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Making Space Defense Work

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earth. Although more sympathetic to the high grounders, Lupton doubts that a shield as permeable as a space-based ballistic missile defense system could significantly reduce the offensive capability of nuclear weapons. Space, he consequently concludes, will be one of four co-equal arenas in any war fought among the superpowers.

But such a hasty summary as this conceals much of Colonel Lupton's originality—that is especially clear in his use of naval analogies rather than the usual shopworn comparisons to air power. For example, to counter the argument that limited maneuverability and high exposure to attack render space stations unsuitable for military use, he likens them to the coaling stations that serviced 19th century steamships. Like the lightly defended coaling stations of yesterday, space stations would be easy targets for attack, but just as the coaling stations greatly extended the range of peacetime fleet operations, so would space stations permit the longer and more complex shuttle missions necessary to fully deploy space power. An admirer of Admiral Mahan, Lupton compares the ability to control passage through the near-earth regions of space to the priority that naval strategists give to dominating the relatively few searoutes over which the majority of vital resources flow.

Despite his fondness for sea analogies, Colonel Lupton is loyal to his branch of the armed services in his prescriptions for the management of military space. He believes that efficient planning, effective program

lobbying, and the command and control requirements of modern war, demand Air Force predominance. Mainly concerned with the force employment side of space doctrine, Colonel Lupton presents the case for Air Force organizational control briefly, almost as an afterthought. Already satellites and other space assets serve a wide variety of functions for a wide variety of military users. This has led, and will continue to lead to conflicts of prioritization and emphasis. Doubtless there will be those who, viewing the matter from different institutional perspectives, will wish to take issue with Colonel Lupton's position, both organizational and otherwise. Nevertheless, most readers will surely agree that as an introduction to an often poorly discussed subject, Colonel Lupton's book sets a high standard for clarity and cogent reasoning.

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Fenner, Milton A., Davis, Scott M., and Parmentola, John A. *Making Space Defense Work: Must the Superpowers Cooperate?* New York: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1988. 209pp. \$21.95

For those who are not intimately familiar with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the multitude of arguments and issues related to it, this book provides an easy-to-read and well organized summary of the more

important factors. It is comprehensive, well balanced, and manages to avoid becoming excessively entangled with detail, whether technical, strategic, or political. Yet, at the same time, it clearly delineates critical technical and strategic factors, such as number of units or performance capabilities, that are crucial to the subject at hand.

Making Space Defense Work begins with an examination of what has happened to the idea of deterrence in the past decade or two. Then it deals with SDI, assessing its ideas, its weapon systems, and the requirements that would be placed upon them. It looks into the concepts of a partial defense and of population defense and concludes with a discussion of strategic defense options. An appendix provides a succinct summary of space weapon capabilities and technical issues.

Fenner, Davis, and Parmentola have solid backgrounds in physics, strategic weapon systems, and defense policy. This text is the result of a project of the Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies. The authors were assisted by a panel of eminent defense technologists and strategic analysts, consisting of former leaders of the Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the U.S. SALT delegation.

The authors' perspective on the benefits of arms control agreements for the U.S. may surprise those who have not previously explored this subject carefully. Working through

the logic and evidence presented here could prove valuable and possibly an eye-opening experience. It clearly shows that this subject is complex and there is no simple "always right" approach to answers in this area, without regard to other factors. The impact of those other factors, such as cooperation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on strategic weapon systems, can completely reverse the benefit or harm to U.S. strategic interests that can be expected to result from a particular policy. Appreciation for these complex interrelationships is vital, especially for those of us in the defense community, because of the many simplistic, doctrinaire solutions proposed by advocates of various policies.

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Clayton, Anthony. *The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-1939*. Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1986. 545pp.

This is a detailed record of Britain's use of force by the army, navy, and air force—from display to action, from Aden to Zanzibar—as one means to maintain an empire. It is military history through the study of imperial technique.

The book deals with the restrained use of power. What the British did they did well, basing the system on force, but using it rarely. Nonetheless, Clayton shows, this was done at