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The SIGINT Secrets

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between April 1986 and May 1988. Each essay examines a historical case study relationship between either political or military leadership at the operational or strategic level, and the intelligence resources that were available and utilized. These relationships and the utilization of those intelligence assets are critiqued in light of the historical and contemporary lessons to be drawn.

As with any collection, there is difficulty in establishing a specific line of thought which flows neatly through to the end, but the editor's introductory essay, while putting forth personal views on the state of current leadership-intelligence relationships, also serves to provide an overview of the works that follow, and establishes a reasonable framework to support the volume as a coherent whole. The tone it sets, initially providing a not-so-subtle bemoaning of the unfortunate fate of intelligence officers in general, does, in the final analysis, give a balanced account of the problems and shortcomings of both sides of the leader-advisor relationship and presents sound arguments, evidence and principles to support the need for further attention on both sides to improve the way each does business.

The case studies selected for this collection vary both in aspect and in style, and cover nearly 200 years: Napoleon in the Jena campaign; German, English and American leadership in World War II; the Army-CIA-media clash during Vietnam; and American and Israeli actions in the Middle East.

"Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker," by Major-General (Res.) Shlomo Gazit, former Israeli Head of Military Intelligence, is a frank, pointed and remarkably revealing position piece. Using examples from recent U.S. and Israeli history, he provides a refreshingly non-American critique of events in the Middle East and the intelligence (and leadership) successes and failures that affected and sometimes precipitated them. He describes in stark and brutal detail how the abortive Israeli war in Lebanon, the occupation of West Beirut, and the resulting Phalangist massacre in the refugee camps were the result of leadership or intelligence failings.

Not only does *Leaders and Intelligence* provide historical lesson and elucidation, it also provides current, real-world examples of what can go right and what can go wrong in the complex environment of leadership-intelligence relations, and offers relevant suggestions for improving them.

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West, Nigel. *The SIGINT Secrets*.
New York: William Morrow &
Co., Inc. 347pp. \$22.95

Anyone who is looking for the complete history of signals intelligence, as defined by the United States, will have to look elsewhere

than in this book. However, this is an interesting review of the start of modern communications intelligence (Comint), how radio came to be, and how some bright people realized early on that it would be important in war as a double-edged sword.

Nigel West is a bit stuffy. He is anxious that we know which school each of the early players in English Comint attended, from what acceptable profession they came and, in many cases, the excellent careers that followed. All of this is interesting to the real aficionado of intelligence, but it makes for heavy reading for someone interested in "just the facts." Happily, a good deal of what he says is, in fact, interesting from a military history point of view.

West maintains that the only really reliable intelligence in World War I and, even more so, in World War II, was Comint. Traditional human intelligence was largely ineffective. This was the result of many factors, including the Gestapo's effectiveness in Germany. He makes a convincing case for this, citing the number of agents that were "turned" and the tremendous damage their handlers did to the agents' unsuspecting employers. Unfortunately, he makes almost no mention of Electronic Intelligence (Elint), the other half of signals intelligence as defined by the United States, and its historically significant contribution to intelligence in both peace and war over the past half century.

West's description of how Comint played a major role in both world wars is first rate, but when dealing with more recent times the book becomes less detailed. It does have some new material, but does not describe in depth Sigint's role in the minor wars and incidents with which Britain and the United States have been involved since 1945, including Korea, Vietnam and the Falklands.

The author is confused over how the National Security Agency was formed, and the missions and roles of the various U.S. service cryptologic elements: the Naval Security Group (NSG); the Electronic Security Command (ESC) and its predecessor, the USAF Security Service (USAFSS); the Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and its predecessor, the Army Security Agency (ASA). For instance, ASA was not disbanded to form the Armed Forces Security Agency, forerunner to NSA, and I find it hard to believe that the Naval Security Group has responsibility for all U.S. communications security as its only mission.

West says that the shootdown of KAL 007, the Korean airliner the Soviets destroyed (claiming they thought it was a USAF RC-135), is proof that the Soviets lag behind the West in Sigint capability. I do not follow how he arrived at that conclusion. One isolated error is a bit much on which to make such a general and, I believe, erroneous assumption.

Still, this book should be required reading for all prospective commu-

nications officers and radiomen. Sections of it would also be good reading for war colleges and prospective commanding officers. It clearly illustrates that even the most sophisticated cryptologic devices can be defeated by users who are careless, lazy, or both, and what the appalling results can be.

The conclusion of the book is the story of a prominent cryptologist who, at the end of his career writes a book about that exact point, and is "hounded to death" by both NSA and the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) because they fear their targets will read the book, understand how we are reading their mail, and change their procedures. I have less faith than that in radiomen worldwide, and more faith than that in cryptologists: Radiomen on both sides are going to continue to make mistakes and cryptologists on both sides are going to continue to exploit them. Let us hope we make fewer significant mistakes than our competitors. This book may make some of us realize the potential penalties.

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Hayler, William B., ed. Turpin and MacEwen's *Merchant Marine Officers' Handbook*. Centreville, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press, 1989. 573pp. \$50

The formal college education of a deck officer in the merchant marine

is very similar to that of a naval officer for, among other things, by law, American merchant marine academies include enough courses in naval science to qualify their graduates for commissions as ensigns. In fact thousands of such graduates have served in the navy and some have reached flag rank.

Fresh out of their respective academies, then, the merchant officer and the naval officer are on reasonably common ground. But after five years or so, each would be quite uncomfortable—miserable even—if suddenly thrust into the other's work place, for the merchant mariner becomes more and more a mariner every year out of the academy, while the naval officer evolves into a remarkable composite: warfare specialist, sub-specialist, administrator, bureaucrat, diplomat, and mariner.

The editor of this book, William B. Hayler, has managed to succeed in both worlds. After a full career as a surface warfare officer, he earned his license as a master mariner and became a professor at the California Maritime Academy. The first edition of this handbook, written by Edward A. Turpin and William A. MacEwen, was published in 1942, nearly 50 years ago. The current edition is written not by two people, but by 24 who collectively have written 25 chapters and five appendices. Hayler himself is a major contributor. Most of the contributors are maritime academy graduates, though three are naval academy alumni who later did the additional