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Pacific Microphone

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shortest casualty lists as a myth. Most serious are Falk's charges that MacArthur's self-interested attitude inhibited the development of unity of command and a unified, better strategy against Japan.

Unlike Falk's, most of the other chapters are infected with hero worship. Donald Goldstein of the Air Force Academy calls USAAF General Ennis Whitehead a "genius," which is rather extravagant given that he was working for General George Kenney, whom Herman Wolk identifies as the "first among equals"—and this in the theater that distinctly did not have first call on either materiel or men. The authors of chapters on ground generals (Walter Kreuger, Thomas Blamey of Australia, Robert Eichelberger) also admire their subjects. So do those dealing with the admirals (Thomas Kinkaid and Daniel Barbey). For the most part, the sketches deal with events that long ago were competently covered in official publications. Little is told about what made these leaders the men that they were, nor about how they managed their relationships with MacArthur. Except for the chapter on Whitehead, which contains many mistakes, all are well edited and all are supported by good documentation and bibliographical essays.

If one desires a comprehensive understanding of the Southwest Pacific campaigns, the official histories and many others are better sources than this book. For a comprehensive understanding of what made

MacArthur and the men around him tick, then some of the MacArthur biographies, particularly that by D. Clayton James, are to be preferred—even if they take more time to read.

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Dunn, William J. *Pacific Microphone*.
College Station, Tex.: Texas
A&M Univ. Press, 1988. 399pp.
\$19.95

The wartime memoirs of military and naval commanders, alas, too often are defensive in tone, dreary in style, and wanting in human-interest stories. On the other hand, the reminiscences of many war correspondents are rewarding as vivid, anecdotal, you-are-there reading. It would be difficult to find a finer example of the latter genre than *Pacific Microphone*. William J. Dunn was the first editor of CBS News and represented that network as its senior radio news correspondent in the Pacific War. In his book, which is based on his personal papers and diaries as well as on his broadcast scripts of the era, Dunn graphically describes his wide-ranging itinerary of 1941-1945, principally in General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific theater (and, in a brief epilogue, during the first six months of the Korean War).

Dunn's assignments during the Second World War took him from Chungking to Melbourne and from Rangoon to Guadalcanal and

included all the major operations of MacArthur's American and Australian forces from the conquest of Papua to the liberation of Luzon. Probably no person, civilian or military, was personally present at more of the epochal happenings in the war against Japan than Dunn, who reported by radio on events from the China and Burma fronts as well as from the operations on Southwest and South Pacific islands. His experiences were rich in the drama, glory, and horror of war, and he tells of his odyssey with an eye for detail and humane perceptiveness that marks the writing of a master war correspondent at his best.

Dunn left the United States in January 1941 on a supposed ninety-day tour of radio facilities in the Far East for future CBS needs in covering the expected expansion of hostilities in that area. He would not return to America, as it turned out, until after witnessing the Japanese surrender ceremony on the battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay in September 1945. In the meantime he had gotten to know a number of American and Allied senior officers, notably MacArthur, who early took a liking to the amiable, portly correspondent. Their friendship grew, and MacArthur invited Dunn along for many of the historic occasions of the war in the Southwest Pacific, such as the general's return to Leyte. Dunn would be at the general's side again in late 1950 during MacArthur's reconnaissance flight above the Yula River. It is not surprising that Dunn

ends his work with a blast at Truman for relieving MacArthur in 1951. Dunn also has high praise for General Robert Eichelberger, head of the Eighth Army, though sometimes at the expense of his able counterpart, General Walter Krueger of the Sixth Army. He strongly defends Admiral Thomas Kinkaid's leadership of the Seventh Fleet, especially in the Leyte Gulf actions, but, oddly, throughout the books he spells his name "Kincaid."

Though a minor error in itself, such misspelling unfortunately reflects a general carelessness in proofreading throughout, thus allowing historical errors as well as typographical ones. General Yamashita, for example, is mistakenly placed in command of Japanese operations on Bataan in 1942 as well as in charge of the Japanese defenders on Leyte in 1944. Regrettably, too, Dunn's likes and dislikes among American and Allied officers frequently seem to be linked to the kind of cooperation received from them or their headquarters staffs in setting up field interviews or in working out the many and varied problems of the relatively primitive broadcast facilities of that time.

The book is excellent for its type, but Dunn could have made it better in two rather simple ways. First, he should have focused on his personal experiences, particularly in radio broadcasting, instead of covering a multitude of topics wherein his knowledge was sometimes indirect. Second, there is little indication that after World War II he kept abreast

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of the ever-growing literature and revelations about the leaders and events of the Southwest Pacific world in which he had been enmeshed in 1941-1945. He apologizes in his preface for occasionally using the term "Jap," but in a sad way that usage typifies much of his knowledge and interpretations that need updating.

Dunn's book cannot be considered a contribution of great relevance to the national security community of today, but *Pacific Microphone* provides fascinating, on-the-spot observations by a veteran correspondent widely esteemed by his peers. And the reader of this book is likely to agree with Dunn's bottom-line conclusion: it was "an unhappy era" and a "cruel and bitter war."

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Day, David. *The Great Betrayal: Britain, Australia and the Onset of the Pacific War, 1939-1942*. New York: Norton, 1989. 388pp. \$19.95

In this thoroughly researched study of Britain, the Dominion, and the onset of the Pacific war 1939-42, Australian scholar David Day examines the period in which his country's colonial mentality and Britain's misleading assurances led to the "Battle for Australia," when that country lay almost unprotected before the conquering Japanese.

Day, author of the earlier *Menzies and Churchill at War*, bolsters his research at Churchill and Clare

Colleges with published and unpublished official documents, private papers, memoirs, contemporary letters, and secondary works. But this is a work of revisionist Australian war history that makes little allowance for the mindset of Prime Minister Robert Menzies' generation of Australian leaders. Day depicts the prejudice in London against Australian origins, accents, and manners. The various causes of bitterness between London and Canberra are carefully researched, but the nobler side of the wartime prime minister, whose broadcasts revived the failing courage of millions of Europeans, gets short shrift. There is little indication of the indomitable courage and the prophetic insights of Churchill as he stood against Hitler. A few maps of the shifting European and North African fronts during the period encompassed would have helped the reader to better understand the balance between the war theaters.

Fourteen chapters trace the progression from Australia's insouciant attitude to its realization, before the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway relieved the pressure, of its dire vulnerability. The 1930s, a time when the concept of the "mother" country led naturally to the expectation of protection, gave way to the Australian discovery that, for Britons, imperial interests and the protection of India—the "jewel in the crown"—were to take precedence over the protection of Australia. Britain was not only unprepared for war but misjudged the coming