

1991

## In My View

Kenneth C. Allard

Eugene V.L. Vogt

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

---

### Recommended Citation

Allard, Kenneth C. and Vogt, Eugene V.L. (1991) "In My View," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 44 : No. 3 , Article 9.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol44/iss3/9>

This Additional Writing is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu](mailto:repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu).

## IN MY VIEW . . .

*Editor's note: The "point-counterpoint" which follows refers to the lead book review in this month's issue.*

### **"Pilgrims Among the Heathen:" An Exchange**

From: Author, *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*

To: Editor

Subj: Review by Captain Wayne Hughes of this book

Part of the fun of writing a book that argues for the tighter integration of joint combat power is anticipating the reactions and counter-fire of a naval establishment which has traditionally viewed joint operations with all the pained ecumenicism of pilgrims forced to make their way among the heathen. Inter-faith perspectives have come a long way in the last few years, of course, but every now and then one gets a sense of just how deeply these issues run.

Notice, for example, the choice of words in Captain Hughes's review: "centralized command authority," "unlimited connectivity," "single unified service," and, worst of all, "the F-111." These are codewords for the old arguments about service autonomy, and, twenty-odd years after those events, naval partisans obviously have their own views of the F-111/TFX controversy. But codewords are hardly the best tools for a reviewer to choose, especially if he is trying to provide an even-handed analysis on which others can rely in making their own judgments.

So in fairness to your readers, let me clarify one point which is central to Captain Hughes's review: my perspective on the "question of command." My

book is really an argument for the fact that the most important thing about command is command itself, *not* its ill-named stepchildren: C<sup>2</sup>, C<sup>3</sup>, C<sup>4</sup>, C<sup>4</sup>I and all the rest. Closely related to that point is the fact that there is a natural tension in the way that command is exercised in different organizations and at different organizational levels. That tension, which is certainly present within service boundaries as well as between them, strongly suggests that one size really doesn't fit all.

My argument is also that we really don't need a "single unified service:" balanced, well-integrated, joint forces with flexible, interoperable command and control will do quite nicely. The trick is to figure out *who* needs to speak (or exchange data) with *whom* about *what* in order to accomplish the joint mission—a common-sense process that I refer to as the "baseline of interoperability." But no final answer on the interoperability issue is likely to emerge until we get a better handle on the more central problem of joint doctrine, an effort that began in a serious way only in the aftermath of Goldwater-Nichols. Fortunately, our understanding of these principles is certain to be enriched by the lessons of Operation Desert Storm, where combat integration across service boundaries was a key to victory.

Finally, I appreciate the generally favorable tone of Captain Hughes's review, his recommendation that naval officers should read the book, and better yet, his implicit suggestion that they should buy it. On that basis alone there are grounds for absolution. After all, sir, I was a captain once myself.

C. Kenneth Allard  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army  
Alexandria, Virginia

From: Reviewer of *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*  
To: Editor  
Subj: Same as Above

I wrote long before Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and so I'm glad to have the chance to add a postscript. As the detailed returns of what went right and could have gone wrong now roll in (the Navy's Tactical Training Group Pacific briefed here yesterday with lots of both), it is well to keep a little perspective.

The major lesson of the Gulf War on command and control is the obverse of the one that is the root source of all the frustration over C<sup>2</sup> issues that were vented after 1973. The lesson is this: when the nation is blessed with a president and a secretary of defense who play their proper roles (unlike in the Vietnam War) and with a chairman of the JCS and a unified commander who are allowed to play theirs (unlike during Vietnam), if we have congressmen who are restricted

to *their* proper role in the prosecution of a war, and a press corps which has less of an axe to grind, then we have established the basis for overcoming the deficiencies of organization and interoperability that will always exist to an extent, and which despite Goldwater-Nichols surfaced again in the prosecution of the Gulf War. This is so whether we define the war as having lasted seven months, forty-two days, or 100 hours.

That having been said, Kenneth Allard may be proud of his part in fostering Goldwater-Nichols. I am glad to say I think we conducted the war more professionally under the new legislation, and I believe our reluctant dragon, the U.S. Navy, has learned that jointness is here to stay and ought to be.

Wayne Hughes  
 Captain, U.S. Navy  
 Monterey, California

### **U.S. Policy, Democracy, and Latin America**

Sir,

In his article "U.S. Policies Toward Latin America: Much Room for Improvement" (Spring 1990), Captain Jorge Swett states that U.S. policies towards that area are perceived as ill-defined, too broadly implemented to be effective for these diverse nations, and poorly communicated as well. Latin Americans in general, and their governments in particular, feel tossed about by the gusts and gales of policy that blow south from Washington. They find it tough going to stay on a steady course, for they must often seem either becalmed or beset by squalls, often on the basis of thirty seconds on the nightly news.

Few Latin Americans have much exposure to our culture, and to the speed with which public opinion here forms and changes. The multitude of issues that concern the U.S. government and people must be addressed in our foreign policy. President Bush has enunciated the broad basis of these policies in the booklet "National Security Strategy of the United States," March 1990. The vice president's travel schedule also reflects the heightened importance placed on the Latin American region. This is exactly the kind of concrete definition, implementation, and communication of policy that Captain Swett's article recommends. This should help provide a steady base for the growth of regional cooperation and harmony.

In the president's policy statement, the main theme for the Western Hemisphere is the continued growth of democracy. This is stated to be the best way to achieve collective security, social peace, and economic progress. Captain Swett writes to say that the U.S. should reward free market-based economies in

the same way it now seeks to reward democracies. There is no doubt that Chile would have politically benefited from this viewpoint over the last fifteen years. Beyond that, however, Captain Swett does have a real and valid point. Cuba was nominally a democracy before the rise of Castro, but the populace felt all the elections were farces anyway. The people were not empowered to change anything by having an election, and turned to a charismatic political outcast with guns. Also, if the Latin Americans can achieve free elections and democratic government throughout the region, on what basis will these populaces vote? With many governments already having a decidedly socialistic bent, what are the odds that some will follow the Roman model and vote themselves bread and circuses till their economies collapse? And how can the U.S. avoid the suffering and economic threat such events could cause?

Chile has soundly demonstrated the ability of Latin Americans to manage successfully a market-oriented society. Costa Rica has demonstrated the ability of Latin Americans successfully to manage a stable democratic government. The U.S. must work with each country in the region to help it achieve a responsible, representative, and successful government that meets the needs of its people and culture without threatening the U.S. We must encourage and aid sound business practices, as we strive to develop professional apolitical militaries to defend duly elected governments. We must realize that the triad of success is nutrition, health, and education, and help our neighbors achieve these goals.

Captain Swett points out the need for exchanges, education, and professional embassy staffs to improve our communications within the region. One of the issues that we face in our relations may already contain the seed of the cure. The "silent invasion" of the U.S. by millions of Caribbean, South and Central Americans in search of a better life is changing the demographics of this country. It will eventually, relentlessly, change the tempo and tone of our foreign relations in Latin America. As with each other wave of immigrants, our culture will grow stronger, more diverse, and perhaps even a little more compassionate.

Eugene V.L. Vogt  
Ensign, U.S. Coast Guard  
Governors Island, New York

---

ψ

---