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Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power

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powerful warships about once a year on peripatetic tours." Which style of deployment is more effective is a question that should have been developed more fully.

While certainly worthy of its audience, there are certain flaws in this book that are probably more apparent to its American than its British readers. These flaws are the result of the author's reliance on *The Times* (of London) as his primary and often sole source for details of current operations, whereby journalistic exaggerations are used to buttress his theoretical arguments. For example, discussion of the costs of long deployments and limits upon naval reach elicits the comment that "in 1980 the nuclear-powered carrier *Nimitz* managed 100 days at sea in the Indian Ocean, but discipline suffered among her crew." This reviewer "managed" around 120 days in the *Ranger* in the following years but saw no such extraordinary discipline problems. Of course, Cable's favorite source for American naval theory is the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, "in spite of some stylistic eccentricities . . . a journal of the highest standards." Who are we to disagree?

A particularly strong area of the book is a discussion on piracy and terrorism at sea; Cable concludes that the maritime nations are not doing enough to suppress piracy in Southeast Asia. In contrast, the U.S. Navy's capture of the terrorists of the *Achille Lauro* is portrayed as a successful employment of naval force in a situation with considerable potential

for political conflict. The final chapter, on naval arms control is the weakest, but perhaps this simply reflects the ambiguity of the topic. As Cable points out, treaties affecting navies can always be interpreted vaguely. The Soviets now openly refer to the *Kiev* as an "aircraft-carrying cruiser," yet it passes through the Montreux Convention-controlled Dardanelles without Turkish protest. So much for treaty restrictions on warships.

Since *Navies in Violent Peace* is the latest and best *brief* treatment of the peacetime role of navies, it should be sought out and read. Unfortunately, it is expensive for only 155 pages. However, the book's brevity and its need for more detailed American source material should only encourage the author—and perhaps some among its readers—to attempt a more definitive version.

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Hattendorf, John B. and Robert S. Jordan. *Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 373pp. \$55

There is more to the dust jacket of this book than meets the eye. Bernard F. Gribble's fine oil painting "The Arrival of the American Fleet at Scapa Flow, 7 December 1917, being Greeted by Admiral Beatty and the Crew of HMS *Queen Elizabeth*"

symbolizes the great links that Britain and the United States have enjoyed, and continue to enjoy, as sea powers. After years of hostility, and two wars (the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812), these great sea powers on either side of the Atlantic have held together the balance of power against continental world power aspirants. Taken together, their naval histories have much in common as do their maritime strategies, which in these years of Nato have become one. The purpose of this collection of essays is to examine the similarity in the Anglo-American perspectives of great-power maritime strategy and of the role of navies in maintaining a balance of power.

To a large degree the purpose of this book has been fulfilled. The work contains some truly brilliant contributions from the brightest and the best who concern themselves with such things. The first chapter belongs, appropriately, to the late Norman Gibbs and is a reissue of his classic "Origins of Imperial Defence," an account of the organization of defence planning by imperial Britain to 1914. John Gooch and Robert S. Jordan follow, with studies of how Britain organized for war and for peacekeeping. Taken together, these three chapters form a minihistory of British planning for security on and over the seas. Robert S. Jordan, in his preliminary statement of the book's purpose, questions whether Britain and the United States could ever have complementary maritime strategies: "In truth," he writes, "there never has been room

enough in the world for coexisting British and American empires, a simple balance of power relationship and so, although logically there should have been intermittent warfare between the two English-speaking maritime Powers, no war has occurred since 1812." This is a curious way of explaining the complementary interests of the two powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: it is a maxim of world history that the Royal Navy allowed the Monroe Doctrine to be as successful as it was in Latin America in the nineteenth century; in addition, as statesmen in London and Washington knew, the business of the two powers was peace for the purpose of profit. The peaceful settlements of the Oregon, Texas, San Juan, and Alaska boundary disputes are examples enough of this.

The fact of the matter is that the two powers had more in common with one another than has been admitted by their diplomatic historians, and even by their maritime strategists. But Captain Mahan knew this, and thus the collection of chapters on maritime theory in the twentieth century (on Mahan, Corbett and more recent thinkers including Wylie, Rosinski, and Eccles) shows the similarities of the two countries in their basic theoretical understanding of the broad uses of sea power. Here our best thinkers on these matters—Barry Hunt, Donald Schurman, and John Hattendorf—cover the waterfront; Hattendorf's more recent perspective is significant in that it lays down some operating principles for

sea powers in times of war *and* in times of peace, the latter almost always forgotten in the rhetoric of statecraft, or dismissed in a simple line.

The third part of this book addresses the topic of "Anglo-American Rivalries and Coalitions." It contains useful essays (all of them starting points for more extended treatment, I should think) by Paul Kennedy, Kenneth McDonald, Malcolm Murfett, and Marc Milner. This is the core of the book, not because it is comprehensive (for it is not) but because it suggests the larger theme that our editors had in mind. Britain and the United States had interests in the security of the seas in common; strangely enough old national rivalries frequently stood in the way of their cooperation, an age-old and ongoing story that has lessons for the future. The last section is entitled "Planning for a Future War in the Nuclear Age." It contains essays by Eric Grove and Geoffrey Till on Anglo-American strategy in the era of massive retaliation (to 1960) and by Joel Sokolsky on the same for the era of flexible response (since 1960), on fleet renewal and maritime strategy in the 1980s by Robert Wood, and a concluding summary by Hattendorf and Jordan which says it all: "It is still a wise admonition to choose one's allies wisely and to conserve one's enemies carefully."

This book was well worth doing, and is a credit to its editors and the publisher. It will long be the source that strategists and naval theorists refer to for collective wisdom on the

themes of maritime strategy and, to a lesser degree, alliance politics. In future, whether in times of war or peace, students of international affairs would do well to remember that seemingly contending rivals have a lot more in common than meets the eye, and that partners in maritime preeminence can hold together the Trident of Neptune.

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McLaurin, Ronald D. and Chung-in Moon. *The United States and the Defense of the Pacific*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989. 353pp. \$45

This is a systematic and generally positive politico-military analysis of the security posture of the United States in the Pacific basin. Starting from the premise that the U.S. has been a Pacific power for more than two hundred years, it advances a careful argument that the present U.S. employment of significant political, economic and military resources to defend the present Pacific order is both necessary and appropriate. Although the authors recognize that the massive American investment in Pacific security has allowed Pacific states to focus their resources on other issues, they maintain that the security of the Pacific is no longer dependent upon U.S. actions alone. Regional security must be and is dependent upon the full participation of all