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War in the Gulf: From the Invasion of Kuwait to the Day of Victory and Beyond

Thomas E. Seal

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amphibious forces had in tying down Iraqi divisions in Kuwait, and he also gives high marks to Central Command (CentCom), especially the army. However, his analysis of the air war brings into question his objectivity. Those who argue that the air war was the decisive part of Desert Storm will disagree with Friedman's analysis, which is critical of the inflexibility of the air-tasking order (ATO). Unfortunately, in the process he loses not only his objectivity but also, I suspect, many readers in the U.S. Air Force. Nevertheless, it is apparent in his analysis that air superiority was of great significance to the overall war effort.

Friedman deserves high marks for his coverage of the background of the war, and the appendices offer solid reference material. In them he lists most of the units involved and provides thorough descriptions of the equipment used by the United States, the coalition, and Iraq, as well as of Scud attacks and the losses suffered by both Iraqi and coalition forces.

Friedman has devoted his final chapter to the lessons we have yet to learn and those from which we have learned. Again his bias toward maritime forces is evident in that he cites as the two great lessons of the war the contributions of its two least-visible elements, sea power and overseas bases. He notes that the only U.S. forces that can be deployed without the consent of current allies are its naval or sea-based forces, and (to his credit, what many believe is the "real" great lesson), that people who are well

trained and well led are what win wars. Weapons are not the deciding factor.

Assessments of the Gulf War will continue on for years, and Friedman's perspective of the war was no doubt influenced by the many naval participants that he interviewed. Those interested in the issues leading up to the war, encountered during it, and those that we face in its aftermath will find this book of great interest.

DONALD H. ESTES
Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Allen, Thomas B., Berry, F. Clifton, and Polmar, Norman N. *War in the Gulf: From the Invasion of Kuwait to the Day of Victory and Beyond*. Atlanta: Turner, 1991. 237pp. \$19.95 *War in the Gulf* is, rather than a study of the Gulf War, a celebration of Cable Network News (CNN). The book was commissioned by CNN and is filled with photos, graphics, and anecdotes of that network's excellent reporting of that conflict. Built on the premise that "fleetingness" is the weakness of television news and that images mark its strength, the book offers us images preserved for posterity.

Written by an experienced team with diverse backgrounds in journalism, military affairs, and pictorial histories, this work makes an immediate positive impression. Its strength, as one might expect, is its pictures. Many of them will be familiar to those who watched the war from afar, but

familiarity does not detract from their impact. The images of both the Gulf and the home front are sharp and skillfully edited. They have been woven into a coherent and moving photo essay. However, the book's weaknesses are the inaccuracies (predictable given its purpose, multiple authors, and speed of production), a self-serving focus on the medium of television, and a disjointed writing style which sometimes repeats whole paragraphs verbatim.

The narrative attempts to accomplish three things: present a chronology of events, provide some political and military analysis, and document the role of CNN in both reporting and influencing the war. It falls short. First, the chronicle of events is full of errors, which detract from the work's credibility. It misidentifies Umm Qsar as a Kuwaiti port, credits marines with capturing Faylakah Island in January, confuses the roles of the Saudi army and national guard, and links the PLO to the beginnings of the Intifada. The work betrays a lack of either research, knowledge, or understanding of the region.

There are many examples of superficial and misleading analysis, but two stand out as particularly pernicious. Discussing Iran under Khomeini, it is stated that "Iranians were shoved out of the modern age." It is not at all clear just what this means, though immediate reference to women's rights, religious laws, and human rights suggests that Iran's failure to reflect American values was the cause for that nation's gratuitous expulsion

from the modern world. The second example is the full-page photo of Iraqi militiamen brandishing their rifles, with the caption, "Guns are a part of the culture of the Middle East." The photo reflects the popular television image of Moslem hostility toward the West which has prevailed since the Iranian revolution. More importantly, the caption is a disingenuous statement that says nothing yet manages to evoke a negative image. Together they reinforce a stereotype that is both incorrect and interferes with our gaining a better understanding of the Middle East. Recognizing the mischief that such stereotypes can cause, one only hopes that the irony of a gun-and-culture statement made by American authors is not lost on the readers.

Finally, when addressing the role of CNN the book confuses the medium with the message, equating reporting about the war with reporting about television. Evidence of this abounds; self-congratulatory passages appear throughout the text. Next, the authors declare that television coverage "changed the face of war," a rather presumptuous statement that is neither explained nor defended. While television has certainly had an impact, it is doubtful that television plays much in the thoughts and emotions of individual soldiers as they prepare for battle. Still another presumptuous statement is that this work covers the war "without modifying what happened." Given that assurance, we can only hope that this is the case.

Since television reporting is the *raison d'être* for *War in the Gulf*, it is unfortunate that the controversy of live coverage is not explored more fully. Acknowledging that live coverage was used to advantage by both sides, this work fails to bring the discussion of television's proper role to a reasoned conclusion. This is particularly unfortunate with regard to the much-debated role played by Peter Arnett. There is much to be said for and against Mr. Arnett's actions, as the authors suggest. Had they pursued the issue beyond the superficial, they might well have contributed something meaningful to the debate over the media's role in modern war. Instead, the readers are left with little more than a weak apologia.

As a picture book, *War in the Gulf* is excellent. Never intended to be definitive or profound, it upholds the authors' assertions that the image is the strength of television news. The book runs into trouble, however, when it distorts these images with shallow and hurried attempts to document, analyze, and explain. Rather than "fleetingness," it is the substitution of images for facts which marks the most serious weakness of this work and, by implication, of television news, which it serves to promote.

THOMAS E. SEAL
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Quantico, Virginia

Barnett, Correlli. *Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the*

Second World War. New York: Norton, 1991. 1052pp. \$35

Barnett has offered a substantial, comprehensive account of the Royal Navy's strategy and operations in the Second World War. Divided into four parts, it discusses the background of the Royal Navy, with a summary of the interwar period and an account of operations up to Dunkirk; the crisis period of 1940-41, from the successful defense against invasion in 1940 to the disasters in the Mediterranean and the Far East; the victory in the convoy battles in the Atlantic, the Arctic, and the Mediterranean; the invasion of northwest Europe; and the return to the Far East.

Barnett argues that through shortsighted policies Britannia had "let the trident slip" in the interwar period and that the Royal Navy had neglected important new forms of naval warfare. Nevertheless, the Royal Navy improved its fighting performance sufficiently to win the vital naval battles required to maintain sea communications so that Anglo-American military power could be reinserted into Europe.

The author argues that much effort was wasted in fruitless Mediterranean diversions. However, the Royal Navy's major achievement was in laying the groundwork for and masterminding Operation Neptune, the naval side of the Normandy landings. Victory against Germany was, however, accompanied by a very subordinate role in the American victory against Japan.