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Seapower and Strategy

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or of those caught in the middle." As such, one might expect it to be a simplistic and sophomoric piece of work; instead, it is a stimulating book of unexpected scope, covering how wars start, how they are fought, and how they end.

The authors are distinguished political scientists, and both have intelligence experience. They demolish many currently fashionable illusions about war. Their book is the kind that one wishes could be forced into the psyches of every American political leader, policy maker, academic, and social commentator. If that could be done, one would expect the quality of decisions that impact America's future to be improved dramatically.

The text is filled with an abundance of judicious and enlightening historical and contemporary examples that reveal much about the nature of war, some of which, as Americans, we must consider highly embarrassing because they point up our dumb decisions so clearly. The book begins with the meaning of war (later treating the concept of a "just war") and of "peace." It addresses the causes and justifications put forth for past wars. It explores the political and material conditions (weather, terrain, logistics, technology, etc.) of battle, and how the fog of war affects battle. Requirements to win on land, at sea, and in the air (including space) are discussed with the panache of a Clausewitz or Machiavelli; also covered are military operations in the nuclear age. The often neglected topics of political warfare in both large and small wars, and

intelligence operations and special operations as well, also receive attention. The authors conclude with considering what outcomes are desirable after a war and how they might be achieved.

For most military specialists, much of the material in this book will be familiar. However, there are a number of interesting and not so well known historical tidbits. In addition, this is the kind of book one wants to know personally so that it can be recommended to friends, students, and others who don't seem to comprehend how important the study of war is for real and lasting peace.

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Gray, Colin G. and Roger M. Barnett, eds. *Seapower and Strategy*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1989. 383pp.

This is the book I was looking for throughout my year as a student at the Naval War College, and have been ever since. What Colin Gray and Roger Barnett have done is combine history and strategy into a cohesive whole—so that, for once, the past really is prologue, the present is understandable, and the future has some direction. They do not do it alone, which makes the book even better.

The work is built around ten themes that are worth summarizing here.

- The natural condition of the land is to be politically controlled.

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- The natural condition of the sea is to be uncontrolled.

- States seek to control the seas in order to affect what is happening on the land.

- The principles of war, the lessons of strategy, and the manner of combat as these have been developed in the context of land warfare should not be carried over uncritically into maritime strategy or warfare.

- The offensive is the stronger form of combat at sea.

- Land power must contend with more “friction” than must sea power.

- Sea powers and land powers throughout history often have had great difficulty in reaching the enemy’s center of strategic gravity to force a favorable decision.

- Sea powers and land powers place strategic confidence in their respective traditional military instrument of excellence.

- Over the course of history many countries have maintained large armies, but those that have built and provided for large navies number ten or fewer.

- The United States is a highly unusual case of a continental-size and, effectively, strategically insular, sea power.

The book, after a statement and discussion of these themes in the Introduction, is, like all of Gaul, divided into three parts. Part I is aptly called “The Basics,” and contains three chapters. (All chapters are individual essays.) In the first, Colin Gray lays out the fundamental differences between sea powers and land powers, the dif-

ferences they have engaging each other decisively, and some solutions to these difficulties. John Gooch revisits the concepts of sea power from the perspectives of Mahan and Corbett in Chapter 2. He seems to prefer Corbett (could they both be English?). The third essay is a brilliant piece by Wayne Hughes on the impact of technology and tactics on strategy, both historically and currently. This may seem to some out of place alongside with the other two, but it is worth remembering that the capability to win battles is fundamental to a successful strategy. With these three chapters the stage is set for a walk through the past.

Part II consists of seven essays addressing maritime warfare from the Peloponnesian War through World War II. Barry Strauss covers Athens and Sparta, Al Bernstein looks at maritime strategy in the Punic Wars, Alberto Coll discusses the wars between England and Spain at the end of the sixteenth century, Robin Ranger covers the protracted series of Anglo-French wars from the late seventeenth through the early nineteenth centuries, Williamson Murray examines naval power in World War I, and, in the last two chapters Jeffrey Barlow deals with the Atlantic and Pacific campaigns of World War II. I found Part II the best individual section of the book. The essays appear to have been written specifically for the context of this book. Each provides a historical survey of its respective war and a strategic analysis as well. It is from these

strategic analyses that the ten themes of the book seem to be drawn.

Part III carries forward from the end of World War II to the present. Colin Gray kicks off by discussing the role sea power plays today in the defense of the Western alliance. In the following chapter Roger Barnett contrasts this with Soviet maritime strategy. Barnett with Jeffrey Barlow, provides readings of declassified and unclassified U.S. Navy documents addressing naval strategy from the end of WW II to the present. It is a wonderful chapter that illustrates both the continuity and the durability of U.S. naval thinking over those four decades. In Chapter 14 Barnett attempts to treat the dichotomy of maritime and continental strategies as a matter of emphasis, i.e., as complementary not competitive matters. In the last chapter Gray and Barnett combine to summarize themes and offer some pointers for the future.

This book is the most thorough and well-balanced discussion recently published of the complex issues surrounding the relationship of sea power and strategy. Thankfully it makes no attempt at force-building or sizing naval forces. It is about the utility and nonutility to a nation of effective naval forces, whatever the composition of those forces might be. This book is for the serious reader, but not solely for the professional strategist; there is much for the general public to make use of as well. Indeed Part I, "The Basics," makes an excellent primer for the novice, while the "Contemporary Maritime Strategy"

discussions of Part III will challenge the national security specialist. "Strategy and History" in Part II keeps everybody honest.

The Maritime Strategy of the U.S. Navy (or, as some call it the Maritime Component of the U.S. National Strategy) that emerged in the 1980s has a thousand fathers, but Roger Barnett is one of the few with a legitimate claim to that relationship. Both he and Colin Gray have been in the forefront of the defense of that strategy for some time. This book is clearly the capstone of that defense. But it is much more, because it is not so much about *the* Maritime Strategy as it is about maritime strategy. Therefore, it belongs on the desk of every war college student and every fleet planner, and in every Washington office with responsibility for national security affairs. I would wager that Admiral Chernavin has already read it.

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Cable, James. *Navies in Violent Peace*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 155pp. \$45

Navies in Violent Peace is a summary and update of Sir James Cable's many writings on naval diplomacy. With five books and numerous articles on the topic, Cable is the most prolific and perhaps the most insightful authority on the role of navies in peacetime. To a great extent, this new volume represents the collection of his wisdom, and is therefore both an excellent