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Strategic Choices and Emerging Power Centers in the Asia-Pacific Region

Claude A. Buss

I

For forty years, the United States has based its policies and strategies in Asia and the Pacific on the assumption that our overriding interest in that region was the containment of communism and/or the Soviet bloc. The costs have been substantial—in lives, dollars and spiritual malaise—but the rewards have also been great. Our own security has been preserved; our friends and allies have prospered; and our adversaries are in disarray. Our basic values are universally respected and envied; the pursuit of communism has led only to disappointment and disaster.

Our choices for new strategies must not rest solely on the premises of the Cold War, but must reflect our concerns with the conflicting interests of *all* the nations and peoples who lie at the geopolitical heart of the Asia-Pacific region.

I prefer to characterize the changes in process in the Asia-Pacific region as “emerging power centers” rather than “emerging multipolarity.” Japan and China—possibly Korea and Australia—are emerging powers, but they are not “poles” around which their neighbors would cluster for protection. I see three power centers—Northeast Asia, China, and Southeast Asia—simply as geographic areas in which each resident nation is striving for its

Dr. Buss has extensive experience in Asian-Pacific affairs. From 1929 to 1935 he served in China as a member of the foreign service, and in 1940 he became the Executive Assistant to the U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines. During World War II he was interned by the Japanese in Manila, transferred by them to Tokyo in 1942, and repatriated to the United States in December 1943. Subsequent government service took Dr. Buss to Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Since 1976 he has been adjunct professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

own place in the sun. An effective American strategy must pay attention to the weak as well as the mighty.

In choosing new strategies, we must of course continue to concentrate on the role of the Asia-Pacific region in the global challenge of the Soviet Union to our security. Without endangering that primary obligation—and in light of all the changes that are taking place in the strategic environment—we can seek new opportunities to encourage genuine independence on the part of the former Soviet satellites; elicit more understanding and cooperation from the non-aligned; contribute to the settlement of disputes among our friends; and address differences with our allies without fear that arguing for our own position will drive them into the arms of an adversary. If we have the good sense, we can parlay all our assets—military, diplomatic, economic and political—into a stronger edifice for enhanced stability and lasting peace.

In analyzing the emerging power centers in the Asia-Pacific region, we must keep uppermost in our minds that we are dealing with sovereign nation-states. They have their own interests—usually expressed in some fashion similar to the preamble of our Constitution: “a more perfect union, justice, the common defense, domestic tranquility, the general welfare, and the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.” Priorities will differ from state to state, depending upon particular problems and immediate needs. Every nation-state has “no permanent friends and no permanent enemies; only permanent interests” and will shift tactics and strategies to accomplish its own objectives. We cannot dictate to nations with whom we deal. We will influence them where we can, compromise where useful, and coexist in peace when our differences are irreconcilable.

II

In examining the emerging power centers of Northeast Asia, China, and Southeast Asia, I shall rely upon historical roots to indicate future trends. I shall select those historical highlights that I consider most helpful in contributing to the solution of current regional conflicts. I shall ask such questions as: which nations are involved; what are their vital interests; whom do they now perceive as friend or foe; and what are their problems in relations with the United States?

Northeast Asia, where the interests of four major powers meet and sometimes clash, is that part of Asia where a local conflict would be most likely to blaze into a global conflagration. But mounting evidence of the comparative strength of ourselves and our allies—and of the inherent weakness of our adversaries—indicates that we have a broader range of options for maintaining our own security than we have previously been willing to consider.

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Soviet territory extends through eleven time zones from the Polish border to Vladivostok, but Siberia only became important to Russia geopolitically when the railway from Moscow reached the shores of the Pacific in 1890. Siberia is vast, rich in resources, but, lacking capital, underdeveloped. Its climate is too rigorous for significant population growth. Of every ten European Russians who emigrate to eastern Siberia, eight go back home. In spite of all this, and its isolation, the Soviets' eastern Siberia military district has been built into a formidable base of operations. Any international agreement on arms control must ultimately deal with Soviet assets in Asia as well as those in Europe.

Gorbachev has given every indication that he intends to safeguard the position of the Soviet Union as a Pacific and Asian power. In his talk four years ago to the people of Vladivostok, he announced that, without exception, the U.S.S.R. would invigorate its relations with all countries in the region. At Krasnoyarsk in 1988, he put forth seven proposals to improve security throughout Eastern Asia, including an offer to give up the Soviet's material and technical supply station in Cam Ranh Bay if the United States agrees to eliminate its military bases in the Philippines. His pronouncements may be only for public relations, but they impact upon all of Asia. They call for an appropriate American response.

Across the Sea of Japan from Vladivostok lies Japan, the strongest power with its home base in Northeast Asia. Long the enemy of Russia and the Soviet Union, it is now the linchpin of the U.S. defense position in the Pacific region. But it has not always been that way.

Although Japan boasts an ancient culture, it is a comparative newcomer in the Western state system. *Glasnost* began in Japan with Commodore Perry in 1853, and *perestroika* with the Meiji Restoration in 1868. In the ensuing decades Japan based its security on an industrious, disciplined people, a strong army, a consistent continental policy and, between 1902 and 1922, an alliance with Great Britain.

Following the victory over the Russians in 1905, Japan adopted an aggressive course that propelled it into dominion over Korea, a couple of invasions of China, an alliance with Germany and Italy, and the tragedy of World War II. Japan was determined to create a co-prosperity sphere on the rubble of the old European East Asian empires and staked its "destiny for a hundred years" on the war of greater East Asia.

After defeat, and occupation, Japan was forced to rethink its place in the world. The vital interests of the nation remained constant: survival, laying a new foundation for the prosperity of its people, and rekindling the glory of the nation. But Japan's tactics—its policies and its strategies—changed 180 degrees. It entrusted its security to the United States, and looked to a strong economy to accomplish what had eluded its military leadership.

Throughout the Cold War, Japan never completely accepted the American perception of the communist threat. Japan cooperated with us in the Korean War (for its own benefit) and subsequently normalized its relations with South Korea (with our prodding). Japan tailored its policies toward Taiwan and the PRC to accord with our whims. But Japan opposed the American crusade in Vietnam and stayed as far away from us as possible in our global commitment to containment.

As of now, Japan still regards the Soviet Union with deep animosity. Japan has ended the state of war with the Soviet Union but has not as yet concluded a treaty of peace. Now regarding the U.S.S.R. as an adversary rather than an enemy, Japan will negotiate as long as necessary over such issues as the "Northern Territories," mutual exploitation of the resources of the sea, and economic assistance for the development of Siberia.

Now that the Cold War is fading, the hopes for continued peace and stability in Asia depend in large measure on the health of the U.S.-Japan connection. Our common purposes, whether or not embodied in a formal alliance, must not be allowed to suffer because of differences of opinion.

Although Japan devotes almost all its attention to economic rather than military matters, it concedes the importance of the military factor in comprehensive security. In the shelter of Article IX of its constitution, Japan has built up its "Self-Defense Forces" to take care of the immediate demands of home defense. Japan has as many destroyers as the Seventh Fleet and more tactical aircraft than deployed by the United States in Japan, Korea and the Philippines combined. Its defense budget is larger than all the defense budgets of greater East Asia put together. Its neighbors would panic if Japan's 1 percent of the GNP for defense were to be increased to the 14 percent of the U.S.S.R. or even the 6 percent that is spent by the United States. It is by no means sure, however, that the proud young men of a later generation will be satisfied to leave the protection of their divine land to allied forces in Yokota, Masawa, Sasebo and Yokosuka. The controversy over the FSX affords a slight glimpse into the future.

When airing our respective positions on defense and economics, we and the Japanese on occasion seem to be talking past one another. We say, "No more free ride," and they respond, "Take care of your deficits." For every Japan-basher in the United States, there is a Japanese counterpart who laments the decline of American power. We say, "Open up your markets," and they respond, "Stop meddling in our internal affairs." Former Ambassador Mike Mansfield has pointed out that the U.S.-Japan relationship is probably the most important in the world, and in the final analysis, when we consider the strategic choices before us, we must not lose sight of that fact.

In spite of its regional predominance, Japan alone cannot prescribe the patterns for peace, stability and progress in Northeast Asia. Japan must eventually come to terms with the growing power of Korea, no matter how

much they dislike and distrust one another. Since the days of the Nixon-Sato communiqué, we and the Japanese have agreed that peace on the Korean peninsula is a vital interest of both Japan and the United States. Korea is the home of a distinct people with a common language and a rich culture. Ascending the throne of the Hermit Kingdom (as it was called) one hundred years before Columbus discovered America, the Yi dynasty lasted until driven into exile in 1910. In its latter days it accepted a tributary relationship with its neighbors, the Manchus, who ruled the Chinese Empire from Peking.

With its isolation shattered by Meiji Japan, Korea was ushered into the Western state system, primarily as a result of the initiative of an American naval officer, Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt. It became a pawn of global diplomacy until 1910, when it was absorbed into the Japanese Empire. The spirit of independence was kept alive by underground Korean patriots at home and by exiles in Russia, Manchuria, China and the United States. Their dreams became possible with the outbreak of World War II. Hopes of independence spread to the Korean masses, who were further embittered by four years of forced participation in a losing war.

At Cairo in 1943, the Allies declared that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent." At a conference in Moscow at Christmastime 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed upon plans for a provisional government for liberated Korea. Then the destiny of Korea became hopelessly entangled in the Cold War. The struggle between conflicting factions in Korean domestic politics was subordinated to the upstage quarrels between the Soviets (backing Koreans in the north) and the Americans (backing Koreans in the south). The inevitable result was the war of 1950 between the "forces of freedom" (as we billed ourselves) and the communists (the North Koreans, the Soviets and their new allies, the Communist Chinese).

An armistice was concluded in 1953. The PRC and North Korea signed for the communists, and the United States signed for the United Nations. South Korea refused to sign, claiming that the continuing stalemate was no guarantee for its national survival.

Since that armistice thirty-seven years ago, changes in Korea have occurred that need to be considered in reassessing our strategic necessities. North Korea, still a Stalinist-style state armed by its allies, seeks reunification on its own terms. South Korea, backed by the United States and dedicated to democracy and free enterprise, also seeks reunification, but likewise on its own terms. As long as the two armed camps face each other eyeball to eyeball at the 38th parallel, the possibility of global war will lurk in the shadows.

Not much in the direction of peaceful reunification can be expected from the North. It is a closed society, an economic basket case, and a political graveyard for human rights. It has no friends in the outside world to whom it could turn for economic assistance. Its military numbers are favorable, but

its allies are in no mood or condition to condone any reckless military adventure.

In contrast, the South is in a favorable position to lead from strength in the interest of improved relations. Its armed forces are formidable, making up with quality what they lack in numbers. Its economic strength is unbelievable, although it suffers from the usual difficulties between management and labor, the rich and the poor, the countryside and the burgeoning municipalities. The government of South Korea still needs to achieve a working balance between the executive (including the armed forces) and the legislature; between the requirements of social order and the demands for human rights—as seen in the frequency and violence of student demonstrations. In foreign policy, the South has depended (perhaps too much) on the United States. With the achievement of economic success, South Korea is now energetically reaching out to the entire world, including even its late enemies, the PRC and the Soviet Union.

It is perhaps the United States and South Korea, together and in consultation with Japan, that can take the most significant steps toward reducing tensions in Northeast Asia. It is important that we cooperate, whether or not we continue our alliance in its present form.

We need to address our economic differences and strengthen those interlinked economic and defense ties essential to mutual understanding. We should reexamine the outmoded military provisions of the 1953 armistice. It is good that we are moving our headquarters (including the golf course) out of Seoul. Such moves are essential if we are to halt the growing anti-Americanism in the south. But why wait until 1995? Our national security may no longer require all or even any of the Second Division on Korean soil. Not even to satisfy the psychological needs of the Koreans would I sacrifice a single American soldier as a “trip wire,” ostensibly to symbolize our credibility. Our record provides ample evidence that we live up to our commitments.

The disillusionment of both the Soviet Union and China with their North Korean ally increases as they are wracked by reform and reaction. Kim Il-Sung cannot be sure that he wants any glasnost or perestroika at home. His own position grows shakier every day. He is old and his son is an untested leader. His ridiculous ideology contains no promise of economic or democratic progress. More North Koreans are aware of their predicament as they are allowed to travel abroad or to have access to outside TV and radio broadcasts.

As North Korea sinks deeper into difficulty, it offers us an opportunity to consider a new approach to our Korean problems. Under no circumstances will we abandon our interests in Korea, but perhaps we can strengthen our security by stepped-up political actions. Whether South Korea approves or not, we can confer with other outside powers on confidence-building measures that would strengthen deterrence. We can deal with North Korea

with at least as much flexibility as South Korea and the Soviet Union show in dealing with each other. Peace on the Korean peninsula is in everyone's interest.

III

China is equally involved in the strategic configuration of Northeast Asia, but when I look at that country's demographic charts, I am not nearly so alarmed by its potential power as I am by the size of its problems. Can any aggregation of government officials keep the country from falling apart, provide food and jobs for a billion people, and reconcile the conflicting necessity of preserving the social order with the recently capped (but not absent) demands of human rights?

China has a gripe against modern history, having suffered a century of decline until that fateful 1 October 1949, when Mao Zedong told a million screaming Chinese in Tienanmen square, "*Wa men chi lai la*" [we have stood up]. The communist victory in the civil war held out the promise of recovery from years of suffering at the hands of Japan and the West. When Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang fled to Taiwan, the communist leadership proceeded to restructure China in the image of its Stalinist model.

The basic interest of the communist regime was, as far as possible, to satisfy the basic needs of the Chinese masses. The party commanded the government and the armed forces, while various individuals and factions waged a constant struggle for control of the party. At any one time, a small clique of leaders set the guidelines for national development. The right to rule was based on rigorous thought control and occasionally on horrendous purges.

Economic policies zigzagged through assorted stages of social experimentation until Deng Xiaoping emerged with his four modernizations—agriculture, industry, science and technology, and the military—as the bedrock of his policies of reform. Ideology was cast aside when Deng announced, "It does not matter if the cat is black or white as long as he catches the mice." China inched its way past central planning towards a modified free market economy.

The path of change was painful—two steps up and one step back. Rapid growth brought inflation and spiritual pollution. Popular resentment against official abuse and discrimination led to demands for political reform. The armed forces chafed against their loss of prestige while journalists, teachers, students and workers joined in demands for freer enjoyment of human rights. At one time, the party permitted big letter posters and the "Democracy Wall." More recently, it tolerated fraternization between soldiers and demonstrating students before the brutal massacre at Tienanmen square.

China is superbly confident in its management of foreign affairs. It looks upon foreign policy as the servant of domestic policy rather than vice versa.

It denies aggressive designs against anyone and fears no attack from any outside power. Neither its new navy nor its missile program is necessarily evidence of aggressive intention. It seeks an alliance with none and friendship with all. It wants no more than help wherever it can find help, and the right to sell anything and everything wherever it can find a market.

For the first twenty years of its communist existence, China was the ally of the Soviet Union. It was the Asian anchor of the communist bloc and the co-supporter of communist wars of liberation, especially in Southeast Asia. But by 1969, the Chinese and the Soviets were at one another's throats in Northeast Asia.

On 15 May 1989, Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping signed an agreement in Beijing once again normalizing their relations. They reaffirmed their endorsement of the principles of peaceful coexistence. They reached a common understanding with regard to Vietnam and Cambodia, the reduction of military forces on the border (including Outer Mongolia), the peaceful settlement of border disputes, expansion of trade, and denial of hegemonic ambitions. They welcomed the relaxation in the international situation and took a positive view on steps to reduce arms and scale down military confrontation, as well as the progress achieved in settling regional conflicts.

China's policies toward the United States have varied inversely with its policies toward the U.S.S.R. Until the Nixon visit to Beijing in 1972, the United States and the PRC were on opposite sides of the Cold War. Relations were normalized under President Carter in 1979. Since then we have extended substantial military assistance to China, made heavy investments in China, provided China with much-desired high technology, and reached acceptable understanding with regard to Taiwan. China is not happy about American trade regulations, and the United States is uneasy about Chinese arms sales to warring nations along the Persian Gulf. Although without tangible effect, President Bush has expressed his displeasure over the tragic events in Tiananmen square. At least for the moment, good relations between China and the United States are on hold.

China has also normalized its relations with Japan. It has built up an enormous trade with Japan, and willingly accepted Japanese advice and investments. The two nations carry on an extensive cultural exchange program. China is still touchy on anything reminiscent of Japan's actions in World War II—such as the textbook controversy¹—and it would register violent protest if Japan were to over-militarize or to build nuclear weapons.

Neither we nor the Soviets will have much influence on China's search for its own security. The problems of Hong Kong and Taiwan, Vietnam and Cambodia, and India and Pakistan will be solved exclusively by China and the parties directly involved. I recognize that the domestic situation in China could explode at any time, but for the moment, at least, China seems to be stable.

IV

In contrast to China, Southeast Asia is a power center that cannot be identified as a single pole. Southeast Asia is a convenient expression for a region in which ten sovereign nations pursue their individual national interests. Every one of them, except Thailand, is an emerging power in the sense that it gained its independence only as a result of World War II. None of them is primarily concerned with the Cold War—or any war. I think they would be very happy if the outside powers would exclude Southeast Asia from their security calculations.

The great regional concerns of the United States in Southeast Asia are to oppose the spread of communism; to maintain its military position, particularly the bases in the Philippines; and to keep open the lines of communication between the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the western Pacific. To accomplish these objectives, it must deal separately with every single nation.

Two situations challenge us to reassess our current strategic stance in Southeast Asia: the possible normalization of relations with Vietnam, and the renegotiation of our mutual security agreements with the Philippines.

The normalization of relations with Vietnam is primarily an American decision. Vietnam has told its friends and neighbors that it wants the Americans back, and has given many signals that it would welcome such a move. Hanoi has toned down its anti-American propaganda and has given assistance to American delegations in search of MIAs or missing POWs. It has opened its doors to Americans who wish to visit.

The Australians and Indonesians think that a positive approach toward Vietnam is advantageous as an offset to the ominous Chinese presence in the region. Malaysia and the Philippines are indifferent, and Singapore is reconciled to the possibility of U.S.-Vietnamese reconciliation. Thailand has at last come around to accepting Vietnam as a peaceful neighbor in Cambodia. The prime minister of Thailand personally invited Hun Sen, the prime minister of Vietnamese-occupied Cambodia, to Bangkok for friendly visits.

In the aftermath of the Vietnamese War and the broken peace of 1972, the American government has remained aloof from Vietnam. As expressed by one ambassador who dealt with the North Vietnamese negotiators for many months, "I want nothing to do with a people whose only word is 'no.'" The underlying assumption is that the Vietnamese are unreconstructed communists, deserving all the suffering they now endure. The Vietnamese are branded as thoroughly ambitious, determined to extend their sway over neighboring Laos and Cambodia. Furthermore, they are seen as proxies for the Soviet Union—a cover for Soviet expansion into the southern oceans. Therefore, the conclusion is that it is not yet time to change existing policies.

Other arguments suggest an opposite conclusion. The Vietnamese excursions into Cambodia and Laos do not constitute conclusive evidence of an aggressive intention, because plenty of provocation existed in both cases. In any event, much of the Vietnamese army of occupation is reported to have left Cambodia. It cannot be assumed that Vietnam covets control of all of former French Indochina. Vietnam will be satisfied as long as there is a friendly government in both Phnom Penh and Vientiane. Nor can it be assumed that Vietnam is a proxy of the Soviet Union. With nowhere else to turn for help, the Vietnamese gladly accepted the offers of the U.S.S.R. Of course, a suitable price had to be paid. But a nation that has fought a thousand years to preserve its independence from China, and has fought to victory against France, Japan and the United States, will not stay subservient to the Soviet Union any longer than absolutely unavoidable.

Help to Vietnam might hasten its opportunity to regain independence and to weaken its communist bonds. A rehabilitated Vietnam could become an accepted member of a reconstructed ASEAN. It could assist in making that organization a more effective agency for regional peace. Diplomatic recognition of Vietnam would not solve American problems with Vietnam, but it would give us another locale in which to continue our negotiations. An embassy in Hanoi would certainly enhance our intelligence and information-gathering capability.

Our second critical situation in Southeast Asia covers the whole gamut of relations with the Philippines. The problems of supporting democracy, strengthening counterinsurgency, improving the armed forces, providing economic and military assistance, renegotiating the bases agreement, and reviewing the mutual defense treaty of 1951 are all strands in a single diplomatic pattern.

It is easy to consider the people's revolution of 1986 as "restoring democracy" because it destroyed the superstructure of martial law. It brought back the excitement of popular elections, but with it came the old rule of graft, guns and goons. Democracy Philippine-style leaves much to be desired, but as Churchill said, the democratic system is still the best there is. Cory too is the best there is, in integrity and devotion to public service. I think our government has been justified in giving her unequivocal and enthusiastic support.

In strengthening the Philippine battle against the so-called "communist insurgency," we are guilty of some questionable assumptions. There is not one insurgency; there are many. Some are communist-led and communist-inspired; many are not. Kalingas in northern Luzon and Muslims in Mindanao have nothing in common except their state of insurgency against the powers that be.

It is wrong to equate the New People's Army (NPA) with the total communist movement. It is only the armed branch of the communists, numbering by best guesstimates in the neighborhood of 20,000 persons. Their

quality is often shown in TV presentations. Some NPA are well-disciplined ideologists providing their districts with an alternative government. Others, perhaps the vast majority, are different. Their only creed is to shoot on sight anyone who happens to get in their way.

The biggest segment of the communist movement, perhaps the most dangerous from the long range point of view, is the National Democratic Front, the mass base of as many as 5 million "fellow travellers." These are the representatives of students, teachers, workers, jeepney drivers, liberation priests and nuns, and the unemployed, whose social protests are rooted in the poverty in which they are obliged to live. To win them from communism, to prevent them from going over completely to the insurgents, will demand a great deal more from the government than a military victory over the NPA.

So much of our well-intentioned economic and military assistance is so misused that it turns out to be more harmful than helpful. Once it gets into Philippine territory, it is beyond our control. Father Bolweg, the leader of the insurgents in northern Luzon, once said to an American, "You tell your president to keep the guns coming in. He is our only source of supply." Many of our assistance projects are never completed: countervailing funds are not forthcoming, and our own supplies disappear before their benefits can reach down to the poor for whom they were intended.

Reforming the armed forces of the Philippines is often a discouraging business. Their military goal is victory over the insurgents; ours is to make a fighting machine that would be credible even in the event of a war against an outside aggressor. American supplies and training are generously given but indifferently received. The result is a military establishment lacking in morale and professional spirit. The officers are faction-ridden and prone to set up profitable rackets on the side. Nobody likes the bloody business of fighting the insurgents, least of all the wretchedly paid enlisted men. President Cory has survived a half dozen attempted military coups, and the charismatic coup leader, Colonel Honasan, is still on the loose.

Our most immediate and most serious problem with the Philippines is the renegotiation of our entire security relationship. The Philippine government may recognize the importance of a U.S. military presence in the Philippines, but at an ordinary cocktail party or reading the daily press, you would never know it. Our critics say we want the bases for our designs of coping with Soviet power in distant places, or for the more efficient utilization of nuclear power. They say that no other nation in Southeast Asia would put up with an alien base in its homeland, and that the whole region would be better off if it were a nuclear weapons-free zone or a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. Most Filipinos do not concede that the U.S. military is helpful to them in combatting the conditions that have given rise to communist insurgency.

The Philippines will never drop its argument over adequate rent. President Quezon was willing to consider "rent-free use of the bases," but that was

long ago. I travelled the length of the Philippines before the last bases review, and I never heard a single voice that would drop the argument for adequate rent. Compensation was the *only* issue in the 1988 batch of negotiations. The demands of responsible officials ranged from a minimum of a billion dollars a year to assumption of the entire \$28 billion debt. Senator Dole's assertions that "we too can play hardball" and "we will not be blackmailed" hoist a clear signal of stormy weather ahead.

A realistic phaseout could be five years or ten years, but as one responsible official told me, "You must be prepared to take a lot of abuse and to pay through the nose." We will have to decide whether the game is worth the candle, i.e., how much we will be willing to spend to preserve the present strategy of forward deployment.

The greatest obstacle of all to a new agreement is a Filipino demand that a new bases agreement not even be discussed without at the same time discussing a new assistance agreement based on cash; a new security agreement incorporating the obligation of automatic response and the same conditions of alliance that are now in the Nato treaty; and that the whole body of agreements be combined in a single document, to be ratified by the senates of both the United States and the Philippines. Insistence on such terms as these would, in my view, kill the negotiations before they begin.

V

In conclusion, I would like to quote Andrew Marshall and Charles Wolf, who observe that "what is most needed in the next few years is more thinking about the nature of the multipower world that probably lies ahead, more imaginative description of the likely behavior and strategies of the other major powers, and clearer formulation of the new plausible scenarios and contingencies to be considered."²

They add that "problems will increasingly arise in regions about which we know relatively little. For the longer term, programs are needed to recruit young analysts, and provide them with language training and the opportunity to develop knowledge of Japan, China, Brazil, India and other future regional powers, in addition to their functional and analytical expertise."³

Notes

1. In 1982 and 1986 China and South Korea objected to official efforts in Japan to soften the treatment in school history texts of Japan's aggressive role in Asia, especially the war-time atrocities.

2. "Sources of Change in the Future Security Environment," paper submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy by the Future Security Environment Working Group (chaired by Andrew W. Marshall and Charles Wolf), (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, April 1988), p. 20.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

This article is adapted from a speech delivered by Professor Buss to the Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College on 14 June 1989.