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Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait

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strategic debate. The results are stunning. For example, Machiavelli is made current in a study of the strategic process. Tunander writes: "For the nuclear prince, war and interest in war are concerned not with actual war but with possible war, with strategies and counterstrategies, moves and countermoves in the superpower game....The simulation of war has not only distanced the prince from brutal force; in the direct interaction between superpowers, simulated war has largely replaced real war and has even distanced military personnel from brutal force."

Tunander's argument is that the underlying assumption in the arms race was that war was no longer possible, and that therefore what we have been doing all these years is interpreting the credibility of the signals and defining the signs—playing a game like chess with elaborate and dangerous rules. We have spent our lives translating the ambiguities and talking in a code.

As we have clearly entered a period in which the game has shifted, with the European nations and Japan scrambling about looking for new combinations and creating new ambiguities, there will be little work for those who deny the importance of political cultures and their language of signs.

The nations which continue to be culturally self-centered in the new age will be given devastating semiotic lessons such as are being administered in the United States by the Japanese. This work, with its engrossing appendix,

splendidly demonstrates the new theory and practice of security studies. As a wonderful bonus, it is written with both clarity and professional scholarship, while avoiding the deadly jargon of the trade, and draws upon the resources of a literate mind for apt illustrations. Here is a man who not only knows his Hegel, but also his Derrida. It is increasingly seldom that we can recommend a book that says something new and useful for these revolutionary times.

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Friedman, Norman. *Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. 435pp. \$24.95

No doubt in the next few years publishers will offer numerous selections about Desert Storm, but Norman Friedman has produced the first comprehensive view of the Gulf War. Author of over twenty books on naval subjects, the internationally known military historian has in this work attempted to provide a balanced look into the air, ground, naval, joint, and coalition warfare aspects of the war. The success of his effort is debatable. It is apparent that Friedman is more conversant with naval concepts, and their contribution to the overall war effort, than with the other factors.

The author emphasizes the importance of maritime forces in deterring Saddam Hussein. In particular, Friedman highlights the effect that

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amphibious forces had in tying down Iraqi divisions in Kuwait, and he also gives high marks to Central Command (CentCom), especially the army. However, his analysis of the air war brings into question his objectivity. Those who argue that the air war was the decisive part of Desert Storm will disagree with Friedman's analysis, which is critical of the inflexibility of the air-tasking order (ATO). Unfortunately, in the process he loses not only his objectivity but also, I suspect, many readers in the U.S. Air Force. Nevertheless, it is apparent in his analysis that air superiority was of great significance to the overall war effort.

Friedman deserves high marks for his coverage of the background of the war, and the appendices offer solid reference material. In them he lists most of the units involved and provides thorough descriptions of the equipment used by the United States, the coalition, and Iraq, as well as of Scud attacks and the losses suffered by both Iraqi and coalition forces.

Friedman has devoted his final chapter to the lessons we have yet to learn and those from which we have learned. Again his bias toward maritime forces is evident in that he cites as the two great lessons of the war the contributions of its two least-visible elements, sea power and overseas bases. He notes that the only U.S. forces that can be deployed without the consent of current allies are its naval or sea-based forces, and (to his credit, what many believe is the "real" great lesson), that people who are well

trained and well led are what win wars. Weapons are not the deciding factor.

Assessments of the Gulf War will continue on for years, and Friedman's perspective of the war was no doubt influenced by the many naval participants that he interviewed. Those interested in the issues leading up to the war, encountered during it, and those that we face in its aftermath will find this book of great interest.

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Allen, Thomas B., Berry, F. Clifton, and Polmar, Norman N. *War in the Gulf: From the Invasion of Kuwait to the Day of Victory and Beyond*. Atlanta: Turner, 1991. 237pp. \$19.95 *War in the Gulf* is, rather than a study of the Gulf War, a celebration of Cable Network News (CNN). The book was commissioned by CNN and is filled with photos, graphics, and anecdotes of that network's excellent reporting of that conflict. Built on the premise that "fleetingness" is the weakness of television news and that images mark its strength, the book offers us images preserved for posterity.

Written by an experienced team with diverse backgrounds in journalism, military affairs, and pictorial histories, this work makes an immediate positive impression. Its strength, as one might expect, is its pictures. Many of them will be familiar to those who watched the war from afar, but