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Book Reviews

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PROFESSIONAL READING

A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

"Remarkable Intellectual Independence and Honesty"

James S. O'Brasky

Berquist, Ronald E. *The Role of Air Power in the Iran-Iraq War*. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Univ. Press, 1988. 104pp. $3.75

Dean, David J. *The Air Force Role in Low Intensity Conflict*. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Univ. Press, 1986. 142pp. $4

Mets, David R. *Land-Based Air Power in Third World Crises*. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Univ. Press, 1986. 186pp. $5

Mrozek, Donald V. *Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam*. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Univ. Press, 1988. 211pp. $9

These four books are products of the Air Power Research Institute of the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education of the Air University. Each author uses carefully researched case studies to illustrate the development and employment of air power doctrine and each provides a scholarly analysis of the doctrinal strengths, fallacies, and organizational pressures illuminated in each study. One of the major strengths of the Air Power Research Institute program as seen in these four publications is the remarkable degree of intellectual independence and honesty exhibited by the

Mr. O'Brasky is Senior Scientist, Surface Warfare Analysis Office, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Virginia.

authors. The administrators of this program have much cause to take pride in these publications.

The common theme of these four books is the role of land-based air power in low intensity conflict and regional war.

In *The Air Force Role in Low Intensity Conflict*, David Dean treats the reader to a definition of low intensity conflict, a short historical account of "air control" in small wars, and an excellent treatise on the little known military assistance effort provided by the U.S. Air Force to the Royal Moroccan Air Force in its conflict with the Polisario separatist movement. Although the author contends that the U.S. Air Force was unable to assist the Moroccans effectively, from a later perspective, the overall military assistance effort to Morocco has to be considered a signal success of U.S. foreign military policy. Morocco has effectively neutralized and isolated the Polisario movement while pursuing the development of a vigorous national life.

Dean's account of the Moroccan-Polisario air war and the ad hoc U.S. Air Force military assistance effort well illustrates the frustrations of such activity. Much of the difficulty is embedded in the relationship between the recipient country's geopolitical military culture with the representatives of a superpower's political-military culture. Much in U.S. military procedures inhibits assistance efforts. Mr. Dean offers some basic requirements for assisting a third world air force: a deep knowledge of third world countries in general and their military forces in particular; the ability to transfer knowledge and technique (i.e. appropriate training packages); cross-cultural awareness, and the capability for speedy reaction.

The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict is not especially well written, but the research is sound and the analysis and recommendations are excellent.

Land-Based Air Power in Third World Crises by David Mets was written to demonstrate the utility and limitations of U.S. land-based aircraft when supporting political objectives in third world crises. The author's perspective is strictly that of the Air Force. It is clear from this study that land-based air power (and indeed air power in general) can signal intentions, demonstrate support, modify behavior and terminate conflict. The principal limitation on land-based air power lies in the projection of power far from main operating bases. Under such conditions, a high level of effort is needed to place small amounts of combat power on target in a timely manner. This reviewer wonders about the implications for the U.S. Air Force in a world filled with heavily armed and capable adversaries, diminishing basing rights and access, and increasing overflight restriction.

The last two studies under review concern regional wars, that between Iran and Iraq and that in Vietnam. Both wars were waged at mid to high intensity levels.

In *The Role of Air Power in the Iran-Iraq War* Ronald E. Berquist shows why neither side chose to use its air power decisively. This is one of the first

explorations of air strategy and doctrine for regional powers (a different perspective from familiar global power considerations). Mr. Berquist begins with a treatment of the Arab air warfare experience and the institutional foundations of the two opposing air forces. He then examines the events of the air war. His basic conclusions are the following: (1) Political constraints heavily influenced the air strategies. Deterrence and conservation of force structure seemed to be major influences. (2) Military lessons learned are largely dependent on the cultural lens through which they are viewed.

Unfortunately, the author did not examine what was militarily possible for these two air forces. Compared to their ground arms, both air forces were seriously constrained in their options by their small size. Even if either had gained regional air supremacy by destruction of the opposing air force, this by no means could be translated into air superiority over the battle area, cities, or industrial complexes (due to each country's air defense system), or to the ability to conduct a decisive battlefield interdiction or strategic bombing campaign (due to each country's lack of throw-weight/aggregate lethality).

The centerpiece of this review is *Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam* by Professor Donald J. Mrozek. This treatise deals with only one quarter of the air war in Vietnam, focusing tightly on an analysis of the Air Force's campaign in support of the ground war within South Vietnam with minor excursions into trail interdiction and the secret bombing in the neighboring countries. The U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy's "strategic" air campaign over North Vietnam is conspicuous by its absence. Even the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine air operations in South Vietnam are treated only in the sense of their impact on joint doctrine. Having limited the scope of the treatise, the author then proceeds to create a minor jewel of analysis.

Dr. Mrozek contends that not only did the United States' commitment to the war in Vietnam lack unity, clarity and coherence, but also that the commitment of the various parties (i.e. U.S. military institutions) to the war was similarly flawed. On the relatively simple matter of the application of air power to the ground war, the myths of each institutional position produced intraservice and interservice rivalries which had serious effects: "(1) efforts to resolve conflict over command and control and strategy went on far too long, perhaps too long to come to grips with the real problems; (2) a decision once agreed upon could not easily be overturned, since it represented either a delicate political compromise or too much invested effort and sunk cost; and (3) whatever the reality behind the services' motivations, the military seemed so self-serving as to undermine the authority they could have mustered with the executive branch in the moments when it was open to advice, or with Congress." Each of the points is starkly illustrated in carefully researched chapters. Mrozek illustrates well both the command and control rivalry and the limits of technology. The reading is often bitter; yet more than adequate confirmation for the contents are available from other sources.

Dr. Mrozek makes several observations which are an essential basis for future joint doctrine development:

- Americans are not only affected by war, they also *affect* war, altering and influencing its characteristics and course. The risks and dangers generated by America's own ways of thinking and behaving will almost inevitably become an element in a future conflict, especially if those ways are left to the unconscious.
- Embedded ways of thinking guide the armed forces. Differing doctrines make for durable rivalries. In the Vietnam conflict, without unswerving direction from civilian authorities, conflict arising from practice embraced by one service but dismissed by another could linger without adjustment or resolution.
- Technical proficiency, operational effectiveness and technological capabilities will not suffice in war. Without a correct strategic vision, these may bring victories to the side better endowed with them, but they will be phantom victories leading to final defeat or stalemate.
- Limited war does not necessarily represent limited commitments by all the participants. Differences in perception about a war's limits are born of difference between the means and objectives of conflict. Political considerations (assessments of national interest—a set for each participant) thus drive the nature and character of the limitations.

Much of Dr. Mrozek's analysis appears to state his position a bit too starkly. While it is certainly true that unsightly interservice rivalries punctuated the establishment of the command and control structure for the American participation in Vietnam, let us not forget that many good men from all services, at considerable personal and professional risk, attempted to make these doctrinal and structural monstrosities work. Let us also not forget that the doctrine of air-land campaigns, precision guided munitions, and precision bombing systems grew out of the Vietnam experience.

A second criticism of this work might well be that Mrozek ignores a whole dimension of force projection. In Vietnam and in any future regional war, the U.S. Air Force's participation was, and is, largely at the mercy of the theatre infrastructure. This dependency on the availability of main operating bases in theatre implies that except when, as in the case of Saudi Arabia where there were plenty of bases ready for aircraft, the maritime and expeditionary services will usually carry the "air power" burden until U.S. Air Force base development can occur. The implication of this observation is that over time the dominant service source of air power in an undeveloped theatre will change several times. This transition is rarely admitted, much less recognized and planned for in joint service doctrine.

To the naval community, the series of writings should contain some disturbing implications. The first of these is that the roles and limitations of doctrine in regional and low intensity warfare is hardly studied in naval

professional schooling, and the second is that even though naval participation in joint doctrine development activity has not been enthusiastic, it appears to be essential.

The general lack of naval interest in doctrine as a topic is becoming dangerous, partly because most future operations will be of a joint nature, and partly because doctrine is becoming embedded in staff planning tools. This embedded doctrine should be that desired by the professional military community rather than that most convenient to the software engineer however well intentioned. Such embedded doctrine is especially pernicious because it subtly teaches its operators specific thought patterns and continuously reinforces them.

This reviewer recommends all these books to a broad professional audience.

Lupton, Donald E. *On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine.* Alabama: Air Univ. Press, 1988. 149pp. $7

Even before space flight became feasible, the more foresighted strategic thinkers had already recognized its potential military use. This recognition, however, rested more on instinct than on a sound understanding of what could and couldn't be done in space. Space is a very different environment from the earth's atmosphere, though the Air Force insists that the two form a continuous medium, and vague analogies drawn from the history of air power have often misled those who would speculate on the nature of space power.

From the many conflicting currents in the ongoing debate about military space, Lt. Colonel Donald E. Lupton isolates four major trends: the Sanctuary School, which wants to keep space free of weapons in the belief that reconnaissance activities conducted there, left unhindered, strengthen deterrence; the Survivability School, which stresses the vulnerability of space assets and portrays space war as a tit-for-tat, beggar-thy-neighbor enterprise likely to leave all parties the poorer; the High Ground School, which favors space-based ballistic missile defense, insisting that these systems could decisively affect the outcome of a terrestrial conflict; and the Control School, which stops short of the claims of the High Ground advocates, yet regards victory in space in a future war as a probable precondition for success in other mediums.

Colonel Lupton strongly favors the Control School. He dismisses the sanctuary theorists as unrealistic: asymmetries in the combatants' degree of dependence on satellites would make them almost certain targets in any protracted war. The survivability school, Lupton argues, overstates the vulnerability of space systems. These systems, he contends, are defensible. In fact, they are no more at risk than fixed assets on

earth. Although more sympathetic to the high grounders, Lupton doubts that a shield as permeable as a space-based ballistic missile defense system could significantly reduce the offensive capability of nuclear weapons. Space, he consequently concludes, will be one of four co-equal arenas in any war fought among the superpowers.

But such a hasty summary as this conceals much of Colonel Lupton's originality—that is especially clear in his use of naval analogies rather than the usual shopworn comparisons to air power. For example, to counter the argument that limited maneuverability and high exposure to attack render space stations unsuitable for military use, he likens them to the coaling stations that serviced 19th century steamships. Like the lightly defended coaling stations of yesterday, space stations would be easy targets for attack, but just as the coaling stations greatly extended the range of peacetime fleet operations, so would space stations permit the longer and more complex shuttle missions necessary to fully deploy space power. An admirer of Admiral Mahan, Lupton compares the ability to control passage through the near-earth regions of space to the priority that naval strategists give to dominating the relatively few sea-lanes over which the majority of vital resources flow.

Despite his fondness for sea analogies, Colonel Lupton is loyal to his branch of the armed services in his prescriptions for the management of military space. He believes that efficient planning, effective program lobbying, and the command and control requirements of modern war, demand Air Force predominance. Mainly concerned with the force employment side of space doctrine, Colonel Lupton presents the case for Air Force organizational control briefly, almost as an afterthought. Already satellites and other space assets serve a wide variety of functions for a wide variety of military users. This has led, and will continue to lead to conflicts of prioritization and emphasis. Doubtless there will be those who, viewing the matter from different institutional perspectives, will wish to take issue with Colonel Lupton's position, both organizational and otherwise. Nevertheless, most readers will surely agree that as an introduction to an often poorly discussed subject, Colonel Lupton's book sets a high standard for clarity and cogent reasoning.

L. T. KILBOURNE
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Dayton, Ohio

Fenner, Milton A., Davis, Scott M., and Parmentola, John A. *Making Space Defense Work: Must the Superpowers Cooperate?* New York: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1988. 209pp. $21.95

For those who are not intimately familiar with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the multitude of arguments and issues related to it, this book provides an easy-to-read and well organized summary of the more

important factors. It is comprehensive, well balanced, and manages to avoid becoming excessively entangled with detail, whether technical, strategic, or political. Yet, at the same time, it clearly delineates critical technical and strategic factors, such as number of units or performance capabilities, that are crucial to the subject at hand.

Making Space Defense Work begins with an examination of what has happened to the idea of deterrence in the past decade or two. Then it deals with SDI, assessing its ideas, its weapon systems, and the requirements that would be placed upon them. It looks into the concepts of a partial defense and of population defense and concludes with a discussion of strategic defense options. An appendix provides a succinct summary of space weapon capabilities and technical issues.

Fenner, Davis, and Parmentola have solid backgrounds in physics, strategic weapon systems, and defense policy. This text is the result of a project of the Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies. The authors were assisted by a panel of eminent defense technologists and strategic analysts, consisting of former leaders of the Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the U.S. SALT delegation.

The authors' perspective on the benefits of arms control agreements for the U.S. may surprise those who have not previously explored this subject carefully. Working through the logic and evidence presented here could prove valuable and possibly an eye-opening experience. It clearly shows that this subject is complex and there is no simple "always right" approach to answers in this area, without regard to other factors. The impact of those other factors, such as cooperation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on strategic weapon systems, can completely reverse the benefit or harm to U.S. strategic interests that can be expected to result from a particular policy. Appreciation for these complex interrelationships is vital, especially for those of us in the defense community, because of the many simplistic, doctrinaire solutions proposed by advocates of various policies.

D. K. PACE
Johns Hopkins University

Clayton, Anthony. *The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-1939*. Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1986. 545pp.

This is a detailed record of Britain's use of force by the army, navy, and air force—from display to action, from Aden to Zanzibar—as one means to maintain an empire. It is military history through the study of imperial technique.

The book deals with the restrained use of power. What the British did they did well, basing the system on force, but using it rarely. Nonetheless, Clayton shows, this was done at

the expense of economic and strategic overextension.

The British government followed a policy beyond its resources, and the British political tradition and morality had a grander vision of empire than simply one held together by brute force. In his concentration on force, Clayton says too little of how the exceedingly constructive institutional transformations, and examples of moral and political leadership—despite all repression—paved the way for the support Britain received in World War II, and the ease with which the empire was dismantled immediately thereafter.

Clayton's conclusion will give a contemporary superpower pause. Britain maintained its empire with bluff, pragmatic concessions, and the show of power. These worked for a while, but all evidence suggests that sooner or later the bluff would have been called. Restrained force was not enough to hold back centrifugal tendencies, such as nationalism and anticolonialism. In the end, the British could not, nor did they want to, hold the empire together by force; and so they gave it up to institutions they had let develop within the system.

GEORGE W. BAER
Naval War College

Bruce, Robert H. *Australia and the Indian Ocean: Strategic Dimensions of Increasing Naval Involvement*. Studies in Indian Ocean Maritime Affairs No. 1, Perth, Australia: Centre for Indian Ocean Regional Studies, 1988. 138pp. $20

This collection of papers from a 1988 conference examines the Indian Ocean region in light of the Australian decision to head toward a two-ocean (Pacific and Indian) fleet.

One of the most interesting papers documents the importance of the Indian Ocean for Australia, noting, for example, that over half the seaborne commerce moving to Australia sails through that ocean. This paper examines why it was not until the mid-1980s that steps were taken to protect the vulnerable northwest coast with a permanently stationed naval presence. The long-standing Australian reliance on the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the lack of a defined threat perception are noted as the major causes of the laxity of Australian defense policy toward the Indian Ocean.

The essay likely to be of most interest to the American reader is by K. Subrahmanyam, formerly director of India's Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, who presents an Indian perspective on the Indian Ocean that is far different from that found in the United States. His is a view that should be considered carefully. The Indian Navy is one of the fastest growing in the world. India is now the sixth nation to be operating a nuclear-powered attack submarine. Countering the perceived U.S. threat has been a major stimulus for this growth. As Subrahmanyam notes, "India had been subjected to an exercise of force

without war in 1971 when the task force 74 headed by the nuclear powered carrier USS *Enterprise* tried to intervene—though it proved to be too late—in the last stages of the war in Bangladesh." India believes that the newly acquired SSN will "provide some minimal deterrence against such interventionism."

One essay focuses on the U.S. military involvement in the 1980-88 Gulf War and another looks at the Australian role. While this is the most dated section of the work, there are many points of value in it. As one paper notes, "The U.S. interventionist strategy for the Gulf region has some serious limitations. On paper, plans and numbers look pretty promising but under the impact of a real conflict situation in a distant area they may not work." As the United States knows full well, the difficulties of mounting any U.S. military activity in the Indian Ocean region cannot be understated. While in 1987-88 the U.S. Navy, with support from the other services, was able to escort merchant ships in the Persian Gulf, this was a difficult mission which required the commitment of a large number of ships.

Though the dramatic changes over the past several years have dated this volume, the work will remain of value for those interested in the Indian Ocean region.

ADAM B. SIEGEL
Center for Naval Analyses

Chandra, Satish, ed. *The Indian Ocean: Explorations in History, Commerce & Politics.* New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1987. 334pp.

This erratic combination of historical essays, technological evaluation and polemics is exceedingly difficult to evaluate. The theme of exploration, commerce and politics in the Indian Ocean region serves as only a tenuous connexion among the various articles. Consequently, either the editor, perhaps finding himself unclear as to the articles' individual accuracy, gave up the attempt to keep the authors' speculation within the theme, or he may simply have failed to meet the most basic requirements of editorship.

If this collection has anything to offer, it is in reminding us that the Indian Ocean is an important area for historical investigation, particularly when it comes to elements of cross-cultural and economic exchange between the area and Europe. S. Bhattacharya in "The Indian Ocean in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," attempts to bring some analysis to the various exchange mechanisms operating during those times; F.J.A. Broeze, K.I. McPherson, and P.D. Reeves, in "The Making of the Modern Indian Ocean Ports," gives us vast technological knowledge of how ports were developed and what factors influenced that development; Immanuel Wallerstein observes the economic impact of West on East.

If the reiteration of these various, often familiar themes were all there was to this collection, it would have

some use, if only as an introductory survey text. However, even that level of use is eliminated by the editor's inclusion of G. Bondarevsky's "Turning the Persian Gulf into a British Lake," which is riddled with factual errors. We are either looking at a stupendously unsuccessful mistranslation, or a work which takes absolutely no account of historical integrity, or a relatively crude attempt at polemical revisionism. The reader will have to judge which is the likeliest.

All these problems come under the category of editorial responsibility. The number of typographical errors, factual misconceptions, even the inoffensive dullness of some of the essays, leads to the belief that the editor has ignored the obligations of his position. It is impossible to determine which of the possibilities raised above have made the articles so opaque. But given the problems, the general reader is well advised to turn elsewhere for more reliable treatments of the same material.

A. J. PLOTKE
Phoenix, Arizona

Greene, Fred, ed. *The Philippine Bases: Negotiating for the Future.* New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988. 158pp. $9.95

This volume provides a useful, general guide to one of the most important foreign policy challenges facing the Bush administration. American military bases in the Philippines have long been a target of nationalist attack and a major irritant in the U.S.-Philippine relationship. Even before the intervention of U.S. forces on behalf of Mrs. Aquino in 1989, the renegotiation promised to be arduous and contentious. At risk are the largest U.S. bases on foreign soil, that for decades have played a central role in U.S. global and regional defense strategy. For the Philippines there are major questions of economics and of principle.

In an overview paper, Fred Greene examines the specific issues likely to arise between the United States and the Philippines in the current round of negotiations, among them differences over compensation, operational control, nuclear weapons, and social problems. Greene points out that questions of sovereignty and national dignity permeate many of these issues and add to the difficulty of resolving them.

The book also contains short versions of earlier works by two other acknowledged experts on the Philippine bases issue, U.S. Air Force Colonel William E. Berry, Jr. and Captain Alva S. Bowen, USN (Ret.). Colonel Berry reviews the virtually unceasing base negotiations between the Untied States and the Philippines since 1947, and concludes that the issues that have shaped these negotiations have changed little over the years. Bowen, recognizing that the current round of base negotiations may not result in agreement, explores several fallback options for the bases: 1) relocation of other U.S.

facilities in the region, 2) an expanded base structure in Micronesia, and 3) relocation to new facilities in the South China Sea. Bowen believes that none of these options is satisfactory in itself, but a combination of locations could replicate the advantages we now enjoy in the Philippines.

Despite differing perspectives, all of the authors contribute to a sense that Philippine and U.S. positions are sharply at odds on a wide range of issues. Both sides have different threat perceptions, and consequently different approaches to regional and national security issues. Moreover, the political will to renegotiate the agreement may be eroding. On the Philippine side there is increasingly strident resentment of perceived U.S. involvement in the domestic political process; on the U.S. side there is growing concern about the erosion of Mrs. Aquino's support, the threat to the bases from insurgency, and major budgetary and operational limits in meeting Filipino negotiating demands. Sadly, unless a high degree of statesmanship is forthcoming from both sides, Bowen's paper on relocation options may prove to be the most useful part of this book.

CHARLES S. AHLGREN
Naval War College

Stokesbury, James L. *A Short History of the Korean War.* New York: William Morrow, 1988. 276pp. $8.95

Stanton, Shelby L. *America's Tenth Legion: X Corps In Korea, 1950.* Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989. 342pp. $24.95

James L. Stokesbury's *A Short History of the Korean War* is a splendid introduction to the war. Only 276 pages long including a useful index, this smoothly written book manages to be both narrative and interpretive and gives a satisfying feeling of completeness. Stokesbury correctly divides the war into two parts which he calls the "War of Maneuver" and the "War of Posts."

Part I, "War of Maneuver," begins with an introductory chapter complete with background information that leads to the North Korean invasion and the United Nations retreat to the Pusan Perimeter. The stumbling performance of the U.S. Eighth Army is treated fairly. The corresponding performance of the Army of the Republic of South Korea looks better, in retrospect, than it did at the time.

The United Nations resurgence comes, of course, with the Inchon landing on 15 September 1950, with the U.S. Marines in the starring role, but not blatantly so. Following are chapters, with titles to suit, of the UN drive "To the Yalu"; "The Chinese Intervention," which turned UN victory into near-debacle; the furore surrounding "The Dismissal of MacArthur"; and, in "Approaching a Stalemate," Ridgway's masterful offensives of Spring 1951 which led to the armistice talks.

Part II, "War of the Posts," covers the down side of the war, when the United States knuckled under to its European partners in the United Nations, and allowed operations to stagnate into positional warfare, horrifically reminiscent of the Western Front in World War I.

There is a chapter on "The Air Battle" which summarizes the superb accomplishments of tactical aviators in gaining air superiority and eventually almost uncontested control of the air, and the disappointing results of both the bombing of North Korea and aerial efforts to interdict the battlefield.

There is no corresponding separate chapter on the naval war. Amphibious aspects are, however, proportionately well-covered. Carrier air and mine warfare get brief mention.

Shelby Stanton's *America's Tenth Legion* is quite a different book but, in its way, equally good. Stokesbury has covered the entire war. Stanton confines himself to the operations of the U.S. X Corps from the landing at Inchon in September to the evacuation from Hungnam in December 1950, scarcely more than three months, but a time in which the fortunes of war gyrated wildly.

Stanton's title, *America's Tenth Legion*, is clever, but its meaning is not immediately apparent until one remembers that William Manchester entitled his biography of MacArthur *American Caesar*; then the connection between MacArthur's X Corps and Julius Caesar's famed Tenth Legion becomes obvious.

X Corps was formed by MacArthur to undertake the Inchon landing. Its original composition was the U.S. 1st Marine Division and the U.S. 7th Infantry Division. It had its own tactical air command, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Later, after the Wonsan landing in October, it would add the U.S. 3d Infantry Division. In those later operations X Corps also had operational control, more or less, of the Republic of Korea's I Corps.

To the disappointment of the Marines, MacArthur gave command of X Corps, not to Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., a superbly successful division commander in World War II and whose Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, was providing the preponderance of troops, but to his own Chief of Staff, Army Major General Edward ("Ned") M. Almond.

Stanton's book is thorough. It takes the reader through the organization of the X Corps, the landing at Inchon, the battle for Seoul, the reembarkation for the landing at Wonsan, and the wild pursuit of the defeated North Koreans into the mountains of Central Korea and toward the Yalu. Then the Chinese came into the war. The Eighth Army under Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, operating to the west along the Seoul-Pyongyang axis, was routed. The X Corps, independent of Eighth Army because of a whim of MacArthur's, fought its own fight and fell back, to be evacuated chiefly from Hungnam. The operations of the 1st Marine Division at Chosin

Reservoir is put into the perspective of these other actions. As with Stokesbury, the performance of the South Koreans comes off better than in other earlier accounts.

A reader, looking at Stanton's carefully assembled order of battle and at the opposing numbers, might wonder, as some of us wondered then, "what if the decision had been made not to have withdrawn to the south, but to hold on at Hungnam?"

EDWIN H. SIMMONS
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
Marine Corps Historical Center

Flesch, Ron. *Redwood Delta.* New York: Berkeley Books, 1988. 272pp. $3.95

Miller, John Grider. *The Bridge at Dong Ha.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989. 181pp. $16.95

These books recount the exploits of two U.S. Marines in Vietnam, one a private first class, the other a captain. They are remarkable for showing the American fighting man at his best: courageous, skillful and resolute. Happily, both authors understood that they needed no scatological detail, vulgarity or profanity. In fact the PFC, Ron Flesch, writing twenty-three years after the event, has produced a totally clean manuscript without in any way reducing the drama of the action.

During 1965 and 1966, Flesch served in Vietnam as a member of Delta Company, 1st Battalion (Redwood), 9th Marines, in the Danang area and spent a year in almost continual patrolling, skirmishing and fighting in defense of the airfield complex. The Marines' search for the Viet Cong led them into frequent contact with villagers and the problems attendant thereto. Graphic action on almost every page reveals the joys of small-unit infantry combat—field operations day and night in heat, rain and mud, attack, defense, ambush, scouting, patrolling, the ballistic crack of small arms fire, the whump of mortars and grenades, the thrill of stepping on a mine or booby trap, the casualties.

Although Redwood Delta was a regular Marine rifle company, and not one of the Combined Action units used with success by the Marines, the company made good progress in driving the Viet Cong out of the villages and in gaining the confidence of the villagers and their chiefs. Flesch and his comrades understood the problem of pacification and sympathized with the beleaguered civilians. The picture emerges of some very effective fighting Marines, tough, upbeat, basically cheerful through it all—not the murderous psychopaths so often portrayed by disaffected authors. On one of his last days in Vietnam Flesch was promoted to lance corporal, a small reward for one year of hard and dangerous service, but the new lance corporal remains unimbittered, still true to corps and country. *Semper Fidelis*!

Captain John Walter Ripley, USMC, served as advisor to the 3rd Battalion of Vietnamese Marines in the spring of 1972, in the area below

the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Almost all American troops had left Vietnam. Only the advisors remained. An experienced officer, Ripley had led a rifle company of the 3rd Marine Division during a previous tour in country.

Colonel Miller, himself at one time an advisor to South Vietnamese Marines, puts himself inside Captain Ripley, voicing Ripley's apprehensions, repeating what Ripley saw, heard and said—an autobiography written by someone else.

As Miller's tale begins, the North Vietnamese, in two-division strength reinforced with armor, cross the DMZ and push rapidly south toward Dong Ha, twelve miles away. At Dong Ha the only north-south artery, Highway 1, passes over a two-lane steel bridge built by American Seabees in other years. Once over the bridge the North Vietnamese can roll south to Hue unimpeded by natural obstacles.

On Easter morning when the enemy attack, Miller focuses on Ripley's effort to destroy the bridge before the enemy can take it.

In his struggle Ripley is aided by Army Major Jim Smock, advisor to an ARVN tank battalion, who knows very little about demolitions. The Marine explains to Smock in some detail how he intends to lay the explosives. The Major responds: "I don't know what in hell you're talking about, but I trust you! What should I do?"

Ripley liked and admired the Vietnamese Marines, who returned his affection and esteem. They called him "Dai-uy Dien!"—"Captain Crazy!" Later on, the fight of this 3rd Battalion, Vietnamese Marine Corps, almost to the last man, against overwhelming numbers of North Vietnamese troops who crossed the river upstream, forms a tragic conclusion to the story. The book fails, perhaps purposefully, to clarify just who ordered Captain Ripley to blow up the bridge. Had he not done so, however, the South Vietnamese forces would have faced certain defeat.

Redwood Delta may have value to the national security community in reminding today's soldiers and Marines of the problems encountered in Third World countries occupied by our troops. Who is friend? Who is foe? Women and children, who are used by the enemy as cover, are often found in the line of fire. What to do? Withdraw and abort the mission? Cease fire and allow the enemy to gain fire superiority or to escape unharmed? Tough decisions for a captain, a sergeant, a PFC or anyone else.

The Bridge at Dong Ha has value as a lesson in leadership—using one's courage, talent and initiative to save the day in the face of "fearful odds"—to save his unit and in this case his army from destruction. Ripley sets a high standard of performance and grace under pressure, which all American officers might emulate. *Semper Fidelis*!

ANTHONY WALKER
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
Middletown, Rhode Island

Broughton, Jack. *Going Downtown: The War against Hanoi and Washington.* New York: Pocket Books, 1988. 283pp. $4.95

It is never too late to learn the truth about an important chapter in history. In this welcome paperback reissue of a book he published some years ago, Jack Broughton, Colonel, U.S. Air Force (Ret.) does a magnificent job of recalling his experiences in the air war over North Vietnam from 1964 to 1967—the toughest years of air combat (at least in that war) with the possible exception of 1972. He also does an excellent job of establishing the relationship between the decisions made in Washington and their effects on the conduct of the war.

Broughton establishes his credentials as a combat fighter pilot by beginning with a chapter on his experiences in air combat during the Korean War. The author began his operational flying in P-47s in Germany in the late 1940s; from that point to his final flights over Vietnam, it seems as if he flew most of the fighter aircraft in the U.S. Air Force. He also does an authoritative job in briefly describing the operational strengths and weaknesses of most of the U.S. Air Force fighters of that era. In one piece of modesty, Colonel Broughton seems to downplay the fact that, in this period, he also had a tour of duty as the leader of the very select group of fighter pilots flying with the Air Force acrobatic demonstration team, the Thunderbirds. As an aviator and as a man, Jack Broughton finished his military flying career at the top of the ladder—a wing commander flying daily combat sorties in F-105s—"Thuds"—from Thailand to "Downtown" Hanoi. So he is well-qualified to write an "inside" account of the most severe combat and the abundant guns, missiles, and fighters in opposition.

Colonel Broughton also writes an excellent account of the best and the worst leadership involved in the air war, and in the wider politico-military war. Beyond his favorite targets in North Vietnam, he takes aim with a vengeance on the usual political targets—Lyndon B. Johnson and Robert S. McNamara. He also does a job on a number of Air Force generals who, in his professional judgment, tried to direct the war from afar while possessing neither the experience nor the integrity to do so competently. At the same time, Broughton gives full credit to those leaders of professional competence, relevant experience, and the best of motives.

The book is by no means overloaded with politics and discontent. It is primarily a personal story about air combat, bravery, and the victories and defeats of the author and those around him. It is a full account of how-to and how-not-to organize, lead and fight in the air.

The recollections of combat from two wars are as real and authentic as any can be. There may be some exaggeration, but not much. (Navy pilots flying the same kinds of missions at the same time to the same places could verify Broughton's

description. For an example of the parallels, read *One Day in a Long War* by Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price (New York: Random House, 1989) to compare the similar narratives of Navy and Air Force crews originating from different places, but fighting the same enemy.) This book ought to be read for its description of war, and its honest appraisal of vulnerable human beings under the stress of combat—or the stress of organizational pressures and personal ambitions.

If the book has a weakness, it could be the overuse of the word "I". But that should not keep you from reading it. The man had to have been extraordinary in order to have done the things he did.

In fact, *Going Downtown* ought to be required reading for all Air Force Academy cadets and other military flight students, including prospective Naval Aviators. It's not too late for designated aviators to learn either.

HUGH F. LYNCH
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Newport, Rhode Island

Brown, David. *The Seafire: The Spitfire that Went to Sea.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1989. 208pp. $24.95

Lamb, Charles, ed. *War in a Stringbag.* London: Leo Cooper, 1987. 325pp. $28

Winton, John. *Carrier* Glorious: *The Life and Death of an Aircraft Carrier.* Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1986. 254pp. $32

For the naval officer and historian well-versed in the role of U.S. naval aviation during World War II, these three books offer a fascinating insight into the different experience of Britain's Fleet Air Arm carriers. The first book is about a carrier fighter plane, the Seafire; the second book is an autobiographical account by Charles Lamb, one of the pilots of a torpedo-bombing squadron, 815 Swordfish; the third book is about a single carrier, the *Glorious*, that was sunk early in the war, 8 June 1940. Together, these works provide an American reader with a survey of the evolution of carrier aviation from a completely different perspective—different in roles and missions, different in flight deck procedures and different in wardroom humor.

Of the three, *War in a Stringbag* makes the best read. The "Stringbag" was Britain's slow, awkward, and virtually obsolete Fairey Swordfish. Lamb's tale is not only of raw courage but of real ingenuity as he and his mates overcame the severe handicaps of the Swordfish, a 100-knot airplane trying to fight and survive in a sky filled with 300-knot enemies.

What was it like to survive the sinking of one's carrier? Lamb begins his memoir with a terrific account of his experience—the destruction of the *Courageous* (twin to the *Glorious*) by a U-boat in British waters on 17 September 1939. The most harrowing aspect was to convince many crewmen, especially the mustered Royal Marines, to jump overboard. The latter only jumped after a flyer

gave a loud command: "ROYAL MARINES—HUN! TURN FOR'ARD —DISMISS! ABANDON SHIP—OVER THE SIDE AT THE DOUBLE—EVERY MAN JACK OF YOU!"

Later Lamb was assigned to the big *Illustrious*, a full-fledged new fleet carrier, for operations in the Mediterranean. That ship's most important operation was the night attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto in November 1940. Lamb sheds light on the five-year-old plan for the attack and describes the role of the pathfinders, of whom he was one, in leading 815 and 819 Squadrons as they crippled the Italian fleet. Interestingly, interservice differences forced the Navy to steal the necessary intelligence photos from the R.A.F. for the pre-battle briefing!

Two months later, in January 1941, the *Illustrious* was badly damaged by Stuka dive bombers off Malta and had to withdraw, leaving her homeless pilots to operate from bases successively in Malta, Crete, Greece, and Egypt.

In addition to many carrier pilots who flew with distinction in these early actions, two key leaders emerge—Rear Admiral Lumley Lyster and Captain Denis W. Boyd, whose talents kept them at the forefront of British carrier aviation throughout the war.

Lamb's recall of verbatim conversations is wonderful, if slightly suspect. He relied on second-hand accounts to fill in gaps of the story. Yet fact is often more remarkable than fiction; for example, landing Swordfish planes in occupied Tunisia to spirit spies in and out of enemy territory under the very nose of the mistrusted Vichy French. On one such caper, in September 1941, Lamb landed in a muddy lake and was captured.

When Vichy France changed sides late in 1942, Lamb returned home for a year and then found himself among many former *Illustrious* shipmates on the new *Implacable* as "Lieutenant-Commander Flying" in charge of hangar and flight deck operations in the Pacific.

John Winton's *Carrier* Glorious is unusual in its intimate portrayal of prewar British carriers. Relying heavily on interviews and personal letters, Winton paints the best and most complete picture of any carrier of any navy of the 1930s. Converted from a cruiser hull, like the *Furious* and *Courageous* during World War I, the *Glorious* did her greatest service in the Mediterranean, providing air cover with three dozen planes for the British fleet, who were trying to deter Italian ambitions in that region.

Fleet exercises stressed convoy protection and multi-carrier operations with the *Eagle*. Shipboard routine is an eye-opener, including daily issues of rum and tobacco as well as anti-gas drills and night-flying operations. Malta's protection occupied the fleet, especially during the Abyssinian crisis and the Spanish Civil War; and *Glorious* was in the thick of it all.

As in the prewar U.S. Navy, men who would dominate wartime oper-

ations appeared on the ungainly carrier in one role or another—Lyster, Bruce Fraser, Edward Evans-Lombe, and L. D. Mackintosh. However, none come more alive than Captain Guy D'Orly-Hughes, a flamboyant submariner who became skipper of the *Glorious* in June 1939. He brought the ship into World War II. A hardheaded, overzealous veteran, he so shunned the advice of his more expert airmen that he lost his ship the following June off Norway to two German battleships.

Winton treats the controversy over the ship's loss by thoroughly analyzing the break between D'Orly-Hughes and his "Commander (Flying)"—air officer—Commander J. B. Heath, a gentle man and early career aviator who bore the brunt of the captain's displeasure. Appraising the merits of the case fairly was difficult, for D'Orly-Hughes sacked Heath, ruining his career, and sent him home just days before the fatal battle, in which the captain was killed. Winton, drawing upon the final analysis of the official British naval historian Captain Stephen Roskill, concludes that D'Orly-Hughes' capricious behavior was a major cause of the *Glorious*' loss.

No fewer than 1,207 men were lost from the ship, leaving only 38 survivors.

David Brown's tome might have been titled "All You Wanted to Know about the Seafire but Were Afraid to Ask." Virtually every flight from every carrier in every action by the naval version of the Supermarine Spitfire is recalled in minute detail, or at least listed. The book is a complete reference work. It includes deck crashes and is replete with appendices on technical details, chronologies, air actions, and squadron or base assignments of each Seafire ever built.

After explaining the several modified versions of the Seafire, the author chronicles its combat record that begins with the invasion of North Africa in November 1942, off the *Furious, Formidable, Argus*, and *Victorious*. The planes served on escort carrier in the Italian and southern France campaigns and suffered high operational losses. Never the equal of the U.S.-built F4U Corsair and F6F Hellcat, the Seafire was often relegated to combat air patrols or gunfire spotting. But it complemented the American-built planes on carriers of the British Eastern and Pacific fleets against Japan during 1945. The Seafires did see some action in Malaya, Korea, French Indochina, and Burma between 1948 and 1954, fighting communist guerrillas and armies. Statistics of sorties summarize each action.

As an encyclopedic book, *The Seafire* is unsurpassed among carrier plane histories. Even the large number of superb photographs is unequaled for a book of this type. But it is downright dull reading.

Together these volumes serve to remind Americans that the British not only invented the aircraft carrier, but that their carriers fought a war all alone until the United

States rallied to their side. All three books include a wealth of heretofore unpublished photos, making their narratives even more graphic. Lessons for modern-day shapers of national security abound in all three.

CLARK G. REYNOLDS
College of Charleston,
South Carolina

Poolman, Kenneth. *Allied Escort Carriers of World War Two*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988. 272pp. $29.95

Allied Escort Carriers of World War II builds on Kenneth Poolman's earlier work, *Escort Carrier, 1941-45*, which deals only with the British escort carrier experience. His new book includes U.S. hunter-killer operations in the Atlantic, as well as escort carrier operations by both navies in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Both books provide a detailed account of day-to-day CVE operations, particularly in the Atlantic.

The present volume has two advantages, aside from additional basic research. It is written in the full knowledge of the very effective first homing torpedo (the U.S. developed Mk 24 "mine"), and the revelation (not emphasized sufficiently) of the use of ULTRA intelligence to determine upcoming German submarine operations. The latter in particular—not publicly known until the late seventies—made the U.S. CVE hunter-killer group concept possible.

The escort carrier was created because of the British need to counter long range air attacks on merchant shipping in the mid-Atlantic where British land-based fighters could not reach. The first CVE was the *Audacity*, a captured German merchant ship upon which a flight deck, but no island or hangar, was built. She operated American made F4F Grumman fighters. Hers was a brief career, beginning in September 1941 and ending on 21 December, when she was sunk by the *U-751*. The U.S. by then was largely involved with the conversion of Maritime Commission C-3 hulls to CVEs. These went first to the British and then, after Pearl Harbor, to the U.S. Navy. Ultimately, the British operated 44 CVEs of which they built six, while the U.S. managed 80 CVEs of four classes, all merchant hull based designs. The U.S. lost one CVE in the Atlantic, and five in the Pacific. The British lost three, all in the Atlantic.

In the Atlantic antisubmarine war, the U.S. Navy got the better deal since it was assigned to close the lower half of the mid-Atlantic gap where the German submarines were safe from shore-based Allied ASW aircraft. There U.S. forces, not concerned with possible surface or air actions, perfected the independently operated CVE hunter-killer group which relied heavily on HF-DF bearings and ULTRA intelligence to find enemy submarines.

In contrast, the British CVEs operated near the convoys, shielding them against both air and U-boat

attack. They operated in the stormy North Atlantic on the icy Murmansk run, and in the Mediterranean.

Allied Escort Carriers of World War Two chronicles these events in human level detail. Carrier aircraft losses, particularly in the northern latitudes, are grimly impressive. Caused not so much by enemy action as by the elements and the small deck, today these operations would be branded by the press as inhuman and unacceptable. Nevertheless, the British carried on.

The book contains numerous photographs, line drawings of the various CVE classes and a series of excellent aircraft profiles by J.M. Goulding. The last were undoubtedly originally in color and would have been more effective if pulled together in a few color pages.

The last third of the book deals with activities in the Indian and Pacific oceans, where, in general, the CVEs played support roles to the main British and U.S. fleets during the closing year of the war. The highlight is the battle between six CVEs and a Japanese task force led by the *Yamato*, the world's mightiest battleship. At the last minute the Japanese unexpectedly turned away after sinking just one of the six. As in the Atlantic, in the Pacific far more CVE aircraft were lost to operational problems than to enemy action.

There are errors, of course. Two pictures, for example, were miscaptioned, and the author cannot agree with himself on how to spell the *Liscome Bay*'s name. These, however, are minor. The book, overall, with eleven appendices and a bibliography is invaluable for what it does.

RICHARD F. CROSS
Alexandria, Virginia

Alden, John D. *Flush Decks and Four Pipes*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1965. Revised printing, 1989. 112pp. $29.95

Hague, Arnold. *The Towns*. Kendal, England: World Ship Society, 1988. 92pp. $12

Flush Decks and Four Pipes is a general history of the design, construction, peacetime use, and wartime service of the American flush-deck destroyers of the *Caldwell, Wickes*, and *Clemson* classes. A total of 273 flush-deckers were built between 1917 and 1922. The *Manley* was the first to commission on 15 October 1917, and the last was the *Decatur* on 9 August 1922. The last surviving flush-decker was not discarded by her owner, a banana company, until 1955. The flush-deck destroyers were built with a heavy gun and torpedo armament for fighting fleet actions. No antisubmarine weapons were installed in the ships as built, but depth charge racks and Y-guns were added to the few ships that were finished in time to serve during the First World War.

The first edition of *Flush Decks and Four Pipes* had a soft cover and an unusual format with two spines, but the revised printing has a hard cover and conventional single-spine format. No changes were made to the

original text but a preface and a full page of addenda have been added. The addenda clear up some minor errors in the original edition and answer several questions about the flush-deckers that have accumulated since the first publication.

About half of the book is a statistical summary with twelve lists of tabulated information about the ships: the main table lists all 273 by hull number with the dates of first commissioning, final decommissioning, and final disposition; flush-deckers converted to roles such as Light Minelayer (DM), Seaplane Tender (AVP), later AVD), High-Speed Minesweeper (DMS), High Speed Transport (APD), Miscellaneous Auxiliary (AG), Unclassified (IX), and Water Barge (YW); flush-deckers that served with the Coast Guard; the fifty ships transferred to Britain, listed by their "Town" numbers and names, cross-indexed to their former United States name and hull number; unit citations and commendations awarded to flush-deckers during World War II; a cross index of names to hull numbers, including the British "Towns"; and a cross-index of Russian names to former British and U.S. Navy names. General specifications are given for one flush-decker, the *Wickes* (DD-75).

The selection of photographs covers the entire life span of these ships. They are shown not only in all their variations but also at work in the multitude of tasks they performed, peace and war, including service by several as banana boats. A centerspread photograph used in the original edition was left out of the reprinted edition. A full page with only its caption was left in. There is one inboard profile drawing of a flush-decker.

The Towns is a history, with text and tabular lists, of the fifty flush-deck destroyers transferred from the United States to Great Britain under the destroyers-for-bases agreement of 1940. The body of the work is devoted to the service history of each of the fifty destroyers. Three flush-deckers of the *Caldwell* class (two of them three-funnelled ships), twenty-seven *Wickes* class and twenty *Clemson* class were transferred at Halifax, Nova Scotia from September through December 1940. The flush-deckers in British service were given town names common to both the United States and Britain. Six of the destroyers were commissioned in the Canadian Navy and named after border rivers common to both Canada and the United States.

The British inspected the flush-deckers at Halifax. Hulls and main machinery appeared to be in good condition, but their boilers, auxiliaries, piping and wiring were not. Many needed immediate repairs before they could make the voyage to England, and others that had started across the Atlantic had to return to Halifax for repairs. Closer inspections were made as the ships were dry-docked in Great Britain where it was revealed that the most serious problem was rust and corrosion of their hulls. For example, loose, corroded rivets led to saltwa-

ter leakage, which contaminated fuel that in turn caused boiler damage. These defects, caused by years of neglect or wear, delayed the entry into combat of some flush-deckers.

The Towns were prepared for service and adapted for antisubmarine warfare through a series of scheduled refits. As a class they became operational early in 1941. They were used on escort duty on the east coast of England, in the North Atlantic and as antisubmarine escorts to the 1st Minelaying Squadron. Some were manned by Dutch, Polish or Norwegian crews. After 1943, most were employed only on training duties or were inactivated. Nine were loaned to the Soviet Union in 1944; one of these, the *Dyatelnyi*, ex-HMS *Churchill*, ex-USS *Herndon* (DD-198), was the last war loss of the class. The rest were returned to Britain in the years 1949-1952 and scrapped.

All the flush-deckers transferred to Britain are pictured, except the *St. Marys*, ex-USS *Doran*, ex-USS *Bagley* (DD-185) for which no authenticated photograph could be found. A foldout plan, with some details left out, shows the internal arrangement of the destroyers on transfer in 1940.

Together, these books offer an almost complete history of the flush-deckers. *Flush Decks and Four Pipes* offers a lively narrative description of the peacetime and wartime activities of the flush-deckers as a class, but Alden makes little mention of the poor material condition of those transferred to Britain. *The Towns* offers a look at the problems of adapting fifty worn-out or neglected destroyers for service in a war for which they were unsuited, but in which they served gallantly.

WILLIAM H. CROFT
San Diego, California

Lambi, Ivo Nikolai. *The Navy and German Power Politics 1862-1914.* Winchester, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1984. 438pp. $65

Ivo Lambi describes in detail the German plans for naval operations from 1862 to 1914 against France and Russia, and later against Great Britain and the United States as well. He also provides considerable information on the German naval construction programs of the period.

The fascinating details of naval operations planning dominate Lambi's narrative. Unfortunately, the author's explanations provide an inadequate strategic background. He has also allowed minor errors in technical points and nautical terminology to slip by. Had he provided a detailed bibliography, that would have been useful.

Still, this book probably stands by itself in the English language in the sheer detail of its scope and coverage. Several articles by Paul M. Kennedy, Jonathan Steinberg, and Holger Herwig, and Herwig's book, *The Politics of Frustration, the United States in German Naval Planning 1889-1941*, contain this same level of detail, but only for isolated periods.

Lambi's book has had very little exposure and has seen few reviews.

This is a shame, for it deserves far better treatment. I recommend it to both the serious student of German naval history and to strategic and force planners.

PETER M. STULTING
Lieutenant JG, U.S. Naval Reserve
Lancaster, California

Cole, Paul M. and Hart, Douglas M., eds. *Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990s*. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1986.

At direct glance the book under review would seem to have been overtaken by the current revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe and the USSR. These days a sudden and massive thrust by the Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces across the North German Plain appears unlikely. The still ongoing upheaval in Eastern Europe, combined with the recent outcome of the talks on conventional force reductions in Europe may have made it almost impossible for the Soviets to carry out a sudden and massive *blitzkrieg*-type thrust into Western Europe.

So why is Nato's Northern Flank still worth serious discussion? To this reviewer, the answer is very simple. No matter what the current Soviet military doctrine may be, that country's military capabilities and geopolitical position count the most. The USSR is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the only country which can obliterate both the United States and everyone else in Nato.

Despite the changes in the military situation in Eastern Europe, Nato's flanks remain vulnerable, particularly in the north. Hence, the importance of the topic chosen by the editors of the book under review.

The aim of the editors and authors was to reassess the security environment in Northern Europe in the light of history, traditions, and regional dynamics. The opening chapter by Arne Brundtland introduces the key issues that affect the policy in the region. Brundtland describes the historical environment that is the foundation of the current security issues. The next three chapters are case studies dealing with Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Norway.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter in the book is about the Federal Republic of Germany by Heinz von zur Gathen. The author describes in some detail the various strategic aspects of the Baltic Sea in its relation to central and northern Europe. His focus is, however, on the German contribution to the defense of the Baltic Approaches.

In a chapter on Norway's energy security, Charles K. Ebinger and Caroline Verhague explain both the potential and the vulnerability of Norway's energy security. Richard Brody in his chapter on deep-strike technology analyzes the relationship between emerging technologies and the defense of northern Europe. He describes how conventional deep-strike weapons can be used against the Soviet targets in the area and vice versa. The author also deals with the

problem of deploying and using such weapons by both sides.

Carl Bildt provides a summary of changes in the security environment in Northern Europe from a Swedish point of view. He indicates that while everyone agrees that things have changed in Northern Europe, there is some dispute about the extent of these changes and their implications. Bildt focuses his attention on the buildup of the Soviet SSBN/SLBM force in the Arctic waters, and the submarine incursions in Sweden's and Norway's territorial waters. But he also analyzes the problems concerning the energy and legal issues in the Arctic, prospects and problems of arms control, and finally on national defense efforts of various countries in the European north.

Bildt concludes that the strategic importance of Northern Europe will continue to increase in the years ahead for both opposing superpowers. Probably rightly, he thinks that Moscow's ultimate objective is to see the entire area neutralized. This reviewer speculates that despite *glasnost* and the *new thinking* the Soviet notion of neutrality still means neutrality on the Finnish rather than on the Swedish model. But only the future can bear out, or refute, that thought.

MILAN VEGO
Alexandria, Va.

Nielson, J.M. *Armed Forces on a Northern Frontier: The Military in Alaska's History, 1867-1987.* New York: Greenwood Press, 1988. 298pp.

For many Americans of the "lower 48," Alaska is an intriguing combination of familiar stereotype and unknown reality. A contribution such as *Armed Forces on a Northern Frontier*, which focuses on a locale often taken for granted, yet (unfairly) not often thought about in connection with anything other than dogsled races and oil spills, is a timely and welcome event.

Armed Forces is the product of considerable labor, that appears to be a labor of love—the author's enthusiasm for Alaska is evident throughout. In fact, it is a massive book; the nominal page length of 298 pages, plus acknowledgements and foreword, is inflated by the fact that the book is printed in a tiny 600 words-per-page typeface only slightly larger than that of a telephone directory. *Armed Forces* is packed with detail. For this reason, it is bound to be a valuable tool for anyone researching the subject of Alaska.

Unfortunately, the book does not achieve the author's aim of providing "a usable understanding of Alaska's past as a process of interrelated or connected events, people. and ideas." It delivers a tremendous quantity of facts, but a major cause of its lack of focus is that portions of the book were apparently developed and presented as separate papers. The rationale for the chapter structure is not evident; while chronological ordering is suggested by the title,

the chapters are not strictly faithful to this. The general lack of convergence of the chapters gives the impression that they may have been produced as separate papers, which later were glued together to produce a book. While this can be a legitimate way to create a book, the chapters should form an integrated whole; else, the resulting product is a compendium, not a book.

There would appear to be enough raw information in *Armed Forces* to lead to several, very good books on Alaska. If this information had been sifted and interpreted, a valuable contribution might have been made to a better understanding of our 49th state. But I found *Armed Forces* to be much like a cluttered attic: likely to have valuable and interesting objects, but hard to decipher as a pattern. A reader with a general curiosity about this subject would be advised to consult other sources first.

PATRICK G. SULLIVAN, JR.
Herndon, Virginia

Weems, John Edward. *Peary: The Explorer and the Man.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988. 362pp. $11.95

Originally published in 1967, Weems' biography of Robert E. Peary and his search for the North Pole has been reissued just in time for the latest round of the controversy over his polar exploration. While the Cook portion of the affair seems to have gone away, new calculations based on Peary's apparent sextant observations indicate that he might have been as much as 110 miles away from the pole on April 6th of 1909.

Regardless of the merits of this newest turn of the controversy, Peary remains an important and impressive figure in naval and polar exploration. Shortly after his graduation from Bowdoin College in 1877, Peary was appointed as a civil engineer in the Navy and began a career of major exploration, that was broken only by the tedium of late 19th Century naval staff service. He seems to have been a good civil engineer, but his heart lay with polar exploration as it had from his undergraduate days. The Navy—whether from lack of interest or remarkable foresight—granted him an unusual number of leaves of absence and eventually the support to pursue his passion.

Peary appears to have been thinking about the Pole when he was surveying a Nicaraguan canal route in 1885. Taking leave from the Navy in 1886, he set out to explore the west coast of Greenland and to test his ideas for polar travel. With additional leaves from the Navy and support from the American Geographical Society, he returned to Greenland in the winters of 1891/92 and 1893/94 and again in the summers of 1896 and 1897.

In 1898, despite the general opposition of the Navy but with the intervention of President McKinley, Peary was directed to "continue his great work in the North." He was given a five year leave at half pay. When the Spanish-American War

broke out, Peary left for four years in Greenland. These were productive years, when Greenland was recognized to be an island, and much was learned about travel by dogsled across the ice. On his return to the Navy, he passed the promotion exams to commander, accepted the presidency of the American Geographical Society, and found a new friend in the White House—Theodore Roosevelt.

With the President behind him, the Navy quickly saw the possibilities in polar exploration.

In the 1905/06 season, the Secretary of the Navy sent Peary to seek the North Pole, saying "Our national pride is involved in the undertaking, and this department expects that you will accomplish your purpose and bring further distinction to a service of illustrious traditions." A sledging season with unusually wide leads in the ice pack prevented Peary from reaching the pole that season.

Again with the active support of President Roosevelt, he set out in 1908 for Greenland. After establishing base camps and wintering-over, he set out for the Pole with Matthew Henson and several Eskimos. By Peary's calculations, he reached the Pole on April 9, 1909 and returned to fame and controversy. Eventually, Congress appointed him rear admiral in the Civil Engineer Corps in recognition of his accomplishments.

What sort of a man was Peary? Peary's diaries and letters show him to be a tough, individualistic driver who was extraordinarily dedicated to a goal that dominated his life. While he had doubts and concerns for the hardships that his life's work caused for his family, he never deviated. One reads of Peary for a study in grit: this was a man who lost all his toes to frostbite in 1894 and still walked to the North Pole, 15 years later when he was 54 years old.

FRANK C. MAHNCKE
Naval Surface Warfare Center

Donnelly, Christopher. *Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War*. Janes Information Group, Ltd., 1988. 288pp. $52.50

The primary strength of *Red Banner* lies in the insights it provides on the underlying forces, motivations, and dynamics which act to shape the Soviet military forces and their doctrines.

Christopher Donnelly is the Director of the Soviet Studies Center at Sandhurst. One of his key premises is that the Soviets view war differently than we in the West do. Hence, he opens his book with a section called "Molding the Soviet Military Mind." He writes that "we may all share the same human features, but we possess them in different measures, and we develop different values depending on our experience and our circumstances. If this can be said of individuals, then it can also be said of nations and equally, of armies." In this section he focuses on the environmental, historic, national, military, cultural, and political factors that create the "lenses" through which Soviet

officers view both the West and the issue of warfare. It is here that Donnelly builds the reader's understanding of the "raw" forces that shape the rest of the military. (For example, the lack of terrain features in much of the U.S.S.R. cause the Russian officer to seek other means to protect himself and men, hence the strong Soviet emphasis on deception or camouflage.)

The following section, "The Soviet Military Infrastructure," examines the place of the military in society, its structure, the development of its doctrine and its training. He places emphasis on the education of officers and the impact of the general staff.

Donnelly's final section brings all these factors together in "The Soviet Art of War." After he discusses the development of Soviet Military Art and its current state, Donnelly presents a view of the how the Soviets would try to fight a war today.

Some of the points advanced by Mr. Donnelly are:

- The remarkable consistency of Soviet military doctrine. Although lessons from modern technology have been integrated, so have many from the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War. In fact, the basic doctrinal structure retains much of Czarist, Leninist, and Marxist origins.
- The Soviet Military is essentially a cadre mobilization system, much like the Israelis. Consequently, the Soviets can, with relative ease, transfer divisions currently maintained at a high readiness state to a lower state without making fundamental changes to their military structure.
- The Soviets see Nato's emphasis on the tactical development of lower level commanders as building very expensive chess pieces, while they focus on developing the best chess masters possible. Thus, even if Nato achieves tactical victories, the Soviets plan to win at the strategic level.
- With the General Staff concept, the Soviets have achieved their own form of "jointness," since an officer's promotion as a General Staff officer is based on his success in that role, and not necessarily on the views of his parent service.
- The Soviets would not use nuclear weapons even when an offensive was "bogged" down. The most likely use would be in response to Nato nuclear actions. But even a Nato "nuclear demonstration" might be ignored if the Soviets were close enough to victory.

Red Banner presents a comprehensive, overall look at the Soviet military structure today. Then, through the depiction of the underlying forces, *Red Banner* also gives the reader a framework to interpret what is happening during the current period of change. Donnelly does all this in a readable and understandable form.

CHRIS STASZAK
Lieutenant Commander
U.S. Naval Reserve
Portsmouth, Rhode Island

Nelsen, Harvey W. *Power and Insecurity: Beijing, Moscow and Washington: 1949-1988.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub. Inc., 1989. 165pp. $25

Now that we are in the last decade of the twentieth century, with events in the international arena spinning out of control, and with historic and seemingly fixed national alignments changing like the winds, Harvey Nelsen's *Power and Insecurity* is a most welcome book. In 178 pages, Nelsen, a former U.S. government intelligence analyst and author of the *Chinese Military System*, attempts to explain the Sino-Soviet dispute in terms of national security parameters.

Starting out his work as a history of a bilateral relationship, Nelsen quickly found that "at every turn, U.S. policies intruded on my attempts to fathom Sino-Soviet bilateral relationships, thus the book became a triangular analysis." Examining this triangular relationship, Nelsen's analytical tool is the theme of "power and insecurity." Nelsen concludes that the key to understanding the Sino-Soviet relationship is neither ideology nor economics. It is, instead, a focus on national security interests and threat perceptions that drive the actions of these two nations and thus shape their relationship.

Since the publication of *Power and Insecurity*, domestic events in both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have moved dramatically. Given these events, however, Nelsen might have drawn different conclusions concerning the roles that ideology and economics play in forming the external relationships of the two nations.

Rather than being minor factors, as Nelsen contends, ideology and economics define the national security interests of the Soviet Union and China. In the Soviet case, Mikhail Gorbachev has been driven by an economic situation that has become the most severe threat facing the Soviet Union today. For the Chinese government, the events of Tiananmen Square have led the communist party leadership to view the trend toward Western-style liberalization as an ideologically based threat to national security.

In both cases, it is domestic factors that constitute the basis for the threat to national security and thus the major force shaping the bilateral and triangular relationship.

Nevertheless, Nelsen provides a sound background from which we can better understand the dynamic Sino-Soviet relationship. In the potentially turbulent years ahead, it would do us all well to improve our understanding of the operation of one of the most important trilateral relationships in the world. In this sense, anyone interested in U.S. national security would profit from reading this book.

MICHAEL T. BYRNES
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College

Huang, Ray. *China: A Macrohistory*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1988. 277pp. $24.95

In the spring of 1989, the blossoming of the prodemocracy movement and its brutal suppression by the Beijing regime drew worldwide attention and underscored the difficulties of bringing about change in China.

Those who seek historical insights into why reform is so hard to implement in contemporary China would do well to read Ray Huang's *China: A Macrohistory*. Huang, a Ming dynasty (1368-1644) specialist who has taught at several U.S. universities, has produced a concise, readable, interpretive history of China.

Huang's thesis is that China's vast territory and enormous population shaped and constrained the evolution of Chinese politics, economy, and society. China's huge size dictated that a mystical political authority and patriarchal social system—the sociopolitical system of Confucianism—buttress the thinly stretched state apparatus. Furthermore, management of this large agrarian society required that simplicity and uniformity inform the organization and activities of the state.

The need for homogeneity had several ramifications for the polity. First, political power and correctness emanated from the top—the emperor—downward to the peasantry, mediated by a bureaucratic class schooled in ideological correctness. Political authority was unitary and unidirectional.

Second, in political life, form often superseded content. Higher levels of authority tolerated nominal compliance in implementing policies, as long as lower levels made the correct motions of obeisance. Such tolerance was necessary to carry out uniform policies over a vast nation, but over time also resulted in the failure of reforms and the decline of central government power.

Third, the bureaucracy, trained exclusively in the reigning sociopolitical orthodoxy, never developed the technical skills necessary to address the increasingly complex practical problems that began to face China in the 18th and 19th centuries.

Fourth, the state viewed the polity as a collection of villages of small-scale peasant farmers, and based its policies on this simple ideal. No effort was made to break up the cellular nature of the village economy or to develop a national economy beyond the needs of the taxation system. The development of countervailing local interests, institutions, or a legal system that might challenge the political and economic structure was precluded.

As a result, size, Confucianism, and the agrarian-bureaucratic management system made China "mathematically unmanageable" and inhibited efforts to change China. Dynasties fell when the existing taxation and military systems became unable to support

the superstructure of the state, and thus the state lacked the resources to govern and defend the nation. New dynasties reconstituted the state, revived the economy and taxation system, and reinforced the Confucian social system, but remained unwilling and unable to effect the necessary reforms to make China "mathematically manageable."

Yet, Huang contends, beginning with the onslaught of the West in the 19th century, China has been shifting from its outdated agrarian-bureaucratic management to the system of "monetary management" that characterizes modern nations. Monetary management is the application of commercial principles to the governance and economic life of a nation, whether it be capitalist or socialist. Huang believes that China's move to monetary management is irreversible. He maintains, nevertheless, that the strength of the legacy of the past, as testified by the difficult and protracted course of the Chinese Revolution, means that this change will be slow and will experience reverses, contradictions, and readjustments.

China: A Macrohistory offers an excellent analysis of the logic of Chinese history to specialists and nonspecialists alike. Huang's concise volume, however, may leave some readers hungering for more details on contemporary China. Those concerned principally with issues related to national security, therefore, should read this book for background, and consult other works on the People's Republic of China. Finally, in light of the riveting events of the spring of 1989 and the conservative backlash thereafter, Huang's optimistic conclusion that China is well on its way to becoming "mathematically manageable" by modern standards seems premature.

ROXANE D.V. SISMANIDIS
The Library of Congress
Washington, D.C.

Handel, Michael I., ed. *Leaders and Intelligence*. Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd. 1989. 300pp. $12.95

"There are in any army, and for that matter any big organization, very large numbers of people whose existence is only remembered when something for which they are responsible has gone wrong."

When British Field Marshal Slim pointed this out in recounting his experiences in World War II, he was not specifically referring to the intelligence community. But his comment, included in the anecdotal and highly enjoyable essay by former head of British scientific intelligence, Professor R.V. Jones in *Leaders and Intelligence*, neatly characterizes one of the major themes of this collection.

Leaders and Intelligence contains nine essays which were originally delivered during three international conferences on Intelligence and Military Operations that were held at the U.S. Army War College

between April 1986 and May 1988. Each essay examines a historical case study relationship between either political or military leadership at the operational or strategic level, and the intelligence resources that were available and utilized. These relationships and the utilization of those intelligence assets are critiqued in light of the historical and contemporary lessons to be drawn.

As with any collection, there is difficulty in establishing a specific line of thought which flows neatly through to the end, but the editor's introductory essay, while putting forth personal views on the state of current leadership-intelligence relationships, also serves to provide an overview of the works that follow, and establishes a reasonable framework to support the volume as a coherent whole. The tone it sets, initially providing a not-so-subtle bemoaning of the unfortunate fate of intelligence officers in general, does, in the final analysis, give a balanced account of the problems and shortcomings of both sides of the leader-advisor relationship and presents sound arguments, evidence and principles to support the need for further attention on both sides to improve the way each does business.

The case studies selected for this collection vary both in aspect and in style, and cover nearly 200 years: Napoleon in the Jena campaign; German, English and American leadership in World War II; the Army-CIA-media clash during Vietnam; and American and Israeli actions in the Middle East.

"Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker," by Major-General (Res.) Shlomo Gazit, former Israeli Head of Military Intelligence, is a frank, pointed and remarkably revealing position piece. Using examples from recent U.S. and Israeli history, he provides a refreshingly non-American critique of events in the Middle East and the intelligence (and leadership) successes and failures that affected and sometimes precipitated them. He describes in stark and brutal detail how the abortive Israeli war in Lebanon, the occupation of West Beirut, and the resulting Phalangist massacre in the refugee camps were the result of leadership or intelligence failings.

Not only does *Leaders and Intelligence* provide historical lesson and elucidation, it also provides current, real-world examples of what can go right and what can go wrong in the complex environment of leadership-intelligence relations, and offers relevant suggestions for improving them.

R. WEYRICK
Lieutenant Commander
U.S. Navy
Naval War College

West, Nigel. *The SIGINT Secrets.* New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc. 347pp. $22.95

Anyone who is looking for the complete history of signals intelligence, as defined by the United States, will have to look elsewhere

than in this book. However, this is an interesting review of the start of modern communications intelligence (Comint), how radio came to be, and how some bright people realized early on that it would be important in war as a double-edged sword.

Nigel West is a bit stuffy. He is anxious that we know which school each of the early players in English Comint attended, from what acceptable profession they came and, in many cases, the excellent careers that followed. All of this is interesting to the real afficionado of intelligence, but it makes for heavy reading for someone interested in "just the facts." Happily, a good deal of what he says is, in fact, interesting from a military history point of view.

West maintains that the only really reliable intelligence in World War I and, even more so, in World War II, was Comint. Traditional human intelligence was largely ineffective. This was the result of many factors, including the Gestapo's effectiveness in Germany. He makes a convincing case for this, citing the number of agents that were "turned" and the tremendous damage their handlers did to the agents' unsuspecting employers. Unfortunately, he makes almost no mention of Electronic Intelligence (Elint), the other half of signals intelligence as defined by the United States, and its historically significant contribution to intelligence in both peace and war over the past half century.

West's description of how Comint played a major role in both world wars is first rate, but when dealing with more recent times the book becomes less detailed. It does have some new material, but does not describe in depth Sigint's role in the minor wars and incidents with which Britain and the United States have been involved since 1945, including Korea, Vietnam and the Falklands.

The author is confused over how the National Security Agency was formed, and the missions and roles of the various U.S. service cryptologic elements: the Naval Security Group (NSG); the Electronic Security Command (ESC) and its predecessor, the USAF Security Service (USAFSS); the Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOMM) and its predecessor, the Army Security Agency (ASA). For instance, ASA was not disbanded to form the Armed Forces Security Agency, forerunner to NSA, and I find it hard to believe that the Naval Security Group has responsibility for all U.S. communications security as its only mission.

West says that the shootdown of KAL 007, the Korean airliner the Soviets destroyed (claiming they thought it was a USAF RC-135), is proof that the Soviets lag behind the West in Sigint capability. I do not follow how he arrived at that conclusion. One isolated error is a bit much on which to make such a general and, I believe, erroneous assumption.

Still, this book should be required reading for all prospective commu-

nications officers and radiomen. Sections of it would also be good reading for war colleges and prospective commanding officers. It clearly illustrates that even the most sophisticated cryptologic devices can be defeated by users who are careless, lazy, or both, and what the appalling results can be.

The conclusion of the book is the story of a prominent cryptologist who, at the end of his career writes a book about that exact point, and is "hounded to death" by both NSA and the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) because they fear their targets will read the book, understand how we are reading their mail, and change their procedures. I have less faith than that in radiomen worldwide, and more faith than that in cryptologists: Radiomen on both sides are going to continue to make mistakes and cryptologists on both sides are going to continue to exploit them. Let us hope we make fewer significant mistakes than our competitors. This book may make some of us realize the potential penalties.

GUY G. THOMAS
Commander, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Greenville, Texas

Hayler, William B., ed. Turpin and MacEwen's *Merchant Marine Officers' Handbook*. Centreville, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989. 573pp. $50

The formal college education of a deck officer in the merchant marine is very similar to that of a naval officer for, among other things, by law, American merchant marine academies include enough courses in naval science to qualify their graduates for commissions as ensigns. In fact thousands of such graduates have served in the navy and some have reached flag rank.

Fresh out of their respective academies, then, the merchant officer and the naval officer are on reasonably common ground. But after five years or so, each would be quite uncomfortable—miserable even—if suddenly thrust into the other's work place, for the merchant mariner becomes more and more a mariner every year out of the academy, while the naval officer evolves into a remarkable composite: warfare specialist, sub-specialist, administrator, bureaucrat, diplomat, and mariner.

The editor of this book, William B. Hayler, has managed to succeed in both worlds. After a full career as a surface warfare officer, he earned his license as a master mariner and became a professor at the California Maritime Academy. The first edition of this handbook, written by Edward A. Turpin and William A. MacEwen, was published in 1942, nearly 50 years ago. The current edition is written not by two people, but by 24 who collectively have written 25 chapters and five appendices. Hayler himself is a major contributor. Most of the contributors are maritime academy graduates, though three are naval academy alumni who later did the additional

study necessary to advance to master mariner.

Some chapters are peculiar to the merchant service: containership operations, labor relations, tankers, ship's business, Coast Guard inspections, and so forth.

Many others would be useful to merchant and naval officers alike: piloting and navigation, collision avoidance, celestial navigation, steering gear, ground tackle, stability and trim, fire fighting, accident prevention, medical emergencies, and rules of the road, among others. Of course, there are none on strictly naval matters, such as formation steaming, battle station procedures, and protocol.

The first chapter, by Captain William F. Schill, is a beauty: "The Everyday Labors of a Ship's Officer." It is the common-sense, plan-ahead, know-your-gear, know-your-men stuff of which success is made. It could just as easily have sprung from the pens of Nelson or Nimitz.

Very much up-to-date, this entirely new text treats the shipboard use of computers, electronics, and inert gas systems, and deals with the problem of pollution. It provides instruction in the use of hand calculators to figure everything from great circle distances and course angles to fuel consumption.

The book is intended as a text for both the maritime academy cadet and the able seaman preparing to sit for his first license, and as a reference for the professional mariner who needs only to jog his memory.

The text appears complete, up-to-date, and accurate. What is not accurate is its title, which ought to be *Merchant Marine Deck Officer's Handbook*. But the editor can't be faulted for that; the title was selected for him nearly fifty years ago.

SAYRE A. SCHWARZTRAUBER
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Massachusetts Maritime Academy

"The winds and waves are always on the side of the ablest navigators."

Edward Gibbon
Decline and Fall
of the Roman Empire
(1776-1788)