unpersuasive, especially in light of Lenin's late opposition to the rise of Stalin. (For an interesting argument *contra* Pipes on this matter, the reader should examine Robert C. Tucker's recent work, *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941*, which interprets Stalinism as a second revolution.)

The well known historical landmarks which fall within Pipes's culminating period (or, more precisely, that part of the period examined in this book—the remainder will be examined in a sequel, *Russia under the New Regime*) are subjected to his considerable powers of extensive and intensive scholarship. The result is an engaging and occasionally provocative book. He informs us that: (1), contrary to popular opinion, interior minister Plehve did not seek war with Japan in order to divert a domestically troubled Russia; (2), the 1905 Revolution, although a clear victory for the liberals, exacerbated Russia's principal problem—the conflict between the government and society; and (3), prime minister Stolypin's agrarian reform was but a marginal success, even before it was disrupted, and his plan to create a class of farmers loyal to the regime was thus destined to fail.

In Pipes's view, World War I was less the cause of the revolutions of 1917 than were two decisions made by Tsar Nicholas during the war: to

prorogue the Duma and take personal command of the war at the front. According to Pipes, "the decisions which Nicholas took in August 1915 made a revolution unavoidable. Russia could have averted a revolutionary upheaval only on one condition: if the unpopular bureaucracy, with its administrative and police apparatus, made common cause with the popular but inexperienced liberal and liberal-conservative intelligentsia."

The spontaneous revolution in February brought not only the end of tsarist rule in Russia but also a weak but accountable Provisional Government that was beholden to an unaccountable and hostile Provisional Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. Trotsky subsequently utilized the soviets as a cover for initiating the Bolshevik coup. Lenin completed the coup by emasculating the soviets and proroguing the Constituent Assembly. As these highlights indicate, Pipes believes that political events were more responsible for bringing revolution than were social problems (e.g., the dislocation of peasants or alienation of workers). This perspective allows the author to establish the continuity between Russian patrimonialism and Soviet totalitarianism—in the person of Lenin.

Richard Pipes's treatment of Lenin is a bit much. Not only is too much made about his "cowardice," given the admitted paucity of evidence, but what is one to make of the following? "To reconstruct his thinking, it is necessary, therefore, to proceed retroactively, from known deeds to concealed intentions." Are we to discount totally the possibility of tactical adjustments in response to events? Nevertheless, it is from this questionable methodology that Pipes (less than two pages later) has Lenin personifying the critical, deterministic link between Russian patrimonialism and Soviet totalitarianism. Pipes says, "This [militarized] outlook on politics Lenin drew from the inner depths of his personality, in which the lust for domination combined with the patrimonial political culture shaped in the Russia of Alexander III in which he had grown up. But the theoretical justification for these psychological impulses and this cultural legacy he found in Marx's comments on the Paris Commune. Marx's writings...served to justify his destructive instincts and provided a rationale for his desire to erect a new order: an order all-encompassing in its 'totalitarian' aspiration."

Such is the narrow and inadequate interpretation of Russian history which emerges from an otherwise rich and engaging work.

WALTER C. UHLER
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Williamson, Samuel R., Jr. *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War.* New York: St. Martin's, 1991. 272pp. (No price given)

This publisher's series, *The Making of the Twentieth Century*, has included to date works on the origins of the First World War for Britain (Z. Steiner),

France (J. Keiger), Germany (V. Berghahn), Italy (J. Bosworth), and Russia (D. Leiven). Williamson, president of the University of the South, completes the survey with this volume. He is most qualified to do so, having spent the past two decades completing a two-volume history of the Habsburg monarchy from 1910 to 1914. He is perhaps best known for *The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914* (1969).

The book is divided into two major sections: the first six chapters examine the nature of the Dual Monarchy and how it functioned, while the last four analyze decision making during the Balkan Wars and the July Crisis of 1914. The research was conducted in the major Austrian military and political archives and includes the personal papers of Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The work is beautifully crafted and is written in an impeccable style.

Williamson's major purpose is to correct the Germanocentric view of the First World War partially created by Fritz Fischer's pioneering studies. Hence, the author reminds us that the initiative for war was Vienna's, not Berlin's: "The steps that pushed Europe toward war were taken in Vienna." Williamson details how a seasoned set of policymakers, enjoying "unusually complete and united backing" in the monarchy, opted for war in 1914. The military, in the words of the chief of the general staff, wanted "war, war, war." The Foreign Office sought nothing less than a *"final and fundamental reckoning"* with Serbia. The emperor, while recognizing the "tragedy of that contemporary moment," in the end concurred that war was the only solution to the dynasty's ethnic problems.

Despite this "now or never" mentality, Austria-Hungary was ill-prepared for war in 1914. The bulk of the army was on harvest-leave until 25 July, thus precluding a lightning strike against Serbia. Secondly, General Conrad von Hötzendorf committed a major strategic error. On 30 July, ignoring news of pending Russian military measures, he ordered his offensive force to move southward; when Russia ordered mobilization on 31 July, von Hötzendorf agreed with his railway staff that the troops should continue south and then reembark and head northward. They arrived in time to influence neither theater.

Williamson's damning conclusion is that von Hötzendorf dispatched the force against Serbia in order to "subvert a diplomatic solution." Put differently, the general had "reacted in an almost classical fashion by ignoring the information that contradicted what he wanted most—war against Serbia." In the end, Habsburg prospects rested upon hopes and illusions (short war, power of the offensive) rather than realistic chances of success. Finally, Williamson rejects the apologia that Vienna pursued no war aims. Russian Poland and the Ukraine emerged in short order on such a wish-list. And in every post-war scenario concocted at Vienna, Austria-Hungary emerged as the dominant power in the Balkans,

"supplanting Russia and excluding Germany."

In conclusion, Williamson has provided a superb corrective to the Germanocentric view of the origins of the First World War. In crisp, well-chiseled sentences the author has laid out the motivations that prompted Vienna to choose war in 1914 as well as both their short-term and long-term results. A more balanced interpretation of the July Crisis of 1914 should emerge as a result of his labors.

HOLGER H. HERWIG
University of Calgary

Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. *In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy 1889-1914*. Scranton, Pa.: Harper Collins, 1989. 377pp. $70

Sumida has offered a study that will profoundly influence our understanding of the Royal Navy before World War I and, in the widest sense, how we view the relationships between technology, finance, and government policy.

The author traces the growth of British naval spending while Britain faced emerging threats from continental Europe during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He connects the pressing requirement to achieve economies in the defence votes with the appointment of the reformist John Fisher as First Sea Lord in 1904. The key to Fisher's confidence that he could improve Britain's imperial security while effecting reductions in naval spending was his belief in the potential of radical technical innovation, particularly the all-big-gun ship, the first of which was the *Dreadnought* of 1906.

Sumida explains Fisher's attempts to embody his ideal fighting ship in a vessel with the endurance and speed necessary to find its opponents and force them into action at a range of its own choosing—at which its superior gunnery ensured that there could be no effective reply. Critical to Fisher's plans for such a "super ship" was his assumption (he did not fully comprehend the complex issues involved) that Britain was on the verge of producing a fire control system that could operate effectively in the worst conditions of sea and visibility when both target and firing platform were manoeuvring, achieving hits at ranges at which Britain's opponents could not. The ideal fighting ship, in Fisher's words, was "never meant to get in [the] enemy's range!" and thus did not require heavy armour.

The failure of the fire control project defeated the concept. Without such predictive systems, it was too easy (as the Germans were to demonstrate) to produce a ship of equal gunpower and speed with superior protection. Because the story of gunnery fire control has never before been comprehensively explained, a popular belief has developed that the *Dreadnought* represented the real "revolution" in capital ship design, and that the faster but ill-protected battle cruisers represented an evolutionary cul-de-sac because of their vulnerability to vessels with better

protection and comparable speed. The true story is much more complex.

Sumida's careful analysis shows how the journalist and inventor Arthur Hungerford Pollen came to define the gunnery problem and set about solving it before anyone else. Pollen's complex travails are discussed with great skill and at necessary length. The Admiralty's misjudgments resulted in the rejection of Pollen's equipment in favor of an inferior, partly plagarised version that was incapable of providing a fire control solution for a manoeuvring ship and thus proved ineffective under the conditions of the coming war. While Pollen made errors in his relationships with the Royal Navy, it is clear that neither its personnel nor administrative structures were capable of dealing with the complex technology of gunnery fire control. Although Sumida is restrained in his conclusions, the incapacity of the understaffed Admiralty to manage a navy of the size of 1910 is manifest. This proved to have dire consequences during the First World War. Similarly, the technical comprehension of most "expert" officers left much to be desired, not from a lack of formal technical training but through a general absence of intellectual curiosity, due to some extent to sheer overwork both in the Admiralty and at sea.

Sumida's work not only illuminates an important aspect of naval history but suggests directions for further research. His own interests are demonstrated in his plans for a sequel to cover the years to 1939 as well as in a recent paper, "British Naval Administration in the Age of Fisher," which reveals more about the Admiralty's fundamental difficulties in this era.

In addition, we need to know more about Fisher's thinking. The creative, and derivative, ferment which was his mind can be likened to an intellectual catherine wheel. He has been compared to Hyman Rickover; but while his ability to grasp great concepts was equally reamarkable, he possessed little of the latter's comprehension of the associated risks and technical difficulties encountered in placing *any* new system into service. Sumida has been careful not to overstress the connection between predictive fire control and Fisher's "all-big-gun" theories, but the evolution of the Admiral's thinking on the subject *without benefit of hindsight* deserves more attention. This process has been started by Charles Fairbanks in his essay, "The Origins of the *Dreadnought* Revolution: A Historical Essay."

Jon Sumida's effort to improve our understanding of the Royal Navy before the First World War can best be summed up by St. Matthew: "The stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner."

JAMES GOLDRICK
Commander, Royal Australian Navy
Naval War College

Schom, Alan. *Trafalgar: Countdown to Battle, 1803-1805.* New York: Atheneum, 1990. 431pp. $27.50

This book starts off with a dubious proposition—namely, that "most

British naval historians" have "ignored or misinterpreted" the series of events that began with the renewed hostilities between Britain and France in 1803 and ended with the famous battle of Trafalgar two and a half years later. In particular, Alan Schom asserts that the role played by the British fleet commanded by Admiral Sir William Cornwallis in blockading the main French naval arsenal at Brest and thereby preventing Napoleon's invasion of England has not been understood. Very few naval operations throughout history have been as exhaustively studied by so many famous historians as the campaign that led to the action off Cape Trafalger on 21 October 1805. It would indeed be surprising, then, if so many talented historians and strategic analysts had missed such a critical aspect of the Trafalgar campaign—and, of course, they have not. To be sure, Cornwallis's name is put in the shadow by Nelson's glory in popular accounts of the actual battle of Trafalgar, but it is simply untrue to say that serious naval historians have not understood the critical role played by Britain's naval forces in the Channel in fending off Napoleon's attempted invasion. One need only recall the famous passage by Alfred Thayer Mahan about those "storm-beaten ships" to realize that naval historians have long understood the strategic importance of the blockade of Brest. In addition to this unwarranted attempt to denigrate the work of other historians, Schom's writing style at times leaves much to be desired: his sentence structure is frequently confusing, and this clumsy writing makes his account difficult to read. *Trafalgar: Countdown to Battle* is also marred by some irritating errors; for example, you would think that Schom, who is so determined to set the record straight and give Cornwallis his due, would get his nickname right and call him "Billy Blue" and not "Blue Billy."

But this book is not without merits. Its principal value is that Schom effectively exploits the studies done by Edouard Desbrière about French invasion plans of England, and he has used French archives for further information about Napoleon's strategic schemes and preparations. Schom is at his best in providing character sketches of France's leaders and in examining Napoleon's difficult relationship with his admirals. In addition to that of Admiral Villeneuve, the unfortunate commander of the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar, Schom quite rightly highlights the important role played by the hard-driving Admiral Denis Decres, the French navy minister, in attempting to carry out Napoleon's plans to defeat Britain. In his typical fashion, Napoleon aimed at delivering a knockout blow against the British, which meant landing a large army in England. Napoleon consistently underestimated the difficulties of transporting an army across the Channel. When his unrealistic plan failed, Napoleon blamed Villeneuve, Decres, his Spanish allies—in short, everyone but himself for the failure of the invasion plan to come off as planned. Although Schom

has not delivered on his promise to offer a corrective to our understanding of British naval strategy in the period 1803-1805, he has provided a good account of French plans, preparation, and operations. Despite this book's flaws, it also places the fleet movements that ultimately led to the battle of Trafalgar within a larger strategic context.

JOHN MAURER
Naval War College

Howarth, Stephen. *To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775-1991.* New York: Random House, 1991. 563pp. $25

Stephen Howarth has provided an entertaining and readable work that is helpful in combining personal experiences and knowledge with the history of the navy as a whole. Written by a Briton, it is a history with a different view of our institution's historical wake. Reading it, one is reminded that many current problems have been around for many years. For example North African pirates and postwar budget cuts are nothing new, but it is instructive and sometimes entertaining to learn how these problems were handled in the past. Howarth has offered a single neatly focused and explicit volume of 214 turbulent years of history.

From the other side of the Atlantic the author writes lovingly of "our" navy and its heroes, with a palpable reluctance to step on America's toes. Unlike the navy's benefactors and heroes, those few characters who attract his scorn do not have ships named after them—with one notable exception, Albert Gallatin, Jefferson's secretary of the treasury. Gallatin was notorious for cutting the navy budget, so it is appropriate that the ship which bears his name is a coast guard cutter.

Howarth can be forgiven for comparing American naval history to the British experience at sea and for quoting his own admirals. However, he is on target in employing a famous Nelsonian remark in defense of Admiral Halsey at the Battle of Leyte Gulf: "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy." He explains the controversy over Halsey's action, but he does not maintain the same balance in having apparently interviewed only Admiral Elmo Zumwalt to describe that officer's polemical years as Chief of Naval Operations in the early seventies.

To Shining Sea has changed my perspective of the U.S. Navy's history and of my own thirty-year participation in it. For example, I never knew before reading this book that the six Russian submarines discovered in the vicinity of Cuba in October 1962 actually surfaced at American request in obedience to orders from Moscow. This reviewer was witness to a Foxtrot surfacing off the north coast of Cuba: I had thought we had hounded them to exhaustion.

Another personal story: Howarth describes how after the battle off Santiago in the Spanish-American War of 1898 the Spanish admiral was fished out of the water hatless and shoeless. When he arrived on the quarterdeck

of the American ship that rescued him, he was cheered for a full minute by the American sailors. In 1988 I spent seven weeks at sea aboard the Spanish aircraft carrier *Principe de Asturias*. The executive officer, Commander Jaime Cervera, jokingly remarked, "My great grandfather Pascual was a 'guest' of the U.S. Navy in Annapolis for two years after 1898." Pascual Cervera was the same waterlogged Spanish admiral who had stood on deck of the USS *Iowa* to the cheers of the American sailors and who had indeed been imprisoned in Annapolis. It would have eased my mind that day if I had known that we had treated him so well the day of his capture.

There are one or two discrepancies I would like to mention. First, the leader of the USS *Enterprise* dive-bomber attack on the three Japanese carriers at Midway was better known as "Wade" McClusky than as Clarence. Second, there were three carrier groups, not two, in the Aleutian exercises of 1982: those of the *Midway*, *Coral Sea*, and *Enterprise*.

The author brings to mind things I had learned long ago and had forgotten, but I also found information I had never known—the most important being that while we professionals understand the need for a U.S. Navy, the public must be repeatedly educated to gain this appreciation. (After every war the United States reduces the fleet and sends the sailors home.)

It will not have been a waste of time and effort for any officer who reads this book.

S.L. TURNER
Captain, U.S. Navy

Barnet, Richard J. *The Rockets' Red Glare: When America Goes to War.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990. 442pp. (No price given).

Richard Barnet has described his study as the story of "the role the American people have played in the critical decisions of war and peace." The text is divided into four eras, based upon the primary national interest of the time: the Federalist period (steering clear of the Napoleonic wars); the nineteenth century (westward expansion); the Colonial period (expansion of empire at the turn of the twentieth century); and World War I to the present (saving Europe from dictatorial rule while picking up the mantle of world leadership). The book is therefore an examination of the relationship between presidential conduct in foreign policy and the will of the people.

Rulers of the past had usually managed to ignore the will of the people. Foreign policy was the business of kings. However, as a result of foreign policy's crucial impact on the American Revolution, a strong interest in it developed throughout the United States. Therefore, from the beginning each president has been forced to consider the impact of public opinion regarding foreign policy decisions. It was quickly learned that

a democratic government made it difficult to conduct a rational foreign policy, especially when public emotion ran counter to national interests.

Barnet points out that during the first years of the republic, existence and trade were so intricately tied to events in Europe that there was little difference between our foreign and domestic policy. His description of late eighteenth-century America is reminiscent of what we face today, with our economic and military interests comingled with the rest of the world. In fact, several analogies can be made: presidential use of force without declaring war; manipulation of the press to sell foreign policy; media portraying themselves as fact-finders while selling their version of the truth; hobo armies taking over the streets; and the presidents' sometimes successful attempts to read the will of the people. After the Vietnam War, the national security community relearned the importance of public opinion and the necessity of the people's backing in any military operation. Secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger epitomized this when he declared, "the armed forces will not fight wars that the American people will not support."

Unfortunately, when the author discusses the 1970s his objectivity slips. His last two chapters contain personal opinions and errors that weaken his otherwise excellent analysis. Barnet's concluding chapter introduces topics not formerly discussed, such as the "growing awareness of the suicidal consequences of even so-called conventional wars," and the "potentially catastrophic consequences of man-made ecological degradation." Important as these issues are, they are forced into his conclusion.

Up to the Kennedy years, however, this is a compelling work. Mr. Barnet has done an excellent job of combining different events and personalities into a coherent thesis. *The Rockets' Red Glare* will show the military professional how and why the principle of the will of the people originated, and that it continues to be important in any national strategy.

JOHN W. EADS
Commander, U.S. Navy
University of Mississippi

Pearson, Mark. *Paper Tiger: New Zealand's Part in SEATO 1954-1977*. Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs with the Ministry of External Relations and Trade, 1989. 135pp. (No price given)

For almost twenty years, the South East Asian Treaty Organization (Seato) played a prominent role in the Western alliance's approach to Southeast Asian security problems during an era in which that region was fraught with instability and conflict. Yet, what is surprising is that the contemporary academic literature on this now moribund alliance is limited indeed. With the exception of the excellent book by Leszek Buszynski, *SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy* (1983), there are few historical

narratives and analyses of Seato. Moreover, despite Buszynski's solid scholarship, he labored under the constraints of not having access to government primary sources.

Mark Pearson, an officer with the New Zealand Ministry of External Relations and Trade, has provided a welcome contribution to our understanding of Seato. *Paper Tiger* provides an excellent analysis of the forces behind the creation (and the subsequent evolution) of this alliance, albeit largely from the limited perspective of New Zealand. Moreover, his work has the singular advantage of being based on the records of the New Zealand Ministry of External Affairs, although it does not include the files from the Ministry of Defence. Despite this limitation, Pearson has succeeded in writing a clear and in-depth assessment of the alliance's history. Also original is his treatment of the evolution of problems associated with the numerous alliance defense plans. Thus, the work's value should extend beyond those who are interested principally in New Zealand's diplomatic history, to include students of Southeast Asian affairs.

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG
U.S. Army War College

Hicks, George, ed. *The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen*. New York: Longman, 1990. 526pp. (No price given).

The Tiananmen crisis—the sudden emergence of the Chinese pro-democracy movement, its bloody suppression in Beijing, and the political repression and leadership changes immediately following the massacre—was a milestone in the turbulent history of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The events of April-June 1989 and their domestic and international repercussions have become the subject of analysis by journalists and academics. This is one of the first scholarly works to address the significance of this crisis.

Edited by George Hicks, a Hong Kong-based economist, *The Broken Mirror* contains twenty-seven essays, many of which were written by distinguished scholars. It contains five parts: an examination of the participants in the Tiananmen crisis (students, intellectuals, the leadership, and the military); the historical and cultural background of communism, political culture, the socialist economy, authoritarianism, and ideology; the reaction of the international community, with a focus on the West, Hong Kong, and Taiwan; the changes in domestic and foreign policy subsequent to Tiananmen (with an emphasis on the suppression of human rights and the diplomatic moves to counter Beijing's international isolation following the massacre); and the exploration of the long-term implications of the Tiananmen crisis for the future of communist rule in China. Two useful appendices are included and a chronology of major documents and statements relating to the crisis, as well as a "who was who" during Beijing Spring.

Two separate themes run through this work: a skeptical assessment of the accomplishments of the decade of reform preceding June 1989, and a pessimistic appraisal of what the future may hold for the PRC. It aims to redress the more optimistic view of the prospects for China's reform program that were prevalent prior to Tiananmen, as well as to contribute to our understanding of this crucial event in the PRC's history. It succeeds in both.

Another strong point of this work is the attempt by some of its authors to relate the Tiananmen crisis and the communist system in China to the collapse and crisis of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Although the PRC's foreign policy, and in particular Sino-Soviet relations and Beijing's role in the "strategic triangle," have received much attention, comparative examination of Marxist-Leninist systems in China and in the former Eastern Bloc has been a weak point in the China studies field. This volume, however, presents both analyses of PRC's foreign policy and also the comparative approach.

The Broken Mirror is long, but its essays are well-written and relatively short. Though published in 1990 it should provide a useful background to those in the national security community who seek a broad understanding of the Tiananmen crisis. The essays relating to political affairs, the military, foreign policy, and the future of China can be read fruitfully by those with little time to spare.

ROXANE D.V. SISMANIDIS
Washington, D.C.

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. *After Tiananmen Square: Challenges for the Chinese-American Relationship*. Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1990. 124pp. $9.95

Historically, Chinese-American relations have been characterized by misperception and illusion. A great cultural gap, some may even say an unbridgeable gap, separates America and China. No matter the time period or the regime in either land, the relationship has been plagued by the same obstacles and pitfalls. Many American illusions about China have prevented U.S. policy makers from correctly identifying the true character of the Chinese condition. In turn, Chinese ethnocentrism has produced a similar situation leading to mutual misunderstandings.

This work was designed to assess the implications of the Tiananmen Square massacre on Sino-American relations in the 1990s. It not only provides a succinct analysis of China's post-Tiananmen domestic and foreign policies but also recommends a reasonable set of U.S. policy options for Sino-American relations. The work contains six chapters written by specialists on China, including two Chinese scholars. Not only are American and Chinese viewpoints offered but also discussions of

the impact of China's relations with the Third World and with the nations of the western Pacific.

Jurgen Domes, a sinologist at the Saar University, examines China's internal dynamics and predicts a collapse of the communist system in that country. The time of the demise of the current system will depend upon the outcome of the forthcoming struggle for succession.

A chapter entitled "The Sino-American Relationship: A Chinese Perspective," by Ding Xinghao, begins with the premise that good relations between the United States and China are of vital importance to peace and stability in East Asia and the Pacific. True to the current party line, Ding places the burden of maintaining this relationship on the United States and warns that using trade and high technology as a lever to pressure China for political purposes would be counterproductive and may force China to close its door again.

In a concluding chapter, Robert Pfaltzgraff notes that Tiananmen brought to the fore the long-standing dilemma that has beset Sino-American relations. Americans believe that the central problem of the relationship is the balancing of U.S. strategic interests with concern for human rights. With the decline of the Soviet threat, the strategic imperative has lost much (but not all) of its impact. The United States must continue to recognize that China remains an indispensable component of any emerging Asian-Pacific political-military balance.

This work is thought-provoking and informative and should prove useful to those interested in world affairs and the Sino-American relationship.

MICHAEL T. BYRNES
Colonel, U.S. Army
Beijing, China

Fotion, Nicholas G. *Military Ethics: Looking toward the Future.* Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1990. 122pp. $18.95

This is an important but difficult work. It is important because it provides a solid, logically argued refutation of the pacifistic belief that all things military are immoral. It is diffficult because of its dense prose, a veritable Socratic argument of endless "either-or" questions. The result is a volume that clearly defines the moral logic of conventional military capability, deterrence, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and strategic defenses. Though relatively short in length, it is not an easy read.

Nicholas Fotion is a professor of philosophy and an expert in the study of ethical behavior. He begins with the subtle premise that many (if not most) of America's intellectual elite have developed an aversion to the serious study of military matters and are therefore easily swayed by what he calls "the big argument" of new-wave pacifism: that modern weapons and military technology have made war more destructive, more costly, and therefore more immoral than ever before. The implication of the argument is that modern nations can no

longer "afford" to fight wars. The hopeful side of this view is that there may be fewer wars; the cynical side is that "civilized" nations may have to acquiesce to the demands of have-not states or dictatorial regimes that threaten violence and destruction. As Fotion points out, this is not an argument directed at traditional pacifists—those individuals who declare their willingness to die rather than cause their enemies harm by defending themselves—but to citizens who are skeptical of the intentions of the world's remaining dictatorial states yet sympathetic to the idea that all "military expenditures can be viewed as a waste, a taking away of money that could be spent on more humanitarian concerns." The impact is on public support for the "opportunity costs of possessing standing military and industrial forces." Fotion demolishes the big argument in a point-by-point refutation that illuminates how modern weapons—smarter, smaller in yield, and more discriminating—can actually make just wars less destructive, and thus, from the logical point of view, more "moral" than past conflicts. The book was published just weeks before Desert Storm verified in practice what Fotion identifies in theory. Since military strategists have long maintained that the use of smart weapons would reduce civilian casualties, Fotion's discussion cannot be claimed as prophetic. However, his use of logical reasoning to demonstrate the ethics of American adoption of emerging military technology enhances the intellectual credibility of modern strategy among those who seem so patently hostile to it, namely, academicians.

One area in which Fotion might claim some degree of prophecy is in his discussion of chemical weapons. He argues that deterrence via chemical weapons might even be more effective than that between nuclear arsenals, since chemical weapon agents are exclusively anti-personnel and cannot be used as counterforce weapons. Since chemical weapon agents cannot destroy an opponent's chemical weapon arsenal per se, these weapons are not in the "use it or lose it" situation which is frequently used to describe strategic nuclear arms. Fotion states that history and logic indicate that the likelihood that chemical weapons would be used in battle against an opponent that also possesses them is very low. His implication is that if a Hitler refused to use chemical weapons, a Saddam Hussein would probably not—for all the same reasons. On the other hand, use of chemical weapons against an opponent unable to respond in kind, whether Ethiopians in the Italian-Abyssinian War or Kurds in Iraq, is likely. As Fotion describes it, antimilitary ideology does not apply in this case: "the cliche, 'if you have a weapon, you will use it' seems far from the truth....Historical records on poison-gas use suggest a different cliche: 'if you don't have it, watch out!' "

For the naval audience, *Military Ethics* may seem like preaching to the choir. However, it is important for officers to be aware of and understand

the arguments that propel those individuals who have the greatest intellectual impact on public (defense) policy. Fotion carefully outlines both the pros and cons concerning future military investment and the maintenance of modernized, capable defenses. He is quite familiar with the specifics of modern weapon systems, although there are a few minor slips. At one point the author compares the Soviet SS-18 strategic missile to the American Titan system; in fact, the Titan is more similar to the SS-9. This does not in the least mar his exposition of the current debates. More importantly perhaps, the professional officer who seeks to examine intellectually what he or she knows "in the gut" to be true will find this work an excellent introduction to the morality of strategic logic. Not a code of ethics, this book is rather an invitation to ethical reasoning on the future of the common defense.

SAM J. TANGREDI
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Hoover Institution

MacKenzie, Donald. *Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990. 464pp. (No price given)

Weapon system development is the result of a fascinating, complex, and varied dance of threat-driven requirements, strategic concepts, technological capabilities, cost, politics and institutional interests, personalities, formal research and development, and acquisition processes. Too often, descriptions of how weapon capabilities develop are overly simplified and do not capture the essential driving factors. Thus, it is easy to misunderstand the development process and to explain why mismatches between America's strategies and the technical capabilities of her forces may arise.

Donald MacKenzie has undertaken the study of the development of the accuracy of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. His focus is upon the social processes involved in the evolution of the V-2s of World War II into today's MX missiles and Trident IIs. MacKenzie included in his research written documents and 140 interviews with guidance and navigation technologists, navy and air force officers, and defense officials, including secretaries of defense and heads of defense research and development. It is an intricate work, full of captivating detail.

MacKenzie accepts the complexity of his subject and does not abuse it with simplistic "insights" that fail to consider all relevant material. In his conclusion he addresses five subjects: technology, politics, the paradoxical ordinariness of the technical and political worlds of nuclear weaponry, the relationship between technology and politics, and facts. (Technical facts are "hard," in contrast to the "soft" political facts.)

Many opponents of the nuclear arms race and the weapons it produces would describe its development as the wild frenzy of a military-industrial dervish. This work does not support the idea of an uncontrollable technological juggernaut pushing the

political system into endless expenditures. Reality is more complex than that.

MacKenzie has offered a satisfying work. Though its sources were from unclassified sources, no part of the subject was slighted. Those interested in the history of modern weapons will put this book on their "must read" list. It has no set answers, but rather it provides much information that will help the reader to have greater insight into a complex subject.

DALE K. PACE
The Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory

Lynn-Jones, Sean M., Miller, Steven E., and van Evera, Stephen, eds. *Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management: An International Reader.* Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990. 347pp. $14.95

This anthology presents reprints of articles that have appeared in the journal *International Security.* The eleven papers are grouped into two sections. The first section discusses "The Political Impact of Nuclear Weapons," and the second discusses "Nuclear Weapons and Crisis Management."

Sean Lynn-Jones reminds us in his preface that since Hiroshima, statesmen have conducted diplomacy in the shadow of the Bomb. The fundamental questions facing strategic thinkers as they attempt to define and analyze the political implications of the nuclear revolution are: Have nuclear weapons fundamentally changed international politics? Has a major war been averted because of, or in spite of, the growth of nuclear arsenals? What are the political uses of nuclear weapons? How have the United States' leaders perceived the nuclear balance? Have they acted as if nuclear superiority can be exploited for bargaining leverage? Have nuclear threats been effective in crises?

The papers cover crises that have occured since the end of World War II. For example, those who served in the Korean War may find Gordon Chang's article, "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis," of interest. Was Eisenhower bluffing or not?

Professor Marc Trachtenberg provides an introduction to a selection of tapes from the "Excom" meetings of October 1962 at the beginning of the Cuban missile crisis, and discusses the decision processes used by John Kennedy and others in resolving the military crisis abroad and the political crisis at home. Interesting reading to say the least!

If one wishes to know if there is a "bottom line," I suggest the final article, "The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: The 1973 Middle East Crisis," written by Barry M. Blechman and Douglas M. Hart. The authors note in what circumstances a state may resort to nuclear threats during tense international situations. This article alone may well provide the motivation for the defense professional to become familiar with this text. The authors state that "it makes sense to analyze past nuclear incidents...to

understand the thinking of those who turn to nuclear threats, the psychological and political mechanisms that are set in motion when such threats are made, and the consequences of these actions both for the specific situation of concern and for broader consideration."

ALBERT M. BOTTOMS
Charlottesville, Virginia

Marshall, Andrew W., Martin, J.J., and Rowen, Henry S., eds. *On Not Confusing Ourselves: Essays on National Security Strategy in Honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. 331pp. $49.95

Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter are truly the first couple of national security studies. Albert Wohlstetter has towered above all other defense strategists and analysts for over a generation, bombarding the community with his far-seeing ideas and often acid prose. Roberta Wohlstetter established her reputation with a seminal 1962 study on the nature of indicators and warning as they applied to the attack on Pearl Harbor. She has continued ever since, often in tandem with her husband, to illuminate the discipline and influence policymakers with her observations on ambiguous warning and nuclear proliferation.

This work is a paean to this remarkable husband-and-wife team by a group of seventeen elite former colleagues or students, many of whom have themselves been at the center of key national security policy debates for the past four decades, and some of whom framed the policies that were the subject of those debates.

The Wohlstetter *festschrift*, like most volumes of its kind, has a certain uneven quality about it. Some chapters were written expressly for the book, while others are adaptations of speeches or other essays. Some contributions are specifically built around the experiences, concerns, and writings of the Wohlstetters, while others address topics that seem less central to the interests of the honorees. Yet all have an element in common in that they not only shed light on the unique personalities of the Wohlstetters, particularly Albert, but offer an introspective portrait of individuals Herbert Goldhamer termed "Advisers" and Fred Kaplan, from a far less flattering perspective, labeled "The Wizards of Armegeddon."

Beginning in the early years of the Cold War, Albert Wohlstetter and his circle set the agenda for national security policy and helped to implement it. With each decade came fresh ideas: work on strategic bomber basing in the fifties; the importance of rational thinking about arms control in the seventies; the nature of discriminate deterrence in the eighties; and the multipolarity of threats to United States interests in the nineties. Along the way they established net assessment as a key national security discipline. They provided the intellectual underpinnings for strategic defenses; emphasized the importance of "regional" conflicts outside Nato and of critical allies on Nato's flanks,

notably Turkey; and underscored the need to harness technology to policy through effective and enduring command and control capabilities.

Therefore, the reader will find in this work a wealth of sociological, historical, and analytical detail. Of special note are, the title essay by J.J. Martin and James Digby; Leon Sloss's valuable chapter on "The Ambiguous Role of Strategic Defense in U.S. Strategy"; William Odom's brief yet encyclopedic review of Soviet military development and doctrine; and the excellent exposition on net assessment by three of its practitioners, George Pickett, James Roche, and Barry Watts. Finally, as Robert Bartley aptly notes in his preface, Fred Ikle's elegant essay on "The Role of Character and Intellect in Strategy," which closes the volume, "sketches a silhouette with recognizable features"—of a voluble fountain of analytical brilliance and intellectual breadth, and of the more reserved but no less worldly and astute analyst who has been his lifelong companion.

DOV S. ZAKHEIM
Arlington, Virginia

Bellamy, Christopher. *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice.* New York: Rutledge, 1990. 327pp. $45

The value of military history has long been a subject of debate in the operations departments of the several war colleges and in the military operations research community. To the outsider or the amateur, this enduring debate seems quite incredible. After all, the works of Alfred Mahan and Julian Corbett are firmly embedded in military history, deriving their lasting value from the illumination which history provides to current issues. To the practitioners of the military arts and science, history is an elusive, seductive, sometimes treacherous muse—often as distorting as illuminating. The modern military planner rapidly discovers that operational planning is a fine art form closely akin to the creative practice of architecture and engineering, while military history seems almost irrelevant. To the military acquisition planner, advanced, rapidly deployed technology appears to distort beyond recognition the patterns of the historical experience. Only upon extended contemplation does the experienced operator or planner come to realize that fine art, architecture, and engineering each have their technical and social histories which provide context and a measure of expectation for current and, indeed, future endeavors. Perhaps military history can serve equally well. Enter Christopher Bellamy, bearing his new book *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare.*

The author largely succeeds in providing a summary of the way modern land warfare, military thinking, and concepts have evolved, and simultaneously makes the case for the utility of competently researched military history. Let the reader be warned, Bellamy is both a professional

research historian and a professional soldier. In his view, useful illumination can be drawn from the full range of the human military experience: Asian military history is just as legitimate as European military history. The study of military operations is, he believes, a neglected historical field, and historical context is a powerful tool in current decision making.

The resulting work is a beautifully researched, nicely written, and well edited book, well worth a leisurely week's reading and contemplation. The air-land community will find this book useful and enlightening. The maritime community is unlikely to find a more accessible and well conceived introduction to modern land warfare. Now that we have fondled the package, let us examine the contents.

The first four chapters are a guided tour through the ground rules of land warfare: the connection between technology and techniques and warfare, and the expansion of the battlefield and the restoration of large-scale maneuver resulting from the industrialization of warfare. There is little that is new or controversial in this section. One may say that it serves its purpose of preparing the reader for what comes later. There is one nuance in this section which this reviewer would have liked expanded (with all due respect to the dangers of Pandora's box). It is Mr. Bellamy's opinion that most of the cliché's about the Great War are "gross over-simplications or completely wrong." This reviewer believes that his view is correct; its importance is simply not developed.

Most of these "cliché's" arose in the popular history of Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller between 1916 and 1956. These two writers dramatically influenced two generations of historians and soldiers. It can reasonably be said that modern American Civil War history is little more than an expansion of Fuller's and Liddell Hart's footnotes. If one really believes in the central utility of military history, a few cautionary paragraphs on the dangers of erudite former soldiers with broadaxes to grind might have been in order.

Bellamy "gets serious" in chapter five and treats his readers to a case study of military history applied to the Operational Maneuver Group concept, which dominated Nato's Central Front nightmare in the early 1980s. The author traces this concept through sixty years of Soviet military thought, shows both its virtues and limitations, and has convinced this reader that a knowledge of serious military history can provide near-immunity from the alarms and excursions of popular fads in the military science arena. This chapter is a useful review of concentrated mobile warfare.

A second serious dose is offered in chapter six, with an introduction to the scale and mobility associated with Asian mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. Here we find a rich understanding of two manifestations of dispersed mobile combat, both highly multi-disciplinary in nature. In Asia,

as elsewhere, politics, economics, military science, and human nature produce an exquisitely braided rope of complexity. The Asian and European variants are quite different and arise from geography, population densities, distances, and culture.

In the final chapter the author offers his conclusions and prognoses. They are simple and insightful.

This reviewer has no hesitation in recommending this book to any serious student of military affairs.

JAMES O'BRASKY
Naval Surface Warfare Center
Dahlgren, Virginia

Shenk, Robert. *Guide to Naval Writing: A Practical Handbook for the Naval Professional.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990. 349pp. $22.95

"What are you trying to say? Rewrite this!" Every officer who has ever stood in front of an executive officer has heard those fateful words. Many sea-service professionals would rather stand consecutive midwatches or take "zero-zero traps" than take pen in hand or sit at a keyboard. Although driving the ship, flying the plane, or diving the boat require carefully developed skill, expressing oneself clearly in writing is perhaps the most difficult task faced regularly by officers and senior enlisted people.

Over the years the art of writing in the navy has been akin to a secret handshake. Those who have never been able to crack the code should take heart, for help is finally at hand. Robert Shenk, a naval officer and professor of English at two service academies, has written a book that bridges the gap between fitness report word-lists and professional style manuals.

This handbook is specifically aimed at the unique requirements of the seagoing officer. Based on interviews with hundreds of naval professionals, it is a jewel. It is filled with common sense and practical advice, and covers all aspects of every writing assignment regularly required of navy and marine corps personnel. Although for decades guides for writing fitness reports have been passed around the fleet, common documents such as naval letters and messages have been given short shrift. Not so in this work. Each of these, along with other reports and forms, is carefully and thoroughly analyzed in separate chapters. In addition to format guides and completed examples (both good and bad) that tell how a phrase should be constructed, the *Guide* explains why it should be written that way.

This is a reference book that not only shows how to draft an effective press release but also how to eliminate emotion in writing and how to use sex-neutral language. It includes a very useful ready reference on the mechanics of writing (capitalization and punctuation), and contains an extensive list of abbreviations and acronyms used in naval messages.

From this description, one could reasonably surmise that this handbook is the usual dry, boring reading normally associated with textbooks. On

the contrary, it has the immediacy of a bull session with a good friend in the wardroom. Sidebars and anecdotes interspersed throughout the book give a unique flavor to this comprehensive, highly readable guide to one of the most important aspects of the naval profession. This book should be in every wardroom and ready room in the fleet. Every reporting officer should receive a copy. It is indispensable.

WILLIAM F. HICKMAN
Captain, U.S. Navy

Peters, Hubert J.M.W., comp. *The Crone Library: Books on the Art of Navigation*. Nieuwkoop, Netherlands: De Graaf Publishers BV, 1989. 805pp. $96

This descriptive bibliography was published for the Netherlands Scheepvaart Museum in Amsterdam and is a major contribution to maritime scholarship. It is not merely a listing of the museum's collections of navigation books but a collection of scholarly treatises, and is a tool of remarkable scholarly value.

There are five parts to the book. The first pays homage to the collector, Dr. Ernest Crone (1891-1975), the former chairman of the board of the Sheepvaart Museum, in a biographical sketch explaining his interest and experience in navigation and listing the 109 items that he published. This is followed by a "Survey of the History of the Art of Navigation in the Netherlands," by Professor C. Koeman. It is a useful sixteen-page overview of the subject, which places Dutch contributions to navigation within the context of broader elements.

Koeman's essay is followed by W.F.J. Morzer Bruyns's descriptive list of the "Crone Collection of Nautical Instruments." These instruments were a direct complement to the books which Crone acquired, linking the bibliographic aspects of the study with the real practice of navigation in history. This description is divided into several categories: instruments for measuring the altitude of a celestial body above the horizon; time measurement; compasses; instruments for measuring the speed of a ship through the water; telescopes; and drawing and computing instruments.

These introductory parts lead to the main catalogue, which is a chronological listing of 1,223 items published between 1483 and 1971. The whole takes up 565 pages, with a complete technical description of each work. There is a thirty-one page explanation of the principles, and also instructions for using the list explaining the various entries, references, and abbreviations.

The main list is followed by seven indices, including one each for authors, printers, and book sellers, and place names and their imprint variants, with reference maps by period showing the place of publication with numbers of editions. The final fifty-pages cap the volume with a selection of illustrations, mainly title pages but also bindings and maps and illustrations within a book.

This is a magnificent piece of scholarship. It is a type of bibliography that is rarely seen and is done to an impeccable standard. *The Crone Library* is a volume which every major maritime library and serious student of the history of navigation should possess. It is not only a guide to the history of Dutch contributions to the art of navigation and to the fine collection in Amsterdam, but it also provides a standard and a reference for the entire history of maritime publishing in Europe.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

CALL FOR PAPERS

WORLD WAR II—A 50-YEAR PERSPECTIVE

Siena College is sponsoring its eighth annual *multidisciplinary* conference, June 3-June 4, 1993, on the 50th anniversary of World War II. The focus for 1993 will be 1943—though papers dealing with broad issues of earlier years will be welcomed. Topics welcome include: Fascism and Naziism; Stalingrad, New Guinea, the Air War, North Africa, Sicily and Italy, the North Atlantic; Literature; Art; Film; Diplomacy; Political and Military History; Popular Culture, Minority Affairs, and Women's and Jewish Studies dealing with the era. Asian, African, Latin American, and Near Eastern topics of relevance are solicited. Obviously, collaboration and collaborationist regimes, the events on the home front, religion, conscription, and dissent will also be of significance.

Replies and inquiries to: Professor Thomas O. Kelly II, Department of History, Siena College, 515 Loudon Rd., Loudonville, New York, 12211-1462.

Deadline for submissions: December 1, 1992