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## Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920

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of the situation by one of the distinguished naval writers of his generation.

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Goldstein, Erik. *Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991. 307pp. \$69

A crafted analysis of bureaucracy and personality, *Winning the Peace* explores how Britain after the Great War emerged from the Paris Peace Conference with its postwar objectives substantially intact. France had obtained neither Luxembourg nor the Rhineland, and Keynes managed to have the reparations sum left blank in the treaty. In Eastern Europe, the New Europe idea had created a relatively stable group of medium-sized powers generally well disposed toward Britain. British interests in the Middle East were protected and consolidated.

How did Britain do it? Goldstein's answer is, preparation. Through the establishment of a Foreign Office Political Intelligence Department (PID) that was staffed by outstanding civilian regional experts, position papers were prepared that addressed the general issues and knotty details that would face the Paris conference participants. These papers served as the informational basis for negotiation.

The book examines the politics surrounding the establishment of the PID in March 1918 by Lord Hardinge of the Foreign Office (a counter to Lloyd George's personal secretariat, the "Garden Suburb"). To begin his operation Hardinge pirated twelve members of the Department of Information's Intelligence Bureau (DIIB) into the Foreign Office, despite the protests of the Department of Information's new minister, Lord Beaverbrook. The twelve included such subsequently well known figures as Robert William Seton Watson, Lewis Namier, and Arnold Toynbee. Brief biographies are given of the principal players in the PID; these provide a rich picture of the personalities who prepared the seventy-one PID memoranda for the conference negotiators. These memoranda were supplemented by 174 Historical Section handbooks and thirty-five military intelligence reports.

Sifting through the mountain of Admiralty, cabinet, foreign office, and personal papers, Goldstein has constructed a coherent thread. His account is not without humor from time to time, as in this discussion of the exultation of the British imperialists in early 1919: "The war was won and the British Empire once again stood victorious. What was more, British armies were in occupation of most of the Middle East. It was not so much a question of what Britain could get, but rather what it would choose to keep. Undoubtedly some dregs would have to be provided for France, preferably in darkest Africa, while some

gristle would be found for the Italians' seemingly curious colonial appetite, and a particularly vile mandate might be graciously offered to the Americans to teach them the arduous nature of an imperial burden."

But as 1919 continued on, the euphoria of the imperialists proved short-lived: Ireland was erupting, Egypt was rumbling, and the Amritsar massacre had ignited India. The tide turned, and imperial reformers became more important in the negotiations.

Allen Leeper, whose credentials included speaking Romanian and holding the position of secretary of the Anglo-Romanian Society, had the difficult job of representing Britain on the conference's Romanian Committee in the face of Italy's support of maximal Romanian claims. Italy, on the basis of checkerboard diplomacy, sought Romania as an ally located to Yugoslavia's rear. Leeper's comment in a Foreign Office minute conveys his despair: "If Mr. Bratianu's Govt. insists on quarreling with the Serbs & putting their trust in Italy, no one can save them from ruin." Allen Leeper's correspondence with his brother Rex, who worked on Russian questions for the PID, is cited on a number of occasions and provides candid background comment on the diplomatic developments. In future, the reader might hope to hear more from Goldstein about the role of the Leeper brothers in postwar diplomacy.

Successful though they were, the PID staff and the British negotiators wanted more from the Paris Peace

Conference than they got. They wanted a larger Belgium that included Luxembourg. They wanted a Yugoslavia that included Fiume. They wanted a pro-British Greece. They did not get these or a number of other desired concessions and arrangements. For Britain, winning at Paris meant not losing. As Goldstein puts it, "On paper Britain gained nothing. Its victory was that neither did any other state." Winning the peace meant losing less than anyone else.

This work provides a powerful case for Britain's thoroughness in its preparations and the quality of its PID experts, which made it successful in the diplomatic arena.

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Pipes, Richard. *The Russian Revolution*. New York: Knopf, 1990. 970pp. \$40

*The Russian Revolution* is an immense and masterful account of the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, the Bolshevik coup of October 1917, and that party's attempt to consolidate its power. It begins where Professor Pipes's earlier study, *Russia under the Old Regime* (1974), left off—both chronologically and, one must lament, ideologically. The work is vintage Pipes. It displays an impressive mastery over evidence which, unfortunately, is forced to serve a narrow and inadequate interpretation of Russian history.

Pipes is probably the foremost proponent of the "patrimonial" interpretation of Russian history, which avers