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"Why the Soviets Violate Arms Control Treaties," and "Nuclear Weapons, Policies and the Test Ban Issue"

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As specific confidence-building measures that may actually help reduce tension and suspicion, Admiral Hill offers advance notification of naval exercises, the delineation of exercise areas, and the presence of observers. He feels that an atmosphere of confidence would be helped by a more "measured" explanation of the U.S. Navy's 1986 Maritime Strategy and less emphasis on its "gung-ho" offensive nature.

Admiral Hill concludes, however, that the control or limitation of naval armaments is not the main issue, but really a diversion. First of all, the arbitrary removal or limitation on numbers of naval forces would be highly difficult to put into effect. Secondly, and most importantly, such limits would not contribute to security. If naval forces did not exist, Hill states, "some other means would have to be found to settle disputes." In fact, history suggests that the presence of maritime forces has actually contributed to the containable and nonescalatory resolution of crises.

Some criticisms are in order. This book is not very readable. The indirect style makes it difficult to grasp the message the first time around.

Secondly, an American audience will not find in Hill's analysis the most important current issue, namely, the impact and meaning of Gorbachev's "smile diplomacy" and the superpower debate over naval forces in arms negotiations.

Thirdly, while the book's consideration of all naval powers, especially France and Britain, provides a broad perspective, it makes Hill's text sound a little like Arms Control for Medium Powers. The focus of attention in arms control must always be on the biggest guys on the block and what their decisions imply for the global military balance.

Nonetheless, Arms Control at Sea provides an excellent gauge with which to measure the progress of this debate. As Gorbachev pursues his agenda and offers more and more tempting proposals—and as START and other arms negotiations gain momentum—an understanding of the pros and cons of naval arms limitations will be of increasing importance to all of us.

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It is often recalled that the celebration of apparent triumph should be tempered with caution. In the triumphs of the ancient Roman conquerors, a dwarf was specifically assigned to ride beside the great hero, whispering of his mortality. In this way, the exultant leader would not be swept by the euphoria of the
moment into believing that he was immortal, or his great deed irreversible. Considering the apparent success of the INF Treaty and the stated willingness of the current Soviet regime to consider meaningful arms control, it is important that potential national security decision makers receive similar periodic warnings concerning the permanence or effectiveness of arms control agreements. Following SALT I we learned it is easy to be led by the euphoria of the moment into believing that there has been a profound change in the effectiveness of agreements.

Although written prior to the INF agreement and the gathering momentum of glasnost, these two books play the important role of skeptical counsel. Each explores a particular aspect of the dilemma inherent in American-Soviet negotiations: how to get a totalitarian state with an expansionist ideology to respect treaty restraints on its military development. The effects of the political asymmetries are compounded by ideological and technical factors often overlooked by optimistic advocates of arms control. While the ideological factor is the focus of Dr. Douglass’s study of Soviet arms control strategy, the team of Van Cleave and Cohen explicates and simplifies the technical aspects of the most persistent arms control proposal. Both volumes are well researched, logically argued and persuasive.

Since Leninist ideology has always condoned cheating the bourgeoisie, the answer to Joseph Douglass’s title is obvious. The Soviets “cheat” because they consider such action as a significant element of their diplomacy. It is not only condoned, it is required. Under Leninist ethics, any act that undermines the capitalists and advances Soviet control is necessarily moral. Mix this code of un-ethics with the passion for deception and intrigue that pervades the Russian tradition, and the greater question becomes: Why does the Soviet government cheat inconsistently? According to Douglass’s research, which relies on interviews with Soviet emigrés, Soviet restraint is due to a combination of caution and calculation. The Soviets plan to take advantage of Western faith in the sanctity of treaties. However, having learned from experience, such as the Cuban missile crisis, the Communist Party knows exactly how far to push.

Douglass’s emigrés know the Communist Party, since they are former members of high standing, and willing participants in deceptive actions. Universally they agree that the Soviet regime has developed an active plan to distort, defy, or simply disregard arms control treaties to which the West will continue to adhere. What surprises these witnesses is not that the Soviets place so little faith in treaties, but that the Western alliance refuses to countenance the possibility that it is being misled.

Exploring the clues and impressions of the former cadres, Douglass finds that all the paths of Soviet logic
return to ideology and that the ideology simply cannot withstand equitable, lasting agreements with democratic states. In response to calls to reduce defense expenditures due to the utter improbability of an American attack, a Soviet General responded "If we accept your theory, where is the basis of our ideology and propaganda?" Douglass concludes that the Soviets must cheat to demonstrate support for the Leninist ideology of continuous conflict with the capitalists. And without that ideological base, there is no legitimacy for the one-party state.

Under such logic, Douglass can provide few recommendations for Western diplomats except to expect the Soviet regime to violate any agreement that cannot be enforced by strenuous sanctions. Douglass’s call is for "safe" arms control—agreements whose violation would not place Western defenses in jeopardy. However, the book is more basic research than policy pronouncement. Based on a study originally compiled for the U.S. government, the work allows decision makers—and readers—to draw their own conclusions. Retaining a portion of its governmental study format, the book concludes with a risk assessment for future policy decisions and five supporting appendices from corroborating experts.

William Van Cleave was the only expert to testify against the SALT I Treaty during the euphoric days of its ratification hearings, so it is not surprising that his study finds considerable flaws with the ongoing proposal for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. His collaborator, physicist Samuel Cohen, is frequently referred to as the "father of the neutron bomb," having played a major role in designing the weapon President Carter was pressured into discarding. Despite holding what might be considered "hawkish credentials," the authors have produced a balanced study that carefully outlines the advantages of continuing a modest test program for nuclear weapons. Even a committed advocate of arms control (as opposed to disarmament—a much different objective) would find portions of their argument persuasive. The guiding assumption is that despite the rhetoric of conventional modernization, Nato will continue to rely on theater nuclear forces to deter war. It would be irresponsible, the authors argue, to rely on an aging, untested deterrent. With a total ban on nuclear testing, the deterrent effect of Nato's nuclear weapons will eventually erode as probable opponents find the threat of using untested, possibly unreactive weapons less than convincing.

Supporters of the concept of mutual assured destruction might argue that any nuke—whether aged or untested—would prove a sufficient disincentive towards war. However, as Van Cleave and Cohen point out, the technical challenges of detecting very low-order nuclear detonations—tests sufficient for modernization, but difficult to distinguish from seismic
phenomena such as earthquakes—are such to tempt determined violations. Since the Soviet Union remains a closed society, especially in the realm of weapon development, the possibility of "cheating" is largely one-sided. If one party continues to modernize its arsenal while the other eschews testing, the eventual outcome is a destabilizing advantage that would make aggressive action more likely. Van Cleave and Cohen cite reports indicating that the Soviets may have already violated the 150-kiloton limit of the current Threshold Test Ban Treaty, an unratified yet presumably mutually observed agreement. Even an organized on-site inspection program would have difficulty detecting a well-planned series of tests.

While Van Cleave and Cohen conclude with the same pessimism of the Douglass study, they recognize the power of arms control euphoria to ignore the likelihood of violation. They also recognize the role of skeptical counsel as a lonely one.

Summing the ideological objectives identified by Douglass with the technical objections elucidated by Van Cleave and Cohen, the open-minded reader may be converted to caution. Converted or not, readers of both books will come away with a greater understanding of the complexity of arms control: a complexity that dispels the euphoria of a momentary success.

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What do Soviet leaders really want? Beneath the protective veneer of censorship and propaganda, what long-term goals explain Soviet behavior in world affairs?

Ronald R. Nelson and Peter Schweizer answer such questions by letting the Soviets speak for themselves through representative quotations from over 350 articles and books by Soviet spokesmen, from 1972 to early 1987. They reject the view that the Soviets are mere cynics, proceeding instead on the assumption that some hard, ideological core of shared beliefs must give shape and substance to Muscovite public statements.

Again and again, Nelson and Schweizer document the Soviet assertion that the expansion of socialism brings peace, while the defense of capitalism causes war. Thus, "peace requires the extinction of capitalism and the class system on which it is based." Soviet authorities attribute détente between these two rival systems to the rising might of the Soviet bloc—rather than to Western goodwill or a mutual desire for peace—and they proclaim that a major goal of "peaceful coexistence" is to assist the national liberation movement and all other forms of the world revolutionary process.

Nelson and Schweizer do cite a few cases in which especially anti-