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## On Not Confusing Ourselves

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understand the thinking of those who turn to nuclear threats, the psychological and political mechanisms that are set in motion when such threats are made, and the consequences of these actions both for the specific situation of concern and for broader consideration.”

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Marshall, Andrew W., Martin, J.J., and Rowen, Henry S., eds. *On Not Confusing Ourselves: Essays on National Security Strategy in Honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. 331pp. \$49.95

Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter are truly the first couple of national security studies. Albert Wohlstetter has towered above all other defense strategists and analysts for over a generation, bombarding the community with his far-seeing ideas and often acid prose. Roberta Wohlstetter established her reputation with a seminal 1962 study on the nature of indicators and warning as they applied to the attack on Pearl Harbor. She has continued ever since, often in tandem with her husband, to illuminate the discipline and influence policymakers with her observations on ambiguous warning and nuclear proliferation.

This work is a paean to this remarkable husband-and-wife team by a group of seventeen elite former colleagues or students, many of whom have themselves been at the center of key national security policy debates

for the past four decades, and some of whom framed the policies that were the subject of those debates.

The Wohlstetter *festschrift*, like most volumes of its kind, has a certain uneven quality about it. Some chapters were written expressly for the book, while others are adaptations of speeches or other essays. Some contributions are specifically built around the experiences, concerns, and writings of the Wohlstetters, while others address topics that seem less central to the interests of the honorees. Yet all have an element in common in that they not only shed light on the unique personalities of the Wohlstetters, particularly Albert, but offer an introspective portrait of individuals Herbert Goldhamer termed “Advisers” and Fred Kaplan, from a far less flattering perspective, labeled “The Wizards of Armageddon.”

Beginning in the early years of the Cold War, Albert Wohlstetter and his circle set the agenda for national security policy and helped to implement it. With each decade came fresh ideas: work on strategic bomber basing in the fifties; the importance of rational thinking about arms control in the seventies; the nature of discriminate deterrence in the eighties; and the multipolarity of threats to United States interests in the nineties. Along the way they established net assessment as a key national security discipline. They provided the intellectual underpinnings for strategic defenses; emphasized the importance of “regional” conflicts outside Nato and of critical allies on Nato’s flanks,

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notably Turkey; and underscored the need to harness technology to policy through effective and enduring command and control capabilities.

Therefore, the reader will find in this work a wealth of sociological, historical, and analytical detail. Of special note are, the title essay by J.J. Martin and James Digby; Leon Sloss's valuable chapter on "The Ambiguous Role of Strategic Defense in U.S. Strategy"; William Odom's brief yet encyclopedic review of Soviet military development and doctrine; and the excellent exposition on net assessment by three of its practitioners, George Pickett, James Roche, and Barry Watts. Finally, as Robert Bartley aptly notes in his preface, Fred Ikle's elegant essay on "The Role of Character and Intellect in Strategy," which closes the volume, "sketches a silhouette with recognizable features"—of a voluble fountain of analytical brilliance and intellectual breadth, and of the more reserved but no less worldly and astute analyst who has been his lifelong companion.

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Bellamy, Christopher. *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York: Rutledge, 1990. 327pp. \$45

The value of military history has long been a subject of debate in the operations departments of the several war colleges and in the military operations

research community. To the outsider or the amateur, this enduring debate seems quite incredible. After all, the works of Alfred Mahan and Julian Corbett are firmly embedded in military history, deriving their lasting value from the illumination which history provides to current issues. To the practitioners of the military arts and science, history is an elusive, seductive, sometimes treacherous muse—often as distorting as illuminating. The modern military planner rapidly discovers that operational planning is a fine art form closely akin to the creative practice of architecture and engineering, while military history seems almost irrelevant. To the military acquisition planner, advanced, rapidly deployed technology appears to distort beyond recognition the patterns of the historical experience. Only upon extended contemplation does the experienced operator or planner come to realize that fine art, architecture, and engineering each have their technical and social histories which provide context and a measure of expectation for current and, indeed, future endeavors. Perhaps military history can serve equally well. Enter Christopher Bellamy, bearing his new book *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare*.

The author largely succeeds in providing a summary of the way modern land warfare, military thinking, and concepts have evolved, and simultaneously makes the case for the utility of competently researched military history. Let the reader be warned, Bellamy is both a professional