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Glasnost, Perestroika and U.S. Defense Spending

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political appointees, Nitze was more interested in the substance of the job than the title and often took positions with less prestige than he had previously held.

On the other hand, despite his longevity in government, Nitze never received a cabinet-level position, and on three occasions was blocked from high posts because he was considered "too liberal." Moreover, NSC 68, the blueprint he developed for fighting the Cold War, formed the intellectual basis for our involvement in Vietnam, a war Nitze opposed. Similarly, Nitze's often shrill objections to SALT II were turned against him a decade later to prevent him from getting a START I accord.

Finally, Nitze's positions on issues were often colored by whether he was inside or outside government. While a member of the Reagan administration, he repudiated the antiballistic missile treaty which he had negotiated for Nixon. When not given a post by the Carter administration, he called into question Paul Warnke's patriotism and opposition to the war in Vietnam, despite the fact they had worked closely together in the Pentagon in the 1960s.

Callahan's analysis of the man and his impact on waging and winning the Cold War is superb. However, his conclusion that the price this nation paid to win was too high is not only unsubstantiated but incorrect. After 503 pages of well-documented and balanced analysis, Callahan spends less than a page blaming all of this nation's problems (and there are many) on

"excessive" military spending, and then takes a cheap shot at Nitze by saying that while the nation's finances are in bad shape, Nitze's own financial situation is better than ever. It is too bad that Callahan did not stop a page sooner, but maybe that was too much to expect from a very young man writing his first book.

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Kaufmann, William W. *Glasnost, Perestroika, and U.S. Defense Spending*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990. 80pp. \$8.95

Glasnost and *perestroika*, two Russian words that have become familiar to American readers, are causing dramatic changes in U.S. defense spending. *Glasnost* denotes a new openness in Soviet society and an end to the Cold War, while *perestroika* signifies the transformation of the Soviet economy from one that is centrally planned, in support of a war machine, to a decentralized one that is concerned about its consumers. These ongoing changes in the Soviet Union have reduced the estimates of a Soviet threat and the U.S. defense spending needed to counter it.

Significant cuts in U.S. defense budgets have already begun. The Bush administration and congressional negotiators have agreed to defense spending cuts of about \$182 billion projected over the FY 1991-1995 period. But Kaufmann argues

that the reduced tensions and military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union call for a planned and managed set of reductions in the defense budget rather than muddling through with annual *ad hoc* cuts. He believes that over the next decade the U.S. defense budget could be cut almost in half.

Kaufmann has offered some suggestions for effective cuts. He would begin by slowing down the development and procurement of new generations of weapons systems as well as cutting back what he describes as "redundant forces" such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and carrier battle groups. In the next stage, successful Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreements could improve strategic stability and reduce the chance of a surprise attack on Europe so that both nuclear and conventional forces could be cut. Kaufmann's final stage would generate sizable savings in the defense budget by agreements which would eliminate large numbers of strategic nuclear warheads and cruise missiles, most of the active army divisions in the continental United States and comparable Soviet forces east of the Urals, Soviet and U.S. attack submarines, and additional carrier battle groups and antisubmarine warfare forces. If all these cuts could be made by the U.S. and Soviet defense establishments, U.S. defense spending could go as low as \$160 billion by FY1999.

While Kaufmann's reductions in the armed forces may seem extreme, they are premised on a balance in U.S. and Soviet military capabilities. Other advocates of a "peace dividend" arrive at their cuts in defense spending in a less analytical fashion, apparently the 1990s equivalent of the demobilization of the U.S. military in 1945.

But it would appear that more study remains to be done. For instance, Kaufmann would rely primarily on ten U.S. Army Reserve Component divisions as a hedge against a Soviet threat to Europe. But even with increased warning time due to the reduction in, and redeployment of, Soviet divisions, it seems imprudent to maintain the U.S. reserve force at a lower state of readiness than at present. Kaufmann also recognized the need to keep forces to deal with minor contingencies. But Operation Desert Storm suggests that maintaining just two active army divisions plus the three active and one reserve marine corps divisions may be too little force to deal with some Third World nations from a position of strength. And will the six carrier battle groups which are all that Kaufmann would retain be enough?

This reviewer believes that the United States must critically evaluate the range of contingencies that may arise before it can determine the optimal level of defense spending in the post-Cold War era.

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