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## Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management: An International Reader

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political system into endless expenditures. Reality is more complex than that.

MacKenzie has offered a satisfying work. Though its sources were from unclassified sources, no part of the subject was slighted. Those interested in the history of modern weapons will put this book on their "must read" list. It has no set answers, but rather it provides much information that will help the reader to have greater insight into a complex subject.

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Lynn-Jones, Sean M., Miller, Steven E., and van Evera, Stephen, eds. *Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management: An International Reader*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990. 347pp. \$14.95

This anthology presents reprints of articles that have appeared in the journal *International Security*. The eleven papers are grouped into two sections. The first section discusses "The Political Impact of Nuclear Weapons," and the second discusses "Nuclear Weapons and Crisis Management."

Sean Lynn-Jones reminds us in his preface that since Hiroshima, statesmen have conducted diplomacy in the shadow of the Bomb. The fundamental questions facing strategic thinkers as they attempt to define and analyze the political implications of the nuclear revolution are: Have nuclear weapons fundamentally changed

international politics? Has a major war been averted because of, or in spite of, the growth of nuclear arsenals? What are the political uses of nuclear weapons? How have the United States' leaders perceived the nuclear balance? Have they acted as if nuclear superiority can be exploited for bargaining leverage? Have nuclear threats been effective in crises?

The papers cover crises that have occurred since the end of World War II. For example, those who served in the Korean War may find Gordon Chang's article, "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis," of interest. Was Eisenhower bluffing or not?

Professor Marc Trachtenberg provides an introduction to a selection of tapes from the "Excom" meetings of October 1962 at the beginning of the Cuban missile crisis, and discusses the decision processes used by John Kennedy and others in resolving the military crisis abroad and the political crisis at home. Interesting reading to say the least!

If one wishes to know if there is a "bottom line," I suggest the final article, "The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: The 1973 Middle East Crisis," written by Barry M. Blechman and Douglas M. Hart. The authors note in what circumstances a state may resort to nuclear threats during tense international situations. This article alone may well provide the motivation for the defense professional to become familiar with this text. The authors state that "it makes sense to analyze past nuclear incidents...to

understand the thinking of those who turn to nuclear threats, the psychological and political mechanisms that are set in motion when such threats are made, and the consequences of these actions both for the specific situation of concern and for broader consideration.”

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Marshall, Andrew W., Martin, J.J., and Rowen, Henry S., eds. *On Not Confusing Ourselves: Essays on National Security Strategy in Honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. 331pp. \$49.95

Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter are truly the first couple of national security studies. Albert Wohlstetter has towered above all other defense strategists and analysts for over a generation, bombarding the community with his far-seeing ideas and often acid prose. Roberta Wohlstetter established her reputation with a seminal 1962 study on the nature of indicators and warning as they applied to the attack on Pearl Harbor. She has continued ever since, often in tandem with her husband, to illuminate the discipline and influence policymakers with her observations on ambiguous warning and nuclear proliferation.

This work is a paean to this remarkable husband-and-wife team by a group of seventeen elite former colleagues or students, many of whom have themselves been at the center of key national security policy debates

for the past four decades, and some of whom framed the policies that were the subject of those debates.

The Wohlstetter *festschrift*, like most volumes of its kind, has a certain uneven quality about it. Some chapters were written expressly for the book, while others are adaptations of speeches or other essays. Some contributions are specifically built around the experiences, concerns, and writings of the Wohlstetters, while others address topics that seem less central to the interests of the honorees. Yet all have an element in common in that they not only shed light on the unique personalities of the Wohlstetters, particularly Albert, but offer an introspective portrait of individuals Herbert Goldhamer termed “Advisers” and Fred Kaplan, from a far less flattering perspective, labeled “The Wizards of Armageddon.”

Beginning in the early years of the Cold War, Albert Wohlstetter and his circle set the agenda for national security policy and helped to implement it. With each decade came fresh ideas: work on strategic bomber basing in the fifties; the importance of rational thinking about arms control in the seventies; the nature of discriminate deterrence in the eighties; and the multipolarity of threats to United States interests in the nineties. Along the way they established net assessment as a key national security discipline. They provided the intellectual underpinnings for strategic defenses; emphasized the importance of “regional” conflicts outside Nato and of critical allies on Nato’s flanks,